49 deposit box either by plaintiff or by one having authority to do so.1o So, where a check is made payable to one or order, and the payee indorses it to the order of A, and delivers it to B with instructions to deliver it to A, it was held that A acquired title by such delivery to B, although it did not come into A's possession, but was stolen from B and indorsed by the thief to another.50 And, where an instrument is negotiable in form, it can not be shown that there was a parol agreement between the maker and payee at the time of its execution, that it should not be negotiated by the payee.51 The indorsement must be written on the instrument itself or upon a paper attached thereto, and the signature of the indorser, without additional words, is a sufficient indorsement.52 While the statute provides that "the indorsement must be written on the instrument," etc., yet it is held that the indorsement is sufficient if stamped thereon with the indorser's consent, or, if without his consent, it was subsequently ratified;53 or it may be typewritten,54 or it may be a printed signature on the back of the instrument, if adopted as the genuine signature of the indorser.55 So, where the payee of a note writes on the back thereof: "I hereby assign this note over to * * * , this Nov. 1, 1910," it is held to constitute an indorsement both at common law and under the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.56 But where there is room to write an indorsement on a note, it is held that writing of an indorsement on the mortgage securing the note, and pinning the mortgage to the note amounts merely to an assignment of the note, and not an indorsement thereof.57 And a guaranty of payment written on the back of a note 49 Irwin v. Deming, 142 Iowa 299, 120 N. W. 645. 50 Wolfin v. Security Bank, 218 N. Y. 709, 113 N. E. 1068. 51 Benton v. Sikyta, 84 Nebr. 808, 122 N. W. 61, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1057; Heist v. Hart, 73 Pa. St. 286. 52 Negot. Inst. Act, art. "Negotiation," $31; First Nat. Bank v. McCullough, 50 Ore. 508, 93 Pac. 366, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1105, 126 Am. St. 758. 53 American Union Trust Co. v. Never Break Range Co., 196 Mo. App. 206, 190 S. W. 1045; Mayers v. McRimmon. 140 N. Car. 640, 53 S. E. 447, 111 Am. St. 879; Evans v. Freeman, 142 N. Car. 61, 54 S. E. 847; Flanders v. Snare, 37 Pa. Super. Ct. 28. 54 Pingree Nat. Bank v. McFarland, 57 Utah 410, 195 Pac. 313. 55 Midkiff v. Johnson County Sav. Bank (Tex. Civ. App.), 144 S. W. 705. 56 Farnsworth v. Burdick, 94 Kans. 749, 147 Pac. 863; Thorp v. Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N. W. 417, 68 L. R. A. 146. 57 Clark v. Thompson, 194 Ala. 504, 69 So. 925; First Nat. Bank v. Bickel, 143 Ky. 754, 137 S. W. 790. does not fix the liability of an indorser, and does not bar any defenses which the maker might have as against the payee.58 If the indorsement is written on a separate paper, it must, in order to be effective as an indorsement, be physically attached to the instrument intended to be indorsed.59 The indorsement must be an indorsement of the entire instrument. An indorsement which purports to transfer to the indorsee a part only of the amount payable, or which purports to transfer the instrument to two or more indorsees severally, does not operate as a negotiation of the instrument.60 This section of the statute has no application in an action on a note by an indorsee in due course where a third person furnished half the money for the purchase of the note, and had a half interest therein, and the assignee can recover the full amount. And it is held that an assignment of a third interest in a mortgage securing a note is not a negotiation of the note, and that the assignee is not a holder in due course.62 But, where the instrument has been paid in part, it may be indorsed as to the residue.63 Where an instrument is payable to the order of two or more payees or indorsees who are not partners, all must indorse, unless the one indorsing has authority to indorse for the others.64 This section has no application to a note made payable to one or to another, and in such case the note can be negotiated by the indorsement of either of the payees;65 and does not change the rule as it existed prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law.66 But where one of the joint payees assigns his interest to another payee, 61 Fleshman v. Bibb, 118 Va. 582, 88 S. E. 64. 62 Offenstein v. Weygandt, 89 Kans. 739, 132 Pac. 991. 63 Negot. Inst. Law, art. "Negotiation," § 32. 64 Negot. Inst. Act, art. "Negotiation," § 41. 65 Union Bank v. Spies, 151 Iowa 178, 130 N. W. 928. 66 Ryhiner v. Feickert, 92 Ill. 305, 34 Am. Rep. 130; Foster v. Hill, 36 N. H. 526; Wood v. Wood, 16 N. J. L. 428; Martz v. State Nat. Bank, 147 App. Div. 250, 131 N. Y. S. 1045. the latter has authority to indorse the instrument for the assignor.67 Where an instrument is drawn or indorsed to a person as "cashier" or other fiscal officer of a bank or corporation, it is deemed prima facie to be payable to the bank or corporation of which he is such officer; and may be negotiated by either the indorsement of the bank or corporation, or the indorsement of the officer.68 This section does not apply to cities and towns, and confers no authority on the treasurers of such corporations to impose on them the liability of indorsers.69 But where the instrument is made payable to the "Treasurer of the Town of ***," it is held that the town is in effect the real payee.70 So, where a note is made payable to a certain person who is the cashier of a bank, delivery of the note to the bank, unindorsed, does not give the bank title to the note;71 and where a note is indorsed to the cashier of a bank, and he delivers it to the bank unindorsed by him, and the bank sues thereon, it is subject to existing equities.72 So, where a negotiable instrument is made payable to " *, Cashier," an indorsement by such person, "Cashier," is not different from what it would have been. had it been made payable to the bank, and indorsed in its name by such person acting as cashier.73 The words, "majority stockholders," used after the names of indorsers of a corporation note, executed by the secretary and treasurer of the corporation, being merely descriptio personarum, do not change the import of the indorsement.74 Nor is an indorsement by the "Northland Motor [Car] Company" invalidated by omission of the word "Car."75 Where the name of the payee or indorsee is wrongly designated or misspelled, he may indorse the instrument as therein described, adding, if he 67 Kaufman v. State Sav. Bank, 151 Mich. 65, 114 N. W. 863, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 630, 123 Am. St. 259. 68 Negot. Inst. Act, art. "Negotiation," § 42. 69 Capital Sav. Bank &c. Co. v. Framingham, 246 Fed. 553; Franklin Sav. Bank v. Framingham, 212 Mass. 92, 98 N. E. 925. 70 Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. International Trust Co., 217 Mass. 370, 104 N. E. 845, L. R. A. 1915B, 725. 71 Swanby v. Northern State Bank, 150 Wis. 572, 137 N. W. 763. See also Griffin v. Erskine, 131 Iowa 444, 109 N. W. 13, 9 Ann. Cas. 1193. 72 First Nat. Bank v. McCullough, 50 Ore. 508, 93 Pac. 366, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1105, 126 Am. St. 758. 73 Johnson v. Buffalo Center State Bank, 134 Iowa 731, 112 N. W. 165. 74 Winnebago Nat. Bank v. Woodliff, 145 Ga. 239, 88 S. E. 973. 75 First Nat. Bank v. McNairy, 122 Minn. 215, 142 N. W. 139, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 977. thinks fit, his proper signature.76 And where any person is under obligation to indorse, in a representative capacity, he may indorse in such terms as to negative personal liability." Where a note executed by a church was indorsed by the church, J. E., Pres., E. A. S., Treas., and following was: "Finance Committee: John Elliott, Edward A. Shea, John McKee;" held that the persons signing under the head "Finance Committee" were not individually liable as indorsers, 78 The payee is an indorser, although he signs the note on its face just under the signature of the maker, and such an indorsement transfers the title to the paper to the indorsee.79 And if one specially indorses an instrument to another instead of indorsing it in blank, the defenses available between the original parties are available to the maker in an action by the indorsee.80 So, if an indorser has made fraudulent statements in regard to the note when he induced another to accept it in a deal, he can be held liable thereon.81 Although the indorser and the purchaser of a note may both be innocent persons, and the indorser indorsed it in such manner that a wrong may be and is perpetrated because of the manner of the indorsement, the indorser must suffer the effect of the wrong rather than the innocent purchaser.82 It was held, prior to the Negotiable Instruments Act, that where one to whom a certificate of deposit was issued writes his name on the back thereof and delivers it to another he becomes liable as an assignor, there being nothing to show a contrary intention.83 § 41. Striking out indorsement, and transfer without indorsement.-The Negotiable Instruments Act provides that, “The holder may at any time strike out any indorsement that is not necessary to his title. The indorser whose indorsement is struck out, and all indorsers subsequent to him, are thereby relieved from liability on the instrument."84 Under this section the holder of a note indorsed in blank by the payee can strike out all subsequent indorsements and sue on the note under the blank indorsement.85 Such act also provides that: "Where the holder of an instrument payable to his order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests in the transferee such title as the transferrer had therein, and the transferee acquires, in addition, the right to have the indorsement of the transferrer. But for the purpose of determining whether the transferee is a holder in due course, the negotiation takes effect as of the time when the indorsement is actually made."86 It would seem quite evident that, in view of this section. and of section 191 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act as drafted by the Commission, defining "bearer" to mean the "person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to bearer," the transfer of a note payable to order, without indorsement, does not constitute the transferee an indorsee or "bearer" of the instrument;87 and possession of the paper by the transferee, under such circumstances, does not give rise to the presumption that he is the owner, as against the payee of the instrument;88 and the weight of authority applies the same rule as between the maker and such a transferee. 89 It is obvious that the transferee of an instrument payable 84 Negot. Inst. Act, art. "Negotiation," § 48. The holder of a note may at any time strike out an indorsement not necessary to his title. Leavitt v. Wintman, 234 Mass. 248, 125 N. E. 390. See also Jerman v. Edwards, 29 App. D. C. 535. 85 Howell v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 40 App. D. C. 370. The presumption of ownership arising from an indorsement in blank is not destroyed by the indorsee's erasure of all subsequent indorsements. King V. Bellamy, 82 Kans. 301, 108 Pac. 117. 86 Negot. Inst. Act, art. "Negotiation," § 49. 87 Smith v. Nelson Land &c. Co., 212 Fed. 56; Fosters Admr. v. Metcalfe, 144 Ky. 385, 138 S. W. 314; Manufacturers &c. Co. v. Blitz, 131 App. Div. 17, 115 N. Y. S. 402; Elgin 88 Roy v. Duff, 170 Iowa 319, 152 N. W. 606. 89 Vaneman v. Stanchfield, 10 Minn. 255; Wade v. Boone, 184 Mo. App. 88, 168 S. W. 360; Hair v. Edwards, 104 Mo. App. 213, 77 S. W. 1089; Richardson v. Moffitt-West Drug Co., 92 Mo. App. 513; Hathaway v. Delaware County, 185 N. Y. 368, 78 N. E. 153, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 273, 113 Am. St. 909; Shepard v. Hanson, 9 N. Dak. 249, 83 N. W. 20; Capitol Hill State Bank v. Rawlins Nat. Bank, 24 |