Baptist As 1819. beth, and would, à fortiori, have been supported in courts of equity." And the Court of Chancery, exsociation ercising the prerogative of the king as parens patriæ, Hart'sEx'rs. has been constantly in the habit of establishing cha"In like manner, ritable bequests of this nature. V. says Lord Chancellor Macclesfield, "in the case of a Porter's case, 1 Co. Rep. 22. b. Plowd. 522. b Eyre v. The Countess of Shaftsbury, 2 P. Wms. 119. c Case of Christ's College, Cambridge, 1 Sir W. Bl. 91. d 3 Bl. Com. 476. White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 15. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. 36. 1819. Baptist Association V. proper object." By that law, bequests for charitable purposes, ad pios usos, are not void for uncertainty. But, even supposing all the powers of the English Court of Chancery over charities to have Hart'sEx's. been originally derived from the statute of Elizabeth, still it does not follow, that the courts of the United States have not all the powers which the English courts of equity possessed, when this country was separated from the British empire. The chancery system originated in various sources; in the peculiar jurisprudence of the court, which may be denominated its common law; in statutes; and in the authority of the Chancellor, as keeper of the king's conscience. It is difficult to find any chancery decisions wholly purified from the influence of statutory provisions. The grant of equity powers in the constitution, to the national judiciary, extends "to all cases in equity." It is not limited to those cases which arise under the ordinary jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery. This is not a question of local law, nor can the equity jurisdiction of the United States' courts depend upon the enactment or repeal of local statutes. This court has already determined, that the remedies in the court of the United States, in equity, are to be, not according to the practice of State courts, but according to the principles of equity as known and practised in that country from which we derive a knowledge of those principles. In England, this bequest would, unquestionably, be sustained. The Association, which was a White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 15. Baptist As V. 1819. the object of the testator's bounty, though unincorporated at the time, was certainly as definite a body as the sociation "sixty pious ejected ministers,” in one case," or "the Hart'sEx'rs, charitable collections for poor dissenting ministers living in any county in England," in another. Nor was it necessary that they should be incorporated, in order to take. A devise by an impropriator, directly "to one who served the cure, and all who should serve it after him," &c. has been carried into effect. So, if the devise be to a charitable use, though the object be not in esse, and though it depend on the will of the crown, whether it shall ever be called into existence, equity will establish it." Mr. Leigh, contra, contended, that the Association could not take the bequest, neither in their individual nor in their collective capacity. Not as individuals; because the persons composing the Association were continually fluctuating, and were not designated, nor indeed known, at the time of the bequest. No personal benefit was intended to them. The testator's intent was to constitute the Association, in its collective capacity, trustee of the fund for this charitable purpose; and whether the trust can be carried into effect or not, they cannot take individu a The Attorney General v. Baxter, 1 Vern. 248. Attorney General v. Hughes, 2 Vern. 105. b Walker v. Childs, Amb. 524. c Anon. 2 Vent. 349. d Lady Downing's case, Amb. 592. Ayliff v. Dodd, 2 Atk. The Attorney General v. Oglander, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 166, The Attorney General v. Bowyer, 3 Ves. jun. 725. 328. 1819. Baptist Association V. ally to their own use." Nor can they so take in their collective capacity, because not incorporated at the time and the subsequent incorporation does not help their case. Therefore, this is to be regarded Hart'sEx'rs. as a bequest to charitable uses, without the intervention of trustees to take the legal estate and fulfil the uses. According to the law of Virginia, which must govern in this case, such a trust cannot be carried into effect by any court in any mode. Had such a case occurred in England, it is admitted that the Court of Chancery would carry the trust into effect by supplying legal and capable trustees to take and hold the fund for the objects of the testator's charity; or, if those objects were not designated in the testator's will with sufficient certainty, would execute it, upon the doctrine of cy pres, for objects ejusdem generis, according to a scheme digested by the master. But the Court of Chancery in England exercises such powers solely in virtue of the statute of the 43d Eliz. All ancient precedents of the exercise of such powers, to effect such charitable uses, are expressly stated to be founded on that statute. As all the early decisions are founded on the statute, so the more modern cases are founded on the authority of the ancient; with this only extension of their principle, that although the statute merely provides that a Morrice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399. S. C. 10 Ves. 522. b 8 Vin. Abr. tit. Devise, H. pl. 1. Woodmore v. Woodroffe, Amb. 636. c The Attorney General v. Rye, 2 Vern. 453. Rivett's case, Moor, 890. Pigott v. Penrice, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 191. pl. 6. The Attorney General v. Hickman, Ib. 193. pl. 14. 1819. V charitable donations shall be applied to such of the charitable uses therein expressed, for which they Baptist Association were appointed by the donors or founders, the Court Hart's Ex'ra, of Chancery has gone a step farther, and held upon the equity of the statute, that where objects of charity are in any way pointed out, however vaguely and indefinitely, the Court will apply the fund to charitable uses of the same kind with those intended by the donor, according to a scheme digested by the Master. All the elementary writers and compilers concur in deducing the jurisdiction of the English Court of Chancery over charitable bequests from the statute of Eliz.; tracing all the powers of the Court, as a court of equity, over this subject, to that source; its liberality and favour toward charitable donations; its practice of supplying all the defects of conveyances to charitable uses; of substituting trustees where those named by the donor fail before the vesting of the legal estate; and of taking on itself the execution of the trust, where incapable, or no, trustees are appointed by the donors. Indeed, no donation is considered in England as a donation to charitable uses, unless for such uses as are enumerated in the statute of Eliz., or such as are analogous. The very signification of a Barlis v. The Attorney General, 2 Atk. 239. White v. White, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas. 12. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 517. S. C. 1 Ves. Jun. 464. S. C. 7 Ves. 36. b 2 Bl. Com. 376. 2 Fonbl. Eq. 213. Roberts on Wills, 213, 214. 1 Bac. Abr. tit. Ch. Uses. 5 Vin. Abr. same tit. 1 Burn's Eccles. Law, same tit. c The Attorney General v. Hewer, 2 Vern. 387. Brown v. Yeale, 7 Ves. 50. note c. Morrice v. The Bishop of Durham, 9 Ves. 399. S. C. 10 Ves. 540. |