CHAPTER IX.

JUNE, THE MONTH BEFORE THE SIEGE-PREPARATIONS FOR IT.

The disastrous tidings from out-stations deeply moved Sir Henry Lawrence. -He proposes to remove all the Europeans to the Muchee Bhowun.Council of War called.-Opinions of Captain Fulton, Lieutenant Anderson, Dr. Fayrer, and Mr. Gubbins.-Removal of stores from the Muchee Bhowun.-Sir Henry Lawrence's intention appeared to be to hold both the Residency and the Muchee Bhowun; but to make the last stand at the former place.-Sir Henry Lawrence's health gives way. He appoints a Provisional Council.-The Council refuse to disarm the mutineer remnants, but agree to their being ordered to go to their homes on leave.-The order obeyed: all but 350 men take leave and go.-Major Gall's enterprise and death.-Sir Henry resumes his duties. Mr. Gubbins' management of the intelligence department.Native scouts; assistance given by the native gentry; wild and absurd reports. Full information obtained of the movements of mutineers.— Their concentration at Newabgunje reported to Sir Henry on the 24th of June.-Mutiny of the 3rd Regt. of Military Police.-About the middle of June the engineers begin in earnest to fortify the Residency. Description of the position, which occupied an elevated plateau. Water Gate; irregular line of defence from that to the Hospital; Treasury; Bailey Guard; Aitken's battery; gateway; Dr. Fayrer's compound wall; Financial-office garrison; Sago's house; Post-office battery; Judicial-office garrison; Anderson's house; Cawnpoor battery; Duprat's house; Martinière school-house; King's hospital, or brigade mess; Seikh squares; Gubbins' post.-Unprotected state of the south and west faces of the position.-New battery commenced on the 22nd of June at the south-west angle.-Unfinished Sheep-house battery, and Malakoff.-Mr.Ommanney's enclosure.-Slaughter-house; sheep-house; church; Evans' battery.-Innes' post.-Redan battery.-Surrounding native buildings.-Some of these pulled down, on the west and northwest.-Residency.-Telegraph upon its roof.-Banqueting-hall.-Dr. Fayrer's house.-Post-office.-Mr. Ommanney's house.-Fall in value of public securities.-Cessation of public and private credit.-State prisoners. Mr. Gubbins' levies.-Abdoolazeez Khan Risaldar; the artillery darogha Meer Furzundalee; the overseer Ramadeen; the architect Pirâna; the smith Golaub.-Desertion of all the remnants of Irregular Cavalry.-Sir Henry Lawrence's exertions to provision the garrison.-Native pensioners got in.-Measures taken to secure the allegiance of the talooqdars.-Gunpowder and treasure buried.-Vo

lunteer Cavalry raised by Captain Radcliffe.-Discovery by Captain Fulton of the native guns, and 8-inch howitzer.-Seizure and execution of conspirators.-Communications received from Sir Hugh Wheeler.— News brought by Mr. Gubbins' cossids of the destruction of the Cawnpoor force.-Despatch to Major Rénaud.-Escape of Lieutenants Delafosse and Thompson.-Remarks on the Cawnpoor catastrophe.Removal of the King's jewels from the Kaiser Bagh.-First fall of rain.

THE recurring tidings of these disasters which daily and hourly reached us, being brought in either by the fugitives themselves, or inferred from the ominous stopping of the post from each successive station, deeply moved Sir Henry Lawrence. Though intending to hold the Residency also, he had all along regarded the Muchee Bhowun as his place of strength. Now, therefore, on the 8th of June, he proposed to remove thither all the Europeans and their families. The measure being much opposed, a council of war was called, comprising most of the civil and military officers. A set of questions was proposed, and written answers were required from each member. The two most important questions were, first, whether both posts, i. e. the Muchee Bhowun and the Residency, should be held, or one only; and secondly, whether the ladies should be sent away to Nipaul, or down the Ganges in boats? I did not see all the answers which were given, but certainly among the most valuable opinions given were those recorded by the Executive Engineer, Captain Fulton, and Lieutenant J. C. Anderson, of the Engineers. Both these officers strongly urged the abandonment of the Muchee Bhowun, and the concentration of our force at the Residency. Captain Fulton's opinion was that the Muchee Bhowun was untenable; that its walls would not resist artillery; and that the large masonry drains underneath it would afford the enemy great opportunity of mining Dr. Fayrer pointed out the existing sick

the fort.

ness in the garrison of the Muchee Bhowun, the close and confined accommodation, and gave it as his opinion that, if the number within the fort were much increased, there was great danger of epidemic sickness. I attached my signature to Captain Fulton's opinion. We all, I believe, opposed the removal of the women and children, as no longer practicable.

Sir Henry Lawrence was then extremely weak, and the members of the council separated without any decision being made known. I understood, however, that Sir Henry's faith in the Muchee Bhowun had been much shaken, and though he could not decide on abandoning it, still that he had resolved on making the last stand at the Residency, and abandoning the Muchee Bhowun when it was no longer tenable. Certainly a few days later large quantities of shot, shell, gunpowder, stores of food, beer and porter, and several heavy guns, began to be removed from the Muchee Bhowun into the Residency premises. Still very considerable stores were left in the Muchee Bhowun, and sometimes guns were ordered back there, and the works at the Muchee Bhowun were continued actively; so that Sir Henry evidently clung to the hope of retaining the Muchee Bhowun also.

After the arrival of Sir Henry Havelock, and not until then, I heard the question propounded, as to whether Sir Henry Lawrence would not have followed a more correct military policy, if he had decided before this time, to abandon Lucknow, and to retire upon Cawnpoor. And since then, the same course has been recommended by more than one writer. It has also been said that it was suggested to him by the Government, or at least that authority was conveyed to Sir Henry to fall back upon Cawnpoor if he should think fit. The policy of such a measure,

unless it had been adopted at a very early period of the disturbances, when it was impossible to foretell, and unwise to exaggerate, the extent of the coming danger, may, I think, well be questioned. Without, however, entering upon the question here, it will be sufficient to say that the idea of such a policy was not at this time at all entertained by Sir Henry Lawrence. I never learnt that it had been specifically proposed to him from Calcutta. During the month of May I never heard it mooted. Nor was it comprised in the questions proposed to the Council of War on the 8th of June.

On the 9th of June, Sir Henry's health entirely gave way. An alarming exhaustion came on; and the medical man pronounced that further application to business would endanger his life. A provisional council was accordingly formed by his authority, at which I presided, comprising the Judicial Commissioner Mr. Ommanney, Major Banks, Colonel Inglis, Major Anderson the Chief Engineer, and myself. Our first business was with a letter from Sir Hugh Wheeler, which was put into our hands by a soobahdar of the 1st N. I., who had been sent with it, by the General, from his intrenchment. Sir Hugh wrote that the troops joined by the Nana had attacked him on the 6th with heavy guns, and he entreated that aid might be sent. It was too clear that we were in no condition to render it. Not a man could be spared from the Muchee Bhowun, or Residency; and the Europeans in cantonments could not be withdrawn from their guard over their native comrades. Mournfully but unanimously it was decided that aid could not be rendered; and the soobahdar, who wished to go to his home, departed, first receiving from us the reward of 1000 rupees, promised by General Wheeler.

A company of the 9th O. I. Infantry was on duty then in the Muchee Bhowun, under command of Lieutenant Vanrenen. It was their comrades who perpetrated the frightful massacre of the Shajehanpoor fugitives. This company now exhibited signs of disaffection; and it was proposed in the council to disarm it. The measure was strongly opposed by Colonel Inglis and Major Anderson, who were afraid of bringing on a crisis. The majority, however, carried the measure; and the men were disarmed the same day without any opposition; and sent on leave to their homes.

I again urged upon the council the necessity of taking away the arms from the native troops, who so hampered our movements in cantonments: but I could not get them to agree.

The only officer from whom I received support, in my proposal to disarm the remnants of the mutineer regiments, was Captain R. Edgell, officiating then as Military Secretary. He agreed with me in the necessity of the measure, and drew up at my request a written memorandum recommending it. In it he sufficiently showed that the European force outside the Residency ought to be a movable one: and that it at the time failed to possess this character, in consequence of the necessity which existed, for its watching the native troops. He showed that if the latter were disarmed, the European force would at once assume its proper character, and become available for action wherever its services were required. This paper was read before the Provisional Committee, but without moving their opinion.

I must freely state that I regarded and still regard our condition at that moment to have been most critical. And if we had not succeeded in depriving the large mass of native troops then around us