CHAPTER XIII.

FROM THE 15TH TO THE END OF AUGUST.

Ungud returns again on the 15th of August, bringing a letter for me from Colonel Fraser Tytler.-Transcript of its contents.—Account of the delay in its delivery given by Ungud.-News disappointing indeed; yet not a source of any just anxiety.-Colonel Tytler evidently misapprehended our circumstances.-For us to attempt to cut our way out was impossible.-Mr. Gubbins proposes to Brigadier Inglis to consult upon the reply. The Brigadier shows Mr. Gubbins the answer which he proposed to send.-Transcript of the letter.-Mr. Gubbins proposes some modification, to which Brigadier Inglis would not consent.— Ungud leaves with the despatch.-The serious error in respect to Commissariat supplies contained in this letter noticed.-Ungud's return on the 29th, bringing General Havelock's reply.-Transcript of Havelock's letter.-Account given by Ungud.—Anecdote of Ungud. -Enemy continues his mines. He explodes one at the outer Seikh square on the 18th of August, which does us serious injury.—Enemy's weak attempt to enter at the breach repulsed.-Breach barricaded, and defended by a 9-pounder gun.—M. Duprat killed.-Sortie to the houses of the younger Johannes and others, which were blown up, on the 18th and 19th of August.-Our engineers mine and blow up Johannes' house.-Sortie.-Enemy's battery spiked by Lieutenant Brown.-Johannes' shop blown up by Captain Fulton and Captain McCabe. Another mine of the enemy at the Brigade Mess broken into, and blown up on the 29th of August.-Too much praise cannot be bestowed on Captain Fulton.-Ramadeen Jumadar killed.-Attempt to burn the Bailey Guard Gate.-Dilapidation of buildings.— Two new batteries established against my house.-Lieutenant Webb killed in my south-west bastion.-The battery retrenched and altered ; and the 9-pounder replaced by an 18-pounder gun.-Excellent practice made by Lieutenant Bonham's artillery with his mortar howitzer, called the "Ship."-Enemy open fire on my house from the 24-pounder battery, opposite Innes'.-All the upper rooms abandoned in consequence.-Native followers greatly alarmed.-Desertion of natives, and of Christian drummers.-Measures adopted to prevent further desertion. One month's pay issued; declined by the pensioners and N. I. sepoys. Correspondence of the enemy with the natives inside our intrenchment.-High prices realised at auctions.-Enemy open a 32-pounder gun at the Clock Tower.-Lieutenant Aitken constructs a battery against this.-Losses by sickness during the month.— Casualties.-Names of officers wounded.

On the night of the 15th of August, "Ungud," our only successful messenger, came in again at my post, bearing a letter addressed to me by Colonel Fraser Tytler. It was dated the 4th August at Mungulwar; and the following is a transcript of its contents:

"To M. Gubbins, Esq.

"DEAR SIR,

"We march to-morrow morning for Lucknow, having been reinforced. We shall push on as speedily as possible. We hope to reach you in four days at furthest. You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we can't force our way in. are only a small Force."

We

N.B. The words printed in italics were written in Greek characters.

It appeared from the account given to us by Ungud, that he had received this despatch, as was evident from the date, nearly a fortnight before. He accounted for the lateness of its delivery, by telling us that he had been made prisoner by the enemy, while endeavouring to bring the letter in, and had been long detained in custody. Having been released, however, he had retraced his steps to the General's camp at Mungulwar, which place he had found abandoned.

Proceeding on thence to the Ganges, he had found that the whole of General Havelock's camp had recrossed the river to Cawnpoor. Ungud told us that this movement had been caused by the Nana having threatened Havelock's rear, and the Station of Cawnpoor; at which place the General was awaiting reinforcements.

It must be confessed that these tidings were not satisfactory. It was evident that Havelock had made

an advance early in the month, intending to relieve our garrison. Colonel Tytler mentioned the intention, and Ungud confirmed the fact. The force, he said, had advanced a second time to Busheergunje, had engaged and defeated the enemy, but had retired, after achieving the victory. It was therefore equally clear, that onward progress had been found impossible, and that Havelock had been obliged to retire without even being able to communicate his intention to us. Why then had he retired? It could not be in consequence of the determined resistance offered by the enemy; for Ungud, who confirmed the first victories at Onao and Busheergunje, which had been reported to us by Aodhân Singh, laughed at and ridiculed their cowardice. They never, he said, stood a charge of our men, and had lost most of the guns which they had taken out.

It was evident, to those who could view the matter calmly, that, finding his rear threatened, and his force too weak, the General had retired to secure his communications. To me, therefore, the intelligence brought by Ungud, though disappointing, was not a source of any great anxiety. We well knew that every available soldier, as he arrived in the country, would be pushed up to reinforce Havelock. Every day, therefore, by which our defence was prolonged, would add to the numbers of the relieving army; and our enemy had of late, certainly, shown no very remarkable or increased boldness.

It was evident, however, that Colonel Tytler's letter, in which he proposed that we should cut our way out, had been written under an entire misapprehension of our circumstances. The thing was simply impossible. Encumbered as we were, with large numbers of women, children, sick, and wounded,

guarded by a slender force of Europeans, to have attempted to leave our defences, and lead out this defenceless mass into the streets of the city, crowded with the enemy's marksmen, would have been nothing more than to expose the greater number of them to certain death. Few, indeed, would have been those who would have reached the relieving column. It was of importance that the reply of which Ungud was to be the bearer, should be a clear exposition of our state and circumstances, on which the General at Cawnpoor might build a just plan for our relief. After, therefore, Brigadier Inglis had read the letter, I proposed to him that we should consult upon the reply which should be sent. He courteously came over to my quarters during the day, and showed me the reply which he proposed to send. It was the following:—

"A note from Colonel Tytler to Mr. Gubbins reached last night, dated at Mungulwar the 4th inst., the latter paragraph of which is as follows-You must aid us in every way, even to cutting your way out, if we can't force our way in,'-has caused me much uneasiness, as it is quite impossible, with my weak and shattered force, that I can leave. my defences. You must bear in mind how I am hampered; that I have upwards of 120 sick and wounded, and at least 220 women, and about 230 children, and no carriage of any description, besides sacrificing twenty-three lacs of treasure, and about thirty guns of sorts.

"In consequence of the news received, I shall soon put the force on half rations, unless I hear again from you. Our provisions will last us then till about the 10th of September.

"If you hope to save this force, no time must be lost in pushing forward. We are daily being attacked

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by the enemy, who are within a few yards of our defences. Their mines have already weakened our post, and I have every reason to believe they are carrying on others. Their 18-pounders are within 150 yards of some of our batteries, and from their position, and our inability to form working parties, we cannot reply to them, and consequently the damage done hourly is very great. My strength now in Europeans is 350, and about 300 natives, and the men are dreadfully harassed; and owing to part of the Residency having been brought down by round shot, many are without shelter. Our native force having been assured, on Colonel Tytler's authority, of your near approach, some twenty-five days ago, are naturally losing confidence, and if they leave us I do not see how the defences are to be manned. Did you receive a letter and plan from me from this man 'Ungud?' Kindly answer this question.

"To General Havelock."

"Yours truly,

"J. INGLIS, Brigadier."

In the general purport of this letter I agreed; but thought that the dangers of our position, especially as regarded the supply of food, were exaggerated; and that General Havelock might be induced, on receipt of it, to attempt our relief with an insufficient force. I accordingly recommended some modification of the despatch, which might represent our prospects of defence in more hopeful terms. But to this the Brigadier would not consent. He informed me that he had consulted the officers of his staff; and that they concurred in the justice of his description. On the following night, accordingly, Ungud started with this despatch.