has been held that licenses to make use of property in certain modes may be revoked by the State, notwithstanding they may be connected with grants and based upon a consideration.1 But this subject we shall recur to hereafter. It would seem, therefore, to be the prevailing opinion, and one based upon sound reason, that the State cannot barter away, or in any manner abridge or weaken, any of those essential powers which are inherent in all governments, and the existence of which in full vigor is important to the well-being of organized society ; and that any contracts to that end are void upon general principles, and cannot be saved from invalidity by the provision of the national Constitution now under consideration. If the tax cases are to be regarded as an exception to this statement, the exception is perhaps to be considered a nominal rather than a charter that, after the first improvement of a street, repairs should be made at the expense of the city, was not a contract; and on its repeal a lot-owner, who had paid for the improvement, might have his lot assessed for the repairs. Compare Hammett v. Philadelphia, 65 Pa. St. 146, 3 Am. Rep. 615. See, upon this subject, Brick Presbyterian Church v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 5 Cow. 538; Vanderbilt ". Adams, 7 Cow. 849; State v. Sterling, 8 Mo. 697; Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Brimmer v. Boston, 102 Mass. 19. The power of the State, after granting licenses for the sale of liq. uors and receiving fees therefor, to revoke the licenses by a general law forbidding sales, has been denied in some cases. See State v. Phalen, 3 Harr. 441; Adams v. Hachett, 27 N. H. 289; Boyd v. State, 36 Ala. 329. But there is no doubt this is entirely competent. Freleigh v. State, 8 Mo. 606; State v. Sterling, 8 Mo. 697; Calder v. Kurby, 5 Gray, 597; Met. Board of Excise v. Barrie, 34 N. Y. 657; Baltimore v. Clunet, 23 Md. 449; Fell v. State, 42 Md. 71, 20 Am. Rep. 83; Commonwealth v. Brennan, 103 Mass. 70; McKinney v. Salem, 77 Ind. 213; Moore v. Indianapolis, 120 Ind. 483, 22 N. E. 424; La Croix v. Co. Com'rs, 50 Conn. 321; Brown v. State, 82 Ga. 224, 7 S. E. 915; Beer Company r. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25. Compare State v. Cooke, 24 Minn. 247; Pleuler v. State, 11 Neb. 547, 10 N. W. 481. An additional license may be required within the period covered by a former one. Rowland v. State, 12 Tex. App. 418. A merchant's license may be revoked by a police regulation inconsistent with it. State v. Burgoyne, 7 Lea, 173. But a municipality cannot add to the statutory grounds for revocation. Lantz v. Highstown, 46 N. J. L. 102. Grants of the right to establish lotteries are mere privileges, and as such are revocable. Bass v. Nashville, Meigs, 421, 33 Am. Dec. 154; State v. Morris, 77 N. C. 512; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; Justice v. Com., 81 Va. 209; State v. Woodward, 89 Ind. 110; [Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199.] But if they are au thorized by the constitution, they cannot be abolished by the legislature. New Orleans v. Houston, 119 U. S. 265, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 198. In short, the State cannot by any legislation irrevocably hamper itself in the exercise of its police power. Toledo, &c. R. R. Co. v. Jacksonville, 67 Ill. 37; Chicago Packing Co. v. Chicago, 88 Ill. 221; Beer Company v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25; Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814; People v. Commissioners, 59 N. Y. 92. An act requiring all underground electric lines to be laid under the orders of a commission violates no contract rights of their owners. People r. Squire, 107 N. Y. 593, 14 N. E. 820. No doubt if a license is revoked for which the State has collected money, good faith would require that the money be returned. Hirn v. State, 1 Ohio St. 15. real one, since taxation is for the purpose of providing the State a revenue, and the State laws which have been enforced as contracts in these cases have been supposed to be based upon consideration, by which the State receives the benefit which would have accrued from an exercise of the relinquished power in the ordinary mode. Exclusive Privileges. Under the rulings of the federal Supreme Court, the grant of any exclusive privilege by a State, if lawfully made, is a contract, and not subject to be recalled.1 As every exclusive privilege is in the nature of a monopoly, it may at some time become a question of interest, whether there are any, and if so what, limits to the power of the State to grant them. In former times, such grants were a favorite resort in England, not only to raise money for the personal uses of the monarch, but to reward favorites; and the abuse grew to such enormous magnitude that Parliament in the time of Elizabeth, and again in the times of James I., interfered and prohibited them. What is more important to us is, that in 1602 they were judicially declared to be illegal.2 These, however, were monopolies in the ordinary occupations of life; and the decision upon them would not affect the special privileges most commonly granted. Where the grant is of a franchise which would not otherwise exist, no question can be made of the right of the State to make it exclusive, unless the constitution of the State forbids it; because, in contemplation of law, no one is wronged when he is only excluded from that to which he never had any right. An exclusive right to build and maintain a toll bridge or to set up a ferry may therefore be granted; and the State may doubtless limit, by the requirement of a license, the number of persons who shall be allowed to engage in employments the entering upon which is not a matter of common right, and which, because of their liability to abuse, may require special and extraordinary police supervision. The business of selling intoxicating drinks and of setting up a lottery are illustrations of such employments. But the grant of a monopoly in one of the ordinary and necessary occupations of life must be as clearly illegal in this country as in England; and it would be impossible to defend and sustain it, except upon the broad ground that the legislature may control and regulate the ordinary employments, even to the extent of fixing the prices of labor and of commodities. As no one pretends that the legislature possesses such a power, and as its existence would be wholly inconsistent with regulated liberty, it must follow that lawful grants 2 Darcy v. Allain, 11 Rep. 84. 1 Ante, p. 395, and cases cited; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 74. of special privileges must be confined to cases where they will take from citizens generally nothing which before pertained to them as of common right.1 Changes in the General Laws. We have said in another place. that citizens have no vested right in the existing general laws of the State which can preclude their amendment or repeal, and that there is no implied promise on the part of the State to protect its citizens against incidental injury occasioned by changes in the law. Nevertheless there may be laws which amount to propositions on the part of the State, which, if accepted by individuals, will become binding contracts. Of this class are perhaps to be considered bounty laws, by which the State promises the payment of a gratuity to any one who will do any particular act supposed to be for the State interest. Unquestionably the State may repeal such a law at any time; 2 but when the proposition has been accepted by the performance of the act before the law is repealed, the contract would seem to be complete, and the promised gratuity becomes a legal debt.3 And where a State was owner of the stock of a bank, and by the law its bills and notes were to be received in payment of all debts due to the State, it was properly held that this law constituted a contract with those who should receive the bills before its repeal and that a repeal of the law could not deprive these holders of the right which it assured. Such a law, with the acceptance of the bills under it, "comes within the definition of a contract. It is a contract founded upon a good and valuable consideration, a consideration beneficial to the State; as its profits are increased by sustaining the credit, 1 The grant of an exclusive privilege in slaughtering cattle in the vicinity of New Orleans was upheld as an exercise of the police power, in the SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36. But the legislature could not by a grant of this kind make an irrepealable contract. In regard to public health and public morals a legislature cannot by any contract limit the exercise of the police power to the prejudice of the general welfare. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 746, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652. An irrepealable contract giving exclusive privileges with reference to lighting a city, may be made. New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens' Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265. So as to the privilege of furnishing water. New Orleans Water Works r. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; St. Tammany Water Works v. New Orleans Water Works, 120 U. S. 64, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405; Citizens' Water Co. v. Bridgeport, &c. Co., 55 Conn. 1, 10 Atl. 170. 2 Christ Church v. Philadelphia, 24 How. 300; East Saginaw Salt Manuf. Co. v. East Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 2 Am. Rep. 82, and 13 Wall. 373. So as to pension to a policeman: Pennie v. Reis, 80 Cal. 266, 22 Pac. 176; or an exemption from taxation to persons planting forest trees. Shiner v. Jacobs, 62 Iowa, 392, 17 N. W. 613. 3 People v. Auditor-General, 9 Mich. 327. See Montgomery v. Kasson, 16 Cal. 189; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. [State cannot lower the rate of interest upon its warrants already issued. State v. Barrett, 25 Mont. 112, 63 Pac. 1030.] and consequently extending the circulation, of the paper of the bank." 1 That laws permitting the dissolution of the contract of marriage are not within the intention of the clause of the Constitution under discussion, has been many times affirmed.2 It has been intimated, however, that, so far as property rights are concerned, the contract must stand on the same footing as any other, and that a law passed after the marriage, vesting the property in the wife for her sole use, would be void, as impairing the obligation of contracts. But certainly there is no such contract embraced in the marriage as would prevent the legislature changing the law, and vesting in the wife solely all property which she should acquire thereafter; and if the property had already become vested in the husband, it would be protected in him, against legislative transfer to the wife, on other grounds than the one here indicated. "The obligation of a contract," it is said, "consists in its binding force on the party who makes it. This depends on the laws in existence when it is made; these are necessarily referred to in all contracts, and forming a part of them as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party, and the right acquired by the other. There can be no other standard by which to ascertain the extent of either, than that which the terms of the contract indicate, according to their settled legal meaning; when it becomes consummated, the law defines the duty and the right, compels one party to perform the thing contracted for, and gives the other a right to enforce the performance by the remedies then in force. If any subsequent law affect to diminish the duty or to impair the right, it necessarily bears on the obligation of the contract, in favor of one party, to the injury of the other; 1 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. See Winter v. Jones, 10 Ga. 190; Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44. A law which makes coupons on State bonds receivable for all taxes and dues is a contract, the obligation of which no subsequent law can impair. Antoni v. Wright, 22 Gratt. 833; Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; [McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 134, and many cases therein cited. A valuable history of the persistent attempts of Virginia to avoid the obligation of these bonds and their coupons may be found in McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 972.] Compare Cornwall v. Com.. 82 Va. 644; Com. v. Jones, 82 Va. 789; Ellett v. Com., 85 Va. 517, 8 S. E. 246. So of county warrants. People v. Hall, 8 Col. 485, 9 Pac. 34. An act, changing after issue the place of payment of municipal bonds, is bad. Dillingham v. Hook, 32 Kan. 185, 4 Pac. 166. So one requiring bonds payable to bearer to be registered. Priestly v. Watkins, 62 Miss. 798. See People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48. But compare Gurnee v. Speer, 68 Ga. 711. 2 Per Marshall, Ch. J., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629; Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.,S. 190, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 723; Maguire ". Maguire, 7 Dana, 181; Clark v. Clark, 10 N. H. 380; Cronise v. Cronise, 54 Pa. St. 255; Carson v. Carson, 40 Miss. 349; Adams v. Palmer, 51 Me. 480. Holmes v. Holmes, 4 Barb. 295. hence any law which in its operations amounts to a denial or obstruction of the rights accruing by a contract, though professing to act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious to the prohibition of the Constitution." 1 "It is the civil obligation of contracts which [the Constitution] is designed to reach; that is, the obligation which is recognized by, and results from, the law of the State in which it is made. If, therefore, a contract when 1 McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 612. "The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. The law, then, which has this binding obligation must govern and control the contract, in every shape in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affects its validity, construction, or discharge. It is, then, the municipal law of the State whether that be written or unwritten, which is emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and must govern it throughout, whenever its performance is sought to be enforced." Washington, J., in Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 213, 257, 259. "As I understand it, the law of the contract forms its obligation." Thompson, J., ibid. 302. The obligation of the contract consists in the power and efficacy of the law which applies to, and enforces performance of, the contract, or the payment of an equivalent for non-performance. The obligation does not inhere and subsist in the contract itself, proprio vigore, but in the law applicable to the contract. This is the sense, I think, in which the Constitution uses the term 'obligation."" Trimble, J., ibid. 318. And see Van Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 559; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; People v. Ingersoll, 58 N. Y. 1. Requirement of a license tax for permission to do what a contract with the city gives authority to do, without "let, molestation, or hindrance," is void. Stein v. Mobile, 49 Ala. 362, 20 Am. Rep. 283. But licenses in general are subject to the taxing power. Home Ins. Co. v. Augusta, 93 U. S. 116; Reed v. Beall, 42 Miss. 472; Cooley on Taxation, 386, and cases cited. A law taxing a debt to the debtor and making him pay the tax and deduct the amount from the debt is valid. Lehigh V. R. R. Co. v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 429, 18 Atl. 410. So where the debtor, a foreign corporation, has paid for the privilege of being exempt from taxation. New York, L. E. & W. R. R. Co. v. Com., 129 Pa. St. 463, 18 Atl. 412. A law giving interest on debts, which bore none when contracted, was held void in Goggans v. Turnispeed, 1 S. C. (N. s.) 40, 7 Am. Rep. 23. The legislature cannot authorize the compulsory extinction of ground rents, on payment of a sum in gross. Palairet's Appeal, 67 Pa. St. 479, 5 Am. Rep. 450. A State law, discontinuing a public work, does not impair the obligation of contracts, the contractor having his just claim for damages. Lord v. Thomas, 64 N. Y. 107. A law giving an abutter a right to damages when a railroad is laid in the street is valid as to changes thereafter made by a railroad, though a city ordinance had given it the right to use the street. Drady v. Des Moines, &c. Co., 57 Iowa, 393, 10 N. W. 754. See also Mulholland v. Des Moines, &c. Co., 60 Iowa, 740, 13 N. W. 726. A statute providing for reversion of land condemned for railroad purposes if work on the road has ceased for eight years is valid. The property right does not attach to the land independent of its use for public purposes. Skillman v. Chicago, &c. Ry. Co., 78 Iowa, 404, 43 N. W. 275. [Where at the time a contract was made a judgment for damages for breach thereof was renewable indefinitely, a later enacted statute limiting absolutely the life of the judgment is void with regard to this contract. Bettman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 Pac. 53, 40 L. R. A. 815, and see also Palmer v. Laberee, 23 Wash. 409, 63 Pac. 216. Warrant of attorney to holder of note to enter judgment against maker upon default of payment, and issue execution, etc., valid when note was made cannot be invalidated by subsequent statute. Second Ward Savings Bank v. Schranck, 97 Wis. 250, 73 N. W. 31, 39 L. R. A. 569.] |