sented and protested, and that due notice was given to the defendant to charge them as drawers. The defendants claim that the draft being due when presented, and demand made by the notary, it was then too late to present it for acceptance; and presentment for acceptance of a bill which is due, is not sufficient to charge the drawers. But it is well settled that the holder of a bill, payable a specified length of time after date, or on a day certain, need not, for the purpose of charging the drawers and indorsers, present it for acceptance until it becomes due and payable. It may be presented before or at the time of its maturity. (Edwards on Bills, 387; Story on Bills, § 231; Allen v. Suydam, 20 Wend. 321; s. c., 17 Id. 368.) * All the judges, except Marvin, J., agreed that a refusal to accept on the day payment is due is equivalent to a refusal to pay, and renders a demand of payment unnecessary. On the question of evidence, all the judges concurred. 5 Judgment reversed, and new trial ordered. § 241 ROBINSON v. AMES. 20 JOHNSON (N. Y.) 146. 1822. THIS was an action of assumpsit, on a bill of exchange drawn by the defendants, merchants in Augusta, in the state of Georgia, on the 6th of March, 1819, upon Townsend and White, merchants, in the city of New York, for five hundred dollars, payable sixty days after sight, to Starr and Ross, or order, by whom it was indorsed to the plaintiff. The cause was tried at the New York sittings, in June, 1821, before the chief justice. The bill was presented for acceptance on the 20th of May, 1819, and notice of non-acceptance sent, by mail, on the next day, to the drawers, by a notary, directed to them at Augusta, in Georgia. On the 22d of July, 1819, the same notary presented the bill to the drawers for payment, which they refused, alleging the want of funds. Notice of non-payment was sent through the post-office, two or three days afterwards, addressed to the defendants, at Savannah, in Georgia. Townsend, one of the drawees, who was a witness for the plaintiff, testified, that on the 20th day of May, 1819, the drawees had no funds in their hands belonging to the defendants, and had then accepted drafts to the amount of three or four thousand dollars more than they had funds of the defendants, and that this was the last bill drawn 4 Accord: Philpott v. Bryant, 3 Car. & P. 244; Washington Bam v. Triplett, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 25. — H. On a question of admission of evidence.-H. by them. That the want of funds proceeded from a fall in the price of cotton shipped by the defendants to T. and W.; that by an agreement between them, the defendants were authorized to make purchases of cotton, on the joint account of themselves and T. and W., and to draw on T. and W. for the amount. That, on the 26th of April, 1819, T. and W. stopped payment. That after the 6th of March, and before the failure of T. and W., they had received a considerable amount of cotton from the defendants, but had accepted the bills of the defendants to a larger amount than the value of the cotton so shipped, and the difference was owing to a loss on the cotton shipped; that, if the defendants were to pay all the bills, T. and W. would owe them five or six thousand dollars; but if T. and W. were to take up all the bills, the drawees would owe them three or four thousand dollars. It was proved, that the mail which left Augusta about the 10th of March, was lost; and that the mail goes from that place to New York, in ten days, and leaves the former place three times a week. That where bills are remitted by merchants, it is the usual course to send the bill by one mail, and to advise by the next. A verdict was taken for the plaintiff, for five hundred and seventytwo dollars, subject to the opinion of the court on a case, as above stated. SPENCER, CH. J., delivered the opinion of the court. The questions in this case are: (1) Whether the bill was transmitted in due time; and (2) Whether the want of fund in the hands of the drawees, will excuse the delay in presenting the bill, or the irregularity in the notice of the non-payment of it. 1. I am entirely satisfied that there is no foundation for saying the defendants are precluded from setting up laches, because they had no right to draw the bill. The case of Bickerdike v. Bollmar (1 Term Rep. 405), is considered the first case deciding that notice to the drawer of the dishonor of the bill was unnecessary; and in that case the drawer had no funds, and knew he had none, in the hands of the drawee. The drawing the bill was considered a fraud, and it was held that he was not entitled to notice, and could not be injured by the want of it. It has, however, since that case, repeatedly been decided, that where there are any funds in the hands of the drawee, so that the drawer has a right to expect the bill will be paid, or where there are not any funds, yet if the bill was drawn under such circumstances as induced the drawer to entertain a reasonable expectation that the bill would be accepted and paid, the person so drawing it is entitled to notice; and, a fortiori, he is entitled to have the bill duly presented. The rule is correctly laid down in Claridge v. Dalton (4 Maule & Selw. 229), by Lord Ellenborough. The principle which has been stated is very ably supported by Chief Justice Marshall, in French v. The Bank of Columbia (4 Cranch's Rep. 153), where the principal authorities are reviewed. There is nothing more important, than that, in questions of a general mercantile nature, there should be a uniformity of decision; and, although the justice and equity of this rule may not, in some cases, be perceived, where the payee has purchased a bill, and it is drawn in good faith, and no conceivable loss has happened by the want of notice; yet, as there may be cases where, though there were no funds in the hands of the drawee, the drawer may be injured by the want of notice, it is better that the rule on the subject should be general and uniform throughout the mercantile world." In the case of Miller v. Hackley (5 Johns. Rep. 375); Weldon and Furniss v. Buck and another (4 Johns. Rep. 144); and Mason and Smede v. Franklin (3 Johns. Rep. 202), it was decided that if a bill was presented for acceptance, and the drawee refused to accept it, and notice thereof was duly given, a demand of payment, and notice of a refusal to pay, was unnecessary, because the drawer was fixed already. 2. The only remaining question, then, is, whether there was laches in presenting the bill for acceptance; for there is no doubt that regular notice was given of the refusal to accept the bill, the day subsequent to the demand. I do not find, that where a bill of exchange has been drawn payable at sight, or any specified number of days after sight, that there is any definite or fixed rule when the bill shall be presented for acceptance, other than this, that due diligence must be used. And it is certain, that with respect to such bills, and particularly where they are negotiated by the payee, there is much more latitude, as to the time of presentment, than where the bill has a fixed period of payment. In the case of Muilman v. D'Eguino (2 H. Bl. Rep. 565), which is a very leading case on this subject, the judges felt the difficulty of saying at what time such a bill should be presented for payment. Ch. J. Eyre observed, that the courts had been very cautious in fixing any time for an inland bill, payable at a certain period after sight, to be presented for acceptance. He said, that if, instead of drawing their foreign bills payable as usances, in the old way, merchants chose, for their own convenience, to draw them in this manner and to make the time commence when the holder pleases, he did not see how the courts could lay down any precise rule on the subject. But he thought the holder was bound to present the bill in a reasonable time, in order that the period might commence from which the payment was to take place; and that what was reasonable time must depend on the particular circumstances of the case. Buller, J., said, that he thought a rule might, thus far, be laid down as to laches, with regard to bills pay See Ner. Inst. Law, § 185 and § 245. — H. able at sight, or a certain time after sight, namely, that they ought to be put in circulation. If they are circulated, he said, the parties are known to the world, and their credit is looked to; and if a bill, drawn at three days sight, was kept out in that way for a year, he could not say there would be laches; but further than that, no rule could be laid down. Heath, J., observed that no rule could be laid down as to the time for presenting bills, payable at sight, or a given time after; that in the French ordinance of 1673 (Postlethwaite's Dict. tit. Bills of Exchange), it is said, that a bill, payable at sight, or at will, is the same thing, and that this agreed with Marius. Now, here, the bill was put in circulation by Ross and Starr; and although it is probable, that the first of exchange was lost, by the loss of mail, we are not authorized to consider that as a fact in the case; but I cannot say, that upon such a bill there has been laches. We perceive how extremely cautious the judges were, in the case cited, in laying down any rule. The evident inclination of their minds was, that when the payee put the bill in circulation, the subsequent holder was not bound to any strict presentment. drawers of the bill evidently did not mean to limit the time of presentment, by making the bill payable at sixty days after sight. They meant to give a latitude, as to time, to the holder; and my conclusion is, that there is not such laches as will discharge the drawers. Judgment for the plaintiff. 8 Accord: Wallace v. Agry, 4 Mason (U. S. C. C.) 336; s. c., 5 Mason, 118, in which a "6 sixty days after sight "bill drawn June 18 at Havana, Cuba, on W. in London, and there presented Oct. 31, having been locked up in the holder's hands in Boston, from July 6 to Sept. 29, was, on the second trial, found by the jury to have been presented within a reasonable time; Aymar v. Beers, 7 Cowen, (N. Y.) 705, in which case a "three days after sight' bill drawn Dec. 12 in New York, presented Jan. 10 in Richmond, Va., having been in the payee's hands during that time, was held by the court to have been presented within a reasonable time, under the circumstances of the case; Bolton v. Harrod, 9 Mart. (La.) 326; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 176; Montelius v. Charles, 76 Ill. 305. Mullick In the following cases the delay was deemed to be unreasonable: v. Radakissen, 9 Moore P. C. 66; Fernandez v. Lewis, 1 McCord, (S. C.) 322; Dumont v. Pope, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 367; Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Allen, 11 Mich. 501; Chambers v. Hill, 26 Tex. 472. Whether what is a reasonable time is a question for the jury or for the court has occasioned some conflict. The question was left to the jury in Wallace v. Agry, supra; it was decided by the court in Aymar v. Beers, supra; it was held to be "a mixed question of law and fact" in Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray, (Mass.) 217. See 1 Daniel, § 466; note, 17 Am. Dec. 544-549.-H. STUART, J.-Suit on a bill of exchange by Drew, indorsee, against Sharpe, the indorser. The action was instituted before the mayor of the city of Evansville, where the plaintiff had judgment for the bill and interest. Sharpe appealed to the Circuit Court, where it was tried with the like result. Sharpe excepted to the rulings of that court, and now appeals to this. Two points are made and argued 1. The evidence of presentment to the drawee for acceptance. 2. The evidence of notice of protest to Sharpe. 1. It is correctly contended that the presentment for acceptance should be to the drawee himself, if he can be found. (Chitty on Bills, 278.) If to an agent or other person authorized to accept, the fact should appear. In the present case the only evidence of presentment is the certificate of protest. The notary certifies "that on, etc., I did present the annexed draft of T. C. Wetmore on W. W. Peters, at the store of Silliman and Gardiner, and demanded acceptance of the same, which was refused," étc. It is contended that this is not evidence of a presentment to Peters for acceptance. The statute makes notarial certificates evidence of the facts therein stated (2 R. S., p. 91.) The notarial certificate is clear as to the facts of presentment, the place of presentment, the demand of acceptance, and the refusal. To whom was it presented? Who refused to accept? It cannot admit of doubt that Peters himself was the person. The plain English of the protest is that the notary found Peters at the store of Silliman and Gardiner, Troy, N. Y., and there demanded of him acceptance, which Peters refused. The form here used seems to be the common one prescribed by the books. (Chitty on Bills, 333; Byles on Bills, 191.) The language is not even obscure. The presentment, the demand, the refusal, all clearly mean, that it was the drawee who was the object and actor. We are not at liberty to doubt the sufficiency of the evidence that the bill was duly presented for acceptance. [The Court then holds the notice of dishonor sufficient.] PER CURIAM. The judgment is affirmed, with 5 per cent. damages and costs." It would seem that presentment for acceptance must be made to the drawee or his authorized agent in person and that diligent inquiry should be made for the drawee if no person is found at his office or residence having authority to accept for him. Bank v. Triplett, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 25, 34; Wise |