be followed of necessity in the Federal Supreme Court. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10. See Gibson v. Lyon, 115 U. S. 439, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129.

This doctrine does not apply to questions not at all dependent upon local statutes or usages; as, for instance, to contracts and other instruments of a conmercial and general nature, like bills of exchange: Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1; Oates v. National Bank, 100 U. S. 239; Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14; and insurance contracts. Robinson v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 3 Sum. 220. And see Reimsdyke v. Kane, 1 Gall. 376; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; Gloucester Ins. Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. C. C. 322; Bragg v. Meyer, McAll. 408. Whether a lunatic's contract is void or voidable is a question of general jurisprudence. Edwards v. Davenport, 20 Fed. Rep. 756. And of course cases presenting questions of conflict with the Constitution of the United States cannot be within the doctrine. State Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369; Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436. The Federal court must decide for itself whether there exists a contract within the constitutional protection. Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 193; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. So in determining the validity of municipal ordinances. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1064. And where a contract had been made under a settled construction of the

State constitution by its highest court, the Supreme Court sustained it, notwithstanding the State court had since overruled its former decision. Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175. See Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 67; Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 677.

1 To constitute a bill of credit within the meaning of the Constitution, it must be issued by a State, involve the faith of the State, and be designed to circulate as money on the credit of the State, in the ordinary uses of business. Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 11 Pet. 257; Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. Treasury warrants designed so to circulate are bills of credit. Braggs v. Tuffts, 49 Ark. 554, 6 S. W. 158. [But if they are to be retired, as soon as presented for payment at the State treasury, and paid, they are not bills of credit, even though the creditor to whom they are issued may demand at the time of receiving them that they be issued in denominations of one dollar each to the extent of the debt, the remainder being issued in denominations of not less than five dollars, and even though they may pass from hand to hand and are receivable from any person in payment of taxes. Houston & T. C. R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545, rev. 41 S. W. 157.] The facts that a State owns the entire capital stock of a bank, elects the directors, makes its bills receivable for the public dues, and pledges its faith for their redemption, do not make the bills of such bank "bills of credit" in the constitutional sense. Darrington v. State Bank of Alabama, 13

1 Const. of U. S. art. 4. "What are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are in their nature fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the several States which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What those fundamental principles are, it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the government, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of every kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the citizens of the other State, may be mentioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental; to which may be added the elective franchise as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly speaking, privileges and immunities; and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union." Washington, J., in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 380. The Supreme

Court will not describe and define those | privileges and immunities in a general classification; preferring to decide each } case as it may come up. Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391. The question in this last case was whether the State of Virginia could prohibit citizens of other States from planting oysters in Ware River, a stream in that State where the tide ebbs and flows, and the right be granted by the State to its own citizens exclusively. Waite, Ch. J., in answering the question in the affirmative, said: "The right thus granted is not a privilege or immunity of general, but of special citizenship. It does not belong of right to the citizens of all free governments, but only to the citizens of Virginia, on account of the peculiar circumstances in which they are placed; they, and they alone, owned the property to be sold or used; and they alone had the power to dispose of it as they saw fit. They owned it, not by virtue of citizenship merely, but of citizenship and domicile united; that is to say, by virtue of a citizenship confined to that particular locality." See also Paul v. Hazelton, 37 N. J. 106; [Com. v. Hilton, 174 Mass. 29, 54 N. E. 362, 45 L. R. A. 475.] For other discussions upon this subject, see Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf. 393; Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270, and 20 N. Y. 562; Campbell v. Morris, 3 Har. & M'H. 554; Amy v. Smith, 1 Lit. 326; Crandall v. State, 10 Conn. 340; Butler v. Farnsworth, 4 Wash. C. C. 101; Commonwealth v. Towles, 5 Leigh, 743; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Md. 194; Slaughter v. Commonwealth, 13 Gratt. 767; State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68; People v. Coleman, 4 Cal. 46; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 544; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 68; Ducat v. Chicago, 48 Ill. 172; Fire Department v. Noble, 3 E. D. Smith, 441; Same v. Wright, 3 E. D. Smith, 453; Robinson v. Oceanic S. N. Co., 112 N. Y. 315, 19 N. E. 625; Bliss's Petition, 63 N. H. 135; State v. Lancaster, id. 267; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W. Rep. 88; State v. Gilman, 33 W. Va. 146, 10 S. E. Rep. 283; Fire Dep't v. Helfenstein, 16 Wis. 136; Sears v. Commis

sioners of Warren Co., 36 Ind. 267; Jeffersonville, &c. R. R. Co. v. Hendricks, 41 Ind. 48; Cincinnati Health Association v. Rosenthal, 55 Ill. 85; State v. Fosdick, 21 La. Ann. 434; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130; Bartmeyer v. Iowa, 18 Wall. 129; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Kimmish v. Ball, 129 U. S. 217, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 277; [Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 558–593, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 448, 494. Upon privileges of citi zens of States, see note to 1 L. R. A. 56; political rights of, note to 8 L. R. A. 337. This clause does not give a citizen the right to enjoy within his own State the privileges which citizens of other States enjoy under the laws of those States. McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 913. Nor to carry with him, when he goes into other States, the privileges which he enjoys in his home State. Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U. S. 492, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1012. Exemptions from taxation must be granted to non-residents upon same terms as to residents. Sprague v. Fletcher, 69 Vt. 69, 37 Atl. 239, 37 L. R. A. 840. Citizen of sister State may sue defendant resident of his home State in any State where he can get service upon him, even though cause of action arose in home State, provided it be transitory. Eingartner v. Illinois Steel Company, 94 Wis. 70, 68 N. W. 664, 34 L. R. A. 503; Cofrode v. Gartner, 79 Mich. 332, 44 N. W. 623, 7 L. R. A. 511. Insurance laws cannot place greater restrictions upon citizens of other States than upon those of home State. State v. Board of Ins. Com'rs, 37 Fla. 564, 20 So. 772, 33 L. R. A. 288. Agents of nonresident insurers may be required to secure a certificate of authority from the insurance commissioner before insuring property within the State. People v. Gay, 107 Mich. 422, 65 N. W. 292, 30 L. R. A. 464. Citizens of other States cannot be denied right to become trustees by appointment through deeds, mortgages, &c. Roby v. Smith, 131 Ind. 342, 30 N. E. 1093, 15 L. R. A. 792. Dower interests may be restricted to widows of residents. Buffington v. Grosvenor, 46 Kan. 730, 27 Pac. 137, 13 L. R. A. 282; Bennett v. Harms, 51 Wis. 251, 8 N. W. 222. Privilege of selling liquors may be

restricted to male inhabitants of State. Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 25 N. E. 883, 9 L. R. A. 664. Discrimination in inheritance tax law between nephews and nieces resident within the State and those resident without is void. Re Mahoney's Estate, 133 Cal. 180, 65 Pac. 389.] The constitutional provision does not apply to corporations. Warren Manuf. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 737; Woodward v. Com., 7 S. W. Rep. 613 (Ky.); Phenix Ins. Co. v. Burdett, 112 Ind. 204, 13 N. E. 705; [Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; s. c. 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281.] A discrimination between local freight on railroads and that which is extra-territorial is not personal, and therefore not forbidden by this clause of the Constitution. Shipper v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 47 Penn. St. 338. This clause does not forbid requiring security for costs from nonresident plaintiffs. Cummings v. Wingo, 30 S. C. 611, 10 S. E. Rep. 107. See, for taxes which are forbidden by it, post, 688, note. [A State cannot give priority to creditors residing within its boundaries over those of the same class residing without. Blake v. McClung, 176 U. S. 59, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; s. c. 172 U. S. 239, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Sully v. American Nat'l Bk., 178 U. S. 289, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 935. A conveyance, which the courts of the State wherein it was made, hold void as against the citizens of that State, the Federal courts will hold void as against the citizens of other States. Smith M. P. Co. v. McGroarty, 136 U. S. 237, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1017. The mere fact that a partnership was organized under the laws of another State is not sufficient to justify the imposition of conditions upon its doing business within the State not required of local partnerships. State v. Cadigan, 73 Vt. 245, 50 Atl. 1079, 57 L. R. A. 666, 87 Am. St. 714.

For an instructive discussion of the doctrine of the "Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States," see article by Wm. J. Meyers in 1 Mich. Law Rev. 286, 364.]

1 Extradition as between the States.

The return by one State of fugitives from justice which have fled to it from another State is only made a matter of rightful demand by the provisions of the Federal Constitution. In the absence of such provisions, it might be provided for by State law; but the Constitution makes that obligatory which otherwise would rest in the imperfect and uncertain requirements of interstate comity. The subject has received much attention from the courts when having occasion to consider the nature and extent of the constitutional obligation. It has also been the subject of many executive papers; and several controversies between the executives of New York and those of more southern States, are referred to in the recent Life of William H. Seward, by his son. [Upon extradition between States, see note to 36 L. ed. U. S. 934; upon extradition interstate and international, see note to 41 L. ed. U. S. 1064. See also Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U. S. 231, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 297, and note to 40 L. ed. U. S. 406. The sufficiency of the proceedings upon which a governor bases his issue of a warrant for the arrest of an alleged fugitive may be inquired into on habeas corpus. Ex parte Tod, 12 S. D. 386, 81 N. W. 637, 47 L. R. A. 566. A governor may revoke his warrant at any time before the alleged fugitive has been removed from the State. State v. Toole, 69 Minn. 104, 72 N. W. 53, 38 L. R. A. 224. An escaped prisoner is a fugitive. Drinkall v. Spiegel, 68 Conn. 441, 36 Atl. 830, 36 L. R. A. 486.] The following are among the judicial decisions: The offence for which extradition may be ordered need not have been an offence either at the common law or at the time the Constitution was adopted; it is sufficient that it was so at the time the act was committed, and when demand is made. Matter of Clark, 9 Wend. 212; People v. Donohue, 84 N. Y. 438; Johnston v. Riley, 13 Ga. 97; Matter of Fetter, 23 N. J. 311; Mat

ter of Voorhees, 32 N. J. 141; Morton v. Skinner, 48 Ind. 123; Matter of Hughes, Phill. (N. C.) 57; Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66; Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 748; In re Hooper, 52 Wis. 699, 58 N. W. 741. The offence must have been actually committed within the State making the demand, and the accused must have fled therefrom. Ex parte Smith, 3 McLean, 121; Jones v. Leonard, 50 Iowa, 106, 32 Am. Rep. 116; Hartman v. Aveline, 63 Ind. 344; Wilcox v. Nolze, 34 Ohio St. 520. To be a fugitive it is not necessary that one should have left the State after indictment found, or to avoid prosecution; but simply that, having committed a crime within it, he is when sought found in another State. Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 291; State v. Richter, 37 Minn. 436, 35 N. W. 9. [A person standing in one State and shooting across the boundary line and injuring one in another State is not a fugitive from justice in the first State. State v. Hall, 115 N. C. 811, 20 S. E. 729, 44 Am. St. 501.] The accused may be arrested to await demand. State v. Buzine, 4 Harr. 572; Ex parte Cubreth, 49 Cal. 436; Ex parte Rosenblat, 51 Cal. 285. See Tullis v. Fleming, 69 Ind. 15. But one cannot lawfully be arrested on a telegram from officers in another State and without warrant. Malcolmson v. Scott, 56 Mich. 459, 23 N. W. 166. Nor can he be surrendered before formal demand is made, and parties who seize and deliver him up without demand will be liable for doing so. Botts v. Williams, 17 B. Monr. 677. Still if he is returned without proper papers to the State from whence he fled, this will be no sufficient ground for his discharge from custody. Dow's Case, 18 Penn. St. 37. Even forceable and unlawful abduction of a citizen gives a State no right to demand his release. Mahon . Justice, 127 U. S. 700, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1204; [Cook v. Hart,