charged as a misdemeanor, or as the statutory offence of perjury. (a)

But now the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s. 10, contains provisions as to the form of the indictment, whether the offence has or has not been actually committed, and section 8 provides that any person accused of perjury may be tried and convicted in any district, county, or place, where he is apprehended, or is in custody.

The ordinary conclusion of an indictment for perjury, "did thereby commit wilful and corrupt perjury,” may be rejected as surplusage. (b)

It has been held, under the 14 & 15 Vic, c. 100, s. 1, (c) that the Judge had power to amend an indictment for perjury, describing the Justices before whom the perjury was committed as Justices for a county, where they are proved to be Justices for a borough only. (d)

By 26 Vic., c. 29, s. 7, it is enacted that witnesses before commissioners for enquiring into the existence of corrupt practices at elections shall not be excused from answering questions, on the ground that the answers thereto may criminate them, and that "no statement made by any person, in answer to any question put by such commissioners, shall, except in cases of indictments for perjury, be admissible in evidence in any proceeding, civil or criminal":-Held, that, "except in cases of indictments for perjury," applies only to perjury committed before the commissioners; and, therefore, on an indictment for perjury, committed on the trial of an election petition, evidence of answers to commissioners appointed to enquire into the existence of corrupt practices at the election in question is not admissible. (e)·

(a) Reg. v. Clement, 26 U. C. Q. B. 297; see ante, p. 84.

(b) Reg. v. Hodgkiss, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 212; 39 L. J. (M. C.) 14; Ryalls v. Reg. 11 Q. B. 781.

(c) See 32 & 33 Vic., c. 29, s. 71.

(d) Keg. v. Western, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 122; 37 L. J. (M. C.) 81. (e) Reg. v. Buttle, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 248.

Some one or more of the assignments of perjury must be proved by two witnesses, or by one witness and the proof of other material and relevant facts, confirming his testimony. (a) And the assignment so proved must be upon a part of the matter sworn, which was material to the matter before the Court, at the time the oath was taken. (b)

Where three witnesses proved that the prisoner had made parol statements, contradictory to the truth of the statement upon which perjury was assigned, and the evidence of several witnesses went to confirm the truth of such parol statements: but there was no direct evidence that they were true-a conviction for perjury was supported.

The prisoner, having laid an information against a publican for keeping open after lawful hours, swore, at the hearing, that he knew nothing of the matter, except what he had been told, and that he did not see any person leave the house after eleven o'clock. Perjury having been assigned on this allegation, he was convicted. To establish that it was false, the magistrate's clerk proved a statement by the prisoner, when laying the information, that he had seen four men leave after eleven o'clock, and that he could swear to one W.: and two other witnesses proved that the prisoner had made a statement to this same effect to them. It was further proved that W. did leave after eleven-that, at the hearing, the prisoner had acknowledged that he had offered to smash the case for 30s.—and that he had talked of making the publican pay to settle it. A third witness proved that he had heard the prisoner offer to settle it for £1: and a fourth wit

(a) R. v. Boulter, 2 Den. 396; 21 L. J. (M. C.) 57; 3 C. & K. 236; R. v. Webster, 1 F. & F. 515; R. v. Braithwaite, ib. 638; Reg. v. Shaw, L. & C. 579; 34 L. J. (M. C.) 169; Arch. Cr. Pldg. 822.

(b) Ib. see also R. v. Muscot, 10 Mod. 194; R. v. Lee, 2 Russ. 650; R. v. Gardner, 8 C. & P. 737; R. v. Roberts, 2 C. & K. 607.

ness proved that the prisoner owned he had received 10s. to smash the case, and was to receive 10s. more:-Held, that the evidence was sufficient to establish the falsehood of the prisoner's statement made on oath, and that he was properly convicted of the perjury alleged. (a)

The 32 & 33 Vic., c. 23, s. 8, applies to all cases of perjury, and not merely to "perjuries in insurance cases," which is the heading under which the sections from 4 to 12 are placed. Therefore, a magistrate acting in the County of Halton has jurisdiction to take an information, and to apprehend and bind over, a person charged with perjury committed in the County of Wellington. (b)

See 31 Vic., c. 1, s. 6, sixteenthly, as to powers of officer to administer oath, and what statements shall be perjury. Conspiracy. A conspiracy is an agreement by two persons, or more, to do, or cause to be done, an act prohibited by penal law, or to prevent the doing of an act ordained under legal sanction, by any means whatever, or to do, or cause to be done, an act, whether lawful or not, by means prohibited by penal law. (c)

It is otherwise defined as a crime which consists either in a combination and agreement by persons to do some illegal act, or a combination and agreement to effect a legal purpose by illegal means. (d)

Conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more, to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act, by unlawful means, So long as such design rests in intention only, it is not indictable. But where two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties promise against promise, actus contra actum, cap

(a) Reg. v. Hook, 4 U. C. L. J. 241; Dears & B. 606; 27 L. J. (M. C.) 222. (b) Reg. v. Currie, 31 U. C. Q. B. 582.

(c) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 93, per Drummond, J.

(d) Reg. v. Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91, per Alderson, B.; Reg. v. Roy supra, 92, per Drummond, J. Z

able of being enforced if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object, or for the use of criminal means. (a) The conspiracy or unlawful agreement is the gist of the offence. (b)

As it is thus complete, by a mere combination of persons, to commit an illegal act, or any act whatever, by illegal means, the parties will be liable, though the conspiracy has not been actually carried into execution. (c) The actual execution of the conspiracy need not be alleged in the indictment. (d)

For the same reason, it is not necessary that the object should be unlawful; and in many cases an agreement to do a certain thing has been considered as the subject of an indictment for conspiracy, though the same act, if done separately by each individual, without any agreement amongst themselves, would not have been illegal. (e)

The rule is, that, when two fraudulently combine, the agreement may be criminal, although, if the agreement were carried out, no crime would be committed, but a civil wrong only inflicted on the party. (ƒ)

It is sufficient to constitute a conspiracy if two, or more, persons combine, by fraud and false pretences, to injure another, and it is not necessary that the acts agreed to be done should be acts which, if done, would be criminal. It is enough if they are wrongful, i.e. amount to a civil wrong. (g)

A fraudulent agreement, by a member of a partnership,

(a) Mulcahy v. Reg. L. R. 3 E. & I. App. 306-317-328.

(b) Horseman v. Reg., 16 U. C. Q. B. 543; R. v. Seward, 1 A. & E. 706; 3 L. J. (M. C.) 103; R. v. Richardson, 1 M. & Rob. 402; R. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49; 12 L. J. (M. C.) 135; 3 Russ. Cr. 116.

(c) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 92, per Drummond, J.

(d) Ib.

(e) Rex. v. Mawbey, 6 T. R. 636, per Grose, J.; 3 Russ. Cr. 116.

(f) Reg. v. Warburton, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 276, per Cockburn, C. J. ; 40 L. J. (M. C.) 22.

(g) Ib. 276, per Cockburn, C. J.

with third persons, wrongfully to deprive his partner, by false entries, and false documents, of all interest in some of the partnership property, in taking accounts for the division of the property, on the dissolution of the partnership, was held to be a conspiracy, although the offence was completed before the passing of the corresponding English section of the 32 & 33 Vic., c. 21, s. 38, (by which a partner can be criminally convicted for feloniously stealing the partnership property); for the object was, to commit a civil wrong, by fraud and false pretences, and that is a conspiracy. (a)

It appears that an indictment lies not only wherever a conspiracy is entered into for a corrupt or illegal purpose, but also where the conspiracy is to effect a legal purpose by the use of unlawful means, and this although such purpose be not effected (b)

But in an indictment for conspiracy, an offence prohibited by penal law must be set forth either in the averment of the end or means. The indictment ought to shew that the conspiracy was for an unlawful purpose, or to effect a lawful purpose by unlawful means. Malum prohibitum, and not malum in se non prohibitum, is the only foundation either as to the end or the means, upon which an indictment for conspiracy should rest. (c)

All the definitions of conspiracy shew that the offences of this nature belong to one or other of two classes. The first, where the illegal character of the object constitutes the crime; the second, where the illegal character of the means used to attain the end is the constituent feature of the offence. In the first class of cases, it is unnecessary to state in the indictment the means by which the un

(a) Reg. v. Warburton, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 274.

(b) Reg. v. Tailor's Cam. 8 Mod. 11; Reg. v. Best, 6 Mod. 185; 3 Russ. Cr. 116. (c) Reg. v. Roy, 11 L. C. J. 89-93, per Drummond, J.