1. THEFT OF ABANDONED PROPERTY-ACT 1825, SECTION 9, CONSTRUED.—
The ninth section of the act of congress of March 3, 1825, against plun-
dering or stealing money, goods, merchandise, or other effects, from or
belonging to any ship or vessel, in distress or wrecked, lost or stranded,
does not apply to property which has been abandoned by its owners.
Property thus abandoned may be acquired by any one who has the energy
and enterprise to seek its recovery, without violating the statute. United
States v. Smiley, 640.
2. EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION.-The criminal jurisdiction
of the United States may, in some instances, extend to their citizens be-
yond their territory, as, for instance, for violation of treaty stipulations
by them abroad; for offenses committed in foreign countries where juris-
diction is by treaty conceded for that purpose, as in some cases in China
and the Barbary States; for offenses committed on deserted islands or
uninhabited coasts; by officers and seamen of vessels sailing under their
flag; and for derelictions of duty by their ministers, consuls, and other
representatives abroad. But except in cases like these (and their extra-
territorial character is generally indicated in the law designating the act
for which punishment is prescribed), the criminal jurisdiction of the
United States is limited to their own territory, actual or constructive.
Their actual territory is co-extensive with their possessions, including a
marine league from their shores on the sea. Their constructive territory
embraces vessels sailing under their flag. Wherever they go they carry
the laws of their country, and for a violation of them their officers and
seamen may be subjected to punishment. Id.
3. JURISDICTION OF PROPERTY BURIED IN SEA NEAR COAST.-In this case the
vessel, which carried the money recovered by the accused, was at the
time of its recovery broken up, without a vestige of it remaining. The
money was buried in the sand, several feet under the water of the sea,
and was within one hundred and fifty feet of the Mexican shore: Held,
that there was no jurisdiction of the United States over the place or prop-
erty; and that the jurisdiction of Mexico over all offenses committed
within a marine league of its shores, not on a vessel of another nation,
was complete and exclusive. Id.
1. ACCOUNT STATED-BROKER'S PASS-BOOK.-Under the circumstances of this
case, the balances struck in a "broker's pass-book:" Held, accounts stated.
Marye v. Strouse, 204.
2. INTEREST-ACCOUNT STATED.-An account stated is a new promise, and
not a promise to pay any particular item that went into it. Id.
1. SALVOR, UNDERTAKING OF.-A salvor does not undertake to succeed in
saving the property in peril, but only that he will exercise ordinary skill
and diligence in the use of the means or machinery with which he under-
takes the salvage service. The Allegiance, 68.
2. DUTY OF THE Tow.-It is the duty of the vessel in tow to keep in proper
trim and tack, to follow the tug and steer accordingly, and if injury re-
sults to the tow from negligence or mistake in these respects, the tug is
not responsible. Id.
3. SALVAGE BY A STEAM TUG-COMPENSATION FOR. Owing to its compar-
ative independence of the winds and currents, a steam tug may perform
a salvage service with comparative safety to herself, and therefore the
matter of risk to herself and crew is to be estimated accordingly, in fix-
ing the value of such service. Id.
4. SALVAGE SERVICE-COMPENSATION FOR.-A steam tug of three hundred
and four horse-power left Baker's bay, and overtook an iron ship of one
thousand two hundred and thirty-five tons, worth forty-seven thousand dol-
lars, drawing twelve feet of water, in ballast, drifting on to the west end of
Chinook spit in seventeen feet of water at flood tide, near two hours be-
fore high water, with the wind blowing about eight from the south-south-
east, and took her hawser and towed her under the lee of the east end
of Sand island, where, owing to the strength of the wind, which had in-
creased to ten and veered to south-east by south, she was compelled to
let her go in comparatively safe anchorage in twenty-three feet of water;
but the ship, only letting go one anchor, dragged on to the spit, where
she lay until next morning in about four or five feet of water at low tide,
when the tug, and three others of near the same power and working
under the same management, returned to her and pulled her off about
two hours before high water, with a light breeze from the east by south,
and the ship heading south by east, without any serious risk to the tugs,
or actual injury thereto: Held, that the service was a salvage service,
and the compensation therefor fixed at five thousand dollars. Id.
5. COLLISION. Steamer adjudged in fault for not keeping out of the way of
a schooner seen to be approaching her nearly bows on, at the distance of
a mile and a half. Steamer Ancon, 118.
6. LOOKOUT. The duty of unremitting attention on the part of a lookout en-
forced. Id.
7. IF THE NIGHT WAS FOGGY, as claimed by the libelants, the steamer should
have blown her whistle and moderated her speed, both of which precau-
tions she neglected until too late. Id.
8. IF SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR to permit an approaching vessel to be seen at the
distance of a mile and a half, her negligence in not keeping out of the
way was inexcusable, if not unaccountable. Id.
9. CHANGING COURSE, FAMILIAR EXCUSE.-The familiar excuse set up by the
steamer, that the schooner changed her course and ran across her bows,
rejected as not supported by the testimony; and because, if it did occur,
as stated by the steamer's second officer and lookout, the steamer had
ample time to avoid the disaster. Id.
10. CARRIER'S LIABILITY-GOODS DAMAGED BY SEA PERILS.-Where wool
arrived damaged, and in a perishing condition, from causes for which the
carrier was not responsible, and the consignees declined to receive it,
and it was subsequently sold by the carrier to prevent its perishing on
his hands: Held, that the carrier's duty and liability terminated on the
discharge of the wool, and reasonable notice and opportunity given to
the consignees to take it away. He thenceforth became a compulsory
bailee of the goods, bound only to such reasonable care as a prudent and
honest man would take of property of which he has become the involun-
tary custodian. The Bobolink, 146.
11. DEATH, ACTION FOR.-Although an action may not lie at common law to
recover damages for the death of a person, it will at the civil law, and
therefore semble that it will in admiralty. Holmes v. O. & Cal. R. Co.,
262.
12. MARINE TORT.-A marine tort is one that occurs on any public navigable
water of the United States, whether caused by a wrongful act or omis-
sion, and the proper district court, as a court of admiralty, has jurisdic-
tion of a suit to recover damages therefor. Id.
13. RIGHT GIVEN BY STATE STATUTE.—The jurisdiction of the national courts
does not depend upon the origin of the rights of the parties; and where a
state statute gives a right, the same may be asserted or enforced in such
courts whenever the citizenship of the parties or the nature of the sub-
ject will permit. Id.
14. SAME. The right given by section 367 of the Or. Civ. Code, to an admin-
istrator to recover damages on account of the death of his intestate from
the party by whose act or omission such death was caused, may be en-
forced in the national courts. Id.
15. SAME-SUIT IN ADMIRALTY.-When a passenger on the railway ferry-
boat plying across the Wallamet river between East Portland and Port-
land was drowned by reason of the negligence of the owner of the boat
or its servants, a marine tort was committed, for which a suit may be
maintained in the district court by the administrator of the deceased, to
recover the damages given therefor by section 367, supra. Id.
16. SEAMAN'S WAGES-DISRATING COOK.-When a cook was put off duty in
consequence of persistent negligence, disobedience, and insolence: Held,
that he had no right to recover wages for the period during which he
performed no duty. Bark Antioch, 328.
17. PAYMENT ALLOWED OUT OF SURPLUS PROCEEDS in the registry of a claim,
which, by the law of this state, constituted a lien on the vessel. Mary
Zephyr, 427.
18. CRANE-LINE.—The primary purpose of a crane-line is to steady the back-
stays, and in blustery weather it is very apt to chafe and wear out
where it is fastened to the stays; and, therefore, it ought not to be used
as a foot-rope without caution and the aid of the stays. Chandos, 544.
19. SAME.—The weather being wet, the night dark, and the wind strong,
the libelant was ordered to go aloft and cast off the stop on the foretop-
gallant halyards, which he did by going up the rigging and out on the
crane-line to the space between the topmast and top-gallant-stay, and
there untying the stop with both hands while he sat upon the crane-line,
without any other hold or security, and, just as the stop was cast off, the
line parted near the top-gallant-stay, and the libelant was precipitated
to the deck and seriously injured: Held, that the injury was caused by
the negligence of the libelant in going on the crane-line without an oppor-
tunity of examining its condition and without holding to the stays by his
arms or legs, or both, while casting off the stop; and that if, by reason
of the negligence or misconduct of the mate, the crane-line was insuffi-
cient, still the libelant could not recover damages for the injury, because
even then his own negligence substantially contributed to the result. Id.
20. FELLOW-SERVANT.-Semble, that the mate is not the fellow-servant of a
sailor so as to exempt the master from liability for an injury caused to
the latter by the negligence of the former. Id.
21. DEVIATION.-A departure from the due course of a voyage, to save prop-
erty merely, is a deviation and will forfeit the insurance; but a depart-
ure to save life is not. But although the law will, as between the in-
surer and insured, excuse a departure from motives of humanity, a mas-
ter is not correspondingly bound to make such departure, even to save
the life of one of the crew; but the time and risk likely to be consumed
and incurred in such departure, as compared with that incident to the
direct voyage, are to be considered, and have a controlling influence in
the matter. Id.
22. SAME.-On June 10, in latitude 38° south and longitude 91° west, the
ship Chandos was on her way to Portland, Oregon, with a cargo of rail-
way iron, without a surgeon or any surgical appliances on board, when
the libelant fell from aloft and broke his thigh bone: Held, that if the
ship could have made a port-as, for instance, Valparaiso, distant about
1,080 miles-in five or six days, it would have been the duty of the mas-
ter to have gone there and obtained surgical aid for the libelant; but if
it could not have been done in less than two weeks, he was not bound to
make the departure. Id.
23. SICK OR INJURED SEAMEN.-The hospital service of the United States is
not intended to supersede the marine law, which imposes an obligation
on a vessel to take care of a seaman falling sick or becoming injured in its
service, but only auxiliary thereto. Id.
24. SAME.-A seaman injured in the service of a vessel, without his fault, is
entitled to be taken care of, at the expense of the vessel, until the end
of the voyage, and longer, if necessary to effect a cure, so far as the same
can be done by the use of the ordinary medical means; and the fault
which will exempt a vessel from such liability is not mere ordinary negli-
gence consistent with good faith, but some positively vicious conduct,
such as gross negligence or willful disobedience of orders. Id.
25. NEGLECT TO SEND SEAMAN TO HOSPITAL.-Damages allowed for neglect-
ing to send libelant to the marine hospital at Portland, at the expense of
the ship, for twelve days after her arrival in the Columbia river. Id.
1. ADMINISTRATION-JURISDICTION TO GRANT.-By the constitution of this
state, the county court is a court of record with general jurisdiction of
probate matters, to be regulated by law (art. 7, secs. 1 and 12); and by
statute (Civ. Code, sec. 869) it has the exclusive power to grant letters of administration upon the estate of a person who at or immediately before his death was an inhabitant of the county: Held, 1. That a decree of the county court of Multnomah county, granting letters to D. upon the estate of P., by which it appears to have been adjudged by said court upon a proper petition, that P. was an inhabitant of the county at or immediately before his death, cannot be questioned collaterally on the ground that P. was not in fact such inhabitant; 2. That said court having general jurisdiction of the subject-matter-the granting of administration upon the vacant estate of a deceased person-it had the authority to inquire and determine whether, in that particular case, the deceased was an inhabitant of the county or not, and that its decision upon the question is conclusive, except upon appeal; and 3. That a subsequent decree by the county court of another county granting letters of administration upon the same estate to H., while the first was in full force and effect, is null and void. Holmes v. O. & C. R. Co., 262.
2. INHABITANT.-The word "inhabitant," as used in the section 1053 aforesaid, has a narrower and more limited signification than domicile, and implies a personal presence in the county as a dweller therein. Id. 3. DAMAGES.-The damages recoverable under section 367 of the Or. Civ. Code, by an administrator for the death of his intestate, are general assets of the estate, and are given merely as a pecuniary compensation for the death, and not as a solatium; nor are they to be exemplary or vindictive; but according to the value of the life, having due regard to the capacity and disposition of the deceased to be useful to labor and to save. Id.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
See LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS, 6, 8.
1. AGENT.-An agent to buy cannot be the seller. Marye v. Strouse, 204. 2. BROKER'S CONTRACT.-An ordinary broker's contract for the purchase of mining stock, each share of which has an independent value, is not an entire contract. Id.
3. SAME CUSTOM.-A custom of charging customers an arbitrary sum for telegrams, usually much more than the actual cost, if it can be considered reasonable, ought to be established by very satisfactory proof, and it should appear that both parties knew of it. Id.
4. ACCOUNT STATED-BROKER'S PASS-BOOK.-Under the circumstances of this case, the balances struck in a "broker's pass-book:" Held, accounts stated. Id.
5. SAME INTEREST-APPROPRIATION.Where a statute does no more than prohibit a recovery of interest in excess of ten per cent., when the contract is not in writing, but does not otherwise make the rate of interest unlawful, interest in excess of that rate may be included in an account stated; and money paid on account by the debtor may be applied to the payment of such interest by the creditor in the absence of any appropri ation by the debtor. Id.
6. MOTION-APPEARANCE.-A general appearance and consenting to a continuance is a waiver of irregularity in the notice. Id.
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