this number which is but small, has been already hinted, in the second paragraph of this section.

If we admit, as was supposed in the first case, that all the particles which were once united to the corporeal mass, must be again united to it, to form the constituent parts of the body in the resurrection; we shall be obliged to admit, in many cases, bodies so vast, that the idea itself is an outrage on probability. The size must increase with the progress of years, and age must be the criterion from whence magnitude must be denominated. In addition to this, if all those particles which have occasionally adhered to our bodies, must be again reunited to their respective systems; our notions will immediately become inconsistent with those ideas which we have of the transmigration of particles from one body to another; because it will be impossible for the same particles to incorporate with two or more bodies at the same time. For, if any given particle incorporate with two or more bodies, and every particle be necessary to constitute the sameness of each body, the presence of every such particle must be equally necessary in both cases, to constitute the identity of those bodies to which it had occasionally adhered. But, since the cases which are thus absolutely necessary, must be absolutely impossible; it will follow that the identity of our future bodies, cannot consist in the re-union of all those particles, which were once vitally united to the corporeal mass.

We may easily conceive, while the particles in

corporate with no other body, that no difficulty will occur, however they may be disposed of, or in what forms soever they may be combined. We may suppose them to wander through different regions;-they may "float in the breeze, or shiver in the grass;" they may still retain their relative situations, without militating against that theory which I oppose, or for which I contend. They may in either case, at the voice of the archangel, and the trump of God, repair to their respective systems, incorporate and adhere for ever.

But there are cases, in which these theories will wear different aspects.

That cannibals, who feed on human flesh, may live by that nutrition, I flatter myself will be denied by none; and, if they live by nutrition derived from human flesh, some particles of the devoured body must incorporate with the body of the cannibal; for, how any nutrition can be otherwise derived, it will perhaps, be impossible to say. The continuance of life must depend upon nutrition; and the human system must be supported by particles, which are derived from that source. But, if those particles which are thus introduced into the system of a cannibal, were once some of those particles which constituted in part, that body which had been devoured; it is certain that these particles must have formed, in part, the identity of that first body, and must finally resort thither to form anew its identity in the day of the resurrection. And, if each every particle must be again united to the body

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which it once inhabited, in order to constitute its neral identity; these particles must be recalled from the body of the cannibal, to rejoin their primitive system.

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But were we to admit this to be the case, new difficulties will arise on the formation of the body of the cannibal, from which they must be taken. For, if the identity of the body, eaten, depends upon the collection of every particle which had been vitally united to it; so, in like manner, the body of the cannibal must also require each and every particle, which had at any period been vitally united to it, in order to constitute and form its future identity. The reasons are equally good, in both cases; and the claims and necessities wear on both grounds the same aspect; but of this we are well assured, that the claims of one body must be disappointed, because a compliance with both is absolutely impossible. We have now before us two bodies, namely that of a cannibal, and that of a person devoured by him, laying equal claims to the same particles; acting alike under equal necessities, and founding their respective claims on equal reasons. But, of this truth we are well assured, that the same particle cannot enter into the composition of both bodies. And, let it adhere to which body soever it may; the deserted body, having lost those particles which were once vitally united to it, and which on that account are necessary to form its future identity, must remain in an unformed and imperfect state. And being thus deprived of its identity, it can have no share in a future resurrection from the dead; and, conse

quently, all the other constituent parts of this body must be swept away with the common mass of matter never dignified with life. And, as these consequences cannot be avoided, while we admit that all the particles which were at any time united to the body, are necessary to form its future identity ; and, as these consequences will involve us in the contradictions above stated, I think this final conclusion is inevitable-that all those particles which were once united together, cannot be necessary to constitute either the identity of the present body, or the identity of that body, which shall be hereafter.

To avoid the absurdities which are inseparable from the above theory, it has been said, "That all the particles which were once united, are not necessary to constitute the future identity of our bodies; but only those which were united to the body at the time of its being deposited in the grave." But this supposition has its difficulties; difficulties which will appear as great, and perhaps as contradictory as the former; and therefore, equally insurmountable. Let us suppose that the identity of the body of a cannibal, consists partially in those particles which are united to it in that moment when life ends: and, that this cannibal had drawn his nutrition from human flesh. In the case before us, we are drawn, in part, to the same conclusions which we have seen above.

We have now before us a certain number of particles, in the body of the cannibal at the time of his death, which were taken from the bodies of those who had been eaten by him and which were taken

from them at the time of their death, of which this was the occasion. In this case, the body eaten will have a right to those particles, to form its future identity, upon the supposition above given. And, as these particles were lodged in the body of the cannibal, at the moment of his death; an equal claim will arise from that quarter also. In these cases, the two bodies, namely, that of the cannibal, and that of the body eaten, will both have the same identical particles, even at the moment of their deaths. And, if the identity of the body consists in the sameness of these particles which were united to the system at the moment of its death; the identity of one of these bodies must be inevitably lost, since it is impossible that the same particles should constitute the identities of both bodies at the same time. And, therefore, the difficulty will not be rendered less, by our supposing that those particles only, which were united to the body at the moment of its death, shall constitute the identity of that body which shall bloom beyond the grave.

To counteract the force of these reasonings, should it be asserted, "That not the whole, but only a part of these particles, indiscriminately taken, were lodged in the cold repository of death, will be sufficient to constitute the identity of the future body; though myriads of particles should be lost, and though myriads more which are perfectly new should incorporate with the future system;" should these things be asserted, the absurdities to which they lead are not remote. Nor will it be difficult

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