of error, as the deceased party might have done.38 Where the party in whose favor such a judgment or decree is taken dies before appeal taken or writ of error brought, the statute provides that notice to his representatives shall be given from the appellate court, as provided in case of the death of a party after appeal taken or writ of error brought.39 It has been held

that where an appellee has died pending an appeal to the Supreme Court, the administrator of his domicile may be substituted in his place, although he was appointed in a different State from that where the suit was brought below; 40 and that a person who purchased the interest of the appellee during his life and pending an appeal cannot after his death revive the appeal in his own name." When the time to appeal or bring error has expired it is too late to bring in the representatives of a party who died before the appeal was taken or the writ of error sued out. Where notwithstanding the survival of the cause of action or liability to co-appellants, the representatives of the deceased appellant voluntarily come in and ask to be made parties, they may be admitted. Where the presence of the representatives of a deceased appellant is necessary for the due prosecution of an appeal, notwithstanding the survivorship of others, the appellate court may direct that the appeal be dismissed unless such representatives are made parties within a limited time."

§ 506. Time within which writs of error and appeals must be taken.- No judgment, decree, or order of a Circuit or Dis

and the State or Territory in which such representative resides; and, upon such suggestion, he may, on motion, obtain an order that, unless such representative shall make himself a party within the first ten days of the ensuing term of the court, the plaintiff in error or appellant shall be entitled to open the record, and on hearing have the judgment or decree reversed, if the same be erroneous; provided, however, that a proper citation reciting the substance of such order shall be served upon such representative, either personally or by being left at his residence, at least sixty days before the beginning of the term of the Supreme Court then next ensuing; and provided, also, that in every such case, if the representative of the deceased party does not appear by the tenth day of the term next succeeding such suggestion, and the measures above

provided to compel the appearance of such representative have not been taken within the time as above required, by the opposite party, the case shall abate; and provided, also, that the said representative may at any time before or after said suggestion come in and be made a party to the suit, and thereupon the case shall proceed, and be heard and determined as in other cases."

40 Noonan v. Bradley, 12 Wall. 121. 41 Barribeau v. Brant, 17 How. 43. 42 Dolan v. Jennings, 139 U. S. 385; Mason v. U. S., 136 U. S. 581; Estis v. Trabue, 128 U. S. 225. But see Knickerbocker L. Ins. Co. v. Pendleton, 115 U. S. 339.

43 Thorpe v. Mattingley, 1 Phillips' Ch. 200.

44 Blake v. Bogle, Macq. Pr. of H. of L. 244, note; Moses v. Wooster, 115 U. S. 285, 288.

trict Court except in a suit upon a claim against the United States, or of a State Court,' or of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia,2 or of the Supreme Court of a Territory, or of the Supreme Court or the District Court of Porto Rico,3 in any action at law or in equity, can be reviewed by the Supreme Court, unless the writ of error is brought or the appeal taken within two years after the entry of such judgment, decree, or order; but where a party entitled to prosecute a writ of error or take an appeal is an infant, insane, or imprisoned, such writ of error may be prosecuted, or such appeal taken, within two years after the judgment, decree, or order, exclusive of the term of such disability. Where the imprisonment or other disability has not begun till after the statute has begun to run, the operation of the statute is not suspended pending such disability. No appeal from a writ of error to a judgment or decree of a Circuit or District Court in a suit upon a claim against the United States is allowed on behalf of the plaintiff after ninety days from the entry of the same, and on behalf of the United States after six months therefrom." peals in prize causes shall be made within thirty days after the rendering of the decree appealed from, unless the court below previously extends the time for cause shown in the particular case: Provided, that the Supreme Court may, if in its judgment the purposes of justice require it, allow an appeal in any prize cause, if it appears that any notice of appeal, or of intention to appeal, was filed with the clerk of the District Court within thirty days next after the rendition of the final decree therein."8 "All appeals from the Court of Claims shall be taken within ninety days after the judgment is rendered."

6

“Ap

Appeals from the judgments of the Court of Private Land Claims must be taken by the claimant within six months from the date of the decision, and by the United States within the same period of time, unless the attorney of the United States fails to give the Attorney-General, within sixty days after the

§ 506. 1 U. S. R. S., § 1008; Allen v. So. Pac. R. Co., 173 U. S. 479; Holt v. Indiana Mfg. Co., 176 U. S. 68.

2 U. S. R. S., § 705.

3 U. S. R. S., § 702.

431 St. at L. 85, § 35.

5 McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619.

6 U. S. R. S., § 708; 26 St. at L. 505, §9; U. S. v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36, 39. 7 Ibid., § 10.

8 U. S. R. S., § 1009; The Nuestra Senora De Regia, 17 Wall. 29.

9 U. S. R. S., § 708. But see U. S. v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36, 39.

rendition of the judgment, a written notice of the same with a clear statement of the case and the points decided by the court, verified by a certificate of the presiding justice thereof, in which case the right of appeal of the United States continues to exist until six months next after the receipt of such statement. No appeal can be taken or writ of error sued out to review a decision of a Circuit Court of Appeals unless within one year after the entry of the order, judgment, or decree sought to be reviewed." It seems that the same limitation applies to applications to review such decisions by certiorari.12 Appeals to the Supreme Court of the United States from the United States courts in the Indian Territory must be perfected within sixty days from final judgment. No writ of error from the Supreme Court to review a conviction of crime the punishment of which is death can be "sued out or granted unless a petition therefor shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the trial shall have been had during the same term. or within such time, not exceeding sixty days next after the expiration of the term of the court at which the trial shall have been had, as the court may for cause allow by order entered of record.” 14

"No appeal or writ of error by which any order, judgment, or decree may be reviewed in the Circuit Courts of Appeals under the provisions of this act shall be taken or sued out except within six months after the enty of the order, judgment, or decree sought to be reviewed; provided, however, that in all cases in which a lesser time is now by law limited for appeals or writs of error, such limits of time shall apply to appeals or writs of error in such cases taken to or sued out from the Circuit Courts of Appeals." 15 An appeal from an interlocutory order or decree granting or continuing an injunction, or appointing a receiver, must be taken within thirty days from the entry of such order or decree.16 An appeal from a decision of a Circuit Court re

10 26 St. at L. 854, 858, § 9; U. S. v. Pena, 175 U. S. 500.

11 26 St. at L. 828, § 6.

12 The Conqueror, 166 U. S. 110. Cf. Panama R. Co. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U. S. 280.

13 30 St. at L. 591.
14 25 St. at L. 656, § 6.

15 26 St. at L. 829, § 11; Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Colorado E. Ry. Co. (C. C. A.), 54 Fed. R. 22; White v. Iowa Nat. Bank (C. C. A.), 71 Fed. R. 91; Condon v. Central L. & Tr. Co. (C. C. A.), 73 Fed. R. 907; Coe v. East & Ir. R. Co. of Ala. (C. C. A.), 85 Fed. R. 489. 16 26 St. at L. 828, § 7; 31 St. at L

viewing a decision of the Board of General Appraisers must be taken within thirty days from the decision of the court." Appeals to the Circuit Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Courts of the Territories from judgments of the courts of bankruptcy adjudging or refusing to adjudge the defendant a bankrupt, or allowing or rejecting a debt or claim, must be taken within ten days after the judgment appealed from has been rendered.18 It seems that petitions for a revision of the orders of the courts of bankruptcy must be filed within six months from the making of such orders.19

These limitations do not apply to writs of error coram nobis." The State statutes as to the time of taking appeals and suing out writs of error do not affect the jurisdiction of the Federal courts.21 The time does not begin to run till the judgment, decree, or order is actually entered or filed, and, when the judge's signature is required, not till it is signed," although it

660. This rule applies to a decree after a hearing for an injunction and an accounting. Raymond v. Royal B. S. Co. (C. C. A.), 76 Fed. R. 465.

17 26 St. at L. 138, § 15. This limitation does not apply to an appeal by the United States from an order denying a petition to modify a judgment upon a remittitur as regards interest and costs. Marine v. Lyon (C. C. A.), 62 Fed. R. 153.

18 30 St. at L. 544, 553, § 2. In other cases in bankruptcy six months is allowed. Steele v. Buel (C. C. A.), 104 Fed. R. 968; supra, § 494.

19 In re Worcester County (C. C. A.), 102 Fed. R. 808; supra, § 494. But see In re Anderson, 23 Fed. R. 482.

20 Strode v. The Stafford Justices, 1 Brock. 162. See supra, § 379.

21 Logan v. Goodwin (C. C. A.), 101 Fed. R. 654; s. c. (C. C. A.), 104 Fed. R. 490.

22 Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 6 Wall. 153; Del Valle v. Harrison, 93 U. S. 233; Polleys v. Black River Imp. Co., 113 U. S. 81; Radford v. Folsom, 123 U. S. 725. When a decree is entered dismissing a bill with costs, the time to appeal begins to run, although a

judgment for costs is subsequently entered. Fowler v. Hamill, 139 U. S. 549. When one defendant had demurred and obtained a decree dismissing the bill as to him, and the other defendant had answered, and subsequently obtained a decree dismissing the bill, an appeal taken within two years after the second, but more than two years after the first decree, was held to be in time to bring up both decrees for review. Mendenhall v. Hall, 134 U. S. 559. The time of an intervenor to appeal does not begin to run until he is allowed to intervene. Louisville, E. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wilson, 138 U. S. 501. Where a decree dismissed a bill as to all matters except one which was severable from the rest, as to which a subsequent decree was entered, it was held that the right to appeal from the first dismissal began to run from the entry of the first decree. Hill v. Chicago & E. R. Co., 140 U. S. 52. See also Central Tr. Co. v. Grant L. Works, 135 U. S. 207; Richardson v. Green, 130 U. S. 104. The right to appeal from a decree dismissing a cross-bill does not ordina