not be felt, handled, and seen? but she resides, we are informed, in the inmost recesses of her sensorium the brain; a mere assertion that can never be proved; for if she doth indeed enlighten this little citadel, it is with a ray like that of those sepulchral lamps, which, the instant we discover, ›we destroy. But if we return to the evidence of facts, the dissections carried on by Morgagni, Haller, Bonnet and others, do most thoroughly and irrefutably establish one most important, and to me at least, consoling truth; that there is no part of the brain either cortical, or medullary, not even the pineal gland itself, that has not, in one instance or in another, been totally destroyed by disease, but without producing in the patient any corresponding alienation or hallucination of mind; in some cases without any suspicion of such disease during life, and without any discovery of it, until after death, by dissection. But we shall be told, perhaps, that the thinking faculty may be something residing in the very centre of the pineal gland, but so minute as to survive the destruction even of that in which it is inclosed. The pineal gland does indeed contain a few particles of a schistous or gritty substance, but which, alas, prove little for the argument of him who would designate thought, to be nothing more than the result of a more curious and complicated organization; since these particles, on examination, turn out to be nothing more nor less than phosphate of lime!!!

And this intimate union between body and mind is in fact analogous to all that we see, and feel, and comprehend. Thus we observe that the material stimuli of alcohol, or of opium, act upon the mind, through the body, and that the moral stimuli of love, or of anger, act upon the body through the mind; these are reciprocities of action that establish the principle of connection between the two, but are fatal to that of an identity.

For those who would persuade us that the thinking faculty

* For an astounding collection of cases and authorities on this most interesting part of the subject, see the Quarterly Review, page 25 and 26. No. 43.-See also the excellent treatise of Dr. Burrows on Mania.

is an identical part of the body, maturescent in it, and dying with it, impose a very heavy task upon themselves; and if we consider the insuperable difficulties of their creed on the one hand, and the air of conviction with which they defend it on the other, we are perhaps justified in affirming that these men are the very last persons in the universe, to whom the name of sceptic ought to be applied; but a dogmatic doubter, although it may be a something beyond our philosophy, is too often not beyond our observation. We, I repeat, contend for a strong but inexplicable connection between body and mind; and upon this principle all the sympathies of mutual pleasure and of pain, and all the reciprocities of rest and of action, are both natural, and intelligible. But those who advocate the identity of the body, and of the mind, will find that they have embraced a theory surrounded by facts that oppose it at every point, facts which their system will neither enable them to explain, nor their experience to deny. For does not every passion of the mind act directly primarily, and as it were per se upon the body; with greater or with lesser influence in proportion to their force. Does not the activity belong on this occasion to the mind, and the mere passiveness to the body; does not the quickened circulation follow the anger, the start the surprise, and the swoon the sorrow. Do not these instances, and a thousand others, clearly convince us that priority of action here belongs to the mind, and not to the body, and those who deny this are reduced to the ridiculous absurdity of attempting to prove that a man is frightened because he runs away, not that he runs away because he is frightened, and that the motion produces the terror, not the terror the mo tion, a kind of logic this that would become a Falstaff much better than a philosopher. Again, is not mania* produced

* I shall insert a note from Dr. John Armstrong on Fever, p. 478, which those who only look at will think too long, but those who read will think too short.

"It will have been perceived, that I consider insanity as the effect of some disorder in the circulation, whether produced by agencies of a cor

by moral causes, quite as often as by physical, and has not that mode of cure succeeded best, which was instituted with a reference to this cause. On examination, after death, of those who have laboured under chronic mania, it most

poreal or mental nature. It might be shown by familiar facts, that the brain is the principal organ through which the operations of the mind are performed; and it does not, as many have supposed, necessarily involve the doctrine of materialism to affirm, that certain disorders of that organ are capable of disturbing those operations. If the most skilful musician in the world were placed before an unstrung or broken instrument, he could not produce the harmony which he was accustoned to do when that instrument was perfect, nay on the contrary, the sounds would be discordant; and yet it would be manifestly most illogical to conclude, from such an effect, that the powers of the musician were impaired, since they merely appeared to be so from the imperfection of the instrument. Now what the instrument is to the musician, the brain may be to the mind, for aught we know to the contrary; and to pursue the figure, as the musician has an existence distinct from that of the instrument, so the mind may have an existence distinct from that of the brain; for in truth we have no proof whatever of mind being a property dependant upon any arrangement of matter. We perceive, indeed, the properties of matter wonderfully modified in the various things of the universe, which strike our senses with the force of their sublimity or beauty; but in all these we recognize certain radical and common properties, that bear no conceivable relation to those mysterious capacities of thought and of feeling, referable to that something which, to designate and distinguish from matter, we term mind. In this way, I conceive, the common sense of mankind has made the distinction which every where obtains between mind and matter, for it is natural to conclude, that the essence of mind may be distinct from the essence of matter, as the operations of the one are so distinct from the properties of the other. But when we say that mind is immaterial, we only mean that it has not the properties of matter; for the consciousness which informs us of the operations, does not reveal the abstract nature of mind, neither do the properties reveal the essence of matter. When any one, therefore, asserts the materiality of mind he presupposes, that the phenomena of matter clearly show the real cause of mind, which as they do not, he unphilosophically places his argument on an assumption; and his ground or reasoning is equally gratuitous-when he contends, that mind is an attribute of matter, because it is never known to operate but in conjunction with matter, for though this connection is constantly dis played, yet we have no direct proof of its being necessary."

usually happens that no difference of structure is perceptible in the brain, on dissection. If, however, in some few instances there has been a perceptible difference, will not a retrospection to the mental origin of the malady, justly warrant us in asserting that the derangement of structure was not the cause, but is the consequence of the disease. That so many instances should occur where no such difference of structure is perceptible, is analogous to what so often happens in other disorders, where a total functional derangement is unaccom panied by the slightest organic destruction.

It is admitted that each and every component particle of the body is changed in the course of twenty years, and that corporeal identity is by these means so totally destroyed, that a man who lives to sixty shall have gradually received three distinct bodies, the last of which shall not contain one individual atom that composed the first. But those who would persuade us that mind is an absolute and component part of the body, so completely ingrafted as it were and incorporated with it, that the thinking faculty is only the result of a more curious and complicated organization, must admit, that the mind must syınpathize not partially, but wholly with these changes of the body, changes so powerful that they must effect the total destruction of moral identity, as they certainly do of that which is corporeal. The materialist must admit this absurdity, as his only means of escaping a greater, namely, that a whole shall not be altered, notwithstanding a total change of all the parts that composed it. If indeed the materialist is inclined to admit that these changes do alter the body, but not the mind, then indeed he admits that which is true; but truth itself may be bought too dear, in the opinion of some, if the confession of their defeat be the price; but the admission alluded to above, is in fact all the concession for which we contend, namely, that body and mind, although they are united, are also distinct. In a former part of this argument, I have admitted that the proposition that the mind is infantile with the body, is a general rule disturbed by no exceptions. But this truism,

I presume, will perform but little, either for the materialist, or against him, because the terms are convertible. The mind is infantile with the body, says the materialist; but has not the immaterialist quite as much reason on his side, should he feel inclined to assert that the "body is infantile with the mind?" For observe, we do not contend that the mind has no beginning, but that it shall have no end, and it appears that the body is appointed to be the first stage of its existence. Therefore I should rather affirm that the body is infantile with the mind, than that the mind is infantile with the body, and that a fuller and stronger demonstration of all the powers and faculties of the mind evinces itself in proportion as a more matured developement of the organs of the body, enables it passively to receive the impressions, and actively to execute the sovereign volitions of the mind. And in confirmation of this mode of considering the subject, we may observe that children often have a tolerable idea of the thing desired or feared, long before they are able to express the term by which it is described, The mind precedes the tongue, and the effort and wish to speak evinces itself much earlier than the power to do so. The distinguishing and endearing characteristics of mother are sufficiently understood by the infant, long before it can call her by name; and the infantile mind is not without a thousand modes of expressing its feelings, long before the lagging organs of the body are sufficiently developed to accomplish the articulation of them.

But if mind be material, it must be both extended and divisible, for these are properties inseparable from matter. But the absurdity of such a supposition startled even the boldest of sceptics, because he happened also to be the most acute; I shall therefore quote a passage from Mr. Hume, who will be allowed by materialists at least, to be an orthodox authority. "There is one argument (says he) commonly employed for the immateriality of the soul, which seems to be remarkable; whatever is extended consists of parts, and whateyer consists of parts is divisible, if not in reality, at least in