It would seem apparent, therefore, that if the state does not hold the title, but only a lien, during the five year period, even the requirements of the last sentence in Section 8 cannot be met.

Section 8 is not peculiar to the law of California. In Colorado and Washington we find provisions to the effect that a tax title cannot be registered unless a decree of Court finding title valid as alleged is first obtained; or, if the land be vacant, payment of the taxes for eight years. In Illinois and Oregon we find a provision that a petitioner must have the actual, undisputed possession for a period of ten years, and must have paid taxes for seven years of that period. In Minnesota we find that in order to register a tax title a petitioner must obtain a decree of Court estabfishing the validity of the tax title, or must have held adverse possession for the period of fifteen years. It is worthy of consideration that in three states, at least, provision is made that a tax title shall not be registered until a decree of Court is obtained establishing the validity of the tax deed. In fact, in Illinois we find that the record owner-that is as distinguished from the holder of the tax title-may register his title upon proper proof, if he does equity by reimbursing the holder of the tax deed for the amount expended by the latter.

Gage v. Consumers Electric Light Co., 194 Ill., 30; Tobias v. Kaspzyh, 274 Ill., 80.

(In the last case cited registration was ordered without such reimbursement, because the holder of the tax deed failed to make proper showing of amount paid out by him.)

In the case of Partenfelder v. People 211 N. Y., 355, it was held that the object of the law is to register good titles, not to cure bad ones.

It would therefore seem to be the intent of the law to require five years actual adverse possession, or a period of time sufficient to bar the claim of any re

cord owner, before the title is entitled to be registered. In fact this would seem to be the more certain when we consider that an adjudication refusing registration does not necessarily mean that the petitioner does not own the land, but simply that he has failed to meet the requirements of the Land Title Law.

On the other hand, if we construe the last portion of Section 8, to-wit, the exception, to refer to state owned lands, (school lands for example) which have been sold on partial payment contracts, the taxes on which have become delinquent, then all of Section 8 has some meaning. The first provisions of the section refer to tax deeds such as the tax deed in question, and such titles are not entitled to registration unless the holder of the tax title can prove adverse possession, and the exception refers to stateowned lands. This method of construction is the only one which gives effect to all of the language of Section 8, and is therefore, I believe, the one to be adopted.

Therefore the judgment in this case is that Application No. 5 of the Petition to register be dismissed. Ira F. Thompson, Judge.

THE CHICO CONTRACTING COMPANY

VS

FLORENCE E. WHITE et al.

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF BUTTE.

(Chico Street Improvement Case)

1924.

Three actions by the Chico Contracting Company, a corporation against Florence E. White and others, against R. J. Ferguson and others and against D. Breslauer and others. Judgment for the defendants.

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1. PARTIES CITY PAVING CONTRACTS CONTRACTOR MAY SUE TO DETERMINE VALIDITY.

A contracting company having entered into a contract with a city to pave certain streets, may where certain parties file protests with the City Council questioning the validity of the proceedings, bring proceedings against them and the City in the Superior Court to determine the validity of the proceedings and contract.

2. PARTIES CITY-CONTRACTOR'S ACTION AGAINST PROPERTY OWNERS.

In an action by a contractor with the city to pave certain streets against objecting property owners to determine the validity of the contract and proceedings and right to assess property owners for the work, the city is a necessary party. CHANGE OF GRADE -RESOLUTION OF INTENTION DEFECTIVE.

3.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

A resolution of intention to change the grade of city streets which was required by statute to refer to the "Change of Grade Act of 1909" but which instead mentioned an Act of 1919, there being no such Act, is insufficient to support a legal and valid change of grade.

4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -RESOLUTIONS VITAL.

STREETS

GRADE

The resolution of intention to change a street grade is the vital step taken which gives the Board of Trustees authority to so proceed and, unless properly given as required,

by correctly referring to the "Change of Grade Statute of 1909," it is invalid and fails to give the Trustees such authority.

5.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS CHANGE OF STREET GRADE NOTICE OF INTENTION POSTING.

Failure to post resolution of intention to change grade of street at two public alleys and posting of only one notice on a 132 ft. section of a street where the law requires not less than three notices on each street held sufficient irregularity to avoid payment of assessment if ignored in action to test validity of proceedings before contract performed.

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

STREETS CHANGE

In a proceeding to change the grade of streets a notice to bidders specifying the time as "four A. M." as published and posted and later changed to "P. M." was insufficient, the bids being received at about "four P. M."

7. TIME POSTING NOTICE

COUNTING DAYS.

A notice posted April 6, 9:30 P. M. inviting bids at four P. M. April 16th following gives the full ten days required notice since the first day is not counted and the last is counted. 8. TIME-PUBLISHED NOTICE-HELD NOT TEN DAYS. Notice published April 7th for first time allowing bids until April 16th following was not the full ten days required by statute.

H. D. Gregory, Judge.

In the Superior Court of the State of California In and for the County of Butte.

The Chico Contracting Company, a corporation,

The three cases above entitled were, by stipulation of the parties consolidated and heard together.

The plaintiff, The Chico Contracting Company, having entered into a contract with the City of Chico for the improvement and paving of certain streets in said city, and because of the fact that the Defendants named in the three actions above entitled filed protests before the City Council of said City, and in said protests questioning the validity of the proceedings of the said City Council in the steps taken to give the said city the authority to enter into said contract with the Plaintiff, are now seeking to have a declaratory judgment declaring either that the said contract is valid and in full force and effect or that by virtue of certain irregularities in said proceedings the said City Council did not have authority to enter into said contract and that said contract is invalid, and that assessments for improvements against the property owners in the territory set out to be assessed would be invalid.

On the question of the proceedings herein and the right of the Plaintiff to institute these actions seeking such declaratory judgment, the opinion filed in August of this year by Honorable James W. Bartlett, sitting as Judge of this court and passing upon the demurrers submitted by the several parties, is full and complete and beyond question shows that under the law of this State such proceedings are proper and valid.

At the trial the Defendant, The City of Chico, through its counsel J. D. Peters, moved to dismiss as to the Defendant City of Chico, and also moved for a non suit as to the said Defendant City of Chico. Judge Bartlett referred to the fact that there must be an actual controversy in which the City of Chico is involved before proceedings could be had against it for such declaratory judgment. It is not necessary that the controversy be between the City of Chico and the Plaintiff, and if such controversy is between the protesting property owners it is a controversy contemplated by the law constituting the validity of