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by law to have a permanent office and a judgment record open at all times for public inspection in such county or parish."" The

11 25 St. at L. 357, as amended by 28 St. at L. 813.

"The first clause of the act places judgment liens in a Federal court on the same footing in all respects as a judgment lien in a State court of general jurisdiction. But the power of Congress was not adequate to the task of extending the territorial operation of a judgment lien in the mode provided by State laws for a judgment in the State court. Congress was confronted with the difficulty pointed out by Mr. Justice McLean." (Den v. Jones, 2 McLean, 83, 85).

"The law of a State might provide for filing and docketing a transcript of a judgment of a State court in the clerk's office of any county in the State, and in this way extend the lien of a judgment beyond the county in which it was rendered. But there was no Federal clerk's office or other like office, in each county in the State, in which a judgment rendered in a Federal court could be docketed; and Congress could not make it obligatory on the State clerks to docket and enter a judgment of a Federal court on their records. But it was entirely competent for the State to require her clerks to perform this service, and the proviso in section 1 of the act declares, in legal effect, that when the laws of a State provide for docketing in her clerks' offices, or other offices, the judgments of Federal courts, in the same manner that judgments in her own courts may be docketed, then, and not before, the territorial extent (in other respects they were already the same) of the lien of a judgment in a Federal court in that State shall be the same as that of a judgment in the State court. Where the laws of a

State provide for docketing the judgments of its own courts in any county in the State, but do not make a like provision as to the judgments of the Federal court, the act of Congress is not operative; and in such States the lien of a judgment of a Federal court continues to be co-extensive with its territorial jurisdiction. The law of this State conforms exactly to the requirements of the act of Congress, and makes it operative in this State. The statute reads as follows: Judgments of courts of record of this State, and of courts of the United States rendered within this State, shall be liens on the real estate of the debtor within the county in which the judgment is rendered, from the first day of the term at which the judgment is rendered; but judgments by confession, and judgments rendered at the same term during which the action was commenced, shall bind such lands only from the day on which such judgment was rendered. An attested copy of the journal entry of any judgment, together with a statement of the costs taxed against the debtor in the case, may be filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court of any county, and such judgment shall be a lien on the real estate of the debtor within that county from the date of filing such copy. The clerk shall enter such judgment on the appearance and judgment dockets in the same manner as if rendered in the court of which he is clerk. Executions shall only be issued from the court in which the judgment is rendered.' Gen. St. Kan. 1868, ch. 80, $419.

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clerk cannot charge a fee for allowing an individual or a corporation to inspect these indices or records.1

12

A judgment in favor of one or more joint contractors has been held no bar to a suit against another, who was neither served with process nor appeared in the action in which the judgment was rendered.13

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§ 379. Correction of judgments by courts that rendered them. In the correction, amendment, and vacation of their own judgments, the Federal courts act independently of the law regulating the State courts. "The question relates to the power of the courts and not to the mode of procedure." At the term at which it is entered, a judgment may, for cause shown, be set aside, modified or amended, by the court where it was entered. After the term has expired, unless a motion for the relief was made or noticed during that term, no alteration or correction can be made except by writ of error, and in that class of cases in which the writ of error coram nobis was issued in the old English practice."

Federal court held in this State is filed in his office, 'to enter such judgment on the appearance and judgment dockets in the same manner as if rendered in the court of which he is clerk.' The words 'any judgment,' in the second sentence of the section, obviously, and according to every rule for the construction of statutes, include the judg ments specifically mentioned in the first sentence of the section. It may or may not include others, but it undoubtedly includes them. Section 3 of the act of Congress expressly provides that the act shall not be construed to require the filing of a transcript of a judgment of a United States court in the county clerk's office of the county in which the judgment was rendered, in order that such judgment may be a lien on any property within such county. The result is that a judgment in a United States court in this State is a lien on the lands of the debtor only in the county in which the court was

"The writ of error coram

held and the judgment rendered;
but the lien may be extended to any
other county, in the mode provided
by section 419 of the General Statutes
of the State above quoted." Dart-
mouth Sav. Bank v. Bates et al., 44
Fed. R. 546, per Caldwell, J. See
also Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375.

12 In re Chambers, 44 Fed. R. 786.
13 Larison v. Hager, 44 Fed. R. 49.
$379. Bronson v. Schulten, 104
U. S. 410, 417.

2 Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410,
417, per Miller, J.; Ex parte Casey, 18
Fed. R. 86.

3 Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415.

4 Amy v. Watertown, 130 U. S. 301, 313; Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415, 416; Klever v. Seawall, 65 Fed. R. 373.

5 Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 415, 416; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665; Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415; Hook v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 89 Fed. R. 410. But in the District of Delaware a judgment by default

nobis was allowed, to bring before the same court in which the error was committed some matter of fact which had escaped attention, and which was material in the proceeding. These were limited generally to the facts that one of the parties to the judgment had died before it was rendered, or was an infant and no guardian had appeared or been appointed, or was a feme covert, or the like; or error in the process through default of the clerk." "In practice the same end is now generally attained by motion, sustained, if the case require it, by affidavits; and it is observable that so far has the latter mode superseded the former in the British practice, that Blackstone does not even notice this suit among his remedies." An order

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8

may be entered nunc pro tunc to embody a decision made at a previous term of the court even in a criminal case; and in a civil case to make special findings previously omitted, comformably to the opinion filed at the judgment term; but not after a writ of error has been decided to insert in a record certain findings, some of which findings were unavoidably and others accidentally omitted." And an order nunc pro tunc has

no effect upon the statute of limitations; " nor can it relate back so as to make a person guilty of contempt for an act done before it was entered.12 It has been held that a court has power at any time to set aside a judgment which is absolutely void, not merely voidable.13

was set aside upon motion at a subsequent term, where the defendant's attorney had believed that the suit was brought in the State court. Brown v. Phila., W. & B. R. Co., 9 Fed. R. 183. It has been held that an order staying plaintiff's proceedings till he pays costs of a former suit is res adjudicata upon a subsequent motion, and is so far final that it cannot be set aside or modified at a subsequent term. Buckles v. Chicago, M. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 53 Fed. R. 566.

Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U. S. 410, 416, per Miller, J.; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665. See Lincoln Nat. Bank v. Perry, 66 Fed. R. 887.

7 Pickett's Heirs v. Legerwood, 7 Pet. 144, 148, per Johnson, J.

8 In re Wight, 134 U. S. 136; Supervisors v. Durant, 9 Wall. 736; Ætna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S. 117. See Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415. 9 Etna Ins. Co. v. Boon, 95 U. S.

117.

10 Hickman v. Fort Scott, 141 U. S. 415.

11 Fewlass v. Keesham (C. C. A.), 88 Fed. R. 573, 576.

12 Ex parte Buskirk (C. C. A.), 72 Fed. R. 14.

13 U. S. v. Wallace, 46 Fed. R. 569, 570. For example, a judgment entered in vacation without statutory authority. Abraham v. Levy (C. C. A.), 72 Fed. R. 124. Cf. supra, § 351.

§ 380. Executions and proceedings supplementary thereto. A statute passed June 1, 1872, and incorporated in the Revised Statutes December 1, 1873, provides that "the party recovering a judgment in any common-law cause in any Circuit or District Court, shall be entitled to similar remedies upon the same, by execution or otherwise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are now provided in like causes by the laws of the State in which such court is held, or by any such hereafter enacted which may be adopted by general rules of such Circuit or District Court; and such courts may from time to time, by general rules, adopt such State laws as may hereafter be in force in such State in relation to remedies upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise." In pursuance of this statute, the Circuit and District Courts have generally promulgated rules adopting the State practice in this respect.2 The adoption of such a rule gives the Federal court power to enforce the proceedings supplementary to execution authorized by the State statutes. It has been held that a State statute requiring the registration of a judgment against a municipal corporation in a certain office before its enforcement by execution may apply to the judgment of a Federal court; but that a State statute forbidding the enforcement by execution of a judgment against a municipal corporation does not affect the judgment of a Federal court.5

1

The Revised Statutes provide that "all writs of execution upon judgments or decrees obtained in a Circuit or District Court, in any State which is divided into two or more districts, may run and be executed in any part of such State; but shall be issued from, and made returnable to, the court wherein the

§ 380. U. S. R. S., § 916; 4 St. at L., ch. 68, p. 281; Lamaster v. Keeler, 123 U. S. 376. The Pennsylvania statute authorizes the sale of a patent right under a special fieri facias. Pennsylvania Act of 1870 (P. L. 58); Erie Wringer Mfg. Co. v. National Wringer Co., 63 Fed. R. 248; Philadelphia & B. C. R. Co.'s Appeal, 70 Pa. St. 355; Floyd v. Farnsworth, 12 Wkly. Notes, 500. Cf. Ager v. Murray, 105 U. S. 126; supra, § 11.

mulgated by the U. S. C. C., S. D. N. Y., October 11, 1878, and Decem. ber 29, 1881.

3 Ex parte Boyd, 105 U. S. 647; Canal & C. St. R. Co. v. Hart, 114 U. S. 654, 661. See § 21.

4 Hart v. New Orleans, 12 Fed. R. 292, 293. See Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203.

5 Hart v. New Orleans, 12 Fed. R. 292; New Orleans v. Morris, 3 Woods, 115. See Merriwether v. Garrett, 102

2 See for examples the rules pro- U. S. 470.

judgment was obtained." In cases where a writ of error lies to the Supreme Court, or to a Circuit Court of Appeals, the execution cannot be issued till ten days after the entry of the judgment. The writ may, however, be previously prepared by the clerk. It has been held that when a motion for a new trial is pending after the entry of judgment, the ten days does not begin to run till such motion is denied, and that the denial does not become effective till the order has been filed in the clerk's office; and that Sundays must be excluded from the computation of the time. A temporary stay of execution may be granted, although no writ of error is sued out, so that other lienholders may enter judgments against the judgment. debtor, and thus share in the proceeds of the sale." The court may compel the judgment debtor to give security as a condition of a stay of proceedings of more than ten days after entry of judgment. When it is required by the laws of any State that goods taken in execution on a writ of fieri facias shall be appraised before they are sold, the appraisers appointed under the authority of the State may appraise goods taken in execution on such a writ issued out of a court of the United States, in the same manner as if such writ had issued out of a court of such State; and the marshal, in whose custody the goods are, shall summon the appraisers in the same manner as the sheriff is, by the laws of such State, required to summon them, and if the appraisers, after having been duly summoned, fail to attend and perform the duties required of them, the marshal may proceed to sell such goods without an appraisement.13 When such appraisers attend, they are entitled to the like fees as in cases of appraisement under the laws of such State. When a marshal dies, or is removed from office, or his term expires, after he has taken under execution any real property and before sale or other final disposition thereof, the like process issues to the succeeding marshal, and the same proceeding is had as if

6 U. S. R. S., § 985.

7U. S. R. S., § 1007; Danielson v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 55 Fed. R. 49. * Board of Com'rs v. Gorman, 19 Wall. 661.

9 Brown v. Evans, 18 Fed. R. 56; Danielson v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 55 Fed. R. 49.

10 Danielson v. Northwestern Fuel Co., 55 Fed. R. 49.

11 Eaton v. Cleveland, St. L. & K. C. Ry. Co., 41 Fed. R. 421.

12 Fisher v. Meyer, 10 Fed. R. 268. 13 U. S. R. S., § 993; Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1.

14 U. S. R. S., § 993.

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