not what the surviving joint tenant receives, but the extinction of the rights of the deceased joint tenant. It cannot tax a vacuum, as we have stated before. There is no transfer, and therefore there can be no tax. In principle it has been held that in a life estate the State cannot tax the termination of the life estate, but may only tax the original transfer. Hunt vs Wicht, supra. Again: All that a joint tenant has or can exercise is the power to terminate the joint tenancy by transfer and create a tenancy in common. Can it be that the Legislature has the right to tax the termination of a mere unexercised, naked power? If the power to terminate cannot be taxed, the mere death of the joint tenant is not the exercise of the power. Then there can be no transfer by reason of the death, and the rights of the surviving joint tenant remain as they always were from the creation of the joint tenancy. Courts will always look behind an Act of the Legislature to find the fundamental fact. The Legislature will not be deemed to say that white is black, and by so saying make it so. Black is always black, notwith_ standing the Legislature may seem to say it is white. As was well said in the case of Mugler vs Kansas, 123 U. S. 661, cited and quoted in Exparte Hayden, 147 Cal. 649, at Page 651: "The courts are not bound by mere forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretense. They are at liberty-indeed, are under a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the Legislature has transcended the limits of its authority. If therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the Courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the constitution." The objections must be sustained, for the following reasons: 1. That the Legislature never intended that the amendment of 1917 should be retroactive, that if it did so intend, it would be unconstitutional and void, as interfering with vested rights; 2. That the Legislature has not the right to levy a tax as accruing by reason of the death of the joint tenant, as it attempted to do by the amendment of 1917, notwithstanding that it might have the right to levy a tax upon the creation of the joint tenancy payable at death of one joint tenant. It follows that the report of the Collateral Inheritance Appraiser, in so far as it attempts to fix a tax on the real property involved in the joint tenancy, be, and is hereby disapproved, and the State is not entitled to the payment of any tax on said property by reason of the death of George H. Mastick. Since the above was dictated, the Supreme Court of this State has handed down a decision (Estate of Potter, 63 C. D. 141), which will be found instructive and authoritative on several points, involved in this case. E. C. Robinson, Judge. THE FORD CRAIG RANCH CO. VS. THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al. SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. January 10th, 1924. Suits by the Ford Craig Co. a corporation against the City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, and the Board of Public Service Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles for injunction. Judgment for defendants. 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS TION EVIDENCE SUFFICIENCY. MALADMINISTRA In an attack directed toward the manner of public administration by those whose powers and duties are clearly and broadly designed, those alleging fraud, malfeasance, waste and discriminatory practices must establish their contentions by proof sufficient to satisfy the conscience of the chancellor and a showing of mere miscalculations, possible errors of judgment, failure to realize predictions based on long experience and results of eccentricities of the elements does not suffice. COURTS 2. INTERVENTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRA TION - ABUSE OF DISCRETION. The courts will not intervene in an attack upon the manner of public administration by officers whose powers and duties are clearly and broadly designed unless the evidence clearly shows a flagrant abuse of administrative discretion. 8. COURTS-LIMITATION OF POWER MAKING LAWS. Judicial power is limited to declaring and applying laws and not to making them. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW COURTS NOT TO EXER CISE LEGISLATIVE OR EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS. The judicial department must not assume to exercise either legislative or executive functions for the invasion by one department of the field alloted to another will not tend to make government more effective. 5. COURTS MATTERS IN EVIDENCE HELD NOT TO WARRANT INTERVENTION IN ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS. In an action to enjoin a city and its Board of Public Service Commissioners from continuing an alleged waste of water supply whether the water passing through certain power plants would possess greater economic value if applied to irrigation than when utilized for power or whether water for winter irrigation can be advantageously applied to certain lands at present rates the court cannot undertake to determine in the absence of evidence clearly showing an abuse of administrative discretion warranting the court's intervention. INJUNCTION 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Evidence held insufficient to show any gross, flagrant or inexcusable waste of aqueduct water, or that water actually available for agricultural necessities has been diverted to any appreciable extent from its primary purpose to supply the city with water, to the manufacture of hydro electric energy, in a suit against a city to enjoin such alleged use. 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - ADMINISTRATIVE REGULARITY OF ACTION EVIDENCE. In an action to enjoin alleged waste by use for power of water claimed for irrigation use brought against a city and its Board of Public Service Commissioners, evidence held not to overcome the persumption of regularity which attaches to acts of administrative officers acting within the scope of their authority. Paul Burks, Judge. In the Superior Court of the State of California In and for the County of Los Angeles. Nos. 124416 and 131050 (Consolidated). The Ford Craig Ranch Co., a corporation, Plaintiff. VS. The City of Los Angeles, a municipal corporation, and the Board of Public Service Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, Defendants. In these two suits in equity which were consolidated for the purposes of trial, the Ford Craig Ranch Company on its own behalf and on behalf of other land owners, agriculturists and water users of the San Fernando Valley, who are similarly situated, seeks (First) to enjoin the alleged maladministration by the City of Los Angeles and by its Board of Public Service Commissioners of a public trust, and to restrain an alleged waste of the water supply of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, and, (Second) to have this Court assume the administration of that governmental function, and to reduce by one half, and to fix the rates now prescribed by ordinance for the use of water for purposes of winter irrigation. The cases are highly important in their public aspects. They involve important principles of administrative law. They will have justified the time, expense and effort devoted to their careful consideration if they shall have served, upon the one hand, to arouse an intelligent interest in and to throw light upon the manner in which the public trust is being administered, and, upon the other hand, more forcefully to impress upon those charged with such administration the necessities of water users and the primary importance of responding to agricultural and horticultural requirements. It would be a work of supererogation to reiterate the allegations of the complaints. In brief, and free from any unnecessary terminology and technical expressions, they seek to enjoin the diversion of aqueduct waters into the Santa Clara River or into any other water course in such manner as to preclude the use thereof by the inhabitants and tax-payers of the City of Los Angeles for domestic, industrial and agricultural purposes, and to secure radical reduction in the present rates fixed by ordinance for winter irrigation, which rates are alleged to be unfair, unjust, unreasonable and discriminatory. In other words, it |