shall be at such place or places as Congress may by law have directed," is also restrictive, because it prohibits a trial at any place other than where Congress shall have directed, viz., before the commission of the specific offence; so that the whole subject of the section was a restriction upon the power of Congress, and when Mr. Morris offered the Habeas Corpus clause as an amendment to it, it shows, when read in connection with it, that it also, was (for greater caution) a limitation upon the power of Congress.

It has been further objected: "In opposition to an intention to leave the power to Congress, observe the striking departure from parallel of the second clause of Section 9, Article I., from the first clause of the same section:

"First Clause.

The migration or importation of such persons, &c., shall not be prohibited by Congress before the year 1808, but a tax or duty (expressly within the power of Congress, section 8) may be imposed on such importation.'

"Second Clause. The privilege of the Writ, &c., shall not be suspended, unless when, &c., the public safety may require it,' and the word "Legislature' dropped from Mr. Pinckney's clause."

The answer to "the departure from parallel" is this:-Had the word "Congress" been omitted from the first clause, so as to read "the importation, &c., shall not be prohibited," &c., that might have been construed as prohibiting not only Congress but the States from abolishing the slave trade before the year 1808, but the insertion of the word "Congress," prohibited them only, and thus "in the interim all the States were at liberty to prohibit it.”—Mass. Debates, p. 117. And the limitation on taxing was inserted, lest a prohibitory tax should be imposed by Congress, (see Virg. Deb., p. 322-324,) so the parallel is not departed from.

Passing from the Convention which prepared, to the State Conventions which ratified and made it, what was their opinion of the clause?

So soon as the Federal Constitution had been framed, it was submitted to Conventions of the respective States. The members of those Conventions were generally the ablest in the States, and among them were the chief men who had themselves framed the Constitution, and who, of course, knew what its several clauses

meant.

In the New York Convention there were, among others, Hamilton, Jay, Morris, and the Livingstons. In that of Massachusetts, were Adams, Hancock, Cushing, and Gorham. In that of Virginia, were Madison, Mason, Randolph, and Henry. It has been observed, that in the Federal Convention, this Habeas Corpus clause was adopted with very little debate. That is true, also, of the State Conventions; for example, in that of New York, it is recorded that "the Committee (of the Whole) then proceeded through sections 8, nine, and 10, with little or no debate. The fact is most significant, but of what? It could not be that the subject was of little importance, for the people of this country, as well as those of England, had ever considered it of the greatest importance.

The Constitution was adopted in Federal Convention in Sept., 1787, it was first ratified by Delaware, in Dec., 1787, and, lastly, by Rhode Island, in May, 1790. The second State that ratified it was New York, in July, 1788. During that period the press teemed with letters, essays, and addresses, for and against it. Every material objection to it was taken up and discussed by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, in a series of papers, which, together, are now known as The Federalist. Yet, in them, this clause is mentioned but twice, and by Hamilton, who, in one, says, the Writ is amply confirmed; and, in the other, (No. 84,) he argues that it is secured by the Constitution as well as by a Bill of Rights. That "the practice of arbitrary imprisonment has been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instrument of tyranny," and then cites from Blackstone (vol. 1, p. 136) the passage that such imprisonment is more dangerous to liberty than violently to take property or life; but not a word is said about having taken this power from the Legislature. It is true, then, that for some reason, there was very little objection to this clause, and it is certain that there was no objection to it on the ground that the power of suspending the privilege was to be exercised by a department of the Government which should not exercise it. Nay, more, as to which of the departments had it, there seems to have been a universal concurrence of opinion.

So objectionable were some parts of the Constitution to the more Democratic part of the members, that some of them either left the Convention itself, or refused to sign it, and afterwards did all they

could, both in the State Conventions and elsewhere, to prevent its ratification; among these may, especially, be mentioned, Luther Martin, of Maryland; Yates and Lansing, of New York; Mason and Edmund Randolph, of Virginia, and Gerry, of Massachusetts. In the State Conventions, the chief objections to it were that it consolidated all the powers of the States and people in the Federal Government; that their rights were at its mercy; that it contained no Bill of Rights; that trial by jury, freedom of speech, freedom from arrest, unless upon a warrant supported by oath, and the prohibition of excessive bail, were not sufficiently provided for; and, indeed, the Constitution was only ratified upon the well understood assurance that these things should all be, as they were immediately afterwards, secured by amendments. There were other objections, too, some of them real, many of them chimerical. Patrick Henry, above all others, was persistent in his objection to it, on the ground that it did not sufficiently fence in and guard the liberty of the people. Was there then no objection to this clause? The answer is, there were two objections. It was objected, 1st. That the privilege ought not to be suspended for any time, or at all. 2d. That, at least, the time of the suspension ought to have been limited, as it was in the Constitution of Massachusetts, whence it was borrowed; but, it was universally agreed, that C'ongress alone had the power to suspend the privilege; and those objections were to entrusting that power even to Congress. It was this universal understanding and supreme consciousness of the fact, that Congress alone had the power to suspend, which accounts for the fact, that neither in the Federal or in any of the State Conventions, was there a question raised as to which department of the Government had the power; and that will now be made evident by the express and recorded resolution of one Convention, and by the declaration of every member of each Convention, who spoke either for or against the clause itself.

In the New York Convention, on July 2, towards the close of the proceedings, it is recorded in 1 Ell. Deb., p. 350, that "The Committee (of the Whole) then proceeded through sections 8, nine, (that in question,) and 10, of this article, (first,) and the whole of the next, with little or no debate. As the Secretary read the paragraphs, amendments were made in the order and form here

after recited. In the paragraph, "Sec. 9. Respecting the privilege of the Habeas Corpus," Mr. TREDWELL moved this amendment: "Resolved, That whenever the privilege of Habeas Corpus shall be suspended, such suspension shall, in no case, exceed the term of six months, or until the next meeting of the Congress." Thus, assuming that Congress passed the Act at one session, it sought to limit the time, for which they should suspend it, to six months, or till their next session. The New York Convention adopted the Constitution; but they prefaced that adoption by a Declaration of Rights, which they declared "cannot be abridged or violated," and "are consistent with the said Constitution;" and one of them is in these words-"That every person restrained of his liberty is entitled to an inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful; and that such inquiry and removal ought not to be denied or delayed, except when, on account of public danger, the CONGRESS shall suspend the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus."

Then followed certain amendments which they had confidence would be and which they enjoined their Representatives to exert themselves to have-adopted; one of which is in these words, "That the privilege of the Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended for a longer term than six months, or until twenty days after the meeting of the CONGRESS next following the passing the Act for such suspension."

These resolves set the whole question at rest. They express the opinion of Hamilton, Jay, Livingston, Morris, Clinton, and others. They have distinctly declared, in reference to the very clause in question, that it is the Congress which has the power to suspend the privilege; and the question now is, were they, who made the Constitution, mistaken, or are those who differ from them mistaken ?

To these will now be added the recorded opinions of the makers of the Constitution (and of those who ratified it) in the Conventions of the several States. In reply to a congratulatory address, Mr. Jefferson said: "The Constitution shall be administered by me according to the safe and honest meaning contemplated by the plain understanding of the people at the time of its adoption; a meaning to be found in the explanations of those who advocated,

not those who opposed it. These explanations are presented in the publications of the times." And the same sources of explanation are referred to in Mr. Madison's letter to Mr. C. J. Ingersoll, Feb. 22, 1831-4 Elliott's Debates, pp. 414, 446. It was Mr. Tredwell who, in the New York Convention, moved the amendment limiting the time of the suspension. He objected to any suspension, but thought that at least its duration should be limited. He, also, objected to the terms of the clause, which seemed to concede a prior power in the General Government, of which it was but the limitation. On these points he said, (2 Elliott's Debates, p. 399,) "Why is it said that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unless, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it? What clause in the Constitution, except this very clause itself, gives the General Government a power to deprive us of that great privilege, so sacredly secured to us by our State Constitution? Why is it provided that no bill of attainder shall be passed, or that no title of nobility shall be granted? Are there any clauses in the Constitution extending the powers of the General Government to these objects? Some gentlemen say that these, though not necessary, were inserted for greater caution." That is to say, those who defended this Habeas Corpus clause, among others, had justified its insertion, not for the purpose of giving a power, but for greater caution to restrain a power which otherwise might be exercised by the General GovernIment, certainly not by the Executive. No matter, however, about that point; it is clear that Mr. Tredwell, and all who heard him, never questioned but that the power, with or without the clause, belonged to Congress only.

Luther Martin, a delegate from Maryland to the Federal Convention, opposed the ratification of the Constitution on the grounds, among others, that it gave too much power to the General Government, did not sufficiently secure the civil rights of the people, and that it did not prohibit the slave trade. In his address to the Legislature of Maryland, detailing the grounds of his objections, = he says:

"By the next paragraph, the General Government have a power of suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in cases of rebellion or inva

sion.