§ 2706. Cumulation of facts not duplicity. — The cumulation of facts, therefore, to show the criminal character of the intent, is not duplicity. Thus a Massachusetts indictment under Rev. Stat. 133, s. 12, is not bad for duplicity, when, besides setting forth an "attempt " to set fire to a building, it avers a breaking and entering of the building. e Hence the attempt may be alleged to be to commit more offences than one. ƒ V. JURISDICTION. § 2707. The question of jurisdiction, when an attempt is pursued through two or more distinct sovereignties, has been already discussed. g It is clear that such attempt is cognizable in the place where, if not interrupted, it would have been executed; g1 and from the very nature of things, it must be cognizable in the place where the preliminary overt acts constituting the attempt are committed. VI. EVIDENCE. 1. Intent to be inferred from Acts. § 2708. As in consummated crimes, the intent, which is here essential, may be inferred by the jury from acts. Thus when an fire to a dwell indictment alleges that a party attempted to set ing-house, with intent to burn it, by attempting to set fire to another building, the jury are authorized to infer the alleged intent from the evidence respecting the attempt to set fire to the other building. h 2. Principals and Accessaries. § 2709. All confederates in the attempt, whether present or absent at the overt acts, are responsible as principals, when the attempt is a misdemeanor. i Hence an averment that three joint defendants, in an indict niously to steal, take and carry away." R. v. Johnson, 1 L. & C. 489. See R. v. Bullock, Dears. 653. So also in New York. People v. e Com. v. Harney, 10 Metc. 422. g See ante, § 210 a; and see Griffin v. People, 26 Ga. 493. gl R. v. Collins, L. & C. 471; 9 Cox C. C. 497. h Com. v. Harney, 10 Metc. 422. i Uhl v. Com. 6 Grat. 706. ment for an attempt at larceny, "put their hands" into the prosecutor's pocket, may be sustained by evidence that while all participated in the act, only one put his hand in the pocket.j If the attempt is a felony, co-defendants are responsible according to the laws of principal and accessary. 3. Adaptation. § 2710. If the instrument by which an attempt is effected is apparently adapted to the end (e. g. a gun to shooting), this is a sufficient prima facie case. The defendant must prove that the gun was not loaded, and known not to be so. k VII. VERDICT. § 2711. The topic of verdict, in cases where an assault or attempt is proved on an indictment for a greater offence (e. g. felony), is elsewhere noticed. It may now be specially stated, that while by the old common law there can be technically no conviction of an attempt on a count for felony, this power is given to juries in many jurisdictions by statute. m But unless the attempt be averred in the indictment, there can be no conviction of the attempt on statutes which simply give power to convict of minor offences inclosed in major. n It has been held in England, that under an indictment charging H. with rape, and U. with aiding and abetting, H. could be convicted under the stat. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 29, of attempting to commit the rape, and U. of aiding him in the attempt. n1 VIII. PUNISHMENT OF ATTEMPT. § 2712. For the reasons heretofore given, the punishment of an attempt should be less than that of the consummated crime. The attempt involves neither the duration of premeditation, nor the obduracy of purpose, which belong to the crime when complete. And the policy of the law is by assigning more lenient punishment to the incomplete offence, to arrest offences in the process of completion. This view, so long neglected in English law, and which Anglo-American judges, acting on what is called the preventive policy, even now sometimes lose sight of, o is essential to a sound ethical jurisprudence. p o See post, § 3374. p See Geib, ut supra, § 99. Plato de legg. IX. p. 876 sq.: káv тiç diavonveìs ry βουλήσει κτεῖναι τινὰ φίλιον, πλὴν ὧν ὁ νόμος ἐφίησι, τρώσῃ μὲν, ἀποκτεῖναι δὲ ἀδυνατήσῃ, τὸν διανοηθέντα τε καὶ τρώσαντα οὕτως οὐκ ἄξιον ἐλεεῖν, οὐδὲ αἰδούμενον ἄλλως ἢ καθάπερ ἀποκτείναντα, ὑπέ. χειν τὴν δίκην φόνου ἀναγκάζειν. τὴν δὲ οὐ παντάπασι κακὴν τύχην αὐτοῦ σεβόμενον, καὶ τὸν δαίμονα, ὃς αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν τρωθέντα ἐλεήσας ἀπότροπος αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο, μὴ τῷ μὲν ἀνίατον ἕλκος γενέσθαι, τῷ δὲ ἐπάρατον τύχην καὶ ξυμφορὰν, τούτῳ δὴ χάριν τῷ δαίμονι διδόντα, καὶ μὴ ἐναντιούμενον, τὸν μὲν θάνατον ἀφελεῖν τοῦ τρώσαντος, μετάστασιν δὲ εἰς τὴν γείτονα πόλιν αὐτῷ γίγνεσθαι, διὰ βίου καρπούμενον ἅπασαν τὴν αὐτοῦ KTηow. So Beccaria dei delitti e delle pene, § 37. (§ 14.) p. 139: "Perchè le leggi non puniscono l'intenzione, non è però che un delitto, che cominci con qualche azione, che ne manifesti la volontà di eseguirlo, non meriti una pena, benchè minore all' esecuzione medesima del delitto. L'importanza di prevenire un attentato autorizza una pena; ma siccome tra l'attentato e l'esecuzione vi può essere un intervallo, cosi la pena maggiore riserbata al delitto consumato può dar luogo al pentimento." So Rossi Traité de droit pénal, II. p. 318-334; III. p. 7-12: "La tentative est suspendue par un événement fortuit; mais sans cet événement le crime aurait-il été conVOL. II.55 sommé ? Cela est possible; si l'on veut, probable; mais rien de plus: car, si c'est une vraie tentative, l'auteur pouvait aussi se désister. Ce surplus de volonté, de degré ultérieur de perseverance, et d'iniquité comment l'imputer? Point de fait révélateur. Ainsi toute la partie de l'imputation qui dépasse linstant de la suspension de la tentative, est une imputation hasardée; c'est imparter ce que l'on ignore; c'est punir la pensée par conjecture. Cependant si la peine doit être la même que celle du crime consommé, il faut la même certitude non-seulement sur la volonté de l'agent, mais sur la persévérance de cette volonté. Sans cela, on peut croire faire une loi utile; mais il ne faut point parler de justice. . . . De l'autre côté, si l'on prend en considération le mal matériel produit par la tentative, comment en conclure qu'elle doit être punie comme le crime même? La violation du droit menacé n'est pas accomplie; peut-être même n'y a-t-il encore d'autre mal objectif que le danger et l'alarme. Ainsi, soit qu'on considère la partie morale, soit qu'on s'arrête à la partie matérielle de l'acte, rien ne justifie aux yeux de la justice humaine laprétendue parité de la tentative et du crime. La loi qui la sanctionne n'est donc plus qu'une mesure d'utilité et de convenance." 865 BOOK VII. OFFENCES AGAINST GOVERNMENT. CHAPTER I. TREASON. I. TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, § 2715. CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES. Treason: in what it consists, § 2715. 1. LEVYING WAR, § 2719. (a.) Term to be accepted according to prior judicial meaning, § 2719. (b.) War is essential; but if there be an overt act of war, then all contributing to the common design are principals, § 2721. c.) Number necessary to constitute, (d.) What is "leying," § 2724. Constructive, § 2725. (e.) Belligerent insurgents, § 2728. 2. ADHERING TO ENEMIES, § 2730. (a.) Does not cover aid to rebels, § 2730. (b.) But covers all voluntary aid to a foreign hostile state, § 2732. 3. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL POLITICAL OFFENCES BY SUBJECTS, § 2734. I. TREASON AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES. § 2715. Treason: in what it consists. - Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. a No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court. (Const. U. S. art. 3, sect. 3, cl. 1.) Evidence and punishment. If any person or persons, owing allegiance a to the United States of America, shall levy war against them, or shall adhere to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort within the United States or elsewhere, and shall be convicted on confession in open court, or on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act of treason whereof he or they shall stand indicted, such person or persons shall be adjudged guilty of treason against the United States, and shall suffer death. (Act 30th April, 1790, sect. 1.) - § 2716. Punishment of treason. Every person who shall hereafter commit the crime of treason against the United States, and shall be adjudged guilty thereof, shall suffer death, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; or, at the discretion of the court, he shall be imprisoned for not less than five years, and fined not less than ten thousand dollars, and all his slaves, if any, shall be declared and made free; said fine shall be levied and collected on any or all of the property, real and personal, excluding slaves, of which the said person so convicted was the owner at the time of committing the said crime, any sale or conveyance to the contrary notwithstanding. (Act 17th July, 1862, sect. 1; 12 Stat. 589.) § 2717. Concealment of treason. - If any person or persons, having knowledge of the commission of any of the treasons aforesaid, shall conceal, and not, as soon as may be, disclose and make known the same to the President of the United States, or some one of the judges thereof, or to the president or governor of a particular state, or some one of the a A rebel, being a citizen of the United States, cannot be viewed as an enemy under the Constitution of the United States; and hence a conviction of treason, in promoting a rebellion, cannot, it has been held, be sustained under that branch of the constitutional definition which includes "adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." But such a rebel may be convicted under the phrase relating to "levying war." U. S. v. Greathouse, 2 Abbott U. S. 364 (U. S. Cir. Ct. Cal., 1863; Field and Hoffman, JJ.). See post, § 2724. a1 See Sprague, J., 23 Law Rep. 705; U. S. v. Villato, 2 Dall. 370. |