which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, or to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, or to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (a)

1 As to this clause, see p. 567, note 4, infra.

(a) [A discrimination between agricultural lands and other lands with regard to the right of a city to annex them by extension of its corporate limits so as to include them is no denial of the equal protection of the laws. A State may classify the objects of legislation so long as its attempted classification is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 114, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284, aff. 59 Kan. 427, 53 Pac. 468. Many cases upon the power of the legislature to annex rural lands to municipalities are collected in a note to this case in 44 L. ed. U. S. 392. Nor does a statute making a railroad company liable to an employee injured by the negligence of a fellow-servant deny to such company the equal protection of the laws, since there are peculiar hazards in the operation of a railroad which warrant the discrimination between railroad companies and ordinary employers in this regard. Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western R. Co., 175 U. S. 348, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136. The act (Burns's An. Stat. of Ind., Rev. of 1894, §§ 7083-7) applies in terms only to corporations. The point was raised in the defence that this discrimination between corporations operating railroads and other persons or associations operating railroads was unconstitutional, but it was not noticed by the court. That the exception of a dummy railroad operated by steam or of an electric railroad from an ordinance limiting the speed with which railroad trains may run within the city limits is not an arbitrary and unreasonable classification in denial of the equal protection of the laws, see Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819, aff. 60 Kan. 251, 56 Pac. 133. On validity of ordinance requiring possession of good character and reputation in one seeking license to sell cigarettes and vesting mayor with power to determine whether or not applicant possesses such, see Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633, aff. 176 Ill. 340, 52 N. E. 44.

A county board of education maintained primary schools for white children and for negro children. They also maintained a high school for white children, but had discontinued a high school for negro children for the reason that the funds were needed for primary schools for a much larger number of negro children than attended the negro high school. Such discontinuance of high school privileges for negroes while high school privileges are continued for white children cannot be corrected by injunction against maintenance of high school for white children, and refusal to grant such injunction is no denial of the equal protection of the laws nor of any privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. Cumming v. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 197, aff. 103 Ga. 641, 29 S. E. 488.

Upon equality of exemption under State taxation, see People v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 58, aff. 91 Hun, 158, 149 N. Y. 608, 44 N. E. 1127. State may abridge right of trial by jury in city courts without making same provision for county courts, Chappell Chem. & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U. S. 474, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 268, citing Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 350, and Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22. Jury trial is not necessary in a commitment for contempt of court. Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U. S. 101, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 805. Nor in disbarment proceedings, Shepard's Case, 109 Mich. 631, 67 N. W. 971.

State may provide that plaintiff in an action against a railroad company for loss by fire caused by operation of the road shall, if successful, recover a reasonable attorney's fee in addition to damages, while, if unsuccessful, no attorney's fee shall be assessed against him. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 609. See in this case a vigorous dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., concurred in by Brown, Peckham, and McKenna, JJ. That state may require railroad companies to pay discharged employees at regular rate until time of full payment, not to exceed sixty days after discharge, see St. Louis, I. M. & S. R.

2. It provides that when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors (a) for President or Vice-President of the Co. v. Paul, 173 U. S. 404, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419, aff. 64 Ark. 83, 40 S. W. 705, 37 L. R. A. 504.

A statute providing that if a tramp shall threaten to injure the person or property of any person he shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary, is not void as denying equal protection. State v. Hogan, 63 Ohio, 202, 58 N. E. 572, 81 Am. St. 626. The equal protection of the laws is not denied to negroes by those provisions of the Constitution of Mississippi which place burdens and limitations upon persons subject to vices and guilty of crimes that are characteristic of the negro race, nor is there any discrimination thus brought about against the race itself. Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 583. Or by a law requiring whites and negroes to occupy different compartments of passenger-cars. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1138. See Smith v. State, 100 Tenn. 494, 46 S. W. 566, and Anderson v. Louisville & N. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. 46. Accused cannot insist that his race be represented upon the jury, either trial or grand. Wood v. Brush, 140 U. S. 278, 370, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788, 942; Jugiro v. Brush, 140 U. S. 291, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 770. A State may abolish the fellow-servant rule with regard to a particular class of employers only, e.g. railroad companies. Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585. State may provide that coming into court to challenge the validity of an alleged service upon the defendant shall constitute a general appearance. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; Kauffman v. Wooters, 138 U. S. 285, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298. Exemption by statute of "planters and farmers grinding and refining their own sugar and molasses" from a license tax upon persons and corporations carrying on the business of refining sugar and molasses is not a denial of the equal protection of the laws to the persons taxed. Am. Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43. State may levy a specific tax upon persons engaged in the business of hiring laborers to be employed beyond the limits of the State, while levying none upon those hiring laborers to be employed within the State. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128, aff. 110 Ga. 584, 35 S. E. 699. A person cannot complain that he is denied the equal protection of the laws when valid laws are fairly administered as to him, although there is maladministration as to his neighbors, as, eg. by under-assessment of property for taxation, New York v. Barker, 179 U. S. 279, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121. The levy of a tax upon owners of lands abutting on streets along which conduits for public water supply run, in excess of that levied upon owners of lands not so located, upon the theory that better fire protection is afforded is unconstitutional. Lemont v. Jenks, 197 Ill. 363, 64 N. E. 362. State may classify cities for regulation of registration of voters. Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125. In Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co. et al., 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 30, a statute of Kansas defining what shall constitute public stock yards and regulating all charges thereof, is held to be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment for the reason that the definition of a "public stock yard" was made to depend upon the volume of business done and the facts showed that the Kansas City Stock Yards Co. was the only one within the definition, and the legislation was therefore a denial to the Kansas City Co. of the equal protection of the law.

For other cases on "equal protection," see Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1031; Jones v. Brim, 165 U. S. 180, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255, rev. 87 Tex. 19; 26 S. W. 985; St. L. & S. F. R. Co. v. Mathews, 165 U. S. 1, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 243; Merchant v. Pa. R. Co., 153 U. S. 380, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894; Jennings v. Coal Ridge Imp. & Coal Co., 147 U. S. 147, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 452, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 528; Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Chambers, 182 U. S. 556, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 863, aff. 21 Utah, 324, 61 Pac. 560; Estate of Mahoney, 133 Cal. 180, 65 Pac. 389, 85 Am. St. 155]

(a) [The appointment and mode of appointment of electors from a State are within the power of the State acting in such manner as its legislature may direct;

United States, representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or is in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of congressional representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 3. It disqualifies from holding Federal or State offices certain persons who shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. 4. It declares the inviolability of the public debt of the United States, and forbids the United States or any State assuming or paying any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave. The fifteenth amendment declares that

standing the abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude, the freedmen were in some portions of the country subjected to disabilities from which others were exempt. There were also complaints of the existence in certain sections of the Southern States of a feeling of enmity, growing out of the collisions of the war, towards citizens of the North. Whether these complaints had any just foundation is immaterial; they were believed by many to be well founded, and to prevent any possible legislation hostile to any class from the causes mentioned, and to obviate objections to legislation similar to that embodied in the Civil Rights Act, the fourteenth amendment was adopted. This is manifest from the discussions in Congress with reference to it. There was no diversity of opinion as to its object between those who favored and those who opposed its adoption." Mr. Justice Field in San Mateo County v. Sou. Pac. R. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722.

1 "That amendment was undoubtedly proposed for the purpose of fully protecting the newly-made citizens of the African race in the enjoyment of their freedom, and to prevent discriminating State legislation against them. The generality of the language used necessarily extends its provisions to all persons, of every race and color. Previously to its adoption, the Civil Rights Act had been passed, which declared that citizens of the United States of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, should have the same rights in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, own, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and should be subject to like punishments, pains, and pena'ties, and to none other. The validity of this act was questioned in many quarters, and complaints were made that, notwithand a law directing that one elector and one alternate shall be elected from each congressional district, and one elector and one alternate shall be elected at large in each of two districts into which the legislature divides the State for the purpose of electing the remaining two electors, is a valid exercise of the power of the legislature in this regard. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3, aff. 92 Mich. 377, 52 N. W. 469, 16 L. R. A. 475, 31 Am. St. 587.]

"A State acts by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities. It can act in no other way. The constitutional provision, therefore, must mean

the right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.1

The executive power is vested in a president, who is made commander-in-chief of the army and navy, and of the militia of