of Court,) to dissolve an Injunction,” would have the like FEBRUARY, good effect upon the Country.” 1820. West's executor V. "The value of this Rule is derived from it's inflexible character: it is known; it is fixed; and never yields to time or circumstances; and I hazard nothing when I say Logwood. there is not a lawyer at the bar, that would, if consulted, give his consent to part from it. Let the Rule, then, with respect to relief in Chancery, after a judgment at law, be as well fixed, as the rule is with respect to motions to dissolve, and it will be as valuable. The reason of the rule, in relation to such motions, is this, that, as the Court is always open to re-instate an Injunction, if dissolved, so the Court, when sitting, should never, within it's rule, refuse a motion to dissolve. The good effect of the rule, is seen in the promptitude of the parties, who, as it never varies, always understand it. The justice of the Country requires that the rule, by which a party shall be let into this Court for relief against a judgment at law, should also be as well known and fixed; and that it should not bend to time or circumstances; unless they were not reasonably to be controlled. The reason of it, to my mind, is obvious; since it is a legal, and not an equitable right the plaintiff comes here to assert.' 99 "Allow me to say, that rules prescribed by Courts, like those prescribed by the Legislature, should neither conflict with the Constitution, nor with the reasonable convenience of the people." "As to the former, it is declared by the 11th section of the bill of rights, that, "in controversies respecting property, « in suits between man and man, the ancient trial by Jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred." Perhaps it may be said, that this section of the bill of rights is not to be infringed; because, if the new trial be granted, the case is to be tried by a Jury again: but the section is not worth reading, if this Court can set the verdict already found aside, which the Court, where it was found, (for aught that appears, for the same reasons,) refused." FEBRUARY, 1820. West's executor V. "As to the latter, look at the record, and let the inconvenience and trouble, as well as the expences of the parties, be contrasted with their inconvenience, trouble and expences in going to the dernier resort of the law, Logwood. for a new trial. In the former case, it is really not a very easy matter to make an estimate; without saying a word as to the effects of the written evidence upon the verdict found under circumstances which satisfied a most intelligent and enlightened Court. In the latter case, if that Court erred, a bill of exceptions, (as in Hook v. Nanny and others,) transmitted to the Supreme Court, with the aid of Counsel, put an end at once to all the trouble and expence of the parties, and held "sacred" the verdict, unless by law it should be set aside; and then by law the same cause would be tried again. Surely this is the better course, and one which, with great deference to the opinions of others, I think ought to be pursued, or the decision of the Court of law, as in Syme and others v. Montague, ought to be satisfactory; unless the broad ground is to be taken that this Court is not to be satisfied without reviewing every case in it's own way, regardless of the rules of law; against which unauthorised assumption of power, I avail myself of this occasion to enter my solemn protest." "I have regretted very much to hear some Gentlemen of the Bar say, that they consider the line, as drawn by the case of Terrel v. Dick, between the Courts of law and equity, and supported by one uniform course of decision, in the cases of Turpin administrator of James v. Thomas, 2 H. & M. 139, Syme and others v. Montague, 4 H. & M. 180. Delima v. Glassel's administrator, ibid. 369, Kincaid v. Cunningham, 2 Munf. 1, The Auditor v. Nicholas, ibid. 31, Fenwick v. M•Murdo & Fisher, ibid. 244. and Duvals v. Ross, ibid. 290, removed by the decision in the case of Price's executor v. Fuqua's administrator, 4 Munf. 68, and the cases which have followed since.These cases shall in due time receive my attention. In . the case of Fenwick v. M.Murdo & Fisher, the PRESIDENT of the Supreme Court, adverting to the cases of Terrel v. Dick, Turpin administrator of James v. Thomas. 1820. West's Morris & Overton v. Ross, Syme and others v. Montague, FEBRUARY, and Delima v. Glassel's administrator, said, "the princi"ple settled on solemn argument and due consideration of "those cases, ought not now to be disturbed; which is executor "that, where a cause has been once fully heard and decided Logwood. in a Court of common law having competent jurisdiction " of the case, a Court of Equity ought not to interfere, un less fraud or surprise be suggested and proved, or some "material adventitious circumstance had arisen which "could not have been foreseen or guarded against. The "case before us was most properly cognizable in a Court "of common law, where it seems to have been thorough"ly investigated, and underwent an able and lengthy "discussion in all it's parts, and a verdict and judgment "was rendered in favour of the plaintiff, to which there "was no exception taken, nor was there a motion for a "new trial. The Court, without deciding on it's merits, ❝is unanimously of opinion that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction of the case.” "There is no difference discerned, between the principle settled, upon a review of those cases, in that Court, and that laid down, by this Court, in Alderson v. Biggers & others, 4 H. & M. 470, and in Nicholson and Heth v. Hencock and others, ibid. 491, and which I still think is correct, and that it ought to give the rule in the case before me." “Let us now turn our attention to the case of Price's executor v. Fuqua's administrator, 4 Munf. 68, and to the decisions in the other cases since, to see if those Gentlemen, to whom I have referred, were correct in supposing the decision in Ferrel v. Dick, (recognised by the cases referred to,) overruled. The principal cases, since Price's executor v. Fuqua's administrator, in which the question of jurisdiction was presented, are Wall's executor v. Gressom's distributees, 4 Munf. 110, Spencer and White v. Wilson, ibid. 130, Noland v. Cromwell, ibid. 155, and Wilkins v. Woodfin administrator of Pearce, 5 Munf. 183: and, first, as to the case of Price's executor v. Fuqua's administrator." V. FEBRUARY, 1820. "This was a decision in the absence of the appellee; and therefore, as I understand the course of the Court, West's it would not be considered as authority there: it should executor not be considered so elsewhere; or, in other words, it Logwood. gives the rule only in that particular case." V "In the next case, of Wall's executor v. Gressom's distributees, I understand Judge ROANE in delivering the opinion of the Court, as I do in Terrel v. Dick; and the decision being founded upon the circumstances of the case," confines it's authority, I believe, to that case only." "In the next case of Spencer & White v. Wilson, it does seem to me, I admit, that the decision conflicts with the rule in Terrel v. Dick, and in the cases which followed, down to the decision in the case of Duvals v. Ross.The conflict seems to be in this, that, in these cases, the plaintiffs in this Court were denied relief in the Supreme Court, upon the ground taken by Judge ROANE in Branch v. Burnley, and by the Court in Terrel v. Dick. In Branch v. Burnley, that very distinguished Judge said, "I hold it to be a clearly established principle "that a judgment of a Court of common law, given on a "legal question shall never be corrected or disturbed in "Equity upon grounds which were proper for the com"mon law Courts, and which, therefore, we must suppose "such Court to have decided upon; unless the applicant "to the Court of Equity can shew some particular cir"cumstances to have taken place, operating as an impe"diment to his availing himself of those grounds upon "the trial at law." "In Terrel v. Dick, Judge RoANE, on a like question, again said, “in order to save time, I beg leave to refer, "in support of this opinion, to the observations I used "upon this point, in the case of Branch v. Burnley, and to remark that, upon mature reflection, since, I have "not seen cause to change my opinion upon the subject." In the case of the Auditor v. Nicholas, Judge BROOKE said, upon a like point, that, "the doctrine is well es"tablished in this Court, that decisions at law can not "be revised in a Court of Chancery upon the mere "ground of error in the law Court, nor upon circum 1820. stances of which that Court had cognizance, unless the FEBRUARY, "complainant can make a competent excuse for having "failed to defend himself at law." West's v. "In the case of Duvals v. Ross, upon a like point, executor Judge CABELL said, “I can not perceive in this case Logwood. "any ground on which Ross can found his claim to the "interference of a Court of Equity. The controversy "between the parties, a mere contest about the terms of a "contract, was properly cognizable before a Court of law. It was regularly submitted to a Jury, who fully investigated and fairly decided it. Ross himself com"plains neither of surprise, of the absence of witnesses, "nor of any other circumstance to impeach the fairness of the trial: he does not state the subsequent discovery "of testimony unknown to him at the trial; and, altho' he calls on the Duvals to answer as to certain facts which he alledges were known to them, yet he no where intimates that these facts were known to them only, so "as to be incapable of other proof, and thus to authorise "a resort to a Court of Equity for the purpose of extort❝ing a disclosure. In fact, the only ground on which he himself sets the subject is, that the judgment is op"pressive and unjust. What is this but, under the spe"cious pretext of equity and justice, to give to the Court "of Chancery the enormous power of revising and con❝trolling verdicts and judgments in all cases whatso"ever? a power dangerous in itself, incompatible with the genius of our government, and utterly denied by ❝our laws." "In this case, also, Judge FLEMING said, that "all the facts and circumstances stated in the bill were, or might have been, given in evidence on the trial at law;" so that four Judges, in five, concurred with this Court in Fenwick v. M Murdo and Fisher." "But, in the case of Spencer and White v. Wilson, now the subject of consideration, relief was afforded, tho' no reason was assigned in the bill for not having made their defence at law, as seems to me to be required by all of the foregoing opinions; and without a proper case being made by the bill for a discovery, as was said by Judge |