Toleration, Neutrality and DemocracyDario Castiglione, Catriona McKinnon Springer Science & Business Media, 2013. 3. 9. - 186페이지 Catriona McKinnon and Dario Castiglione It is not an overstatement to say that toleration is one of the most important issues for the defmition of a moral and political theory with application to modem globalised societies. Toleration is a value which no politician in any liberal democratic society would dare to reject. In the UK, its value is reflected in the learning outcomes of education for citizenship isolated by the Final Report of the Advisory Group on Citizenship (which schools have a statutory responsibility to deliver): children ought to be disposed to the 'practice of toleration', and have the 'ability to tolerate other view points'. In these days of feelings of heightened insecurity prompting suspicion of strangers and departures from the norm, toleration has again taken centre stage as one of the values defmitive of stable and just liberal democratic societies. Toleration is a matter of principled restraint with respect to differences which are opposed, either at the personal or at the political level. With respect to the former level, the tolerant person does not use the power she has over others she dislikes and/or disapproves of to interfere with them. However, the tolerant person does not thereby divest herself of her dislike or disapproval; the tolerant person does not transform her dislike and disapproval into warm feelings, and neither does she simply become indifferent to what she hitherto disliked and disapproved of when she practices toleration. |
목차
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195 | 64 |
Compatible Ideals? | 97 |
Neutrality Toleration and Reasonable Agreement | 111 |
Is a Tolerant Democracy a Rubber Duck? | 141 |
The Enforcement of Toleration | 163 |
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accept actions argues argument attitude autonomy behaviour beliefs Cambridge University Press citizens civil claim comprehensive doctrines conception of toleration concern conflict constitutional cultural democracy democratic dislike distinction diversity Essays ethical example exclusionary reason first-order reason freedom Graham Finlay grounds harm harm principle human Ibid individual institutions intolerance issue J.B. Schneewind J.S. Mill John Rawls John Stuart Mill Kymlicka Letter Concerning Toleration Liberty limits live Meckled-Garcia Mendus Mill Mill's mind Montaigne Montaigne's moral model moral reasons moral toleration moral virtue neutralist neutrality and toleration neutrality constraint non-liberal normative overlapping consensus Oxford particular Philosophy political conception Political Liberalism political toleration political virtue position practices Princeton principle of toleration problem public reason question Rawls Rawls's reason to repress refrain religious respect restrictions second-order reason simply social society standards T.M. Scanlon theory Theory of Justice toleration and neutrality tradition views virtue of toleration