House of Commons from arrest for debt. A Bill for this object was originated by Mr. Hunt, who argued that this privilege ought to share the fate of others which had been gradually abandoned. Formerly, he said, members could not be sued; their goods were exempt from distraint, and even their servants from arrest. All these privileges had been abolished, and freedom of speech, and freedom from arrest for debt, alone remained. It was time that members, who could not now fear oppression from the Crown, should be placed on the same footing with the rest of the community. The House had abolished property qualification; men of straw might now be returned; and therefore the privilege of freedom from arrest should be abolished.

Mr. Bouverie defended a privilege which protected the independence of members, and was shared in by barristers attending the courts or on circuit, justices of the peace at sessions, suitors and witnesses, the Queen's servants, and foreign ambassadors and their servants. On what ground, he asked, did the Bill draw a distinction between Peers and members of the House of Commons?

The Bill was read a second time on the 30th of June, after a division, in which 129 supported and 75 voted against it. It was, however, not carried further.

Another unsuccessful attempt in the direction of Parliamentary Reform was made by Mr. Caird, who moved for leave to bring in a Bill to assimilate the county franchise of Scotland with that of England. He showed the disparity of the two franchises, and that the county constituency in

Scotland was narrowed to the landlords and tenant farmers (the artisan population being unenfranchised); and the tenants, he said, being always expected to vote with their landlords, so that the Scotch county members were practically returned by the landed aristocracy. He was aware that the proposed assimilation would greatly enlarge the county constituency of Scotland; but this, in his opinion, was a recommendation of the measure.

The motion was seconded by Mr. Cowan.

Mr. Moncreiff opposed the motion. He was at a loss, he said, to understand how the assimilation was to be accomplished; if the object was to introduce into Scotland the 40s. freehold franchise, with all its incidents, characteristics, and effects, this, he contended, was impossible. Mr. Caird had not said what classes he proposed to enfranchise, and there was no large amount of small tenements capable of conferring the 40s. franchise separately. He pointed out various objections to the measure, which, in his opinion, would not improve the county constituency of Scotland, but would check the progress of liberal and enlightened opinions, and give greater scope to the influence of power and money.

Mr. Baxter and Mr. E. Ellice recommended Mr. Caird to withdraw his Bill, though they were not opposed to it in principle. Lord Elcho, Mr. Cumming Bruce, and some other Scotch members, expressed much objection to it.

The Lord Advocate said he believed that the Bill was the result of an entire misconception on the part of the promoters of

the movement in which it originated, who supposed that it was possible to effect an assimilation between the county franchise of England and Scotland, which had been demonstrated by Mr. Moncreiff to be an impossibility. This demonstration he enforced and amplified, showing at the same time the ill effects of an attempt at assimilation, in extending the means of creating votes.

Mr. Whiteside observed that if the 40s. freehold franchise was to be extended to Scotland because it existed in England, it ought by a parity of reasoning to be restored in Ireland, where it had been extinguished by the Legislature for very sufficient reasons.

Mr. Caird having replied, the motion was negatived by 103 to

84.

The last of this class of questions which it is necessary to notice, was Mr. H. Berkeley's annually repeated motion in favour of vote by ballot. The honourable member for Bristol made his application for leave to bring in a Bill on the 8th of June, when a debate of some length took place, not marked, however, by much novelty of argument. Mr. Berkeley founded his advocacy of the ballot, he said, by which he meant emphatically secret voting, upon one sound axiom-that Parliament had no right to create a functionary without giving to that functionary adequate protection in the discharge of his office. He reiterated most of his former arguments, founded upon principle and upon successful experiments in favour of this mode of taking votes, contending that under the present mode elections went for nothing, and the nation was not fairly represented. The

first step to a reform of Parliament, he said, was to free the electors, who were now bound hand and foot, and there was no other way of doing this than by giving them the ballot. He illustrated his arguments by familiar examples of the application of what he termed the "screw."

The motion was seconded by Mr. W. P. Martin.

Mr. S. Estcourt, in resisting the motion, urged, among other reasons for desiring publicity, that secrecy in the discharge of a public function was un-Englishthat is, it was directly at variance with the habits, customs, and notions of Englishmen. He maintained that the franchise was a public trust, and that all public trusts ought to be openly exercised. In his opinion, the ballot would not put down intimidation and bribery, while it would introduce evils of its own; the prin ciple would work ill for the public, and cause misunderstandings, jealousies, and heart-burnings.

Sir A. Elton supported the motion. There should, he said, be no artificial restraint upon the free action of the voter. The ballot would enable him to act independently of all influence, and was the only means of securing his independence, whereas open voting counteracted the natural intention of the Reform Act.

Mr. Bentinck remarked that Mr. Berkeley must know as well as he did that the proper title of a Bill for introducing the system of the ballot ought to be " a Bill to prevent the detection of bribery." He defied any one to show that there would be any other result from the ballo system except

that it would be perfectly impossible under it to detect systematic bribery.

General Thompson endeavoured to remove a misapprehension upon this question, by observing that there was no wish to prevent a voter from making his vote public; all that was desired was that the mode of voting should be such that the vote could not be known unless the voter pleased.

Sir G. Lewis remarked that this question had been argued on both sides on the supposition that the ballot would produce a system of secret voting; but the position he wished to see established was that the ballot would produce a system of secrecy. He contended that in the United States the ballot was not a system of secret voting. With the exception of one State, the votes taken by ballot were practically as public as in England; the real difference was that, in the United States, the ballot, being a piece of paper, is put into a box, and there is no authentic and official record of the vote, so that there could be no indictment for bribery. In other respects, voting in the United States and in England was practically identical. Unless universal secrecy were secured, no effectual protection would be given, and the ballot did not secure universal secrecy in the United States.

Lord Palmerston could not concur in the motion. Mr. Berkeley, he observed, had not explained whether the mode of voting by ballot was to be compulsory or permissive; if compulsory, it would impose a restriction upon electors incompatible with the national feeling and the vital principle of the inVOL. C.

stitution. The law must go further, and make it penal for a man to tell how he voted. He maintained that the franchise was a trust, and should be exercised, like all our Parliamentary functions, in a manner, open to the criticism of the public. The ballot would not accomplish the object of secrecy, and, if it did, it would convert electors into hypocrites, and put an end to public and party spirit in the country.

Mr. Bright would not go to the United States or to Australia. He would have this measure considered with refernce to the conditions of our own society, and he insisted that this country, where there were so many incentives to undue influence, and so little power of resisting it, was of all countries that in which this question ought to be fairly considered, and if the remedy was good, it should be applied. He described the secret operation of influence in our electoral system, and cited evidence of what he termed the intolerable working of the screw spoken of by Mr. Berkeley. To masses of the population the franchise would be of no use without the ballot. Was it not a fact, he asked, that in every petition for Parliamentary reform the House was asked to include the ballot, and that at almost every public meeting held for years past the establishment of secret voting by the ballot was made a cardinal point? Would the House disregard this? As the ballot was no sacred principle, but a mere matter of machinery, no member, he observed, could be charged with inconsistency in consenting to try this great experiment; and he appealed to both sides of the House [P]

to lay aside their fears, to have a little faith, and not to be misled by the flimsy arguments of Lord Palmerston, but for the sake of morality and the tranquillity of the country, to give a candid and favourable consideration to Mr. Berkeley's proposition.

Mr. Walpole observed that the fair way of testing this question was by considering whether open or secret voting was most successful in putting down bribery and intimidation; and he contended, from known facts and the history of late years, that there could be but one conclusion,namely, that in order to prevent the corrupting and intimidating influences exerted during elections, there must be the means of detection and punishment. For this purpose, as well as for the sake of public responsibility and bringing to bear upon it the control of public opinion, there must be publicity. If the secret system of voting were once established, there would be great danger that engines would be used in the dark which could not be employed in the light. He could not consent to the introduction of the Bill.

Lord J. Russell replied to Mr. Bright, who had represented truly, he said, that this was a change in only the machinery of our electoral system; but he (Lord John) considered that the change would be not for the better, but for the worse. It was strange, he remarked, that the advocates of the ballot were not able to show a completely satisfactory example that where the ballot was established, there were more facilities for discussion and greater liberty of choice than under our own imperfect system.

He was therefore not willing to make a change, which, he repeated, would, in his opinion, be a change for the worse; and if anything could prevent the serious mischief of such a change, it would be the open, truth-telling character of the people.

On a division the motion was rejected by 294 to 197.

Mr. Roebuck renewed this Session the motion which had been made on more than one former occasion for the abolition of the office of Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Having vindicated. himself from a charge of being the enemy of Ireland, he briefly stated the reasons that led him to propose this resolution. First, the office of Lord-Lieutenant was expensive. It cost the Government 50,000l. a year; and the only counterbalancing advantage was, that certain persons were obliged to buy certain coats and breeches to go to court in; thereby benefiting the shopkeepers of Dublin. Secondly, the office exercised a bad social influence. Persons were invited to Court just as the underlings pleased; and intrigue, heartburning, and all sorts of evils, arose from the institution. Thirdly, considered politically, the Government of Ireland was triple-headed. There were the Home Office, the Lord-Lieutenant, and the Chief Secretary, and no real responsible Government. The office of Lord-Lieutenant was a badge of slavery, a mere pageant, and he would abolish it, and substitute for it a Secretary of State. Communication between the two countries was rapid and easy, and the abolition of this satrap government would create a cordial union between the two countries.

Mr. Gilpin seconded the motion. It was warmly opposed by several Irish members, among whom were Mr. S. B. Miller, who moved the previous question, Col. French, Mr. Esmonde, Mr. Vance, Mr. Conolly, Mr. Bagwell, and Mr. P. O'Brien. Mr. Dodson, Mr. Evans, Mr. Blackburn, and Mr. Baxter, supported Mr. Roebuck's resolution. Lord Naas, Chief Secretary for Ireland, explained the many onerous duties which the Lord-Lieutenant had to discharge, and the difficulties which impeded the transfer of them to a public department in London. He thought that before many years the change proposed might advantageously take place; but before that result could be satisfactorily brought about, the opinion of the Irish people in its favour must be clearly manifested through their representatives.

Mr. Walpole enforced the same arguments.

Lord John Russell was of opinion that if the change could be effected, there should be but one Secretary of State for England, Ireland, and Scotland, with one administration throughout the kingdom. The time was not distant when Irish Members would look on the change with less regret than now. In the mean time, he thought there was no great evil in leaving the government of the present LordLieutenant alone.

Lord Palmerston balanced the views on either side, and arrived at the conclusion that the decision of the question ought to be governed by the feelings of the people of Ireland. If the people of Ireland were for abolishing the office he would vote for its abolition; but if they clung to this

mode of government, Parliament ought to defer to their wishes, and preserve the office of LordLieutenant.

Sir George Lewis put the question very succinctly in his speech.

"I do not think myself that the time is very distant when it will be possible from the Home Office to give all those general directions which, in the comparatively tranquil state of Ireland, it will be necessary to issue for the superintendence of Irish affairs. The main departments in Ireland will still retain their local character. The Police, the Poor-law department, and other branches of local management, will be governed from Dublin, although there may be certain important questions upon which reference will be necessary to the home Government. Whenever the time shall come when the Government of Ireland may be conducted upon the same principle as the Government of Scotland-when there will be no necessity for daily superintendence by a local head such as the Lord-Lieutenant-then, I think, the Lord-Lieutenancy ought to be abolished, without the substitution of such a department as my honourable and learned friend contemplates. But until that time arrives-and I am not prepared to say that it has arrived at this moment-it appears to me better to retain the present organization, which, at all events, has historical recollections on its side, which has assumed a form, to a certain extent, acceptable both to the people of Dublin and the general population of Ireland, and which has therefore recommendations that any new department constituted for the separate