that the master gave orders to the engineer as to banking the fires which, if properly attended to, ought to have enabled steam to be got up in a shorter time, but in the opinion of the Court, he ought to have cautioned him as to the well known danger of the roadstead; that being in an exposed roadstead, the master neglected to place a proper anchor watch with specific instructions as to reporting the weather; that he did not come on deck immediately on being called by the chief officer, and in the opinion of the Court, he ought either to have complied with the request of the chief officer to be allowed to give instructions to the engineer to get steam up, or to have satisfied himself at once of the state of the weather; that steam might have been obtained in much less time had the fires been properly banked and attended to from time to time; that the master should have shown greater alacrity in going on deck; that the port anchor was not in such a state of readiness as it ought to have been; and that the chief engineer was not justified in leaving the engine-room and stoke-hole without an engineer or fireman in charge. In these circumstances the Court found the master and chief engineer in default, and suspended the certificate of the master for three months, and that of the chief engineer for a similar period, recommending however, if desired, the grant of a chief officer's certificate to the master, and a second engineer's certificate to the engineer during the periods of suspension. Against this decision the master appealed on the following grounds (inter alia), viz. : That the causes of the stranding as found by the Court were not attributable to any act or default of the master within the meaning of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, section 242: That the admitted main cause of the stranding was the want of steam to enable the master to lift the anchor and stand out to sea, for which the master was in no way responsible: That by the judgment and report of the Court, the orders given by the master to the chief engineer were sufficient if properly attended to, and it was not the duty of the master to explain the reason and urgency The Largo Bay. The Largo Bay. of his definite orders to a certificated chief engineer: That the anchor watch set in fine settled weather was sufficient, and according to the usage of practice, and, if such watch was insufficient, that upon the evidence such deficiency did not cause, or in any way materially contribute to the casualty: That the master came on deck with all reasonable dispatch when called by the chief officer, and that there was no proof of delay in calling the chief engineer, which would have contributed to the casualty. The Appeal was heard before Sir James Hannen, the President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division of the High Court, and Mr. Justice Butt. In giving judgment Sir James Hannen stated that according to his view of the question for determination, it was not merely whether the master of the Largo Bay had completely done his duty to the satisfaction of the Court, but whether the vessel was lost by any misconduct of his. With respect to the finding of the Court below that the master ought to have cautioned the engineer as to the well known danger of the roadstead, and dealing with that finding as a legal question, Sir James Hannen held that the accident was not occasioned by the captain not having given special directions to the engineer, or by not having questioned him as to whether or not his orders to bank the fires had been obeyed, and Sufficiency of further that the finding that the anchor watch was insufficient could not be sustained. With respect to the finding that the captain showed a want of alacrity in not coming on deck immediately on being called by the chief officer, Sir James Hannen held that the delay of a few minutes, which was the only consequnce of his not having at once come on deck, was not the occasion of the accident. As to the finding that the port anchor was not in such a state of readiness as it ought to have been, the President held that the accident would not have been avertible by anything more that could have been done with reference to the port anchor. anchor watch. Want of alac rity at a critical time. The President accordingly held that the loss of the vessel was not occasioned by any wrongful act or default on the part of the master, and concluded his judgment in the following terms :— "At the same time I feel very fully the force of The Largo Bay. Necessity for general super vision of the master. the observations which have been made by Mr. Danckwerts on the subject, that it will not do to encourage the idea that the safety of valuable property, and above all, valuable lives, is to be made to depend upon whether everybody in a chain of services has been discharging his duty, that something more lies upon the captain to be vigilant, or to use a very good expression which Mr. Danckwerts has made use of, that he should keep touch' with the full government of the ship, and we come to the conclusion, and are advised, that though the conduct of the captain in this matter has not been the cause of the loss of the vessel, yet that there was such a general laxity of discipline on board this ship, as not to throw discipline. credit upon the captain, and we consider that that should influence us to this extent, that while we relieve him from the stigma of having his certificate suspended, we do not think it is a case in which he should have costs. Mr. Justice Butt said: "I entirely agree with the conclusion at which my Lord has arrived, and for the reasons which he has given in support of that conclusion. I do not doubt for a moment, that in some respects the conduct of this master was open to censure. It does not therefore follow that the facts are such as to justify the suspension of his certificate. I need not go into any detail in the matter, because I agree entirely with the reasons which have been given, and I think that a very good way of marking our sense of the laxity of discipline on board this ship, is to deal with the matter as my Lord has decided, and refuse the master the costs of this appeal." The finding of the Court below was therefore reversed, but no order was made as to costs. The rules which have been made under the Shipping Casualties Investigations Act, 1879, for regulating the procedure on appeals and at re-hearings are given in the next chapter. Laxity of Costs. 204 CHAPTER XI. RULES OF PROCEDURE ON APPEALS AND RE-HEARINGS. The Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, 39 & 40 Vict., Cap. 80. The Shipping Casualties Investigations Act, 1879, Rule 1. Short Title. Rule 2. Commence ment. Rule 8. Interpreta tion. Rule 4. Publication of Rules. RULE I. These Rules may be cited as "The Shipping Casualties (Appeal and Rehearing) Rules, 1880.' RULE II. These Rules shall come into operation on the 21st day of April, 1880. RULE III. In the construction of these Rules the word "Judge" shall mean the Wreck Commissioner, Stipendiary Magistrate, Justices or other authority empowered to hold an Investigation into the conduct of a master, mate, or engineer, or into a shipping casualty. RULE IV. These Rules shall be published by Her Majesty's Stationary Office, through its Agents, and a copy shall be kept at every Custom House and Mercantile Marine Office in the United Kingdom, and any person desiring to peruse them there shall be entitled to do so. RULE V. Where the certificate of a master, mate, or engineer has been cancelled or suspended, the Board of Trade shall, on application by any party to the proceedings, give him a copy of the report made to the Board. The above report setsforth the decision of the Court below. See ante, p. 101. RULE VI. Every appeal under section two of "The Shipping Casualties Investigations Act, 1879," shall be subject to the conditions and regulations following, namely : (a) The appellant shall, within seven days after the day on which the decision appealed against is pronounced, serve on such of the other parties to the proceedings as he may consider to be directly affected by the appeal, notice of his intention to appeal, and shall also, within two days after the appeal is set down, serve on the said parties notice of the general grounds of the appeal. The limit of seven days was no doubt suggested by the ordinary rule as to appeals from the decisions of Magistrates. In such appeals the appellant is required to state the grounds of appeal, see 42 & 43 Vict., c. 49, s. 81, subsec (2). As to the mode of service of notices or proceedings in an appeal or re-hearing, see sub-section (j), page 209. (b) If the appeal is brought by any party other than the Board of Trade, the appellant shall give such security, if any, by deposit of money or otherwise, for the costs to be occasioned by the appeal, as the judge from whose decision the appeal is brought, on application made to him for that purpose, may direct. Security for costs is always required on appeals from Magistrates, see 42 & 48 Vict., c. 49, s. 31, sub-sec. (3). In appeals from the High Court it is not required in the absence of special order, Rules of the Supreme Court, Order LVIII., 15. |