pensation at any sum that he wished, he would still be within the law if the contention of the Petitioner is correct.

We think the law is plain that the County Superintendent of Schools is not so authorized. He is authorized to select these teachers, but can do so only under an ordinance of the Board of Supervisors fixing the number of such teachers and the compensation to be paid them. This is clearly the intention of the general laws and of the Constitution of this State; otherwise there would be no safeguard of the public funds.

We are satisfied that the free-holders in framing the provision in the Charter creating the office of Supervising Deputy County Superintendent of Schools did so for the purpose under the apprehension that they were fulfilling the requirements of the law under Subdivision 18, Section 1543 of the Political Code requiring supervision of teachers in the rural schools, but they have failed to do so and instead thereof have created a new and different office, that of Supervising Deputy Superintendent of Schools to visit the schools in conjunction with the Superintendent himself.

The whole matter can now be easily regulated by the Board of Supervisors by ordinance fixing the number of qualified teachers to supervise the work of teaching in the school districts of the County, and fixing the terms for which they shall be employed as such teachers and the compensation to be paid them.

For these reasons the Respondent's Demurrer to the petition for a writ of mandate is sustained.

H. D. Gregory, Judge of the Superior Court.

MATTER OF ESTATE AND GUARDIANSHIP OF

LESLIE S. PEETS, A MINOR

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF ALAMEDA

(Guardian and Ward. Final Settlement)

November 19th, 1923.

In the matter of the Guardian's application for discharge after filing receipt from Ward and before filing and settlement of final account. Application denied.

1. GUARDIAN AND WARD. NO DISCHARGE UNTIL SETTLEMENT OF FINAL ACCOUNT.

Although a guardian may have settled with and filed his receipt from his ward who has come to majority under Civ. Code Sec. 246, that does not discharge him, ipso facto, and he is not entitled to a decree discharging him and his sureties on ex parte application until he has filed and had settled by judicial decree, by the court his final account under section 256, in view of section 257 and Code Civ. Proc. 1697, 1808.

Sureties on guardian's bond are vitally interested in his filing and having allowed his final account and procuring his and their discharge by final decree.

Must File Account Before Discharge.

A guardian must file and secure approval of his account to his ward before a final discharge can be secured according to a decision just handed down by the Hon. E. C. Robinson, Judge of the Probate Department in the Superior Court of this County. The decision comes in the matter of the estate and guardianship of Leslie S. Peets, a minor, and is here given in full:

E. C. Robinson, Judge.

Decision on Application for Discharge.
In the Superior Court of the State of California.

In and for the County of Alameda.

No. 24412.

In the matter of the estate and guardianship of Leslie S. Peets, a minor.

The Court. The guardian presents the receipt of his ward, and requests a decree discharging him and his sureties, reciting in his petition that the guardian has settled with his ward.

There has been no account filed by the guardian, and his application is made ex parte. The ward is now past twenty-two years of age.

Section 246 Civil Code provides that "after a ward has come to his majority he may settle his accounts with his guardian and give him a release, which is valid if obtained fairly and without undue influence." Such a settlement is not, ipso facto, a dischage of the guardian.

Section 250 Civil Code provides that: "The relation of guardian and ward is confidential, and is subject to the provisions of the title on Trust".

The sureties on the guardian's bond given on qualifying are vitally interested.

After reviewing many cases in other jurisdictions, our Supreme Court adopts the Texas rule, and says: "In this State we have one rule which prohibits an action on the bond of a guardian's surety until there is a final order settling the guardianship account, and another rule barring the action in three years after the removal or discharge of the guardian". Cook vs. Seas, 143 Cal. 221, 231. And on page 234 of the same case, Mr. Justice Van Dyke, concurring, says: "And when the guardian is appointed by the Court, he is not entitled to his discharge as to the estate until a year after the ward's majority (C. C. Sec. 257). Here, however, it is expressly found that no order or decree had ever been entered discharging or removing said guardian,

nor could such order have been made before the settlement of his final account (C. C. P. Secs. 1697, 1808)."

Again an administrator must present and have settled by the Court his final account and must deliver up "under the order of the Court, all the property of the estate to the parties entitled," before the Court will make a decree discharging him, etc. (Sec. 1697, C. C. P.) And the provisions of the statutes relating to accounts and discharge of administrators are applicable to guardians. (See Sec. 1808 C. C. P.)

However it seems to me that a guardian should be required to file and have settled by the Court his final account, turn over to his ward (where he has not already done so by settlement under Sec. 256 C. C.) "under the order of the Court" all property belonging to his ward, taking and filing proper voucher or receipt from the ward, and obtain his judicial decree of discharge. To all this surety is certainly entitled.

The application is denied.

E. C. Robinson, Judge.

COTTLE VS.

CROCKETT

SUPERIOR COURT, COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA

(Principal and Agent. Construction of Powers.)

March 10th, 1922.

Action in replevin by Albert Cottle v. Crete Arnette Crockett. Judgment for plaintiff.

Where owner and broker entered into a contract of employment by written agreement, under Code Civ. Proc. Sec. 1973 and Civil Code Sec. 1624, the execution thereof under Sec. 1625 supercedes all preceding negotiations or stipulations concerning its matters, and where the terms and conditions of sale, and employment were all mentioned in unambiguous and certain language the contract must be strictly construed and no different terms inserted or added thereto, Sec. 2315.

Although land brokers may have led defendant in replevin to believe when purchasig the orchard, that she was entitled to the personal property thereon, the sale by the owner must be measured and determined, wholly and exclusively, by the recitals in the broker's agreement and the deed, there being no other contract between vendor and purchaser, and broker's agreement, not mentioning the personal property, even though brokers allowed purchaser to take possession thereof.

In vendor's replevin action against purchaser, evidence held not to warrant or justify broker in selling the property in question or to show that vendor held brokers out as clothed with any such authority.

4. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT ONE DEALING WITH AGENT.

AUTHORITY

DUTY OF

A person dealing with an agent is under a duty to ascertain what power or authority has been bestowed upon him by the principal, and purchaser, defendant in replevin, should have ascertained broker's authority as to sale of personal property before paying for the property.