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federation remained a substantive offence; and no one, in the subsequent prosecutions for treason instituted by Prussia, thought of setting up as a defence that treason to the particular state was absorbed in treason to the federal head. Far closer is the fusion of the states composing the present North German Confederacy; but treason to the sovereigns of Prussia and of Saxony, so far as such treason is aimed at them in their capacities as heads of their particular states, continues to be cognizable in the Prussian and Saxon courts. Each of the Swiss cantons is accustomed to prosecute for political crimes aimed at it individually; yet the Swiss cantons have enacted that it is also treason to aim at the subversion of the Eidgenossenschaft or Confederate League. The principle is as follows: Wherever a particular state in a confederacy has reserved to it the right of prosecuting, in its own name and as against its own peace and dignity, offences committed within its borders; there it has the juridical right to maintain its integrity by prosecuting for treason subjects who attack its political existence. If we apply this test, there can be no question that the right to prosecute for treason against themselves is reserved to the particular states of the American Union. Each of these, not only by its own constitution and laws, but in accordance with repeated recognitions of the federal supreme courts, prosecutes, as against its own peace and dignity, all offences except those aimed specifically at the reserved powers of the federal government.

7. Pleading and Evidence.

§ 2774. The law on these points has been stated in the sections relating to treason against the United States.

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CHAPTER II.

VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS.

§ 2775. OWING to the transition state in which the law on this topic, in consequence of the Alabama treaty, is now placed, I have not thought it expedient to reprint the chapter bearing on the question as it previously stood. That chapter, with the statutes and adjudications on them, will be found in the sixth edition.

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CHAPTER III.

OFFENCES AGAINST THE POST-OFFICE.

I. ROBBERY OR LARCENY FROM

MAIL, § 2779.

(a.) In what it consists, §.2782.
(b.) Indictment, § 2784.

ETC., § 2785.

II. EMBEZZLEMENT FROM MAIL, § III. RECEIVING EMBEZZLED MONEY,

2782.

I. ROBBERY OF MAIL.

§ 2779. ROBBING the carrier of the mail of the United States, or other person intrusted therewith, by stopping him on the highway, and demanding the surrender of the mail, and at the same time showing weapons calculated to take his life, putting him in fear of his life, and obtaining possession of the mail by the means aforesaid, against the will of the carrier, is such a robbery of the mail, and such a putting the life of the carrier or other person intrusted therewith in jeopardy, as will bring the offence within the act of congress. b

§ 2780. The defendant was indicted upon the act of congress for advising, procuring, and assisting one Joseph J. Straughan, a mail-carrier, to rob the mail; and was found guilty. Upon this finding, the judges of the circuit court of North Carolina were divided in opinion on the question whether an indictment, founded on the statute for advising, &c., a mail-carrier to rob the mail, ought to set forth or aver that the said carrier did, in fact, commit the offence of robbing the mail. The answer to this, it was said by the supreme court, as an abstract proposition, "must be in the affirmative. But if the question intended to be put is, whether there must be a distinctive substantive averment of that fact, it is not necessary. The indictment, in this case, sufficiently sets out that the offence has been committed by the mail-carrier." c

b U. S. v. Hare, 2 Wheeler C. C. 300; 1 Cr. C. C. 82. The same law was recognized by Washington, J. in U. S. v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. 440,

and in U. S. v. Bernard, Trenton, 1819. See also, U. S. v. Aminhiser, 2 Wheeler C. C. xliv.

c U. S. v. Mills, 7 Peters, 138.

§ 2781. Upon an indictment for robbing the mail, and putting the person having the custody of it in jeopardy, under the 19th section of the act of April 30th, 1810, ch. 262, a sword, &c., in the hands of the robber, by terror of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon, within the act, putting the life in jeopardy; though it be not drawn or pointed at the carrier. So a pistol in his hands, by means of which the robbery is effected, is a dangerous weapon; and it is not necessary to prove that it was charged; it is presumed to be so until the contrary is proved. d

It is not necessary to a conviction, under the 22d section of the act above given, that the carrier of the mail should have taken the oath prescribed by the second section of the act of 1825, or that the whole mail be taken. e

§ 2781 a. All persons present at the commission of the robbery, consenting thereto, aiding, assisting, or abétting therein, or in doing any act which is a constituent of the offence, are principals. f

The word "rob," in section 22, is used in the common law sense.g

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Jeopardy," as used in the section, means a well-grounded apprehension of danger to life, in case of refusal to yield to threats of resistance. h

II. EMBEZZLEMENT FROM MAIL.

§ 2782. (a.) In what it consists. Where a letter is delivered to an unauthorized agent, the letter cannot be charged with having been embezzled. Whether a guilty agency existed, the jury must determine from the evidence. i To constitute the offence, the letter must have been obtained from the post-office, or from a letter-carrier; after a voluntary delivery to a third person, the letter is no longer under the protection of the laws of the United States; and the act of fraudulently obtaining it from such third person is not punishable under the statute.j

So an errand boy sent by his master for letters, and embezzling d U. S. v. Wood, 3 Wash. C. C. R. 440.

h Ibid.

i U. S. v. Sander, 6 McL. C. C. R.

e U. S. v. Wilson, 1 Baldwin's C. 598. C. R. 102.

f Ibid.

g Ibid.

j U. S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatch. 104–5; U. S. v. Mulvaney, 4 Parker C. R. 164.

one after receiving it, cannot be convicted under this section of embezzlement. The act of congress does not operate after a delivery has been made. k

If a clerk in the post-office take a letter containing money from its appropriated place of deposit, in the post-office building, with intent to convert its contents to his own use, he is guilty of stealing it from the post-office, under the 22d section of the 3d March, 1825, although it be not removed beyond the building containing the post-office.

§ 2783. A letter containing money, deposited in the mail for the purpose of ascertaining whether its contents were stolen on a particular route, and actually sent on a post route, is a letter intended to be sent by post within the meaning of the postoffice act. m

On a charge for stealing letters out of the mail by a postmaster or other person, it is important to have as witnesses the postmasters through whose offices the letters passed or were distributed. n

When such witnesses are not called, although there may be proof of the mailing of the letters, and that they were never received, it is not sufficient for the conviction of any postmaster on the route. o

§ 2784. (b.) Indictment. — An indictment which charges the defendant with unlawfully abstracting a letter containing bank notes from the mail, is good, if it alleges that the letter containing bank notes was put into the post-office to be conveyed by post, and came into possession of defendant, as a driver of the mail-stage. p

It is not necessary to give a particular description of a letter charged to have been secreted and embezzled by a postmaster, nor to describe the bank notes particularly, inclosed in the letter. But if either the letter or the notes be described in the indictment, they must be proved as laid. q

It is enough to state that the letter came to the hands of the n U. S. v. Emerson, 6 McLean C. C. R. 406.

k U. S. v. Driscoll, 1 Lowell, Dec. 303; U. S. v. Parsons, 2 Blatch. 104; U. S. v. Sander, 6 McLean, 598. See U. S. v. Pond, 2 Curtis C. C. 265.

I U. S. v. Marselis, 2 Blatch. 108. m U. S. v. Foye, 1 Curtis's R. 364; 4 Stat. at Large, 102.

o Ibid.

p U. S. v. Martin, 2 McLean, 256.

q U. S. v. Lancaster, 2 MeLean, 431; U. S. v. Patterson, 6 Ibid. 466. See U. S. v. Sander, 6 Ibid. 598.

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