ing to the state, or any city, county, town, or district therein, and all moneys, bonds, and evidences of indebtedness received or held by state, county, district, city, or town officers in their official capacity. 427. Failure to pay over fines and forfeitures received, a misdemeanor. SEC. 427. If any clerk, justice of the peace, sheriff, or constable, who receives any fine or forfeiture, refuses or neglects to pay over the same according to law and within thirty days after the receipt thereof, he is guilty of a misdemeanor. Stats. 1851, 212, sec. 680. Cited in County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 3 West Coast Rep. 442. 428. Obstructing officer in collecting revenue. SEC. 428. Every person who willfully obstructs or hinders any public officer from collecting any revenue, taxes, or other sums of money in which the people of this state are interested, and which such officer is by law empowered to collect, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 429. Refusing to give assessor list of property, or giving false name. SEC. 429. Every person who unlawfully refuses, upon demand, to give to any county assessor a list of his property subject to taxation, or to swear to such list, or who gives a false name or fraudulently refuses to give his true name to any assessor, when demanded by such assessor in the discharge of his official duties, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Stats. 1861, 419, secs. 17, 18. 430. Making false statements, not under oath, in reference to taxes. SEC. 430. Every person who, in making any statement, not upon oath, oral or written, which is required or authorized by law to be made, as the basis of imposing any tax or assessment, or of an application to reduce any tax or assessment, willfully states anything which he knows to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Stats. 1861, 419, secs. 17, 18, 68. 431. Delivering receipts for poll-taxes, other than prescribed by law, or collecting poll-taxes, etc., without giving proper receipt. SEC. 431. Every person who uses or gives any receipt, except that prescribed by law, as evidence of the payment of ary poll-tax, road tax, or license of any kind, or who receives payment of such tax or license without delivering the receipt prescribed by law, or who inserts the name of more than one person therein, is guilty of a misdemeanor. "Stats. 1861, 419, sec. 95. This and the lating to tax receipts, licenses, etc.: See Pol. nine following sections are extended to cover Code Cal., secs. 3356-3385, Licenses,' and the several provisions of the revenue law re- 3607-3892, 'Revenue:"" Commissioners' note. 432. Having blank receipts for licenses, etc., other than those prescribed by law. SEC. 432. Every person who has in his possession, with intent to circulate or sell, any blank licenses or poll-tax receipts other than those furnished by the controller of state or county auditor, is guilty of felony. 433. Undated foreign-miners' licenses. related to selling undated foreign-miners' licenses. The Penal Code was adopted February 14, 1872, and went into effect January 1, 1873. Section 433 was repealed by an act entitled "An act to amend and in relation to the Political, Civil, and Penal codes, and the Code of Civil Procedure," approved April 1, 1872. It 434. Refusing to give name of persons in employment, etc. SEC. 434. Every person who, when requested by the collector of taxes or licenses, refuses to give to such collector the name and residence of each man in his employment, or to give such collector access to the building or place where such men are employed, is guilty of a misdemeanor. "Stats. 1864, 45, sec. 1. This section was more particularly applicable to the collection of foreign-miners' license; but it is competent for 435. Carrying on business without license. the collector to enforce this information from any one when collecting taxes: See also Pol. Code Cal., secs. 3848-3850:" Commissioners' note. SEC. 435. Every person who commences or carries on any business, trade, profession, or calling, for the transaction or carrying on of which a license is required by any law of this state, without taking out or procuring the license prescribed by such law, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Licenses: See Pol. Code, secs. 3356 et seq. License law: See "an act to prohibit the issuance of licenses to aliens," etc., approved 436. Unlawfully acting as auctioneer. April 12, 1880: Stats. 1880, 39. In People v. Quong On Long, 6 Pac. C. L. J. 116, this act was held unconstitutional. SEC. 436. Every person who acts as an auctioneer in violation of the laws of this state relating to auctions and auctioneers is guilty of a misdemeanor. 437, 438. Forging revenue stamps. Sections 437 and 438 were repealed by act approved April 1, 1872. The two repealed sections became inopera tive and unnecessary by the stamp tax being declared unconstitutional in Brummagin v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 265. 439. Effecting insurance on account of foreign companies that have not complied with laws of state. SEC. 439. Every person who in this state procures, or agrees to procure, any insurance for a resident of this state, from any insurance company not incorporated under the laws of this state, unless such company or its agent has filed the bond required by the laws of this state relating to insurance, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Bonds from foreign corporations: Pol. Code, sec. 623. 440. Officer charged with collection, etc., of revenue, refusing to permit inspection of books. SEC. 440. Every officer charged with the collection, receipt, or disbursement of any portion of the revenue of this state, who, upon demand, fails or refuses to permit the controller or attorney-general to inspect his books, papers, receipts, and records pertaining to his office, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Stats. 1852, 57, sec. 2. 441. Board of examiners, controller, and treasurer neglecting certain duties. SEC. 441. Every member of the board of examiners, and every controller or state treasurer, who violates any of the provisions of the laws of this state relating to the board of examiners, or prescribing its powers and duties, is guilty of a felony. Board of examiners: Pol. Code, secs. 654 et seq. 442. Having state arms, etc. SEC. 442. Every person who unlawfully retains in his possession any arms, equipments, clothing, or military stores belonging to the state, or the property of any company of the state militia, is guilty of a misdemeanor. Stats. 1866, 735, sec. 50. 443. Selling state arms, etc. SEO. 443. Every member of the state militia who unlawfully disposes of any arms, equipments, clothing, or military stores, the property of this state, or of any company of the state militia, is guilty of a misdemeanor. X. XI. XII. FALSE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES... FRAUDULENTLY KEEPING POSSESSION OF WRECKED PROPERTY... 544 XIII. FRAUDULENT INSOLVENCIES BY CORPORATIONS, AND OTHER FRAUDS 548 552 ... 557 XIV. FRAUDULENT ISSUE OF DOCUMENTS OF TITLE TO MERCHANDISE.. 577 587 CHAPTER I 447. Arson defined. SEC. 447. Arson is the willful and malicious burning of a building, with intent to destroy it. Arson. The definition given by the above section, though somewhat more extensive, is substantially that of the common-law authorities. The offense is restricted to the burning of a dwelling-house, or some edifice adapted for or connected with human occupation; thus making the gravity of the offense consist in the peril to the person which such burning involves: 1 Whart. Crim. L., 8th ed., sec. 825; 2 Russell on Crimes, 1024; 4 Bla. Com. 219; 2 East P. C. 1015. This and the succeeding sec tions in this chapter apply, it would seem, only to cases of the burning by one of a building owned or occupied by another: See sec. 452, note 1. The punishment of one who destroys his own property for the purpose of obtaining the insurance thereon is provided by section 548. See, generally, People v. Hughes, 29 Cal. 257; People v. Scott, 32 Id. 200; People v. Trin, 39 Id. 75; People v. Wooley, 44 Id. 494; People v. Haggerty, 46 Id. 354; People v. Simp. son, 50 Id. 304; People v. Shainwold, 51 Id. 468; People v. Fisher, Id. 319; People v. Coch, 53 Id. 627; see sec. 451, note. Malice and intent.-It would appear but reasonable as well as just that malice sufficient to constitute arson should be inferred from the proof that the prisoner committed an act of burning a building, and that some other person was rightfully in possession of or actually occupying any part thereof. It ought not to be necessary that the accused should have had actual knowledge of such possession or occupancy, or should have intended to injure another person: See Rex v. Farrington, Russ. & Ry. 207; People v. Van Blarcum, 2 Johns. 105; People v. Orcutt, 1 Park. Cr. 252; People v. Henderson, Id. 563; Jesse v. State, 28 Miss. 100. In Regina v. Regan, 4 Cox C. C. 335, it appeared that the prisoner's intent in setting fire to the building was to obtain a reward offered for giving the earliest intimation of a fire at the engine station: Held, he was guilty of arson. But the burning of a building, under circumstances which show beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no intent to destroy it, is not arson: People v. Cotteral, 18 Johns. 115; State v. Mitchell, 5 Ired. 350. But where any appurtenance to any building is so situated with reference to such building, or where any building is so situated with reference to another building, that the burning of the one will manifestly endanger the other, a burning of the one is deemed a burning of the other, within the foregoing definition of arson, and as against any person actually participating in the original setting fire, as of the moment when the fire from the one shall communicate to and burn the other: Robert's Case, 2 East P. C. 1030; Isaac's Case, Id. 1031; Regina v. Fletcher, 2 Car. & Kir. 215; Regina v. Paice, 1 Id. 73; Rex v. Pedley, 1 Leach, 4th ed., 242. Burning insured property: Sec. 548. 448. Building defined. SEC. 448. Any house, edifice, structure, vessel, or other erection capable of affording shelter for human beings, or appurtenant to or connected with an erection so adapted, is a "building" within the meaning of this chapter. 449. Inhabited building defined. SEC. 449. Any building which has usually been occupied by any person lodging therein at night is an "inhabited building" within the meaning of this chapter. 450. Night-time defined. SEC. 450. The phrase "night-time," as used in this chapter, means the period between sunset and sunrise. 451. Burning defined. SEC. 451. To constitute a burning, within the meaning of this chapter, it is not necessary that the building set on fire should have been destroyed. It is sufficient that fire is applied so as to take effect upon any part of the substance of the building. Burning, what constitutes.-Where a fire was set in old rags saturated with coal-oil, and lying upon the floor of the house, but was quickly discovered and put out, leaving a spot on the floor slightly charred, so as to destroy the fibers of the wood, it was held sufficient to 452. Ownership of the building. constitute the offense: People v. Haggerty, 46 Cal. 354. And where a wooden partition annexed to a building was charred by fire, and in one place burned through, the burning was held sufficient to constitute arson: People v. Simpson, 50 Id. 304. SEC. 452. To constitute arson, it is not necessary that a person other than the accused should have had ownership in the building set on fire. It is sufficient that at the time of the burning another person was rightfully in possession of or was actually occupying such building, or any part thereof. Ownership. At common law, a man could not commit arson by burning a house of which he was lawfully in possession as tenant: Rex v. Pedley, 1 Leach, 4th ed., 242; 2 East P. C. 1026; Holmes's Case, Cro. Car. 376. In this state, however, it is sufficient to prove that 453. Degrees af arson. SEC. 453. Arson is divided into two Degree. If the offense charged in the indictment amounts only to arson in the second degree, it is unnecessary for the jury to specify some person other than defendant occupied the building: People v. Wooley, 44 Cal. 494. And where the defendant is tenant of the house, it is sufficient to allege in the indictment, and prove at the trial, that the landlord is owner of the house:: People v. Simpson, 50 Id. 304. degrees. in their verdict the degree of the crime of which the defendant is found guilty: People v. Fisher, 51 Cal. 319. 454. Arson in first degree-Arson in second degree. SEC. 454. Maliciously burning in the night-time an inhabited building in which there is at the time some human being is arson of the first degree. All other kinds of arson are of the second degree. "Stats. 1856, 132, secs. 4, 5; similar to New York penal code, sec. 532. Taken in connection with the definition of 'building' and 'inhabited,' given in sections 448 and 449, ante, this section would embrace as arson in the first degree the burning of a ship or vessel while lying within this state, if committed in the night-time, for it is an offense of as grave a 455. Punishment of arson. character as burning an inhabited dwelling:" Commissioners' note. An act of April 1, 1872, Stats. 1871-2, 895, defining arson in the second degree, was superseded by the above section. Setting on fire of woods, prairies, grasses, or grain, on any lands, see ante, sec. 384. Arson is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison as follows: 1. Arson in the first degree, for not less than two years; 2. Arson in the second degree, for not less than one nor more than ten years. SEC. 459. Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, or railroad car, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny, or any felony, is guilty of burglary. [Amendment, approved February 9, 1876; Amendments 1875-6, 111; took effect from twelve o'clock noon, May 1, 1876.] 460. Burglary of first and second degrees. SEC. 460. Every burglary committed in the night-time is burglary of the first degree, and every burglary committed in the day-time is burglary of the second degree. [Amendment, approved February 9, 1876; Amendments 1875-6, 111; took effect from twelve o'clock noon, May 1, 1876.] Degrees of burglary.-Prior to the amendment of the above section the law of this state recognized burglary as a crime that could only be committed in the night-time, and called the offense of breaking into a house in the daytime, with intent to commit a felony, housebreaking. This corresponded with the common law. The object and effect of the amendments are obvious. Under the law as it stood before, no conviction could be had for burglary if the offense proved happened to be house-breaking, and vice versa: People v. Griffin, 19 Cal. 578. Under the code as it now stands, the indictment, to cover both degrees of burglary, should not specify that the entry was either by day or night, but should charge burglary generally, and leave the degree to be determined by the jury, or, in case the defendant plead guilty, by the court: People v. Jefferson, 52 Id. 452; People v. Barnhart, 59 Id. 381; see sections 1157, note, and 1192, note. Burglary defined. -The entering of a building with intent to commit larceny, or some felony, is all that is made essential to the crime. The entry and intent being found, the crime would be complete, even though it should turn out, contrary to the calculations of the burglar, that the building was empty: People v. Shaber, 32 Cal. 36. Where defendant was indicted, and, upon sufficient evidence, found guilty of burglary, in having entered a house with intent to commit petit larceny, it was held immaterial that he might also have had the further intent to have sexual intercourse with a woman who was in the house: People v. Soto, 53 Id. 415. A larceny, though committed at the same time, is not necessarily included in a burglary, as manslaughter is in murder. The offense of burglary is complete without any larceny being committed. Upon an indictment for burglary, defendant cannot be found guilty of larceny: People v. Garnett, 29 Id. 622. Where defendant proposed to another to enter a house and steal some money concealed there, and the other, for the purpose of entrapping defendant, appeared to assent, but went and informed the sheriff, and thereafter, by advice of the sheriff and district attorney, did enter the house and take the money, the defendant keeping watch on the outside, and the money obtained was then divided between the two, and thereupon the sheriff immediately arrested defendant, it was held that since the person who entered the building and took the money had no intention of stealing it, but intended solely to entrap defendant into the apparent commission of a crime, no burglary was committed, there being no felonious intent in entering the house or taking the money: People v. Collins, 53 Id. 185. At common law, burglary was defined to be a breaking and entering the mansion-house of another in the night, with intent to commit some felony within the same, whether such felonious intent be executed or not: 4 Bla. Com. 224; 2 East P. C. 484; 2 Russell on Crimes, 1; Allen v. State, 40 Ala. 334. A comparison of this definition with the above section of the code will show that many acts in this state will come within the definition of burglary that were not so at common law. Prior to the amendment of 1876, burglary in this state could only be committed in the nighttime-the felonious entering of a house in the day-time being house-breaking. In the case of People v. Stickman, 34 Cal. 242, the court defined the word "house" to include every kind of buildings or structures "housed in," or roofed, regardless of the fact whether they are at the time, or ever have been, inhabited by members of the human family. A house is any structure which has walls on all sides, and is covered by a roof. In People v. Ah Ping, 27 Id. 489, the court held that the mere fact that one person is with another who enters a dwelling-house and steals therefrom, and sees him steal without interference, does not render him guilty of the crime of burglary: See People v. Kennedy, 55 Id. 201. Indictment.-Charging the crime in the |