defendant, without any physical impossibility or lawful excuse, refused to do so. Whether the aid of the party called upon would have proved sufficient or useful is not the criterion; and it is no defense to a party that his aid would have done no good. În the note to sec151, 152. Administering and taking oath, Sections 151 and 152 were repealed by act approved March 30, 1874; Amendments 1873-4, 425; took effect July 1, 1874. The repealed sections were as follows:

"SEC. 151. Every person who takes an oath before an officer, or person authorized by law to administer oaths, except when such oath is required or authorized by law, or is required by the provisions of some contract as the basis of or in proof of a claim, or when the same has been agreed to be received by some person as proof of any fact in the performance of any contract, obligation, or duty, instead of other evidence, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

"SEC. 152. Every officer who administers an cath to another person, or who makes and delivers any certificate that another person has taken an oath, except when such oath is required or authorized by law, or is required by the provisions of some contract as a basis of or in proof of a claim, or when the same has been agreed to be received by some person as a proof of any fact in the performance of any contract, obligation, or duty, instead of other evidence, is guilty of a misdemeanor."

153. Compounding crimes.

tion 17 of Wharton's Criminal Pleading and Practice, 8th edition, will be found a very able exposition of the law upon this subject, by Judge King of Philadelphia, on the occasion of the Philadelphia riots in 1844.

when a misdemeanor.

The note appended to section 152 by the commissioners was as follows:

"It is known that, in many cases, persons employ the sanctity of a judicial oath to gain credence for their statements, yet escape punishment for falsity in those statements because the penalties of perjury do not extend to mere voluntary oaths. Sworn statements are frequently published to advance the sales of a particular article, or to support one side in a public controversy. It is the intention of the two sections above to restrict the practice of taking or administering these voluntary oaths. The provisions allow affidavits to be made in proof of loss under policies of insurance; in proof of facts necessary to show title between vendor and purchaser of real property; and in all the other cases where there is an agreement to receive them instead of pursuing the ordinary methods of legal investigation. And by antecedent provisions of this code the penalties of perjury are extended to willful false swearing in these cases, as well as in cases where the oath is required by law: See sec. 118, and note."

SEC. 153. Every person who, having knowledge of the actual commission of a crime, takes money or property of another, or any gratuity or reward, or any engagement or promise thereof, upon any agreement or understanding to compound or conceal such crime, or to abstain from any prosecution thereof, or to withhold any evidence thereof, except in the cases provided for by law in which crimes may be compromised by leave of court, is punishable as follows: 1. By imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years, or in a county jail not exceeding one year, where the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life;

2. By imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding three years, or in the county jail not exceeding six months, where the crime was punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for any other term than for life;

3. By imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, where the crime was a misdemeanor. Compounding crimes.-To compound a crime is to agree not to prosecute it, when the party so agreeing knows it to have been committed: 2 Whart. Crim. L., 8th ed., sec. 1559; 4 Bla. Com. 124-136. At the common law, a party guilty of this crime was punishable as an accessary. Where a party received a note, signed by a person guilty of larceny, as a consideration for non-prosecution, the offense was held complete: Commonwealth v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91; see Ex parte Butt, 13 Cox C. C. 374. The mere retaking by the owner of stolen goods is no offense, unless there is an agreement not to prosecute the thief: 1 Ch. Crim. L. 4; 1 Hale P. C. 619; 1 Hawk. P. C., c. 59, sec. 7; Regina V. Stone, 4 Car. & P. 379; Plumer v. Smith, 5 N. H. 553. To compound a misdemeanor is a perversion or defeating of public justice, the same as the compounding a felony, and was an

indictable offense at the common law: Jones v. Rice, 18 Pick. 440. In Keir v. Leeman, 6 Q. B. 308, it was held that the law will permit a compromise of an offense, though made the subject of a criminal prosecution, for which offense the injured party might recover damages in an action; but if the offense is of a public nature, no agreement can be valid that is founded on the consideration of suppressing a prosecution for it. On an indictment for compounding a felony, the record of the conviction is prima facie evidence of the felony, but not conclusive: State v. Duhammel, 2 Harr. (Del.) 532. It is not necessary, however, that the principal offender should have been convicted

to sustain the indictment: People v. Buckland, 13 Wend. 592.

Compromising certain offenses: See secs, 1377-1379, and notes.

154. Debtor fraudulently concealing his property.

SEC. 154. Every debtor who fraudulently removes his property or effects out of this state, or fraudulently sells, conveys, assigns, or conceals his property, with intent to defraud, hinder, or delay his creditors of their rights, claims, or demands, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by both.

155. Defendant fraudulently concealing his property.

SEC. 155. Every person against whom an action is pending, or against whom a judgment has been rendered for the recovery of any personal property, who fraudulently conceals, sells, or disposes of such property, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the person bringing such action or recovering such judgment, or with such intent removes such property beyond the limits of the county in which it may be at the time of the commencement of such action or the rendering of such judgment, is punishable as provided in the preceding section. 156. Fraudulent pretenses relative to birth of infant.

SEC. 156. Every person who fraudulently produces an infant, falsely pretending it to have been born of any parent whose child would be entitled to inherit any real estate or to receive a share of any personal estate, with intent to intercept the inheritance of any such real estate, or the distribution of any such personal estate from any person lawfully entitled thereto, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding ten years.

157. Substituting one child for another.

SEC. 157. Every person to whom an infant has been confided for nursing, education, or any other purpose, who, with intent to deceive any parent or guardian of such child, substitutes or produces to such parent or guardian another child in the place of the one so confided, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding seven years.

158. Common barratry.

Common barratry is the practice of exciting groundless judicial proceedings, and is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding six months, and by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars.

Common barratry, in criminal law, is the offense of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or other wise: Bouv. Law Dict., tit. Barratry; 4 Bla. Com. 134. An indictment for this offense must charge the offender with being a common barrator. Such a person was indictable at common law as a nuisance: Commonwealth v. Mohn, 52 Pa. St. 243; State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey, 379. A person can only be convicted of this offense by the showing a number of distinct acts of misconduct: Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 434; Commonwealth v. Pray, 13 Id. 362; Commonwealth v. Tubbs, 1 Cush. 2. It is not necessary, however, that the particular acts of misconduct should be set forth or specified in the indictment; but the defendant is entitled to a note, before the trial, of the particular acts of barratry which the prosecution intend to prove against him. A failure to furnish such note will be sufficient to justify

159. What proof is required.

the court in refusing to proceed with the trial of the indictment: Commonwealth v. Davis, 11 Pick. 434; Commonwealth v. Pray, 13 Id. 362. The moving and exciting criminal prosecutions is barratry, the same as the exciting of civil suits: State v. Chitty, 1 Bailey, 397. And it may be committed by moving and exciting the commencement of a just suit, if the motive is selfish or oppressive: Id. Whether three acts of barratry constituted the perpetrator a common barrator was at first unsettled in Massachusetts, but it was subsequently determined that they did: Commonwealth v. McCulloch, 15 Mass. 226; Commonwealth v. Tubbs, 1 Cush. 2. In this state, before a person can be convicted of common barratry, it must appear that he has excited at least three suits or proceedings at law, with a corrupt or malicious intent to vex and annoy: Sec. 159; see Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580.

SEC. 159. No person can be convicted of common barratry except upon proof that he has excited suits or proceedings at law in at least three instances, and with a corrupt and malicious intent to vex and annoy.

160. Misconduct by attorneys.

SEC. 160. Every attorney who, whether as attorney or as counselor, either: 1. Is guilty of any deceit or collusion, or consents to any deceit or collusion, with intent to deceive the court or any party; or,

2. Willfully delays his client's suit with a view to his own gain; or,

3. Willfully receives any money or allowance for or on account of any money which he has not laid out or become answerable for;

-Is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Disbarring attorneys: See sec. 287, Code Civ. Proc., and note.

161. Buying demands or suit by an attorney.

SEC. 161. Every attorney who, either directly or indirectly, buys or is interested in buying any evidence of debt or thing in action, with intent to bring suit thereon, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

Maintenance and champerty. - Blackstone defines maintenance to be "an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party with money or otherwise to prosecute or defend it:" 4 Bla. Com. 134. The same writer defines champerty to be "a bargain with a plaintiff or defendant, campum partire, to divide land or other matter sued for between them if they prevail at law, whereupon the champertor is to carry on the party's suit at his own expense: Id. 135. The distinction between the two seems to be, where there is no agreement to divide the thing in suit, the party intermeddling is guilty of maintenance only; but where he stipulates to receive part of the thing in suit, he is guilty of champerty. The doctrines of champerty and maintenance are generally recognized as a part of the ancient common law. In later days the law on the subject of these two offenses has been greatly modified both in England and America, and in many of the states is regarded as entirely obsolete: Thallhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 15 Am. Dec. 318, and cases there cited. These offenses, prior to the adoption of the codes, had no existence in this state: Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 94; Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Id. 564. By this section they seem to be made a part of the law, to the extent of prohibiting an attorney from buying or being interested in buying any evidence of a debt or thing in action, with intent to bring suit thereon. Much conflict exists in the authorities on the point as to whether or not a contract of an attorney to receive compensation for his services out of the subject-matter of the 162. Attorneys forbidden to defend prosecutions carried on by their partners or formerly by themselves.

suit is champertous. In Rust v. Larue, 14 Am. Dec. 172; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Lathrop v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 489; Backus v. Byron, 4 Mich. 535; Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. I. 389; Scobey v. Ross, 13 Ind. 117; and Quigley v. Thompson, 53 Id. 317, contracts by which an attorney was to receive a part of the land or other thing in dispute as his compensation in case of success, were held champertous, and therefore void. While in Moses v. Bagley, 55 Ga. 283; Meeks v. Dewberry, 57 Id. 263; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill. 449; Thompson v. Reynolds, 73 Id. 11; Boardman v. Thompson, 25 Iowa, 487; McDonald v. Chicago R. R. Co., 29 Id. 170; and Wright v. Tebbitts, 91 U. S. 252, it was held that such contracts were not champertous unless the attorney undertakes to bear the expenses of the suit. And in those states in which the doctrine of maintenance and champerty has not been adopted, contracts entered into by an attorney to recover land or other property for an interest in it, even though he agree to pay the expenses, are not champertous: Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86; Hoffman v. Vallejo, 45 Id. 564; Ballard v. Carr, 48 Id. 74; Howard v. Throck morton, Id. 482.

Contingent fees are not within the rules against champerty and maintenance: Wilhite v. Roberts, 4 Dana, 172; Ramsey v. Trent, 10 B. Mon. 336; Stansell v. Lindsay, 50 Ga. 360; Newkirk v. Cone, 18 Ill. 449; Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U. S. 548; Porter v. Parmly, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 219; Ely v. Cook, 2 Abb. App. Dec. 14; Marsh v. Holbrook, 3 Id. 176.

SEC. 162. Every attorney who directly or indirectly advises in relation to, or aids or promotes, the defense of any action or proceeding in any court, the prosecution of which is carried on, aided, or promoted by any person as district attorney or other public prosecutor, with whom such person is directly or indirectly connected as a partner; or who, having himself prosecuted or in any manner aided or promoted any action or proceeding in any court as district attorney or other public prosecutor, afterwards, directly or indirectly, advises in relation to or takes any part in the defense thereof, as attorney or otherwise; or who takes or receives any valuable consideration from or on behalf of any defendant in any such action, upon any understanding or agreement whatever

having relation to the defense thereof-is guilty of a misdemeanor, and in addition to the punishment prescribed therefor, forfeits his license to practice law. 163. Limitation of preceding section.

SEC. 163. The preceding section does not prohibit an attorney from defending himself in person, as attorney or counsel, when prosecuted, either civilly or criminally.

164. Grand juror acting after challenge has been allowed.

SEC. 164. Every grand juror, who with knowledge that a challenge interposed against him by a defendant has been allowed, is present at or takes part or attempts to take part in the consideration of the charge against the defendant who interposed the challenge, or the deliberations of the grand jury thereon, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

165. Bribing members of common councils, boards of supervisors, or trustees.

SEC. 165. Every person who gives or offers a bribe to any member of any common council, board of supervisors, or board of trustees of any county, city, or corporation, with intent to corruptly influence such member in his action on any matter or subject pending before the body of which he is a member, and every member of either of the bodies mentioned in this section who receives or offers to receive any such bribe, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not less than one nor more than fourteen years, and is disqualified from holding any office in this state.

Stats. 1863, 645, secs. 1, 2.

Subd. 4. Willful disobedience of process or order: See Ex parte Cohen, 5 Cal. 494; Ex parte Perkins, 18 Id. 60; People v. County Judge, 27 Id. 151; Ex parte Smith, 53 Id. 204. A court has no power to punish a person for not complying with an order that is not within his power to perform: Adams v. Haskell, 6 Id. 316; Galland v. Galland, 44 Id. 475; Williams v. Dwinelle, 51 Id. 442; Ex parte Cohn, 55 Id. 193.

The superior courts of this state have power to issue a writ of habeas corpus commanding the production of the body of a prisoner held

166. Criminal contempts.

under authority of a warrant of arrest issued by the governor of this state upon the requisition of a governor of another state, that the causes of his detention may be inquired into, and the refusal of the custodian to obey the writ is a contempt of court: In re Robb, 64 Cal. 431. This view was sustained in Robb v. Connolly, 111 U. S. 624, disapproving In re Robb, 9 Saw. 568.

Subd. 6. Refusal of witness to answer: Ex parte Rowe, 7 Cal. 175, 181.

Subd. 7. Publication of false report of court proceedings: Matter of Levi Parsons, 1 Cal. 539.

SEC. 166. Every person guilty of any contempt of court, of either of the following kinds, is guilty of a misdemeanor:

1. Disorderly, contemptuous, or insolent behavior committed during the sitting of any court of justice, in immediate view and presence of the court, and directly tending to interrupt its proceedings or to impair the respect due to its authority;

2. Behavior of the like character committed in the presence of any referee, while actually engaged in any trial or hearing, pursuant to the order of any court, or in the presence of any jury while actually sitting for the trial of a cause, or upon any inquest or other proceedings authorized by law;

3. Any breach of the peace, noise, or other disturbance directly tending to interrupt the proceedings of any court;

4. Willful disobedience of any process or order lawfully issued by any court; 5. Resistance willfully offered by any person to the lawful order or process of any court;

6. The contumacious and unlawful refusal of any person to be sworn as a witness; or, when so sworn, the like refusal to answer any material question;

7. The publication of a false or grossly inaccurate report of the proceedings of any court;

8. Presenting to any court having power to pass sentence upon any prisoner under conviction, or to any member of such court, any affidavit or testimony or representation of any kind, verbal or written, in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment to be imposed upon such prisoner, except as provided in this code.

Contempt punishable as a crime: Sec. 657. Contempts.-Power of court to punish: Code Civ. Proc., secs. 128, 177, 178. The power of a court to punish for an alleged contempt of its authority is undoubted, but such power is in its nature arbitrary, and its exercise is not to be upheld except under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed by law: Batchelder v. Moore, 42 Cal. 412; Galland v. Galland, 44 Id. 475; see People v. O'Neil, 47 Id. 109.

167. False certificates by public officers.

Criminal contempt: See a series of valuable articles by S. D. Thompson on this subject in 5 Crim. Law Mag. 151, 483, 647.

Subd. 1. Impairing respect due the court.-Sending a threatening and insulting letter to the grand jury in regard to a matter pending before them is an offense against the criminal law, and directly tends to impair the respect due the court, and to obstruct the course of justice: Matter of Tyler, 64 Cal. 434.

SEC. 167. Every public officer authorized by law to make or give any certificate or other writing, who makes and delivers as true any such certificate or writing containing statements which he knows to be false, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

168. Disclosing fact of indictment or presentment having been found or made.

SEC. 168. Every grand juror, district attorney, clerk, judge, or other officer, who, except by issuing or in executing a warrant of arrest, willfully discloses the fact of a presentment or indicment having been made for a felony, until the defendant has been arrested, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

"This section is founded upon sections 223 and 224 of the criminal practice act: Stats. 1851, 212, extended to embrace indictments as

well as presentments, the reason of the rule applying with as much force to one as to the other:" Commissioners' note.

169. Grand juror disclosing what transpired before the grand jury.

SEC. 169. Every grand juror who, except when required by a court, willfully discloses any evidence adduced before the grand jury, or anything which he himself or any other member of the grand jury may have said, or in what manner he or any other grand juror may have voted on a matter before them, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

170. Maliciously procuring search-warrant.

SEC. 170. Every person who maliciously and without probable cause procures a search-warrant or warrant of arrest to be issued and executed is guilty of a misdemeanor.

171. Unauthorized communication with convict in the state prison.

SEC. 171. Every person, not authorized by law, who, without the consent of the warden, or other officer in charge of the state prison, communicates with any convict therein, or brings into or conveys out of the state prison any letter or writing to or from any convict, is guilty of a misdemeanor.

172. Selling liquor within a mile of state prison, etc.

SEC. 172. Every person who, within two miles of the land belonging to this state upon which the state prison is situated, or within one mile of the insane asylum at Napa, or within one mile of the grounds belonging and adjacent to the university of California in Alameda county, or in the state capitol, or within the limits of the grounds adjacent and belonging thereto, sells, gives away, or