matter. (a) The interest, however, which disqualifies at common law must be direct and certain, not remote or contingent. (b)

The mere possibility of bias in favour of one of the parties does not ipso facto avoid the Justice's decision; in order to have that effect, the bias must be shewn at least to be real.

The Corporation of B. were the owners of water-works, and were empowered by Statute to take the waters of certain streams, without permission of the mill-owners, on obtaining a certificate of Justices that a certain reservoir was completed of a given capacity, and filled with water. An application was made to Justices accordingly, which was opposed by mill-owners; but, after due enquiry, the Justices granted the certificate. Two of the Justices were trustees of a hospital and friendly society respectively, each of which had lent money to the society on bonds, charging the corporate funds. Neither of the Justices could, by any possibility, have any pecuniary interest in these bonds; but the security of their cestui que trusts would be improved by anything improving the borough fund, and the granting of the certificate would indirectly produce that effect, as increasing the value of the water-works. There was no ground to doubt that the Justices had acted bona fide :-Held that the Justices were not disqualified from acting in the granting of the certificate, and the Court refused a certiorari for the purpose of quashing it. (c)

But if a Judge is really biassed in favour of one of the parties, it would be very wrong in him to act, and seems the Court would interpose in such case. (d)

(a) Reg. v. Rand. L. R. 1 Q. B. 232, per Blackburn, J.

(b) Reg. v. M. S. & L. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 339, per Mellor, J. (c) Reg. v. Rand, L. R. 1 Q. B. 230.

(d) Ib. 233, per Blackburn, J.

It seems no objection to a Justice that he is remotely connected with one of the parties, so long as there is no consanguinity or affinity. (a)

If a person assault a Justice, the latter might, at the time of the assault, order him into custody; but when the act is over, and time intervenes, so that there is no present disturbance, it becomes, like any other offence, a matter to be dealt with upon proper complaint, upon oath, to some other Justice, who might issue his warrant; for neither a magistrate nor a constable is allowed to act officially in his own case, except flagrante delictu, while there is otherwise danger of escape, or to suppress an actual disturbance, and enforce the law while it is in the act of being resisted. (b)

Monopoly.-A by-law passed under 31 Vic., c. 30, s. 44, for exempting from taxation any person commencing any new manufacture of the nature contemplated by the section, and employing therein more than $1,000, and paying to operators more than $30 weekly, was held bad, for exempting new manufactures in preference to old-established business, and for exempting only those persons doing a specified amount of business. (c) The giving to one person of a trade a benefit which another of the same trade does not get also, is a monopoly of the worst description; (d) and a by-law passed for such a purpose, would be void.

Rules in restraint of trade are not criminal, though they may be void as against public policy. (e) Nor are strikes necessarily illegal, and their legality or illegality must depend on the means by which they are enforced,

(a) Reg. v. Comrs. High Ways, St. Joseph, 3 Kerr, 583. See also on this subject Wildes v. Russell, L. R. 1 C. P. 722; Ex parte Leonard, 1 Allen, 269. (b) Powell v. Williamson, 1 U. C. Q. B. 156. per Robinson, C. J.

(c) Pirie and the Corporation of Dundas, 29 U. C. Q. B. 401.

(d) Ib. 407, per A. Wilson, J.

(e) Reg. v. Stainer, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 230, 39 L. J. (M. C.) 54.

and upon their objects. They may be criminal, if part of a combination for the purpose of injuring or molesting either masters or men, or they may be simply illegal, as when they are the result of an arrangement depriving those engaged therein of the liberty of action. (a)

"The Trade Unions Act, 1872," declares that the purposes of any Trade Union shall not, by reason merely that they are in restraint of trade, be deemed to be unlawful, so as to render any member of such Trade Union liable to a criminal prosecution for conspiracy, or otherwise.

By an Act of the last session of the Dominion Parliament, every person who uses violence to any person, or any property, or threatens or intimidates any person in such a manner as would justify a Justice of the Peace, on complaint made to him, to bind over the person so threatening or intimidating to keep the peace, or who "molests" or "obstructs" any person in manner defined by the Act, with a view to coerce such person-being a master, to dismiss or cease to employ any workman; or, being a workman, to quit any employment, or return work before it is finished; being a master, not to offer, or, being a workman, not to accept, any employment or work; being a master or workman, to belong to, or not to belong to, any temporary or permanent association or combination; being a master or workman, to pay any fine or penalty imposed by any temporary or permanent association or combination; being a master, to alter the mode of carrying on his business, or the number or description of any persons employed by him-shall be guilty of an offence against the Act, and shall be liable to imprisonment, with or without hard labour, for a term not exceeding three months.

(a) Farrer v. Close, L. R. 4 Q. B. 612, per Hannen, J.; Hilton v. Eckersly & B. 47.

Any person shall, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to molest or obstruct another person in any of the following cases :-that is to say (1) If he persistently follows such other person about from place to place; (2) If he hides any tools, clothes, or other property owned or used by such other person, or deprives him of, or hinders him in the use thereof; (3) If he watches or besets the house or place where such other person resides, or works, or carries on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such house or place, or if with two or more other persons he follows such other person, in a disorderly manner, in or through any street or road.

By the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 20, s. 42, assaults in pursuance of any unlawful combination or conspiracy to raise the rate of wages, are punishable as misdemeanors.

These Statutes, in a great measure, assimilate the law as to trades unions and strikes to that existing in England. Several cases have been decided in England, which may assist in the construction of the Canadian Statutes. (a)

A by-law of Frederickton, to regulate the public market, required the stalls in the market to be leased annually, and declared that the lessee of a stall should receive from the Mayor a license to occupy, and that any person occupying without license should be liable to a penalty:-Held, in a prosecution for the penalty, that the only question was, whether the defendant had a license. (b)

Champerty and Maintenance.-The offence of champerty

(a) See Reg. v. Bykerdike, 1 M. & Rob, 179; Reg. v. Rowlands, 2 Den. 364, 17 Q. B. 671; Reg. v. Duffield, 5 Cox, 404; Walsby v. Anley, 30 L. J. (M. C.) 121; O'Neill v. Longman, 4 B. & S. 376; O'Neill v. Kruger, 4 B. &. S. 389; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, 592, 601-2; Reg. v. Shepherd, 11 Cox, 325; Reg. v. Selsby, Cox, C. C. 495; Hilton v. Eckersly, 6 E. & B. 47-53; 24 L. J. Q. B. 353; Hornby v Close, L. R. 2 Q. B., 153; Reg. v. Hunt, 8 U. & P. 642; Reg. v. Hewit, 5 Cox, C. C. 162.

(b) Ex parte Milligan, 2 Allen, 583; see as to forestalling, Wilson v. Corporation, St. Catherines, 21 U. C. C. P. 462.

is defined in the old books to be the unlawful maintenance of a suit, in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute, or some profit out of it. (a) The object of the law is not so much to prevent the purchase or assignment of a matter in litigation, as the purchase or assignment of a matter in litigation, with the object of maintaining and taking part in the litigation. (b) All the cases of champerty and maintenance are founded on the principle that no encouragement should be given to litigation by the introduction of parties to enforce those rights which others are not disposed to enforce. (c)

The principles of the law of maintenance are recog nized and adhered to in the modern cases. (d) But the general doctrines of the law are largely modified, and restrained in their operation to cases where there is danger of oppression or abuse; (e) or where a man improperly, and for the purpose of stirring up litigation or strife, or of profiting by it, encourages others to bring actions, or make defences, which they have no right to make. (f)

Champerty is punishable at common law. (g) It seems the Crown is bound by the law on this subject. In Smyth v. M'Donald, (h) it was held that the Crown must first eject the occupant before selling land of which it is not in possession; and that neither the 32 Hy. 8, c. 9, nor the ordinary principles of the common law, allowed the conveyance of such land by the Crown. (1)

The plaintiff having recovered judgment against B. &

(a) Carr v. Tannahill, 30 U. C. Q. B. 223, per Morrison, J.; Kerr v. Brunton 24 U. C. Q. B. 395, per Hagarty, J.; Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing, 369.

(b) Carr v. Tannahill, supra, 223, per Morrison, J.

(c) Ib. 224, per Morrison, J.; Prosser v. Edmonds, 1 Y. & C. 497.

(d) Carr v. Tannahill, supra, 227, per Morrison, J.

(e) Allan v. M'Heffey, 1 Öldright, 121, per Young, C. J.

(ƒ) Ib. 122, per Young, C. J.

(g) Scott v. Henderson, 2 Thomson, 116, per Haliburton, C. J.

(h) 1 Oldright, 274

() And see Scott v. Henderson, supra, 116 per Haliburton, C. J.