acqaintance of the Hon. Stephen B. Cushing, the Attorney-General, and S. H. Hammond, Esq., the Deputy Attorney-General. Mr. Cushing wrote a letter to Mr. Busteed, authorizing him to make a motion, in behalf of the Attorney-General, to the Supreme Court to "set down the argument for Wednesday, the 20th inst." On Thursday, the 14th February, Judge Roosevelt adjourned the Supreme Court for " one week." Mr. Busteed would have made the motion on the following day, but for this circumstance. On Friday the 15th, I called at the special term room of the Supreme Court where I saw Justice Davies (?) in one of the apartments, Judge Roosevelt and Judge (?) Peabody in another, and Judge Clerke in another! After the adjournment, I had a conversation with Judge Roosevelt, and as he could give me no idea of what was to be done on Thursday, the 21st, (to which time the court had adjourned,) I am sure that I cannot foretell. I do know, however, that Judge Beebe told Mr. Busteed, my "private counsel," on that same day, that he (Beebe) should argue the case for Carlin, and that he would take every advantage that might arise, as to the legal right to act, of those who claim to be the Judges of the Supreme Court. So it seems that Beebe (who was no longer the counsel for Carlin ") has again been engaged by Carlin, or his "private counsel." What is to become of Stoughton and Clinton, whose names are printed upon the "yellow-covered book" as counsel for the defendant?" Is it not a shame that Carlin should discard them, after their having so ably defended him on the trial?

66

"Blow, blow, thou wintry wind,

Thou art not so unkind

As man's ingratitude.

Thy tooth is not so keen,

Because thou art not seen,

Although thy step be rude.

CHORUS. (Indicative of the extreme ungratefulness of Mr. Thomas Carlin, as exemplified

by his treatment of his legal backers.)

Heigh-ho, sing heigh-ho unto the green holly,

Most friendship is feigning, most loving mere folly."

When Recorder Smith denied the "motion in arrest of judgment," on the 7th January, I thought I was "out of the woods," and I then put my manuscript into the hands of the printer, supposing that by the time the type was set, I should be able to add. to this publication, the final settlement, of the principle that I have been contending for; but, as the Court of Appeals may have to decide the question, "Who are the legal Judges of the Supreme Court?" the Lord only knows when I shall be able to do that.

Under these circumstances, I have concluded to end the work, and give the facts to my friends and the public at this time; and when the principle is finally settled, if "such a thing" can ever be accomplished in my time,) to give the result through the newspapers. Should, however, anything occur, by which a decision can be legally obtained from the Supreme Court "this term," I will append it at the end of this publication.

I shall here proceed to canvass the acts of all those who have had any connection with these matters; and the following are my reasons for so doing:

Mr. A. Oakey Hall wrote in his letter of July 20, 1855, to me "You have my full permission to freely canvass my acts in this, and other matters, whenever you please." Judge Beebe, on the 15th September, 1855, in his argument on the motion to quash the indictment against Carlin, said, "I could, with indignation, and with truthfulness, hurl back, not upon counsel, but upon the party prosecuting here (meaning me), the lie."

Mr. Stoughton, and Mr. Clinton, made offensive personal remarks and allusions to me, on the trial of Carlin, and they did their best to place me in a false position before the public, and to lead it to believe that I claimed to be the owner of a horse, that never, in fact, belonged to me; and insinuated that I had stolen it. They further said, that the whole affair was merely a private quarrel between Collins and myself, and that "poor Carlin" was receiving the "knocks" between us-thus endeavoring to make the jury and

the public believe, that I had the impertinence to take up the time of a Criminal Court, for the purpose of convicting an innocent man of a misdemeanor, of which he was not guilty; or in other words, that I was capable of doing acts of rank injustice, and that I was no better than a malicious scoundrel.

In the argument of Mr. Clinton, on the "motion in arrest of judgment," on the 22d December, 1855, he made an insulting and personal allusion to me, (when I was a mere spectator in the courtroom,) which was not in the case, and was entirely uncalled for, in the following words, "I do not suppose that my learned friend, with all his zeal, and notwithstanding his being spurred on by the majestic presence of his client, Mr. Jones," &c.

Mr. Willet (who has been elected High Sheriff) has appointed Thomas Carlin one of his deputies, when he was under a conviction for "willful neglect of duty, as a public officer," which fact, if it is not considered by others as an insult to the Court, and the jury that convicted Carlin, and to this community, I deem a public insult to myself.

I consider that all public officers are subject to criticism, when they do not faithfully perform their duties to the public, who have delegated them for that especial purpose. It may be a custom (particularly in our Criminal Courts) when witnesses for the People (who are generally unwilling ones) have given their testimony, to be blackguarded and insulted before the jury and the public, and attempts made to place their sworn testimony in a false light, by all sorts of "Tombs Shysters," and "Sailor Lawyers;" but it is disgrace that it should be permitted in an enlightened community like this. A citizen, under such circumstances, has no power to defend himself in court from such attacks; and if he did, he might stand a chance to be committed for "contempt of Court." It is in fact no place for personal encounters; but the Court should not permit lawyers to give the offence. I remember, upon the occasion of the trial of two persons for a State Prison offence, in the Court of Sessions, before Mr. Recorder Talmadge, the contemptible

scoundrel of a lawyer for the defence called the complainant (who was one of our oldest and most respectable merchants, and who for a period of more than fifty years had sustained a spotless reputation) "an old bear," and his sons "a set of cubs !" If others choose to submit to such a custom (?) I do not; and while I never intend to be the aggressor towards any one, if I am attacked, either in public or private, I shall be governed by "the first law of nature"self-defence; and I shall defend myself according to the best ability that God has given me.

Of those who have taken a part in these matters, I wish it to be expressly understood, that I have nothing to say personally. But in this public matter, as connected with these cases, (inasmuch as they have misrepresented me, and made personal attacks on me, from positions where I could not defend myself,) I shall, for the purposes of self-defence, and that I may not appear before this public in a false light, canvass their official and professional acts; but only in connection with these proceedings.

The following decision of his "Excellency" Governor Clark, I received on the 17th of November, A. D. 1855. I have kept this document from its proper place according to date, upon the principle of the boy who ate all the crust from his mince pie first, for the purpose of retaining a rich portion with which to regale himself at the latter end of his repast.

GOVERNOR CLARK'S DECISION IN THE CASE OF SHERIFF ORSER.

STATE OF NEW-YORK, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
ALBANY, November 2d, 1855.

In the matter of certain charges preferred by

ARTHUR T. JONES,

agt.

JOHN ORSER,

Sheriff of the County of New-York.

}

This case having been duly investigated, in pursuance of the statute, the testimony has been submitted to me, and duly considered.

The power conferred upon the Executive by the constitution and laws of the State, for the removal of a Sheriff, is an extraordinary power; granted only to be exercised in extraordinary emergencies. The will of the people in the selection of the person to discharge the duties of Sheriff, should not be set aside, unless upon grounds of public necessity, and charges properly sustained, evincing a want of capacity, willful misconduct, or corruption, on the part of the incumbent.

I do not find in this case any evidence which tends to impeach the integrity or capacity of the Sheriff. There was some slight irregularity on the part of his deputy, which the Sheriff evinced a desire to correct. If injury has been sustained by the complainant thereby, he has his remedy by a suit at law.

I can see no sufficient ground for my interference in the matter, and therefore dismiss the charges.

MYRON H. CLARK.