county is so far disordered in his mind as to endanger health, person or property, he must issue and deliver to some peace officer for service a warrant, directing that such person be arrested and taken before any Judge of a Court of record within the county for examination.

Subpoenas must issue thereupon to two or more witnesses best acquainted with such person to appear and testify before the Judge at such examination; the Judge must also subpoena at least two graduates of medicine to appear and attend such examination; and all such persons so subpoenaed must appear and answer all pertinent questions; the physicians so called in by process of subpœna must hear such testimony and must make a personal examination of the alleged insane person, and must make a certificate of their conclusions; and then the Judge, after such examination and certificate made, if he believes the person accused to be so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, person or property, must make an order that such person be confined in the asylum. A record of all such proceedings must be kept by the County Clerk. The physicians attending the examination of "an insane person" are allowed a fee, to be paid by the county.

The foregoing is a summary of all the pertinent provisions of the Codes, with reference to this character of

cases.

Pol. Code, 2210-2222.

An impression seems to prevail that there are certain "Commissioners of Insanity" who pass upon these cases. An examination of the Codes will make manifest the error of this impression. The so-called "Commissioners" are simply physicians, "Graduates of Medicine," in good standing, who are summoned in the same manner as other witnesses to attend the hearing; but it is reserved to the Judge of the Court to find the fact and to adjudicate thereupon. Upon the Judge or the Court the

law casts the responsibility, and to discharge it faithfully is not always a light duty; in this case it has been more than ordinarily onerous, from the peculiar circumstances, the character of the evidence, and the conduct pending the examination and in view of the Court of the parties immediately connected with the subject matter of the investigation.

As a result of the examination, and the subsequent reflections thereupon, the Court is convinced that Mrs. Ingram is the victim of a delusion as to the relations of Miss Pratt with her husband, and has, while possessed of that delusion, subjected that lady and her family to great annoyance and indignity; but the Court is in doubt as to the dangerous nature of the delusion, is not fully persuaded that the accused person is "so far disordered in mind as to endanger health, person or property," or is "unfit to be at large," and the Court is bound to give the accused person the benefit of such reasonable doubt as it entertains upon the whole charge. This is the conclusion from a full investigation and mature deliberation; and, accordingly, the proceeding against Mrs. Hannah W. Ingram is dismissed.

Estate of ELLEN LYNCH, Deceased.

[No. 3,079. Decided June 20, 1884.]

Petition for Partial Distribution.

Partial Distribution- When and How Had-Statute Covers Estates of Testates and Intestates-Time to Contest Will Immaterial.

1. An application for partial distribution of a decedent's estate in course of administration may be made at any time after the period

of administration mentioned in the statute, upon allegations showing the existence of the conditions and circumstances required by the statute.

2. The rule prescribed by the statute, as to when and under what circumstances a partial distribution of a decedent's estate may be had, is the same whether the decedent left a will, or died intestate. And a petition for the partial distribution of a testate's estate is not premature merely because the year given by the statute, within which a contest to the probate of the decedent's will may be filed, has not elapsed. Estate of Pritchett, 51 Cal., 563, followed.

[T. J. L.]

The opinion of the Court in this case was rendered upon objections made to two separate petitions for distribution after the lapse of four months of administration"partial distribution," as usually designated. The first filed petition was that of Margaret Daly, presented June 6, 1884, showing that petitioner was a legatee under decedent's will, which had been duly proved, to the extent of $1,000, and certain specified household furniture; that four months had elapsed since the issuance of letters testamentary to John D. Coughlin and Daniel J. Coughlin, the executors named in the will, and who qualified May 24, 1884 [Error: should be January 28, 1884.—REP.], and prayed for distribution of the legacies upon giving the bond required by the statute. The second petition was filed June 7, 1884, on behalf of and subscribed by (1) Catherine Riley, (2) Margaret Ware, (3) Margaret Weston, (4) Hannah Sullivan, (5) Adina Gertrude Ware, (6) Frances Ellen Ware, (7) Henry Ware, (8) Mary Cunningham, (9) Miss Lizzie Armor, Superioress of the Convent of the Holy Family, and (10) Daniel J. Coughlin ; and set forth the same facts respecting the administration as in the petition of Margaret Daly, first above mentioned. No attorney's name appeared upon either of the petitions, but it is recited by the record that Selden S. Wright, Esq., as the appointee of the Court, appeared for them.

The two petitions came on regularly for hearing on the

20th day of June, 1884, and a decree of "partial distribution" was made according to the prayers of the petitioners, under date of June 20, 1884, and was filed on the 24th day of June, 1884.

The record shows that Selden S. Wright, Esq., was appointed by order of June 6, 1884, as attorney to represent in the administration all unrepresented heirs and legatees, naming the parties interested, so far as known, to be Mary Riley, Ellen Riley, Anastasia Riley, Johanna Riley, David Riley, Henry Riley, Michael Riley and Patrick Riley (all of these parties named were legatees and also nephews and nieces respectively, and heirs of deceased; and resided at St. Peters, Cape Breton, Nova Scotia. None of them were petitioners for or participants in the "partial distribution ").

Mr. Selden S. Wright, for petitions.
Mr. E. E. Haft, contra, for executors.

COFFEY, J.-It is suggested, on behalf of executors, that the petition for partial distribution is premature; that a year (the time to contest the validity of the will) should elapse before the application.

Under the authority of the Estate of Pritchett, 51 Cal., 568, the petition is not prematurely preferred, the essential facts and the principle of this matter corresponding to the facts and principle in that case. Petition granted.

NOTE. The petitions contained no allegation as to the financial condition of the estate; that it "was but little indebted," etc.; but no objection to the petitions on this score appears to have been made or considered, and the decree made on the petition found that all claims were paid and the estate "freed from debts." Compare Sections 1658 and 1661, C. C. P.

J. M. PAINTER v. T. B. PAINTER and R. B. DALLAM, Executors, and CAROLINE A. PAINTER, Executrix, of the Last Will of JEROME B. PAINTER, Deceased, et al.

[Hon. J. V. COFFEY, Judge, sitting, by consent, in place of Hon. T. H. REARDEN, Judge. No. 18,351. Decided October 1, 1887.]

Bill in Equity to Obtain Construction of Will. Also, Injunction Against Surviving Partner and to Marshal Assets.

Res Adjudicata-Surviving Partner-Legatee-Claim-Construction of Will.

1. J. B., a member of a firm composed of himself and T. P., died, leaving his partnership interest in said firm to said T. P. and one J. M., by will. T. P., as surviving partner, without having settled the partnership affairs with the estate, presented a claim against it for alleged overdrafts of J. B. on the partnership funds, although it appeared from the inventory that J. B.'s interest in the partnership assets exceeded his liabilities to the firm; the claim having been rejected and action brought thereon, Held, by the Supreme Court (63 Cal., 395), that it was properly disallowed, and that the surviv ing partner must first comply with Section 1585, C. C. P., so that the assets and liabilities of the firm might be ascertained.

In this suit by J. M. (the other legatee), to enjoin the surviving partner from selling the firm assets to satisfy the indebtedness of J. B., Held, that the decision of the Supreme Court above mentioned constitutes the law of the case, and injunction was denied. 2. Where a testator bequeathed his partnership interest, including "moneys out at interest," and testator had during his lifetime drawn moneys from the firm, which it was claimed that he had merely borrowed from it, paying interest thereon, Held, that "moneys out at interest" do not include moneys drawn by testator from firm.

3. Where a testator leaves certain property to his children by will, and in a subsequent clause provides that his wife shall share with them in all property, Held, that the second clause relates to and is controlled by the first, and the word "all" underscored, in the second clause, refers to the property specified in the first clause. 4. Held further, that certain legacies by testator to third persons provided for in his will are not revoked by above language in codicil,