declaration. This motion was denied, and then, upon the application of counsel for the plaintiff, and against objection upon the part of the defendant, the trial court permitted a juror to be withdrawn. The defendant then applied for and obtained a rule to show cause why a new trial should not be directed. The rule to show cause should be discharged. The withdrawal of a juror by direction of the court produced a mistrial. There never having been any trial of the cause, it is obvious that a new trial cannot be directed. The original venire still remains in force, and parties are entitled to proceed under it. Rule discharged. DAMAGES-INADEQUATE VERDICT. 1. Where a verdict cannot be declared inadequate, plaintiff cannot have it set aside as too small, though a considerably larger sum would not have been declared excessive. 2. A verdict of $100 to a husband for deprivation of his wife's society, and for expenses necessarily incurred by him because of her injuries, will be set aside as inadequate, the undisputed evidence showing he has paid or is liable to pay considerably more than that for expenses rendered necessary by her injuries. Action by Lorenda G. Caswell and husband against the North Jersey Street Railway Company. Heard on rule to show cause. Verdict set aside as inadequate. Argued November term, 1902, before GUM. MERE. C. J., and VAN SYCKEL, FORT, and PITNEY, JJ. Benjamin & Benjamin, for plaintiffs. Howard MacSherry, for defendant. PER CURIAM. This was an action for personal injuries received by the female plaintiff. The jury rendered a verdict of $500 in favor of the wife, and of $100 in favor of the husband. The contention on behalf of the plaintiffs is that the amounts allowed by the jury in each instance are too small. So far as the amount allowed by the jury to the wife as compensation for the injury received by her is concerned, although a considerably larger sum could not have been declared to be excessive, yet, on the other hand, the amount fixed by them cannot be declared inadequate. The verdict in her favor, therefore, must stand. The compensation allowed to the husband for the deprivation of the society of his wife, and for the expenses necessarily incurred by him, by reason of her injuries, is clearly inadequate. The undisputed evidence in the case shows that he has either paid out, or is legally liable to pay, for medical attendance to his wife, necessitated by her injury, and for other expenses rendered necessary thereby, a sum considerably in excess of the amount 1. Where, in a landlord's proceeding for possession, his affidavit shows neither his ownership, nor any right of possession in him, the court has no jurisdiction. Appeal from District Court of Trenton. Action by Margaret Cleary against John J. Waldron. From a judgment for plaintiff, de. fendant appeals. Reversed. Argued November term, 1902, before GARRISON and GARRETSON, JJ. Wm. J. Walsh and James J. Cahill, for appellant. Scott Scammell and Jno. T. Van Cleef, for appellee. GEORGE JONAS GLASS CO. v. GLASS BLOWERS ASS'N OF UNITED STATES & CANADA et al. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. March 16, 1903.) TRADE UNIONS STRIKES TIMIDATION OF EMPLOYÉS-INJUNCTION PENDENTE LITE. PICKETING -IN 1. Where, on an order to show cause why an injunction should not be granted against strikers and the labor union, restraining picketing and illegal interference with plaintiff's employés pending suit for permanent relief, the only showing by defendants consisted of a large number of affidavits, written on printed blank forms the spaces being filled with the names of the particular answering defendants-which consisted merely of a denial of the facts alleged in the bill, and allegations that the strike which was in progress was being conducted without violence or unlawful interference with complainant's business, and it did not appear that the issuance of the injunction until final hearing would result in any hardship to defendants, the injunction would be granted. Suit by the George Jonas Glass Company against the Glass Blowers Association of the United States & Canada and others for an injunction to restrain defendants from picketing and illegally interfering with plaintiff's employés. On order to show cause why an injunction should not be granted pendente lite. Decree for complainant. Hampton & Fithian and John W. Harding, for complainant. H. L. Miller and John W. Westcott, for defendants. GREY, V. C. (orally). In this case an order was made that the defendants show cause why an injunction should not issue according to the prayer of the bill of complaint. Accompanying that order, an ad interim stay was allowed, restraining certain named defendants "from entering or attempting to enter complainant's premises, consisting of its glass manufacturing plant at Minotola, in the township of Buena Vista, county of Atlantic and state of New Jersey; and from obstructing or attempting to obstruct the free passage of any employé or employés of complainant in going to and from complainant's premises; from in any wise threatening or using any coercive language or coercion whatever in order to induce any employé of complainant not to work for complainant; and from in any wise interfering with, or annoying by acts or words, any such employé of complainant, against his will, in going to and from, or while engaged in, such employment; and from entering its grounds and premises for the purpose of interfering with, hindering, or obstructing its business; and from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, annoying language, or acts of force and violence any of the employés of complainant to refuse to or fail to perform their duties as such employés; and from compelling or inducing, or attempting to compel or induce, by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, any of the employés of complainant to leave the service of complainant; and from preventing or attempting to prevent any person or persons, by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, from entering the service of the complainant; and from congregating at or near the said premises of complainant, or in the public highway, for the purpose of intimidating complainant's employés or preventing them from rendering their services to complainant, and from inducing, by the payment of money, or by promises to pay money, or coercing by threats, annoying language, or acts, said employés to break their contracts of employment with complainant and to leave its employment; and from collecting, either singly or in combination with others, in and about the approaches to complainant's said plant, or in the public highway, for the purpose of picketing or patrolling or guarding the streets, highways, gates, and approaches to complainant's said property for the purpose of intimidating or coercing any of the employés of the complainant in going to and from their work, and the said factory of the complainant; and from congregating at or about any place at Minotola for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person or persons seeking employment of complainant; and from going, either singly or collectively, to the homes of complainant's employés, or any of them, for the purpose of intimidating or coerIcing any or all of them to leave the employ of complainant, or from entering complainant's employment; and from intimidating or in any manner threatening the wives and families of said employés at their homes because of their said employment; and from conspiring in meetings, or otherwise conspiring together, by threats or other coercive action, to induce or coerce any of the employés of complainant to leave the service of said complainant, or to prevent any person, by threats, intimidation, force, or violence, from entering the service of complainant; and that the said William M. Doughty be, and he hereby is, restrained from using money in furtherance of the purpose of preventing employés of the complainant from returning to their work, and from paying money to such employés to induce such employés to leave their employment with complainant." On the coming in of the order to show cause, the defendants filed separate answers, to the number of about 100, most of them using the same printed form; blank spaces being filled with the names of particular answering defendants. Numerous affidavits were attached to these answers, in which printed forms were used; many of the defendants swearing to the same precise form of words. Additional separate affidavits were also submitted in opposition to the allowance of the writ. ness. Neither by these elaborate pleadings, nor the accompanying affidavits, nor in the arguments of the defendants' counsel, is it claimed that the terms of the restraint allowed by the above-recited ad interim stay work any hardship or oppression upon the defendants. The whole burden of the pleadings, proof, and argument submitted by the defendants is directed to a denial of the facts and circumstances set up in the complainant's bill, and to contentions that the strike which is now admittedly being conducted under the direction of the defendants at the complainant's works is carried on without either violence, intimidation, or other unlawful interference with the complainant's busiThe situation is this: A restraint is outstanding which imposes no hardship upon the defendants, and the legality of which is not challenged, save as it is contended that in point of fact there is no occasion for its exercise. At the present stage of the case, this question is before the court upon ex parte affidavits. The cause has been set down for a day certain on final hearing, when witnesses will be produced in open court and subjected to cross-examination on the very same points which are now presented only by voluntary affidavits. It is indicated that the case will turn almost wholly upon the credibility and weight of the testimony of witnesses of whose worthiness the court has but little opportunity to be advised. If I pass upon the credibility of this testimony as exhibited by the affidavits on file, I shall have prejudged this case, and have subjected the parties to embarrassment when the same facts shall be presented by the same wit nesses on the stand, giving their testimony in open court. There will be two hearings and decisions on substantially the same question. The cause can be disposed of on the final hearing in a much more intelligent and conclusive manner. As the ad interim restraint is not injurious to the defendants, but its removal may work great harm to the complainant, the present status may remain until the final hearing gives a full opportunity to pass upon the whole case by a single judgment. (64 N. J. E. 644) GEORGE JONAS GLASS CO. v. GLASS BLOWERS ASS'N OF UNITED STATES & CANADA et al. (Court of Chancery of New Jersey. March 16, 1903.) TRADE UNIONS-STRIKES-INTIMIDATION OF 1. Defendants, who were engaged in a strike, had been restrained from intimidating plaintiff's employés, and from congregating for the purpose of intimidating any person seeking employment of plaintiff. In an application to punish defendants for contempt, the only evidence was that two men who approached plaintiff's works were asked whether they were going to work in the factory, and were accompanied by several strikers to the gates of the factory, but were permitted to enter without molestation; that when they came from the factory they were followed at a distance, but, on their return, entered the factory without molestation, but were thereafter followed to the house of a third person, with whom some of the strikers offered to fight. The proof as to the assemblage of the persons was uncertain. Held, that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a finding that the injunction had been violated. Application by the George Jonas Glass Company against the Glass Blowers Association of the United States & Canada and others for the punishment of defendants for violation of an injunction. Denied. See 53 Atl. 138. Hampton & Fithian and John W. Harding, for complainant. H. L. Miller and John W. Westcott, for defendants. GREY, V. C. (orally). The petition in this matter asks that certain defendants may be adjudged to be guilty of contempt because of their action on September 17, 1902, in alleged breach of a restraining order of this court made on the 7th day of July, 1902. The order restrains the defendants from attempting to prevent any person, by threats, intimidation, annoying language or acts, force or violence, from entering the service of the complainant, and from congregating for the purpose of intimidating, threatening, or coercing any person seeking employment of complainant, etc. An order to show cause was allowed, and testimony in open court was taken in suppert of and in opposition to the charges of the petition. The petitioner's testimony is that two men, named Mingin and Noble, had been told that, if they applied at the works of the complainant company, they could probably get employment. They approached the complainant's factory by walking along the railroad which passes by it. They were met by two or three men, apparently strikers, one of whom asked whether they were going to the factory to work. They denied that they were, and proceeded towards the factory; several of the strikers accompanying them nearly to the gates. They went into the factory without interference or molestation of any sort. They then left the factory to go to the house of a Mr. Schaible. Three or four other men went ahead of them, and some followed them on bicycles; no conversation passing between them. They were unable to find Mr. Schaible's house, and returned to the factory without hindrance from any one; some of those who had accompanied them going before and some behind them, at distance varying from 25 to 75 yards. At the factory they stated their inability to find Schaible's house, and started out again with a Mr. Dare to find it. They testify that they were now followed, at some yards' distance, by a considerable number of men on bicycles and afoot. When they were going across a lot, one of these men threw an apple at them, and, Mingin says, called Mr. Dare a foul name. Noble says, if he understood them aright, the men called foul names after all of them. When they got to the Schaible house, Mingin, Noble, and Dare went into the house, while the men who followed remained outside. One of the latter came to the door, and wanted to talk to Mingin and Noble. Mingin went to the door, and was asked by the man if he was going to work at the factory. Mingin again told him that he "didn't know as he was." Mr. Schaible and the men then had some words, and one of the latter pulled off his coat and invited Schaible to fight. The two-Mingin and Noble stayed in the house three-quarters of an hour, and then left by a back door. Neither Mingin nor Noble was hired to work at the factory, and both declared they were afraid to stay. Their testimony is flatly contradicted by that of a large number of witnesses who deny the use of any opprobrious words or threats. It is shown by the testimony of Mingin and Noble themselves that they had been drinking when they came to Minotola, and the proof strongly indicates that they were considerably under the influence of liquor. They admit that they told the first man they met that they did not mean to apply for work at the complainant's factory, and that they afterwards repeated this statement at Mr. Schaible's house. There is no pretense of proof that there was in fact any interference seeking to prevent the two men from entering the complainant's factory. They went into the factory twice without any attempt on the part of any one to stop or molest them. The testimony as to a showing of hostility to Mingin and Noble is by words only, which might, of course, be sufficient, if proven by the weight of the evidence. But the evidence given by the complainant's own witnesses as to the words used is neither consistent nor clear in stating what was said, and it is flatly contradicted by numbers of witnesses who were in the party, or followers of it. There is but one element in the proofs which leads me to hesitate in disposing of this motion, and that is on the charge that there was a congregating of a large number of men for the purpose of intimidating those who might wish to seek employment at the complainant's factory. There can be no question, taking the whole case together, that at and near the complainant's factory a system of picketing has been inaugurated. All of the approaches to Mr. Jonas' factory are watched by these men, who frankly say that they propose to persuade (as they say, peaceably) anybody from taking employment in the factory. I have not been invited to declare that mere peaceable picketing of public roads is in itself a breach of the restraint. I am not prepared to say, if that question were under consideration, that men may not, under the law, stand in a public road and try in a peaceable way to persuade other people not to take work in a factory. The difficulty in such cases is that the picketing is usually done by persons who are ignorant of the line where persuasion ends and intimidation begins; who are actuated to a considerable extent by a determination to accomplish the ultimate object-the prevention of employment at the factory. They are men who have never felt the responsibility attendant upon the exercise of power. When they know that the result which they wish to accomplish can be certainly attained by the use of intimidation or force, the line of persuasion is very apt to become obscure and to be ignored, and conduct which ought to be a simple persuasion between one man and another becomes a course of threatening or violence for the accomplishment of the result sought. The proof on the point of the assemblage of a number of persons for the purpose of intimidating persons seeking the complainant's employment was uncertain and variant as to their number, and still more so as to their purpose. Noble and Mingin themselves differ as to their number, and do not show that at any time the followers approached at all nearly to them-apparently not near enough for them to distinguish their remarks with any certainty. On this point, however, the testimony comes nearer to showing a breach of the restraint than on any other line of the examination. I make this judg ment with some hesitation, but, considering the weight of all the testimony, I am not able to say that a breach has been shown. The prayer of the petition that certain defendants be held to be in contempt because of their conduct in the incident of September 17, 1902, narrated in the petition, is refused. (69 N. J. L. 300) HICKS v. LONG BRANCH COMMISSION et al. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Feb. 21, 1903.) CITIES-OFFICERS-INTEREST-LEGISLATIVE BODY-PUTTING MOTION-RESULT. 1. Where a member of a city commission acted for a water company on two occasions, in each of which the city was equally interestedone being advice to pay a franchise tax to the city, and the other to secure an injunction to prevent the pollution of the city's water supply -he was not thereby disqualified to vote on a resolution awarding a contract to such company. 2. Where the president of a board of commissioners refuses to put a motion duly made, any member may put it, and declare the result. 3. On a viva voce vote in a legislative body, the whole body is counted as the chair announces, and where the declaration that a motion was carried was not challenged, and the minutes showing that it was carried were approved at the succeeding meeting, the motion should be considered properly carried, as against an objection subsequently made that an insufficient number of votes were heard in favor of the motion. Certiorari, on petition of Alfred O. Hicks, against the Long Branch Commission and Tintern Manor Water Company, to review a resolution of the commission. Writ dismissed. McCarter, Williamson & McCarter, for prosecutor. Corbin & Corbin, for defendant Tintern Manor Water Co. Thomas P. Fay, for defendant Long Branch Commission. FORT, J. The certiorari in this case brings up a resolution of the Long Branch commission passed November 24, 1902. There are but few questions that need to be considered. There is no proof to justify any allegation of fraud, or of a palpable abuse of discretion, in the board of commissioners, in passing the resolution. In awarding contracts, where there are no arbitrary statutory regulations, a municipal body vested with the power to make them has a large measure of discretion. In reviewing such action, the court will only inquire into the honesty and good faith of its exercise. Two cases recently decided in this court contain a reference to like decisions on this subject: Ryan v. Paterson, 66 N. J. Law, 533, 49 Atl. 587;. Kraft v. Board of Education, 67 N. J. Law, 512, 51 Atl. 483. Upon the evidence in this case, I find the following facts: First. That the resolution brought up was duly passed by a viva voce vote on November 24, 1902. Second. That Winfield S. B. Parker, one of the commissioners, was not, at the time of the passage of said resolution, the attorney of the Tintern Manor Water Company, and that he had no interest therein. There is proof in the cause, not controverted, that Mr. Parker represented the water company during 1902 in two matters, but in both of these matters it likewise appears that the city was quite as much interested as the water company. In the spring of 1902, Mr. Parker had insisted that the water company should pay to the city its franchise tax, and the secretary of the company told him that they did not think it was a legal tax against them, but that if he would look it up, and advise them that it was legal, they would pay. He did this, and gave them an opinion that they were bound, and the water company paid and the city received the tax. It would be difficult to question Mr. Parker's motives in that case. The other case was one in which the city was more vitally interested than the water company, and under quite as great an obligation to take proceedings. One Dangler was polluting the city's water supply by maintaining objectionable conditions adjacent to it. The water company asked Mr. Parker to secure an injunction to prevent the continuance of the nuisance. He did so. The nuisance was abated. It would have been equally proper for the city to have done this. There could be no possible antagonism to the city's interests under these employments. There is not a semblance of proof that in any other way or at any other time did Mr. Parker ever appear for the Tintern Manor Water Company. The proof is that he has not now, and never has had, any interest in the company. Mr. Parker is a member of the bar in good standing and of excellent repute. No attempt was made to show that he received any improper compensation in either case. Upon the passage of the resolution in question he was clearly entitled to vote. This case does not come within the rule enunciated in the case of The Traction Co. v. Board of Works, 56 N. J. Law, 431, 29 Atl. 163. In that case the member of the board voting was clearly an interested party at the time he gave his vote. Third. That there was sufficient appropriation, legally voted and unexpended, to cover any sums required to meet the expenditure authorized, if any was authorized, by the resolution. Fourth. That there was no irregularity in the procedure in passing the resolution which should vitiate it. The president of the board of commissioners of Long Branch is only the mouthpiece of the commissioners. It is his duty to put a motion duly made. If he refuses, any member may put it. Any other rule is destructive of legislative functions. Fifth. That the evidence is conclusive that he did refuse to put the motion on the passage of the resolution here attacked. Considerable evidence has been taken, and, on the argument, much stress was laid, upon the alleged fact that only two votes were heard in favor of the passage of the resolution. The minutes show that it was carried, and these were duly ratified at the succeeding meeting. There was no challenge by any member of the announcement that the resolution was carried, when that statement was made by the chair, nor any demand for veri fication of the vote by show of hands or roll call. On a viva voce vote in a legislative body, the whole body is counted as the chair announces. Mr. Cushing states it this way: "In all his official acts and proceedings, therefore, he represents and stands for the assembly; and his will is taken for that of the whole body, compendiously expressed through him, and by his mouth, instead of being collected from the individual wills of all the members." Cushing's Law & Practice of Legislative Assemblies, § 294. But if it be proper to go into the proof of the actual vote, then in the case before me the proof is as clear as it can be made that five members of the board voted for the resolution. There is but one question before me, viz., as to the legality of the passage of this resolution to authorize the making of a contract. Whether all that was necessary to be done to have a contract executed, or whether the form of agreement in the report of the finance committee on November 17, 1902, was approved and authorized by the action of November 24, 1902, to be executed, is not decided; for, as I view this case, it is not before the court. Whether there is any contract, pursuant to that resolution, must be tested in some other way. The writ is dismissed. (69 N. J. L. 193) BUDD et al. v. CITY OF CAMDEN et al. (Supreme Court of New Jersey. Feb. 25, 1903.) LACHES USE BY CERTIORARI 1. Certiorari to set aside a municipal ordinance granting rights to a trolley company six years after its passage, prosecutor having known of the ordinance all the time, is too late. 2. The question whether the proposed use of a highway by a trolley company is reasonable is for the municipality, and not for the court. Application for certiorari by Hiram E. Budd and others against the city of Camden and the Camden & Suburban Railway Company. Denied. Argued November term, 1902, before GARRISON and GARRETSON, JJ. Francis D. Weaver, for applicants. E. A. Armstrong, for defendants. GARRISON, J. The prosecutor is in laches. The ordinance sought to be set aside was passed on September 19, 1896. The prosecutor at that time knew of the proposed ordinance, for he refused to give his consent to the exercise of municipal discretion in the premises, and employed counsel, who, on August 28, 1897, filed a bill in equity. At this date the ordinance had stood for nearly a year, and work had been done under it. Six years had passed before the legality of the ordinance was directly drawn in question by the present application. During all this time the trolley company had a right to assume |