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toothpick, under his clothes, or concealed about his person, conflicts with the twenty-sixth section of the first article of the bill of rights, securing to the free white citizens the right to keep and bear arms for their common defence. The contrary rule, it would seem, has been laid down in Indiana, where it was held that a similar statute was in conformity with the federal and the state constitutions. c An act of the same character is in force in Virginia, d and Ohio. e If a person, not being a traveller, carry a pistol concealed about his person, he is guilty of an indictable offence, under the revised statutes of Indiana of 1843, and his motive for carrying the pistol is immaterial.ƒ

4. Indictment.

§ 2498. An indictment charged that two persons, with force and arms, &c., "did make an affray, by fighting," was held to be sufficiently certain and definite. g In such an indictment an assault and battery may be averred and proved. h

V. POWER OF MAGISTRATES IN DISPERSING.

§ 2499. An unlawful assembly may be dispersed by a magistrate whenever he finds a state of things existing calling for an interference in order to the preservation of the public peace. He is not required to postpone his action until the unlawful assembly ripens into an actual riot. For it is better to anticipate more dangerous results, by energetic intervention at the inception of a threatened breach of the peace, than by delay to permit the tumult to acquire such strength as to demand for its suppression those urgent measures which should be reserved for great extremities. The magistrate has not only the power to arrest the offenders, and bind them to their good behavior, or imprison them if they do not offer adequate bail, but he may authorize others to arrest them by a bare verbal command without any other warrant; and all citizens present whom he may invoke to his aid are bound promptly to respond to his requisition, and support him in maintaining the peace. i A justice of the peace

b Aymette v. State, 2 Humphreys,

154.

c State v. Mitchell, 3 Blackf. 229.

d Act of 1838, c. 101.

e See ante, § 2472 a.

ƒ Rev. Stat. p. 982; Walls v. State. 7 Blackf. 572.

g State v. Benthal, 5 Humph. 519.
h Childs v. State, 15 Ark. 204.
i 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 63, s. 16; Lamb.

either present or called on such an occasion, who neglects or refuses to do his utmost for the suppression of such unlawful assemblies, subjects himself to indictment and conviction for a criminal misdemeanor. Where, however, as was laid down in the Lord George Gordon riots by Lord Loughborough, and as has been held in this country in riots of similar type, k an unlawful assembly assumes a more dangerous form, and becomes an actual riot, particularly when life or property is threatened by the insurgents, measures more decisive should be adopted. Citizens may, of their own authority, lawfully endeavor to suppress the riot, and for that purpose may even arm themselves; and whatever is honestly done by them in the execution of that object will be supported and justified by the common law. It is the duty of every citizen to make such endeavor, and when the rioters are engaged in treasonable practices, the law protects other persons in repelling them by force. l

272; Dalt. Co.; 4 Penn. Law J. 31;
R. v. Pinney, 3 B. & Ad. 947; 5 C. &
P. 254; R. v. Neale, 9 C. & P. 431.
Post, § 2936.

j State v. Littlejohn, 1 Bay, 316. Post, § 2528.

k Annual Register, 1780, 277; 3 Penn. Law Jour. 345; 4 Ibid. 31.

Respublica v. Montgomery, 1 Yea. 419. Post, § 2935-6.

For forms of indictment, see Wh. Precedents, as follows:

(858) Disturbance of election in Mas

sachusetts.

(859) Another form for same.
(860) Interrupting a judge of the
election in Pennsylvania.

(861) Disturbing a religious meeting,
under the Virginia statute.
(862) Same, under Rev. Sts. Mass.
ch. 130, § 171.

(863) Disturbing a congregation wor-
shipping in a church, at common
law.

(849) General frame of indictment (864) Disturbing same in a dwelling

for riot.

(850) Affray at common law.

(851) Unlawful assembly and assault.
(852) Riot and hauling away a wagon.
(853) Riot, in breaking the windows
of a man's house.

(854) Riot, and disturbing a literary
society, under Ohio statute.
(855) Riot, and pulling down a dwell-
ing-house in the possession of pros-

ecutor.

(856) Riot, and false imprisonment.
(857) Disturbing the peace, &c., on
land occupied by the United States
for an arsenal.

house.

(865) Dressing in woman's clothes,
and disturbing a congregation at
worship.

(866) Going armed, &c., to the terror
of the people, at common law.
(867) Carrying a dangerous weapon,
under Indiana Rev. Stat.
(868) Maliciously firing guns into the

house of an aged woman, and kill-
ing a dog belonging to the house.
(869) Breach of peace, tumultuous
conduct, &c., in Vermont.
(870) Refusing to aid a constable in
quelling a riot.

CHAPTER VII.

COMPOUNDING CRIMES.

§ 2505. COMPOUNDING a crime is committed by agreeing to conceal it, when the party concealing knows it to have been committed. a It has been held to have been completed where a party received a note, signed by a person guilty of larceny, as a consideration for not presenting him. 6 The bare taking of one's goods back again, however, or receiving reparation, is no offence, unless some favor is shown, or agreed to be shown, to the thief. c The offence has been sometimes, though erroneously, limited to compounding felonies. But to agree, for a valuable consideration, not to prosecute any misdemeanor, is indictable at common law, or under 18 Eliz. c. 5, which in the United States may be viewed as part of the common law. e But the rule does not, under 18 Eliz. c. 5, apply to offences cognizable solely before magistrates.ƒ

§ 2506. On an indictment for compounding a felony, the record of the conviction is prima facie evidence of the felony, but not conclusive as against the compounder. g But it is not necessary that the principal offender should have been convicted to sustain an indictment for compounding the offence. h

§ 2507. To indictments for compounding, the ordinary rules as to repugnancy apply. i

a 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 59, s. 5; 4 Blac. Com. 133. See, for form, Wh. Prec. 895-6.

b Com. v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91; 1 Camp. 45; 2 M. & S. 201.

c R. v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 59, s. 7; Plumer ". Smith, 5 N. H. 553.

e Johnson v. Ogilby, 3 P. Wms. 277; Com. v. Pease, 16 Mass. 91. See R. v. Stone, 4 C. & P. 379; R. v. Daly, 9 C. & P. 342; Brery v. Levy, 1 W. Bl. 443; R. v. Gotley, R. & R.

C. C. 84; R. v. Best, 9 C. & P. 368;
2 M. C. C. 125; Dwight v. Ellsworth,
9 Up. Can. Q. B. 540. This, how-
ever, does not include suits for penal-
ties. R. v. Mason, 17 Up. Can. Q. B.
540; R. v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282.
f R. v. Crisp, 1 B. & Ald. 282.
g State v. Williams, 2 Harring.

532.

h People v. Buckland, 18 Wend.

592.

i State v. Dandy, 1 Brevard, 395.

CHAPTER VIII.

MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE.

I. IN OFFICES BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON NATURAL LAW, § 2508.

1. RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENT FOR CHILD, AND HUSBAND FOR WIFE, § 2508.

2. MISCONDUCT MUST RESULT IN EXPOSURE OF THE PERSON NEGLECT

ED TO PHYSICAL DANGER, § 2509.

3. PARTY CHARGED MUST HAVE HAD MEANS TO DISCHARGE THE OFFICE, § 2510.

4. PERSON NEGLECTED MUST HAVE BEEN INCAPABLE OF SELF HELP, § 2511.

5. NEGLECT IN SUCH CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCE, INDEPENDENT OF CONSEQUENCES, § 2512.

II. IN STATUTORY OFFICES.

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLE THAT WHERE
THE LAW IMPOSES AN OFFICE,

THERE DISOBEDIENCE TO THE RE-
QUIREMENTS OF THE LAW IS IN-
DICTABLE, § 2513.

2. EXCEPTION IN IMPEACHABLE CASES,
§ 2516.

3. CORRUPTION, § 2517.

Indictment, corrupt motive, §

2518.

4. EXTORTION, § 2519.

Motive must be corrupt, § 2521.
Act must be complete, § 2522.
Indictment, § 2523.

5. NEGLIGENCE, § 2524.

Need not result in injury, § 2524.
Need not be malice, § 2525.
Mistake of law or fact no defence,
§ 2526.

Drunkenness, § 2527 a.

Neglect by justice in attempting to suppress riot, § 2528.

III. INVOLUNTARY OFFICES. 1. GUARDIANS, MASTERS, KEEPERS OF ASYLUMS, ETC., § 2529 ƒ.

2. OFFICERS OF SHIPS AND RAILROADS, § 2530.

3. INNKEEPERS, § 2531.

4. IGNORANCE AND WANT OF MALICE AS A DEFENCE, § 2532.

IV. EVIDENCE, § 2533.

1. PROOF OF OFFICER'S APPOINTMENT, § 2533.

2. PROOF OF MALICE AND CORRUPTION, § 2533, 2534.

V. RESISTANCE TO ILLEGAL ACT OF OFFICERS, § 2534 a.

I. IN OFFICES BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON NATURAL LAW.

1. Responsibility of Parent for Child, and Husband for Wife. § 2508. THE first relationship that arrests us, when we take up the question of penal responsibility for neglect, is that of parent and child and of husband for wife. In many other cases, as will be presently seen, such responsibility is imposed on those having exclusive charge of others. But the duty of a parent to provide for a helpless child, and of a husband to provide for a

helpless wife, lies at the foundation of society, and is wrought up with the law's chief civil sanctions. b

The processes of juridical reasoning in this respect are not without practical value. According to the old Roman law, the father was privileged under certain circumstances to kill or abandon his new born child. One of the first results of the establishment of Christianity was the enactment, under Constantine, of a law making the exposure of infants a Parricidium. In A. D. 374, under Valentinian and Valens, the offence was made capital. "Si quis necandi infantis piaculum aggressus sit, sciat se capitali supplicio esse puniendum."¿1 The canon law went still further, placing the rule in its present shape, by making it penal for those having exclusive charge of any helpless persons (Languidi) to expose them to bodily suffering. 62 This view b

has been accepted in the modern German codes, which make penal the exposure (Aussetzung) of helpless persons, whether the helplessness results from infancy, sickness, or old age. Other motives may concur in the act, the getting rid of a child, — the absorption of its patrimony, the alteration of a line of descent; but such motives are not necessary to constitute the offence, and do not give it its peculiar type. The offence is complete when the offender (who has at the time the exclusive charge of the dependent person) leaves the latter in a helpless state. The offender must actually abandon the person so left, and this without the intention of returning. To sustain an indictment, however, for misconduct of this class, the following conditions must exist:

2. Misconduct must result in Exposure of the Person neglected to Physical Danger.

§ 2509. No matter how gross may be the mismanagement, for instance, by a parent of a child, the law does not interpose by way of punishment, unless physical injuries may ensue. Erroneousness of moral and religious teaching, no matter how pernicious may be the consequences, it is not within the province of

b R. v. Shepherd, 9 Cox C. C. 123; L. & C. 147; R. v. Ryland, 1 L. R. C. C. 99; 11 Cox C. C. 569.

b1 See L. 2 Cod. de infant. expos.; and see Nov. 153.

b2 C. IX. de infantibus et languidis expos.

bs See Berner, Lehrbuch, § 178.

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