by want of action under it, it follows that there was no authority of law for the paving of the footwalks, nor giving notice to the owners to do it. In the case of The Bank vs. Lefever, 24 P. F. Smith, 49, the Supreme Court has said: That where no question has been reserved, the court which has tried the case cannot enter judgment non obstante veredicto. As no question was reserved in this case, the rule for judgment non obstante veredicto is discharged and the verdict is set aside. H. C. Titus, Esq., and W. N. West, city solicitor, for plaintiff. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 156.] SMITH VS. PASSENGER RAILWAY COMPANY. A child between six and seven years of age, accustomed to board the cars of a street railway while in motion, for the purpose of selling water thereon, fell from the front platform while so engaged, and was killed by being run over. Held, that the child was guilty of contributory negligence. Sur motion to take off non-suit. Action on the case by Elizabeth Smith, surviving parent of William Smith, deceased, against the Hestonville, Mantua, and Fairmount Passenger Railroad Company, to recover damages for the killing of plaintiff's son, through the alleged negligence of defendants' servants. At the trial, before Allison, P. J., the plaintiff's witnesses testified that for two or three months prior to decedent's death, who was between six and seven years of age, it had been his habit with several companions, to get on and off the company's cars while moving slowly in ascending a hill, for the purpose of selling water to the drivers and conductors, and that he died from injuries received upon an occasion when so employed, from falling under the wheels of a car from the front platform, which was without a guard. The plaintiff's employment compelled her absence from her home during the day, but she knew of her son's occupation, and had not forbidden it, though she had frequently cautioned him to be careful. At the close of the plaintiff's case, the court, on motion, granted a non-suit, on the ground of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff, in allowing the deceased to engage in the employment stated in the evidence, at the age of seven years. A. S. Biddle, Esq., for the rule: Negligence of the parent, imputed to the child, is for the jury; it depends upon and shifts with the age, strength, size, etc., of the child, which determine the hazard or risk of its employment: Wharton on Negligence § 313, n. 4; R. R. Co. vs. Gray, 3 W. Ñ. C., 421; R. R. Co. vs. Pearson, 22 P. F. S. 169. H. Hazlehurst, Esq., contra, cited Glassey vs. R. R. Co., 7 P. F. S. 172. March 29, 1879. Motion dismissed. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 156.] WARD US. WHITNEY. Execution-Sheriff's interpleader-Second execution-Property levied upon and remaining in the possession of the claimant is, pending the determination of the feigned issue, beyond the reach of other process. Rule on constable to abandon levy. On March 7, 1879, judgment was obtained by Ward against Whitney in the Court of Common Pleas No. 1, and execution issued. The property levied upon was claimed, a feigned issue awarded, narr and bond filed by the claimant, and the sheriff withdrew from the possession of the goods. Before trial, on February 25, 1879. judgment was obtained by Hughes against Whitney before a magistrate, and execution issued. The same property which had been levied upon in the first execution was seized by the constable. Harold Goodwin, Esq., for the rule, contended that the lien of the first execution was not discharged, and that the goods continued in custodia legis, although they were not in the possession of the sheriff, under the forthcoming boud filed by the claimant, and were protected from a subsequent execution issuing from other jurisdiction. This interpretation had been given to an Alabama statute, similar to the act of April 10, 1848, by the Supreme Court of the United States, and was adopted as the rule of practice in this State: Hagan vs. Lucas, 10 Peters, 400; Bain vs. Lyle, 18 P. F. Sm. 60; Burns vs. Toner, 9 Philadelphia, 37. As to jurisdiction, Duncan vs. Mc Cumber, 10 Watts, 212. James J. Broadhurst, Esq., contra: The goods are no longer in the custody of the law, as the plaintiff in the first execution has his remedy on the claimant's bond, if the determination of the feigned issue is in his favor. March 29. The court, referring to Bain vs. Lyle, supra, made the rule absolute. NOTE.-This question was decided otherwise in the Court of Common Pleas No. 2; Battersby vs. Haubert, 37 Leg. Int. 26. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 156.] BROWNE vs. LEWIS. The words “grant, bargain, and sell," in the absence of an express covenant, do not imply the vendor's protection from a ground-rent which was a subsisting encumbrance when the vendee took title. Rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. Covenant by G. B. Browne against Lewis to recover the arrears of a ground-rent reserved on a lot of ground by deed from P. A. Browne to Lewis. From the plaintiff's statement, it appeared that P. A. Browne, having acquired possession of a lot subject to the payment of an annual groundrent, a first encumbrance, divided it into smaller lots; and by deed of general warranty, "did grant, bargain, sell, etc.," one of the smaller lots to Lewis, the defendant, subject to a second ground-rent. The deed to Lewis made no mention of the paramount ground-rent, and contained a covenant following: "And it is hereby further covenanted and agreed, by and between the said John Lewis, his heirs and assigns [he or they paying the aforesaid rent and taxes thereon, accruing from time to time as aforesaid, or extinguishing the same], shall and may from time to time, and at all times forever hereafter, freely and peaceably, have, hold, use, occupy, possess and enjoy, the lot of ground and premises hereby granted, with the appurtenances, without any let, suit, molestation or hindrance, of him, the said Peter A. Browne, or of or from any other person or persons, lawfully claiming, or to claim, by, from, or under him, them, or any or either of them.' The plaintiff purchased the second ground-rent from P. A. Browne, and brought this suit to recover arrears upon it. The affidavit of defence by Gallagher, the terre-tenant, alleged that Peter A. Browne, until the time of his death, had made the payments due upon the paramount ground-rent, but that since his decease his heirs or assigns had failed to make further payments upon it, and that the terre-tenant had been compelled to make payments of its arrears by the paramount landlord, because of the default of the assigns of the said P. A. Browne. H. C. Smith and G. Biddle, Esqs., for the rule cited Shaffer vs. Greer, 6 W. N. C. 323; Knepper vs. Kurtz, 8 P. F. S. 480; Gratz vs. Ewalt, 2 Binn. 95. George McGowan, Esq., contra. Opinion delivered April 5, 1879, by BIDDLE, J.-We think this rule should be made absolute. Peter A. Browne having granted the land in question to Lewis subject to a ground- rent, covenanted only that his estate was an indefeasible estate in fee simple, free of incumbrances created by himself, and that the grantee's possession should be good against the grantor, his heirs and assigns. This is all the words "grant, bargain, and sell," imply. This is so under the act of May 28, 1715, and is clearly settled by the decisions cited in support of the rule. Rule absolute. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 202.] COPELAND vs. IRON Co. In a suit on a coupon payable to bearer copies of accompanying bonds are unnecessary to entitle plaintiff to judgment for want of an affidavit of defence. Sur rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defence. This was an action in debt, upon an instrument of writing, as follows: The Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company will pay to bearer at the office of the company in the city of Philadelphia, ou September 1, 1877, thirty-five dollars, being six months interest on bond 51. J. W. JONES, Treasurer. The affidavit of defence alleged that the instruments sued upon were coupons, which were attached to and formed parts of certain bonds issued by the said company, wherein it was provided that the interest due thereon would be paid semi-annually, upon presentation of the said coupons. Copies of the bonds to which the coupons were attached have not been filed, and it is therefore suggested to the court that the plaintiff is presumably the holder of the bonds, and that to entitle him to recover for the interest due thereon he should have filed copies of the bonds as well as copies of the coupons. T. Hart, Jr., Esq., showed cause: There is no averment or presumption that the coupons have been detached from the bonds, and their possession is prima facie evidence that their holder is the holder of the bonds. If they are not detached suit for interest must be brought on the bonds, copies of which should be filed; the cases sustaining suits upon coupons alone, were cases of coupons detached and presented before a jury: Thomson vs. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; City vs. Lamson, 9 Id. 477; Clark vs. Iowa City, 20 Id. 589. Alfred Moore, Esq., for the rule, cited County vs. Armstrong, 8 Wright, 63. Rule absolute. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 214.] BREMER VS. WARREN. Bail substituted on the twenty-first day for an unapproved surety, does not make an appeal a supersedeas. Sur rule to show cause why order for payment of money should not be vacated. The exceptions taken to the report of an auditor upon the distribution of a fund realized from a sheriff's sale were dismissed, and the report of the auditor confirmed on March 15, 1879. The exceptant, Mary Davis, a married woman, entered her appeal from the decree of the court on March 31, signing the usual bond in blank for her convenience, without name, date or amount, in the office of the prothonotary of the Court of Common Pleas, with Mary Jones surety. On April 4, the twentieth day after the decree was entered, notice was given the appellees that the bail would be perfected on the following day; when objection being made to the sufficiency of Mary Davis, John Crowe was substituted for Mary Jones, and approved of. The appellees then applied for and obtained an order from the court, distributing the fund in accordance with the auditor's report, for the reason that the security in the appeal having been entered on April 5, the twenty-first day after the final order of court, was not a supersedeas. To vacate that order this rule was taken. Henry Reed, Esq., for the rule: The appeal entered within twenty days was a supersedeas, and the bond filed was complete, and one upon which liability could be enforced, though signed in blank. The substitution of Crowe for Mary Davis' security, excepted to after the expiration of twenty days, was proper under the rule of court: 35 Legal Intelligencer, 78. W. H. Staake, Esq., contra: That rule contemplates the substitution of new bail for bail which had been approved of, but subsequently excepted to. An appeal from a decree distributing the proceeds of a sheriff's sale without the intervention of a jury, to be a supersedeas must be taken and security given with sufficient surety approved of by the court within twenty days. Bail unperfected or security entered but unapproved of by the court, within that time, does not make the appeal a supersedeas. May 24, 1879. Rule discharged. [Leg. Int., Vol. 36, p. 234.] MOORE vs. JUVENAL. An action against an attorney for neglect to bring suit, was brought fifteen years after the negligence complained of began, and nine years after it was complete; held, in the absence of fraud on the part of defendant, to be barred, although four years only had elapsed since the dissolution of the relation of attorney and client, and since the damage resulting from the attorney's negligence became definite. Rule for judgment for the defendant on the point reserved non obstante veredicto. Opinion delivered June 7, 1879, by PEIRCE, J.-The point reserved on behalf of the defendant was whether the plaintiffs were estopped from recovering by the runuing of the statute of limitations. The defendant was employed as counsel by plaintiffs in an equity proceeding and claim which they had against the Green and Coates Streets Passenger Railway Company. In that proceeding the Court of Common Pleas for the city and county of Philadelphia, on the 23d day of May, 1859, decreed in favor of the plaintiffs for the sum of $24,797.20, the amount of the award of the appraisers in their favor, without prejudice to the right of the defendants to contest the same; and inter alia ordered that an amicable action be entered forthwith by and between the plaintiffs and defendants to determine the legal and binding effect of the award. On the 26th of May, 1859, this decree was modified by agreement of the parties, and $15,000 were paid to the plaintiffs; and defendants in that suit agreed to pay a further sum upon said award as soon as approved. On June 6, 1866, the plaintiffs moved for a final injunction, which was refused, and a decree was made in accordance with that of May 23, 1859, as modified by the agreement of May 26, 1859. From this decree the plaintiff's appealed to the Supreme Court. The decree was there affirmed. No action was brought on behalf of the plaintiffs, as ordered by the court, until February 27, 1867. To this the defendants therein, the Green and Coates Streets Passenger Railway Company, inter alia, pleaded the statute of limitations, and the Supreme Court gave judg ment on this plea in favor of the defendants: Railway Company vs. Moore, 14 P. F. Smith, 79. The defendant in this action, believing that the appraisement made in favor of the plaintiffs was in the nature of a legal award, and that the plaintiffs had twenty years in which to bring |