self insupportable. But, my Lords, I object to | country ever produced (it is hardly necessary to our negotiating at all, in our present circum- mention the name of Sir Walter Raleiga), sacristances. We are not in that situation in which ficed by the meanest prince that ever sat upon the a great and powerful nation is permitted to ne- throne, to the vindictive jealousy of that haughty gotiate. A foreign power has forcibly robbed court. James the First was base enough, at his Majesty of a part of his dominions. Is the the instance of Gondomar, to suffer a sentence sland restored? Are you replaced in statu quo? against Sir Walter Raleigh, for another supposed If that had been done, it might then, perhaps, offense, to be carried into execution almost twelve have been justifiable to treat with the aggressor years after it had been passed. This was the upon the satisfaction he ought to make for the pretense. His real crime was, that he had morinsult offered to the Crown of England. But tally offended the Spaniards, while he acted by will you descend so low? Will you so shame- the King's express orders, and under his comfully betray the King's honor, as to make it mat- mission. ter of negotiation whether his Majesty's possessions shall be restored to him or not? My Lords, the pretended disavowal by the court of Spain is as ridiculous as it is false. If your Lordships want any other proof, call for your own officers who were stationed at Falk the garrison, whether, when he was summoned to surrender, the demand was made in the name of the Governor of Buenos Ayres or of his Cath olic Majesty? Was the island said to belong to Don Francisco Buccarelli or to the King of Spain? If I am not mistaken, we have been in possession of these islands since the year 1764 or 1765. Will the ministry assert, that, in all that time, the Spanish court have never once claimed them? That their right to them has never been urged, or mentioned to our mistry? If it has, the act of the Governor of Buenos Ayres is plainly the consequence of our refusal to acknowledge and submit to the Spanish claims For five years they negotiate; when that fails they take the island by force. If that measure had arisen out of the general instructions constantly given to the Governor of Buenos Ayr?: why should the execution of it have been defe. red so long? I doubt not, my Lords, that there are some important mysteries in the conduct of this affair, which, whenever they are explained, will ac-land Island. Ask the officer who commanded count for the profound silence now observed by the King's servants. The time will come, my Lords, when they shall be dragged from their concealments. There are some questions which, sooner or later, must be answered. The ministry, I find, without declaring themselves explicitly, have taken pains to possess the public with an opinion, that the Spanish court have constantly disavowed the proceedings of their governor; and some persons, I see, have been shameless and daring enough to advise his Majesty to support and countenance this opinion in his speech | from the throne. Certainly, my Lords, there never was a more odious, a more infamous falsehood imposed on a great nation. It degrades the King's honor. It is an insult to Parliament. His Majesty has been advised to confirm and give currency to an absolute falsehood. I beg your Lordship's attention, and I hope I shall be understood, when repeat, that the court of Spain's having disavowed the act of their gov. ernor is an absolute, a palpable falsehood. Let me ask, my Lords, when the first communication was made by the court of Madrid of their being apprised of the taking of Falkland's Island, was it accompanied with an offer of instant restitution, of immediate satisfaction, and the punishment of the Spanish governor ? If it was not, they have adopted the act as their own, and the very mention of a disavowal is an impudent insult offered to the King's dignity. The King of Spain disowns the thief, while he leaves him unpunished, and profits by the theft. In vulgar English, he is the receiver of stolen goods, and ought to be treated accordingly. If your Lordships will look back to a period of the English history in which the circumstances are reversed, in which the Spaniards were the complainants, you will see how differently they succeeded. You will see one of the ablest men, one of the bravest officers this or any other History confirms this statement. Adolphus says that when Lord Weymouth inquired "whether Grinaldi had instructions to disavow the conduct of Buccarelli, he received an answer in the negative." --Vol. i., p. 431. It was not until January 22d, 1771, nearly three months after, that the disavowal was made See Adolphus, i.. 435. My Lords, if the falsehood of this pretended disavowal had been confined to the court of Spain, I should have admitted it without concern. I should have been content that they themselves had left a door open for excuse and accommodation. The King of England's honor is not touched till he adopts the falsehoo} delivers it to his Parliament, and adopts it as he own. I can not quit this subject without comparing the conduct of the present ministry with that of a gentleman [Mr. George Grenville] who is now no more. The occasions were similar. The French had taken a little island from us [in 1764] called Turk's Island. The minister then at the head of the treasury [Mr. Grenville] took the business upon himself. But he did not negotiate. He sent for the French embassador ano made a peremptory demanć A courier was dispatched to Paris, and returned in a few days, with orders for instant restitution, not only of the island, but of every thing that the English subjects had lost." Such, then, my Lords, are the circumstances 5 A similar measure of spirit was adopted by the same minister with the Spaniards, who had driven our settlers from Honduras, to whom fourteen days had been allowed; upon which. all was instantly and amicably adjusted and 1 beg that this declaration may he remembered men. My Lords, I have better reasons, perhaps, thar many of your Lordships for desiring peace upor the terms I have described. I know the strength and preparation of the house of Bourbon; I know the defenseless, unprepared condition of this country. I know not by what mismanagement we are reduced to this situation; but when 1 consider who are the men by whom a war, in the outset at least, must be conducted, can I but wish for peace? Let them not screen them. selves behind the want of intelligence. They had intelligence: I know they had. If they had not, they are criminal, and their excuse is their crime. But I will tell these young ministers the true source of intelligence. It is sagacity. Sa gacity to compare causes and effects; to judge of the present state of things, and discern the future by a careful review of the past. Oliver Cromwell, who astonished mankind by his intel of our difference with Spain; and in this situa- | Spain. My Lords, 1 disclaim such counseìs, and tion, we are told that a negotiation has been entered into; that this negotiation, which must have commenced near three months ago, is still depending, and that any insight into the actual state of it will impede the conclusion. My Lords, I am not, for my own part, very anxious to draw from the ministry the information which they take so much care to conceal from us. I very well know where this honorable negotiation will end-where it must end. We may, perhaps, be able to patch up an accommodation for the present, but we shall have a Spanish war in six months. Some of your Lordships may, perhaps, remember the Convention. For several successive years our merchants had been plundered; no protection given them; no redress obtained for them. During all that time we were contented to complain and to negotiate. The court of Madrid were then as ready to disown their officers, and as unwilling to punish them, as they are at present. Whatever violence happened was always laid to the charge of one or other of their West India governors. To-day it was the Governor of Cuba, to-morrow of Porto Rico, Carthagena, or Porto Bello. If in a particular instance redress was promised, how was that promise kept? The merchant who had been robbed of his property was sent to the West Indies, to get it, if he could, out of an empty chest. | At last, the Convention was made; but, though approved by a majority of both houses, it was received by the nation with universal discontent. I myself heard that wise man [Sir Robert Walple] say in the House of Commons, "'Tis true we have got a Convention and a vote of Parlia-ligence, did not derive it from spies in the cabiment; but what signifies it? We shall have a Spanish war upon the back of our Convention." Here, my Lords, I can not help mentioning a very striking observation made to me by a noble Lord [Granville], since dead. His abilities did honor to this House and to this nation. In the upper departments of government he had not his equal; and I feel a pride in declaring, that to his patronage, his friendship, and instruction, I owe whatever I am. This great man has often observed to me, that, in all the negotiations which preceded the Convention, our ministers never found out that there was no ground or subject for any negotiation. That the Spaniards had not a right|isters with the highest crimes that men in their to search our ships, and when they attempted to regulate that right by treaty, they were regulating a thing which did not exist. This I take to be something like the case of the ministry. The Spaniards have seized an island they have 10 right to; and his Majesty's servants make it a matter of negotiation, whether his dominions shall be restored to him or not. From what I have said, my Lords, I do not doubt bet it will be understood by many Lords, and given out to the public, that I am for hurrying the nation, at all events, into a war with The Convention here referred to was the one made by Sir Robert Walpole in 1739, which Lord Chatham at the time so strenuously resisted. net of every prince in Europe: he drew it from the cabinet of his own sagacious mind. He observed facts, and traced them forward to their consequences. From what was, he concluded what must be, and he never was deceived. In the present situation of affairs, I think it would be treachery to the nation to conceal from them their real circumstances, and, with respect to a foreign enemy, I know that all concealments are vain and useless. They are as well acquainted with the actual force and weakness of this country as any of the King's servants. This is no time for silence or reserve. I charge the min stations can be guilty of. I charge them with having destroyed all content and unanimity at home by a series of oppressive, unconstitutiona measures; and with having betrayed and deliv ered up the nation defenseless to a foreign enemy. Their utmost vigor has reached no farther than to a fruitless, protracted negotiation. When they should have acted, they have contented themselves with talking "about it, goddess, and about it." If we do not stand forth, and do our duty in the present crisis, the nation is irretrievably undone. I despise the little policy of concealments. You ought to know the whole of your situation. If the information be new to the ministry, let them take care to profit by it. 1 meal to rouse, to alarm the whole nation; to rouse the ministry, if possible, who seem to awake to nothing but the preservation of their places to awaken the King. Early in the last spring, a motion was made in Parliament for inquiring into the state of the navy, and an augmentation of six thousand seamen was offered to the ministry. They refused to give us any insight into the condition of the navy, and rejected the augmentation. Early in June they received advice of a commencement of hostilities by a Spanish armament, which had warned the King's garrison to quit an island belonging to his Majesty. From that to the 12th of September, as if nothing had happened, they lay dormant. Not a man was raised, not a single ship was put into commission. From the 12th of September, when they heard of the first blow being actually struck, we are to date the beginning of their preparations for defense. Let us now inquire, my Lords, what expedition they have used, what vigor they have exerted. We have heard wonders of the diligence employed in impressing, of the large bounties offered, and the number of ships put into commission. These have been, for some time past, the constant topics of ministerial boast and triumph. Without regarding the description, let us look to the substance. I tell your Lordships that, with all this vigor and expedition, they have not, in a period of considerably more than two months, raised ten thousand seamen. I mention that number, meaning to speak largely, though in my own breast I am convinced that the number does not exceed eight thousand. But it is said they have ordered forty ships of the line into commission. My Lords, upon this subject I can speak with knowledge. I have been conversant in these matters, and draw my information from the greatest and most respectable naval authority that ever existed in this country-I mean the late Lord Anson. The merits of that great man are not so universally known, nor his memory so warmly respected as he deserved. To his wisdom, to his experience and care (and I speak it with pleasure), the nation owes the glorious naval successes of the last war. The state of facts laid before Parliament in the year 1756, so entirely convinced me of the injustice done to his character, that in spite of the popular clamors raised against him, in direct opposition to the complaints of the merchants, and of the whole city (whose favor I am supposed to court upon all occasions), I replaced him at the head of the Admiralty, and I thank God that I had resolution enough to do so. Instructed by this great seaman, I do affirm, that forty ships of the line, with their necessary attendant frigates, to be properly manned, require forty thousand seamen. If your Lordships are surprised at this assertion, you will be more so when I assure you, that in the iast war, this country maintained eighty-five thousand seamen, and employed them all. teen thousand men. Add to these the number newly raised, and you have about twenty-five thousand men to man your fleet. I shall come presently to the application of this force, suck as it is, and compare it with the services which I know are indispensable. But first, my Lords, let us have done with the boasted vigor of the ministry. Let us hear no more of their activity. If your Lordships will recall to your minds the state of this country when Mahon was taken, and compare what was done by government at that time with the efforts now made in very similar circumstances, you will be able to determine what praise is due to the vigorous operations of the present ministry. Upon the first intelligence of the invasion of Minorca, a great fleet was equipped and sent out, and near double the number of seamen collected in half the time taken to fit out the present force, which, pitifui as it is, is not yet, if the occasion was ever so pressing, in a condition to go to sea. Consult the returns which were laid before Parliament in the yea. 1756. I was one of those who urged a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the ministry. That ministry, my Lords, in the midst of universal censure and reproach, had honor and virtue enough to promote the inquiry themselves. They scorned to evade it by the mean expedient of putting a previous question. Upon the strictest inquiry, it appeared that the diligence they had used in sending a squadron to the Mediter ranean, and in their other naval preparations, was beyond all example. My Lords, the subject on which I am speak. ing seems to call upon me, and I willingly take this occasion, to declare my opinion upon a ques tion on which much wicked pains have been employed to disturb the minds of the people and to distress government. My opinion may not be very popular; neither am I running the race of popularity. I am myself clearly envinced, and I believe every man who knows any thing of the English navy will acknowledge, that without impressing, it is impossible to equip a respectable fleet within the time in which such armaments are usually wanted. If this fact be admitted, and if the necessity of arming upon a sudden emergency should appear incontrovertible, what shall we think of those men who, in the moment of danger, would stop the great defense of their country? Upon whatever princi ple they may act, the act itself is more than faction-it is laboring to cut off the right hand of the community. I wholly condemn their conduct, and am ready to support any motion that may be made for bringing those aldermen, who have endeavored to stop the execution of the Admiralty warrants, to the bar of this House. My Lords, I do not rest my opinion merely upon necessity. I am satisfied that the power of im. pressing is founded upon uninterrupted usage It is the " consuetudo regni" [the custom of the realm], and part of the common law prerogative Now, my Lords, the peace establishment of of the Crown. When I condemn the proceed your navy, supposing it complete and effective ings of some persons upon this occasion, let me which, by the-bv, ought to be known), is six- | do justice to a man whose character and conduc have been most infamously traduced; I mean | ice shall accept of the command and stake his the late Lord Mayor, Mr. Treacothick. In the reputation upon it. We have one ship of the midst of reproach and clamor, he had firmness line at Jamaica, one at the Leeward Islands, and enough to persevere in doing his duty. I do not one at Gibraltar! Yet at this very moment, for know in office a more upright magistrate, nor, aught that the ministry know, both Jamaica and in private life, a worthier man. Gibraltar may be attacked; and if they are at tacked (which God forbid), they must fall. Noth. ing can prevent it but the appearance of a supe rior squadron, It is true that, some two months ago, four ships of the line were ordered fron Portsmouth and one from Plymouth, to carry relief from Ireland to Gibraltar. These ships my Lords, a week ago were still in port. If upon their arrival at Gibraltar, they should find the bay possessed by a superior squadron, the relief can not be landed; and if it could be land sists? Two regiments, of four hundred mer each, at a time like this, are sent to secure a place of such importance as Gibraltar ! a place which it is universally agreed can not hold out against a vigorous attack from the sea, if once the enemy should be so far masters of the bay as to make a good landing even with a moderate force. The indispensable service of the lines requires at least four thousand men. The pres Permit me now, my Lords, to state to your Lordships the extent and variety of the service which must be provided for, and to compare thern with our apparent resources. A due at tention to, and provision for these services, is prudence in time of peace; in war it is necessity. Preventive policy, my Lords, which obviates or avoids the injury, is far preferable to that vindietive policy which aims at reparation, or has no object but revenge. The precaution that meets the disorder is cheap and easy; the rem-ed, of what force do your Lordships think it con edy which follows it, bloody and expensive. The first great and acknowledged object of national defense in this country is to maintain such a su- | perior naval force at home, that even the united fleets of France and Spain may never be masters of the Channel. If that should ever happen, what is there to hinder their landing in Ireland, or even upon our own coast? They have often made the attempt. In King William's time it succeeded. King James embarked on board aent garrison consists of about two thousand three French fleet, and landed with a French army in Ireland. In the mean time the French were masters of the Channel, and continued so until their fleet was destroyed by Admiral Russel. Let us now, my Lords, turn our eyes homeAs to the probable consequences of a foreign | ward. When the defense of Great Britain or army landing in Great Britain or Ireland, I shall | Ireland is in question, it is no longer a point of offer your Lordships my opinion when I speak honor; it is not the security of foreign com of the actual condition of our standing army. merce or foreign possessions; we are to conThe second naval object with an English min- tend for the being of the state. I have good ister should be to maintain at all times a power-authority to assure your Lordships that the ful Western squadron. In the profoundest peace it should be respectable; in war it should be formidable. Without it, the colonies, the commerce, the navigation of Great Britain, lie at the mercy of the house of Bourbon. While I had the honor of acting with Lord Anson, that able officer never ceased to inculcate upon the minds of his Majesty's servants, the necessity of constantly maintaining a strong Western squadron; and I must vouch for him, that while he was at the head of the marine, it was never neglected. hundred; so that if the relief should be fortunate enough to get on shore, they will want eight hundred men of their necessary complement. Spaniards have now a fleet at Ferrol, completely manned and ready to sail, which we are in no condition to meet. We could not this day send out eleven ships of the line properly equip ped, and to-morrow the enemy may be masters of the Channel. It is unnecessary to press the consequences of these facts upon your Lord. ships' minds. If the enemy were to land in ful force, either upon this coast or in Ireland, where is your army? Where is your defense? My Lords, if the house of Bourbon make a wise and vigorous use of the actual advantages they have The third object indispensable, as I conceive, over us, it is more than probable that on this day in the distribution of our navy, is to maintain month we may not be a nation. What military such a force in the Bay of Gibraltar as may be force can the ministry show to answer any sud sufficient to cover that garrison, to watch the den demand? I do not speak of foreign expe motions of the Spaniards, and to keep open the ditions or offensive operations; I speak of the communication with Minorca. The ministry interior defense of Ireland and of this country will not betray such a want of information as to You have a nominal army of seventy battalions, dispate the truth of any of these propositions. besides guards and cavalry. But what is the But how will your Lordships be astonished when establishment of these battalions? Supposing I inform you in what manner they have provided they were complete in the numbers allowed, for these great, these essential objects? As to which I know they are not, each regiment the first-1 mean the defense of the Channel- would consist of something less than four hunI take upon myself to affirm to your Lordships, dred men, rank and file. Are these pattalions that, at this hour (and I beg that the date may complete? Have any orders been given for an be taken down and observed), we can not send augmentation, or do the ministry mean to conout eleven ships of the line so manned and equip-tinue them upon their present low establishment? ped, that any officer of rank and credit in the serv- When America, the West Indies, Gibraltar, and Minorca, are taken care of, consider, my Lords, | ment, we have an internal strength sufficient is what part of this army will remain to defend repel any foreign invasion. With respect to Ire Ireland and Great Britain? This subject, my land, my Lords, I am not of the same opinion. Lords, leads me to considerations of foreign If a powerful foreign army were landed in that policy and foreign alliance. It is more connect-kingdom, with arms ready to be put into the ed with them than your Lordships may at first hands of the Roman Catholics, I declare freely imagine. When I compare the numbers of our to your Lordships that I should heartily wish it people, estimated highly at seven millions, with were possible to collect twenty thousand German the popu ation of France and Spain, usually com- Protestants, whether from Hesse, or Brunswick, puted at twenty-five millions, I see a clear, self-or Wolfenbuttle, or even the unpopular Hanoevident impossibility for this country to contend with the united power of the house of Bourbon merely upon the strength of its own resources. They who talk of confining a great war to naval operations only, speak without knowledge or experience. We can no more command the disposition than the events of a war. Wherever we are attacked, there we must defend. verians, and land them in Ireland. I wish it, my Lords, because I am convinced that, whenever the case happens, we shall have no English army to spare. I have taken a wide circuit, my Lords, and trespassed, I fear, too long upon your Lordships' patience. Yet I can not conclude without endeavoring to bring home your thoughts to an I have been much abused, my Lords, for sup- object more immediately interesting to us than porting a war which it has been the fashion to any I have yet considered; I mean the internal call my German war. But I can affirm with a condition of this country. We may look abroad clear conscience, that that abuse has been thrown for wealth, or triumphs, or luxury; but England, on me by men who were either unacquainted with my Lords, is the main stay, the last resort of the facts, or had an interest in misrepresenting them. whole empire. To this point every scheme of I shall speak plainly and frankly to your Lord- policy, whether foreign or domestic, should ultiships upon this, as I do upon every occasion. mately refer. Have any measures been taker That I did in Parliament oppose, to the utmost to satisfy or to unite the people? Are the griev of my power, our engaging in a German war, is ances they have so long complained of removed? most true; and if the same circumstance were or do they stand not only unredressed, but ag. to recur, I would act the same part, and oppose gravated? Is the right of free election restored it again. But when I was called upon to take a to the elective body? My Lords, I myself am share in the administration, that measure was one of the people. I esteem that security and already decided. Before I was appointed Sec-independence, which is the original birthright of retary of State, the first treaty with the King of an Englishman, far beyond the privileges, how. Prussia was signed, and not only ratified by the ever splendid, which are annexed to the peer. Crown, but approved of and confirmed by a reso- age. I myself am by birth an English elector, lution of both houses of Parliament. It was a and join with the freeholders of England as in a weight fastened upon my neck. By that treaty common cause. Believe me, my Lords, we mis. the honor of the Crown and the honor of the na- take our real interest as much as our duty when tion were equally engaged. How I could re- we separate ourselves from the mass of the peocede from such an engagement-how I could ple. Can it be expected that Englishmen will advise the Crown to desert a great prince in unite heartily in the defense of a government by the midst of those difficulties in which a reliance which they feel themselves insulted and oppressupon the good faith of this country had contrib-ed? Restore them to their rights; that is the uted to involve him, are questions I willingly submit to your Lordships' candor. That wonderful man might, perhaps, have extricated himself from his difficulties without our assistance. He has talents which, in every thing that touches the human capacity, do honor to the human mind. But how would England have supported that rep-ual must be done. utation of credit and good faith by which we have been distinguished in Europe? What other for eign power would have sought our friendship? What other foreign power would have accepted cf an alliance with us? But, my Lords, though I wholly condemn our entering into any engagements which tend to involve us in a continental war, I do not admit that alliances with some of the German princes are either detrimental or useless. They may be, my Lords, not only useful, but necessary. I hope, indeed, I never shall see an army of foreign auxdiaries in Great Britain; we do not want it. If our people are united-if they are attached to the King, and place confidence in his govern true way to make them unanimous. It is not a ceremonious recommendation from the Throne that can bring back peace and harmony to a discontented people. That insipid annual opiate has been administered so long that it has lost its effect. Something substantial, something effect The public credit of the nation stands next in degree to the rights of the Constitution; it calls loudly for the interposition of Parliament. There is a set of men, my Lords, in the city of London, who are known to live in riot and luxury upon the plunder of the ignorant, the innocent, the helpless-upon that part of the community which stands most in need of, and best deserves the care and protection of the Legislature. To me, my Lords, whether they be miserable jobbers cf 'Change Alley, or the lofty Asiatic plunderers of Leadenhall Street, they are all equally detesta. ble. I care out little whether a man walks or foot, or is drawn by eight horses or six horses; if his luxury is supported by the plunder of his |