Dumraon Raja, who was upbraided for his backwardness in affording assistance to our troops. On the evening of the 24th, Sir James Outram arrived en route to take command at Cawnpoor, and was joined by Major Eyre's battery, and the detachment of H. M.'s 5th Fusiliers. And thus terminated the expedition "to Arrah."

APPENDIX, No. 11.

ACCOUNT OF THE MUTINY OF No. 1, LIGHT HORSE BATTERY, OUDH IRREGULAR FORCE, AT SECRORA, ON THE 9TH AND 10TH OF JUNE, 1857, BY LIEUT. J. BONHAM, ARTILLERY.

ON the departure of the party under Captain H. Forbes, escorting the ladies and children from Secrora, on the evening of the 6th of June; the troopers who had been left behind under command of a native officer, went down to our lines, and tried to induce our men to rise; but they refused to have any thing to say to them, and reported the circumstance to me on the following morning.

On the 7th, the infantry, who up to that time had been considered trustworthy, were said to be wavering. Fearing a rising of the troops, it was proposed that the Europeans should assemble at night at the bungalow of the Commissioner, Mr. Wingfield.

On the night of the 8th, a serjeant who was on sentry reported that a number of men were advancing from the infantry lines towards the bungalow, under cover of the trees. I immediately went off to our lines, followed by the Commissioner, and shortly after by Captain G. W. Boileau, commanding the Infantry and station of Secrora. The other officers of the 2nd O. I. Infantry were sleeping in another house, and knew nothing of what

had occurred.

Our guns were brought out, and placed on the cantonment side of the stables, facing the Commissioner's house; and all was in readiness to fire on the insurgents. Had they advanced at that

time, I firmly believe that our men would have behaved well, and would have fired on them. But the infantry did not come on, and gave me no opportunity of testing the loyalty of our men.

On the 9th, the infantry became exceedingly mutinous, and took no pains to conceal their disaffection. But our men still held out; and with the exception of some five or six, whose names the Soobahdar Sheikh Murdan Alee gave me, I believe that they were all well inclined towards us. In the evening we heard that the infantry had sent a guard to Byram Ghaut, to cut off our escape, should we attempt to make for Lucknow. During the evening Captain Boileau showed us a letter, in which permission was given by Sir Henry Lawrence for us to leave the station, and consult our own safety, should a rising of the troops be deemed inevitable. He gave it as his opinion that the troops could no longer be trusted, and expressed his intention of leaving the station.

At a meeting of the officers, the adjutant of the 2nd O. I. Infantry, Lieut. Hale, and I, expressed our determination to remain with our men. Captain Boileau and the doctor (Kendall) urged us to accompany them to Gondah: this we both declined to do. At about 10 P.M. I took Serjeants Bewsey and Miller, and went down to our lines, paraded the men of the battery, and had the guns placed in position on the flanks of the stables. The men slept at their guns, and were prepared to act at a moment's notice. Having set everything in order, I turned into my tent, which was pitched next the quarter-guard of the battery, for a few hours' rest. Nothing particular occurred during the night, and on the following morning the usual stable duties were performed by the men.

I was still in my lines, when the whole of the native officers of the 2nd O. I. Infantry came to me and stated that all their European officers had left them; that they wished to hold true to their allegiance, but that unless I would consent to take command of the regiment, they must starve, as the grain merchants had refused to supply them with food. They made the most solemn promises never to leave me, and swore to protect me with their lives. Upon this I consented to take command of them.

I accordingly went down to their lines, and having assembled the men, explained to them the conditions under which I took command. They appeared well satisfied, and were loud in their professions of fidelity. I ordered guards to be placed over the houses of the officers who had left the station, which was immediately done. I then repaired to my house, and made preparations

for marching the battery and infantry into Lucknow. There I knew that the latter could be disarmed, and the guns placed in safety. While I was thus engaged, the soobahdar of the regiment came to report that a large amount of Government treasure had just arrived. Upon this I returned to the lines, and made the treasure over in the usual manner to the jumadar of the guard. I had scarcely done this, when a number of the men collected round me, and began to abuse and threaten me. Being unarmed, I left them, and returned to the lines of the artillery.

The soobahdar of the battery, Sheikh Murdan Alee, who from the commencement had behaved most admirably, and whose fidelity was beyond question, now asked me to allow him to go down to the infantry lines, to ascertain the feelings of the men. He told me that after their conduct towards me there appeared little hope of the regiment marching to Lucknow; but that, should things come to the worst, his own life should be taken before mine.

It was on my return to my lines on this occasion, that I noticed for the first time a marked change in the behaviour of our men. I subsequently heard that they had on that morning received intelligence of the mutiny of the troops at Fyzabad and Duriabad, as well as of the intended mutiny of the regiment at Gondah. That they had been requested to join: and that they had determined on so doing. Shortly after, the soobahdar returned with anything but a satisfactory account of the state of feeling in the infantry.

At about 11 A.M. our bugle was sounded without orders, and the men turned out armed with swords, tulwars, &c., &c. Half the guard armed with carbines under command of Juhangeer Bux was marched to the guns: the remainder to the stables, over which they kept sentry. Presently, a shout arose that the infantry were coming. I saw the 2nd O. I. Infantry at a distance of from four to five hundred yards, advancing in close column of companies towards the battery. I called out to them to stop, or I would fire on them. This had the effect of bringing them to a halt. I then ordered the men to load and fire on the rebels. This they refused to do; and on my moving towards the guns, they threatened me with their carbines.

I then called Sheikh Murdan Alee aside, and asked him whether there were any men in the battery, upon whom reliance could be placed; and who would aid us in spiking some of the guns, and in using the others against the mutineers. He told me that, although a large majority of the men wished me well,

he did not think that there was one who would fight against such odds.

I next tried to persuade the men to harness their horses, and bring away the guns. But this they also declined to do. A number of the best men in the battery, of whom I can now only remember the names of Sheikh Murdan Alee (soobahdar), Bhowany Singh, and Sudanund (havildars), and Khan Singh (private), now came to me and entreated me to leave them, saying, that should I remain any longer, they would not answer for what the infantry might do. They brought horses for us to mount and advised us to ride away.

The infantry had in the meantime advanced to within 200 yards of the guns, and were shouting at and abusing us in true native style. I ordered the serjeants to mount and ride in among the men. I tried all in my power to induce them to return to their allegiance. But without effect. Before I left I asked the men to allow Sheikh Murdan Alee to accompany me. Their answer was that they would all go with me, were it in their power; but they would not let him go. I then turned my horse's head towards Lucknow. Murdan Alee attempted to accompany me; but the guard threatened to shoot him unless he returned. Before he left me, I told him to join me at Lucknow on the following day. On the same evening, he attempted to make his escape; but was seized, and placed in irons. When I last heard of him a few days before the siege began, he was still in confinement with the mutineers. I had gone a short distance, when I was overtaken by privates Jaun Singh, Bindeh Singh, and Eesree Singh, who accompanied me to Lucknow. The two first were recruits who had been enlisted but a few days before. Khan Singh joined me in Lucknow on the day after my arrival.

Knowing that Byram Ghaut was in the possession of the mutineers, I was obliged to make a detour of several miles, and crossed the Gograh at Gurh-kunneah Ghaut. We reached Lucknow on the morning of the 11th of June, without any incident worthy of notice.

Farrier Serjeant James Bewsey, Assistant Farrier James Miller, and the Serjeant-Major of the 2nd O. I. Infantry accompanied me; and behaved remarkably well throughout.

APPENDIX, No. 12.

THE CAUSES OF THE INDIAN MUTINY.

A few words relative to the late mutiny of the Bengal Army, and the rebellion in the Bengal Presidency. By Shaik Hedayut Ali, Soobahdar and Sirdar Bahadoor, Bengal Seikh Police Battalion, commanded by Captain T. Rattray.

I DEEM it my duty, as far as it lies in my power, to explain what has led to the disaffection lately so universally evinced both by the native army and many of the sirdars or chieftains throughout Hindostan

It is well known to the British Government, and to all the world, that the country of Hindostan in former times was almost solely inhabited by people of Hindoo persuasion, and that many years afterwards the Mahomedans conquered the country; and it is also well known that the Hindoos are proverbially foolish on the score of religion, and deem no religion equal to their own.

To the best of my belief and understanding, the first symptoms of disaffection to the British Government on the part of the sepoys were shown in 1833, when an army from Hindostan was ordered to Cabul. When this army crossed the Indus to Attock the sepoys became discontented, grumbling, and angry. They heard that when Rajah Maun Sing, Wuzeer of one of the former emperors of Dehli, crossed the Indus to wage war with the Affghans, he caused all the Brahmins to take off their janeo, or sacred thread worn by Brahmins and emblematic of their caste, and told all his men that the Hindoo religion extended no further than the Indus. Maun Sing built a temple on the other side the Indus, and in this temple the Brahmins were directed to suspend their janeo. This fact is well known to all Hindoos, whether literate or the reverse.

One of the customs of the Hindoos is never to eat or cook their food until they have bathed and gone through other forms of their religion. When, in 1838-39, the army reached Affghanistan, the Hindoos left off bathing and the performance of other acts which their form of religion demanded on account of the extreme cold, to which they were unaccustomed