perceive no ground upon which relief could be granted under the cross-bill, under the facts of this case, without disregarding entirely the statute of frauds. That cannot be done."

dent and unreasonable one for the child to his own free will and accord, without any make, and that an unconscionable advantage particular persuasion on the part of the granhad been taken of the child by the parent, tees, made the deed-at a time, too, when he and the conveyance was set aside. In Pope was fully competent to transact any and all v. Dapray, supra, the daughter's land was business. Indeed, so far as appears the consold at a foreclosure sale, and she had at veyance was a mere voluntary act on the part that time pending a suit for divorce against of Jesse Moore, made with a full understandher husband, and her father advised her noting of the nature of the transaction, and we to bid at the foreclosure sale and that he would bid in the land at the sale and convey it to her after her divorce suit was settled, and it was held the father, who bid under those circumstances, took title to the land in trust for the daughter. In Stahl v. Stahl, supra, the title to valuable real estate was in the name of the mother. While she was upon her deathbed her children met at her home and they agreed it was desirable she should convey the property to some one of the children, and it was arranged the oldest son should take the title and hold it for all the children. An attorney was sent for, the deed was made, and the mother executed it in bed, without consideration, to the son, and it was held he took the title in trust for

himself and his brothers and sisters. And the case of Hilt v. Simpson, supra, is on principle like the case of Stahl v. Stahl, supra. In all of these cases the deeds were without consideration, and were made upon the express agreement that the grantee would hold the title to the property conveyed to him for the benefit of certain persons who were named. Under the circumstances in those cases the court, upon the proofs there introduced, held a trust ex maleficio had been established.

The decree of the circuit court will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree dismissing the original bill as amended and granting the relief prayed for in the crossbill.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(244 Ill. 317.)

PEOPLE ex rel. BOOTH v. OPEL (Supreme Court of Illinois. Feb. 1, 1910. Rehearing Denied April 7, 1910.) COUNTIES (§ 190*)-LEVY-LEVY BY COUN

1.

TIES-VALIDITY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

The act of the Forty-Sixth General Assembly, in force July 1, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 323), amending section 2 of the act concerning the levy and extension of taxes, providing that in reducing taxes the rate levied for county purposes in counties of over 300,000 population shall in other counties below 45 cents, and in cities of not be reduced below 40 cents on each $100, and over 150,000 population the rate for city purposes, excluding library, school, and park purposes, shall not be reduced below $1.10, nor the rate for school taxes for educational purposes, below $1.05, on each $100, and in cities and vilWe think this case falls within the rule lages of less than 150,000 population the rate announced by this court in the case of Moore shall not be reduced below $1.20, nor the rate for school taxes for educational purposes, bev. Horsley, 156 Ill. 36, 43, 40 N. E. 323, 325, low $1.50, on each $100, does not violate Const. rather than within the principle announced art. 9, § 8, prohibiting county authorities from in the cases above referred to, where it was assessing taxes in the aggregate exceeding 75 said: "We are aware of the rule laid down cents per $100 valuation, unless authorized by popular vote, that section of the Constitution in Allen v. Jackson, 122 Ill. 567 [13 N. E. being merely a limitation upon the amount of 840], and other like cases, to the effect that taxes which may be levied for county purposes, where a person obtains the legal title to propthe authority to levy taxes being derived from erty by virtue of a confidential relation and provide needful revenue by taxation by valuasection 1 requiring the General Assembly to influence, under such circumstances that he tion to be ascertained by some one elected or ought not, according to the rules of equity appointed as the General Assembly directs, and and good conscience, as administered in chan-section 9 authorizing the General Assembly to vest in municipal corporations authority to ascery, to hold and enjoy the beneficial intersess and collect taxes. ests of the property, courts of equity in order to administer complete justice between the parties, will raise a trust by construction and fasten it upon the conscience of the offending party, and will convert him into a trustee of the legal title, and order him to hold it or to execute the trust in such manner as to protect the rights of the real party in inter

est. But the doctrine of those cases has no application here. No fraudulent representations were used, nor were there any undue means resorted to by Taylor Moore or Hannah Moore to influence Jesse Moore to deed

the land to them. The matter was talked over among the parties, and Jesse Moore of

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Counties, Dec. Dig. § 190.*]

2. TAXATION (§ 31*) — POWER TO LEVY-MUNICIPALITIES-WITHDRAWAL OF POWER.

Neither counties nor other municipalities have inherent power to levy taxes, and their power to do so may be discontinued at the will of the Legislature, unless the withdrawal of such power would violate some constitutional

inhibition.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 61; Dec. Dig. § 31.*] 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 42*)-STATUTESVALIDITY-PERSONS WHO MAY RAISE QUES

TION.

The act of the Forty-Sixth General Assembly, in force July 1, 1909 (Laws 1909, p. 323), amending section 2 of the act concerning the levy

and extension of taxes, provides that if the ag gregate of all taxes, exclusive of those not subject to reduction, shall exceed 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property upon which the taxes are to be extended, the county clerk shall reduce the rate per cent. of the tax levy of the taxing district in the proportion it would be necessary to reduce the highest aggregate per cent. of all the ievies, exclusive of taxes not subject to reduction, to bring them down to 3 per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property, and that in reducing taxes the rate levied for county purposes in counties having over 300,000 population shall not be reduced below 40 cents on each $100, and in other counties below 45 cents, and in cities having a popu lation of over 150,000 the rate for city purposes shall not be reduced below $1.10 on each $100, nor the rate for school purposes below $1.05 on each $100, and in cities and villages having a population of less than 150,000, the rate shall not be reduced below $1.20 on each $100 assessed valuation. Held, that the restrictions as to the amount of taxes to be levied in counties having a population of over 300.000, and cities having a population of over 150,000, would not affect a county and city having a less population, and a creditor of such county and city could not complain thereof, unless that provision was void so as to invalidate the entire act.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 39; Dec. Dig. § 42.*] 4. STATUTES (§ 93*) SPECIAL STATUTES CLASSIFICATION BY POPULATION

TION.

TAXA

provide for an annual tax sufficient to pay maturing interest, and to discharge the debt, is self-executing, and hence provides adequate means for compelling municipal authorities to collect taxes to discharge anticipation warrants. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 34; Dec. Dig. § 34.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Sangamon County; James A. Creighton, Judge.

Mandamus by the People, on relation of William Booth, against Charles E. Opel to compel defendant to extend taxes at a certain rate without reduction. From a judgment awarding the writ, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Edmund Burke, State's Atty. (A. F. Bernard and T. J. Sullivan, of counsel), for appellant. E. S. Smith, for appellee. W. H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and June C. Smith, for the People.

was

CARTWRIGHT, J. The Forty-Sixth Assembly passed an act which was approved by the Governor on June 14, 1909, and in force July 1, 1909, amending section 2 of the act concerning the levy and extension of taxes (Laws 1909, p. 323) and this suit brought to question the validity of the act. A law is not local or special within the It provides that the county clerk in each constitutional inhibition against such laws regu- county of the state shall ascertain the rates lating county and township affairs, for classifying counties and townships on the basis of popu- per cent. required to be extended upon the lation, if population makes a substantial dif- assessed valuation of the taxable property ference in the conditions affected by the statute, in the respective towns, townships, districts, and the statute, if considered as regulating county and township affairs, did not violate the con- incorporated cities and villages in his counstitutional inhibition for fixing a lower tax rate ty, as equalized by the State Board of Equalin counties and cities having a larger popula-ization for the current year, to produce the tion; such distinction being reasonable.

OBLIGA

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 102; Dec. Dig. § 93.*] 5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 137*) TION OF CONTRACTS. While a statute substantially depriving a municipal corporation of the means of paying debts theretofore contracted is void as impairing the contractual obligation, Laws 1909, p. 323, forbidding the reduction of taxes below specified rates in counties of various populations, does not impair the obligation of any contract, and that a county and city had issued anticipation warrants before it was enacted would not make it do so; such warrants not being an indebtedness of the city, the holder's only remedy being to compel the officers to collect taxes to discharge them.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 354; Dec. Dig. § 137.*] 6. TAXATION (§ 28*)-DELEGATION OF POWERVALIDITY OF STATUTORY PROVISIONS.

The act does not violate the Constitution on the ground that it withdraws from corporate authorities the power to levy taxes for their own corporate purposes, and delegates it to other municipal organizations, contrary to the rule that the Legislature cannot delegate the right of local taxation to any other than the corporate authorities of the district to be taxed. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. § 60; Dec. Dig. § 28.*]

several amounts certified for extension by the taxing authorities in said county as the same shall have been reduced as therein provided, in all cases where the original amounts exceed the amounts authorized by law. There are two provisos to the act, the first of which does not restrain or limit the generality of the act in any manner. It provides that if the aggregate of all the taxes, exclusive of those enumerated therein not subject to reduction, certified to the county clerk shall exceed 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property upon which the taxes are to be extended, he shall reduce the rate per cent. of the tax levy of the taxing district in the same proportion in which it would be necessary to reduce the highest aggregate per cent. of all the tax levies, exclusive of the taxes before mentioned not subject to reduction, to bring the same down to 3 per cent. of the assessed value of the taxable property upon which said taxes are required by law to be extended. The second proviso creates somewhat different limitations as to different taxing districts based on population. It provides that in reducing

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 34*)-CONSTITU-taxes the rate levied for county purposes in TIONAL PROVISIONS-SELF-EXECUTED PRO

counties having a population of over 300,000 shall not be reduced below 40 cents on each $100 assessed valuation and in other counties

For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Reporter Indexes

could apply only to Cook county, and was passed with plain intent to evade the constitutional provision. In the subsequent case of Cummings v. City of Chicago, 144 Ill. 563, 33 N. E. 854, the constitutionality of an act providing for the division of special assessments exceeding a certain amount in cities of a certain population was considered, and the question was whether the act was local or special. It was there said that numerous instances might be given where classification by population had been held valid on account of dissimilarity in the conditions of different municipalities. Again, in People v. Onahan, 170 Ill. 449, 48 N. E. 1003, it was held not to be the intention of the framers of the Constitution to forbid, by section 22, the passage of any law relating to the subjects therein enumerated, unless by its terms and effect it should apply in all cases to all the people of the state and to every local subdivision. In both of these cases the decision in the Devine Case was placed on its true ground and was distinguished from them.

and the county of Sangamon. Why the re-ing a courthouse on a site previously used, lator should complain that restrictions are imposed on counties having a population of over 300,000 and cities with a population of over 150,000 is not very clear. The only matter which affects him is the provision that the county clerk shall reduce the aggregate amount of the taxes mentioned in the petition to 3 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property subject to taxation, and the second proviso only concerns him if it should be considered invalid and its invalidity should render the whole act void. The classification, in itself, does not in any way affect the relator's rights, and unless a classification by population is void and destroys the whole act the judgment on the demurrer was wrong. The Constitution prohibits the enactment of local or special laws regulating county and township affairs, but if this is an act regulating county or township affairs it is not necessarily local or special because it does not apply in precisely the same manner to every county or township in the state. It is a revenue law, and in the case of People v. Commissioners of Cook County, 176 Ill. 576, 52 N. E. 334, it was contended that the revenue act then under consideration was a local or special law regulating county and township affairs, but the court said that it was not. The act provided that in counties containing 125,000 or more inhabitants a board of review should be elected, but in counties of less than 125,000 under township organization the clerk of the county court, the chairman of the county board, and some citizen appointed by the county judge should constitute a board of review, and in counties not under township organization the board of county commissioners should constitute such board. This left Cook county without any board of review from the taking effect of the act, on July 1st, to the following January, so that the relator was deprived of any review of her assessment. The court said that the act did not purport or attempt to regulate county or township affairs, and it could not be said that by the revenue act the Legislature had attempted to regulate the same. But if this act does amount to a regulation of county or township affairs the different limitations in the act are based solely on population, and classification by population may be valid if the number of inhabitants creates substantial differences concerning the subject of the legislation.

In People v. Martin, 178 Ill. 611, 53 N. E. 309, a classification based merely upon the fact that certain territory had previously constituted a part of an incorporated town was held void upon the ground that the mere fact of previous location formed no basis for classification, and that there must be something, in the nature of things, which in some reasonable degree accounts for the division into classes.

In. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410, 56 N. E. 155, it was held that a classification of municipalities cannot be adopted arbitrarily upon a ground which has no foundation in difference of situation or circumstances of the municipalities placed in different classes, but there must be some reasonable relation between the situation of the municipalities classified and the objects to be attained. It was not doubted that a classification of the counties of the state by population, as a basis for legislation, is valid, if such classification is in accordance with material distinctions between populous districts and sparsely settled communities. The classification in that case was condemned on the ground that it was arbitrary and unnatural and based solely on location within a county of a certain population.

In Knopf v. People, 185 Ill. 20, 57 N. E. 22, 76 Am. St. Rep. 17, it was held that while In Devine v. Commissioners of Cook Coun- the Legislature might decide whether a genty, 84 Ill. 590, there was some speculation in eral law could be made applicable except as the opinion as to the effect if the Legislature to the subjects specified in section 22, they could designate as many classes as there are could not determine that question as to such counties in the state by such a classification, subjects so as to put it beyond the power of which would be an absurdity and render val- review by the courts. It was said that in the ueless the provision of the Constitution. The enactment of general laws the Legislature case, however, was decided on the ground may classify counties and other municipalithat the act, which was limited in its opera- ties on the basis of population if there are tion to six years and to a county where there actual grounds of difference between the muhad been a recent destruction by fire of pub-nicipalities or taxing districts placed in diflic buildings and was for the purpose of erect- ferent classes, but that one county cannot

In Pettibone v. West Chicago Park Com'rs, 215 Ill. 304, 74 N. E. 387, an act limited to a town which was at the time included within the limits of a city where the boundaries and limits of the town were coextensive with the boundaries and limits of a park district in which a board of park commissioners then existed, was held to be void because it referred to no town except West Chicago, and there was no possible connection between the fact that the limits of the town were coextensive with the limits of the park district and the necessity and desirability of having small parks or pleasure grounds.

be singled out for legislation on the ground, as impairing the obligation of the contract. of alleged differences in circumstances and Peoria, Decatur & Evansville Railway Co. v. conditions unless they actually exist, and if People, 116 Ill. 401, 6 N. E. 497. It does not the question arises in a judicial proceeding, appear, however, from the act itself or any the court will determine whether there are fact alleged in the petition, that the obligareasonable distinctions in the conditions and tion of any contract would be impaired or circumstances of the municipalities classified, payment delayed or impeded. The only averarising out of the number of inhabitants. ment of the petition touching a personal interest of the relator is, that he is the holder of anticipation warrants issued by the county of Sangamon and city of Springfield. These warrants are not contracts, and the city is not indebted on account of having issued them. Such warrants, payable out of a tax already levied, do not add to the indebtedness of a city which has reached the constitutional limit, and they create no obligation on the part of the city, the only remedy of the holder being against the officers individually, to compel them to collect the tax. City of Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626. The constitutional provision that a municipal corporation incurring indebtedness shall provide for an annual tax sufficient to pay the interest as it matures and to discharge the debt is self-executing, and supplies a sufficient rule by means of which the duty may be enforced. City of East St. Louis v. People, 124 Ill. 655, 17 N. E. 447. But the issuing of anticipation warrants is not incurring indebtedness. Among the taxes which cannot be reduced are school building taxes and bonded indebtedness taxes in cities whose bonded indebtedness exceeds 6 per cent. of the assessed valuation of the property therein, and there is nothing in the act or petition which shows that other indebtedness may not be paid under the provisions of the act. By another act which took effect at the same time as this one, the assessed value of property for purposes of taxation was raised from one-fifth to one-third of the full value, 'which had the effect to increase the amounts that could be raised by taxation.

In People v. Election Com'rs, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N. E. 321, the validity of acts in which counties have been classified according to population, resting on substantial differences in situation and needs, was recognized, but it was held that the act then questioned was based on no reason which could make a difference between Cook county and other counties.

From these and other decisions it becomes manifest that a law is not local or special for the reason that it classifies counties or townships on the basis of population if the number of inhabitants creates substantial differences in situation and needs concerning the subject of the legislation, and the court will determine that question whenever it arises in a judicial proceeding, for the purpose of deciding whether an act conflicts with the constitutional provision. We think it is equally manifest that there is a reasonable ground of distinction with reference to the rate of taxation for county and other purposes specified in the second proviso to this act, between densely populated counties and cities and those which are sparsely set-power to levy taxes for their own corporate tled. It is not an unreasonable conclusion that a slightly lower rate of taxation would be required for the discharge of all the duties imposed upon county boards in counties of a population of 300,000 or more than those of less population, and the same may be said with reference to school taxes and taxes for city or village purposes. We conclude that if the act is viewed as one regulating county or township affairs it is not rendered local or special by the different limitations in the second proviso.

The third objection is that the act impairs the obligation of contracts. All legislative acts passed after a municipal corporation has contracted a valid debt which would deprive it of the means of payment to any considerable extent, such as a law materially

The fourth and last objection is that the act takes from the corporate authorities the

purposes and delegates the power, to a certain extent, to other corporate or municipal organizations. The Legislature cannot delegate the right of corporate or local taxation to any other than the corporate or local authorities of the district to be taxed. Wetherell v. Devine, 116 Ill. 631, 6 N. E. 24; Morgan v. Schusselle, 228 Ill. 106, 81 N. E. 814. But it is not very clear from the argument for the relator in what way it is claimed that this act violates that provision. The taxpayer has a right to object to being taxed by any except the corporate authorities of the taxing district, but under the act all taxes are levied by such authorities. There can be no doubt that the Legislature, so far as that provision of the Constitution is concerned, may limit the several taxing authori