fluctuation; and continues the same through all those changes which the body is destined to undergo. Nothing, therefore, can be so congenial to the case before us as the supposition which we now make; that some radical particles must be fixed within us, which constitute our sameness through all the mutations of life; and which, remaining in a state of incorruptibility, shall put forth a germinating power beyond the grave, and be the germ of our future bodies.

Of the term itself, a definition has been already given; and I now proceed to examine the principal objections by which it is opposed. It has been said, that, "if in the present life, we suppose the identity of the body to be lodged in any given number of immoveable particles; a part must then constitute the whole, which is an evident absurdity."

That a theory which makes a part to constitute a whole must necessarily be erroneous, I am willing to allow; because the supposition includes a contradiction. But, that such absurdities will follow, from the supposition and 'premises before us; is to me neither clear nor satisfactory. On the contrary, the objection which has been started will not apply to the case in hand; but to subjects with which our inquiry has little or no connection.

The subject before us is not an inquiry into the constituent parts of the human body; but into its identity. It is not its numerical particles, but the sameness of personality. These are distinct ideas, and can only have in this view, a distant connection with one another. The numerical particles, of

which our bodies are composed, are in a state of perpetual flux; but since sameness of person remains under every change which these numerical particles undergo, it plainly follows, that that in which sameness consists, must remain immoveable also; and hence it follows, that those particles which constitute the whole body, and the identity of that body, must necessarily be distinct from one another. For, certain it is, that if the sameness of the body consisted in all the numerical particles of which that body was composed, sameness must be capable of a transfer; and, consequently, must be destroyed by the supposition which we are obliged thus to admit, that the identity of the body must not only be compatible with those changes which the body perpetually undergoes; but must be lodged in some secret recess which these changes cannot reach.

Having thus two distinct ideas, one of the identity of the body, and the other of the component or numerical parts of which the body is formed, we can plainly perceive that the latter may change, while the former remains perfect and entire; and the reason is, because the former is not dependent upon the latter for its existence. It therefore follows, that the admission of an inherent principle, which shall become a germ of future life, having only a remote connection with these floating particles which occasionally form the body, cannot include within it that contradiction which the objection has supposed. For, if to adinit a germ or principle of identity, will oblige us to admit that a

part must contain or comprehend a whole, then no such distinct ideas can possibly be formed as those which have been pointed out. The objection itself is founded upon a supposition, that the identity of the body must consist in the numerical particles, of which the whole mass is evidently composed. One of these two points must, therefore, be given up ;either that which makes a part to comprehend a whole, which is the amount of the objection, or that which supposes the identity of the body to remain, amidst the changes which its numerical parts undergo, because they are incompatible* with each other. But, as the latter of these points is founded upon fact, and the former which is included in the objection upon theory;-as the latter is founded upon ocular demonstration, and the former is only speculatively probable ;-as the latter can appeal to visible proof in the growth and changes which are conspicuous in the human body, and the former can only appeal to abstract hypothesis; it is certain, I think, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the nu

The very instant that we

* Their incompatibility arises from this consideration: The contradiction, which the objection supposes, can only be admitted to exist, while we suppose the identity of the body to be lodged in all its numerical parts. suppose a distinction between the numerical particles at large, and that principal, or gerin, in which identity consists; that very instant we destroy the contradiction which has been supposed, and reconcile our own views with those suppositions which have been made. And, therefore, because the identity of the body is not presumed to extend to the whole mass; it cannot be charged with a contradiction, which on account of distinction is rendered inconsistent with its nature.

merical parts of the body may change, while its identity remains entire. And, as this fact is incompatible with the supposition, that a part must comprehend a whole, but is perfectly compatible with the idea of a germ, as constituting the identity of the body, the evidence is at once decisive and unquestionable. The conclusion, therefore, is, that our idea of a germ does not include the contradiction, which the objection has supposed,-that a part must contain or comprehend a whole ;" and we may safely admit, that the identity of the body may consist in some germ, as we have supposed, without involving ourselves either in absurdities or contradictions.

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Whatever is probable, and involves neither absurdity nor contradiction, may be with safety admitted in speculative reasonings; but the idea of a germ is probable, and includes neither absurdity nor contradiction; and therefore the idea of a germ may with safety be admitted, as that in which the indentity of the body does consist.

It has frequently been said, that "all germs must contain within themselves the individual parts of that future production which shall be hereafter;" and even this has been advanced as an argument against the admission of that germ, for which I am contending. But, this objection, together with the arguments by which it has been supported, is rather fictitious than real. It is founded upon a supposition, which is taken for granted as being a fact, but which in reality is destitute of proof.

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That all germs must contain within them a virtual energy, to produce that being or thing, or which they are the germs, must without all doubt be admitted; but this is a notion, distinct from that which supposes that all the individual parts are actually there. The radical energy to produce, may exist, without including any thing of formal being. Where all the parts are in actual existence, nothing more can be necessary, than simple developement, to unfold the latent members which were primarily inherent. But, this will not be consistent with the idea which we have of a germ.

If all the parts of that body, which shall be hereafter, are now included in its present germ of future existence, as parts, and nothing but simple developement be necessary to render formal existence visible; no new accession of extraneous particles can be deemed necessary; because the admitting of the necessity of new particles to fill up any given vacuities, implies previous imperfection in that formal existence, which was admitted. We have as much reason to admit formal perfection, as we have formal existence; and the same arguments, which will militate against the one, must necessarily militate against the other. That formal perfection does not exist, is demonstrated by fact; and from this source we are fully assured that those arguments, which would announce it, must of necessity be wrong. And, without all doubt, could we view formal existence, with the same precision as we view formal perfection, we should see equal reason