EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

In the broadest sense of the term, civil defense is conceived as dealing with the whole complex of nonmilitary activities necessary to prepare or "mobilize" the economy against possible war, to survive and emerge from the ashes of attack, to maintain the continuity of government and essential production, to proceed toward partial recovery and then toward full resumption of peacetime pursuits. The term "non-military defense" often is used to convey the broad sweep of civilian activities which must be joined with the military for preparedness, defense, and recovery.

In the Annual Defense Department Report to the Congress on 5 February 1975, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger discussed Civil Preparedness and Industrial Mobilization in the following words:

"CIVIL DEFENSE

"Our Civil Defense Program is, and has always been, an essential element of our overall strategic deterrence posture. Hence, one would expect that the recent shift in emphasis towards a more flexible strategic response policy, which I discussed earlier in this section of the Defense Report, would be reflected in our Civil Defense Program. That is indeed the case. We are seeking to reflect in our civil defense planning the wider range of response options that we are now introducing into our military planning.

"The Soviet Union for many years has given a great deal of attention to civil defense, including not only the construction of shelters and the training of civilians but also the preparation of plans for evacuation of the bulk of the population from its major cities in the event of a crisis. Thus, the Soviet leaders have the option to evacuate the cities or to shelter the population in place, depending upon their assessment of the situation at the time.

"We believe that the United States should have a similar option for two reasons: (1) to be able to respond in kind if the Soviet Union attempts to intimidate us in a time of crisis by evacuating the population from its cities; and (2) to reduce fatalities if an attack on our cities appears imminent.

"Similarly, this nation should have the option in the event of an intense crisis to evacuate the civilian population from high

risk areas near such military installations as SAC bases, ICBM fields, SLBM support facilities, etc., to less hazardous areas while protecting the rest of the population against fallout. As noted last

year, a Soviet counterforce attack which deliberately avoids our cities would still produce a large amount of nuclear fallout which could drift over areas that are downwind from strategic military installations. This civil defense option would complement the military installations. This civil defense option would complenent the military response options that we are now introducing into our planning to strengthen deterrence against a Soviet counter-force attack.

"Accordingly, we propose to continue our efforts, within the limits of the resources available, to improve our ability to protect the population in place against fallout and to develop in an orderly way two major options for the relocation of the population in a crisis. The first option, which would be designed against the threat of a Soviet counterforce attack, would involve the relocation of the population from high risk areas near key military installations and the protection of the rest of the population against fallout. This option could reduce nationwide fatalities due to fallout from a limited Soviet counterforce attack to relatively low levels -- well under one million provided that the people in the communities that would be most exposed to fallout from such an attack make effective use of the shelters available.

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"The second option, which would be designed against an allout Soviet nuclear attack, would involve the evacuation of the population from cities, as well as from areas near key military installations. Repeated studies have shown that the evacuation of the bulk of the population from our major metropolitan areas could save some 70 million lives in an all-out Soviet attack on the United States, over and above those saved by in-place protection options.

"Pilot-project work undertaken in areas near some of our important military installations during fiscal years 1974-75, has established the feasibility of developing plans to allocate risk area populations to surrounding host areas, including the development of standby public information (for publication during a crisis) on "where to go and what to do" should relocation be implemented. Public officials at state and local levels in the pilot areas accepted the need for this type of contingency planning but pointed out that federally-supported planning assistance would be needed.

"Other studies indicate that it would be feasible to relocate population from cities over a period of several days, and to provide for their reception and care in host counties for a period of up to two weeks. Specially-tailored solutions, however, would have to be developed for the most densely-urbanized parts of the U. S., such as the Northeast. It would also be feasible to redirect the distribution of food and other essentials to support evacuees in host areas, provided adequate state-level planning is done with industries concerned. Pilot-project experience with a "host area survey" indicates that local plans in host areas can provide for protecting evacuees from fallout radiation by use of best available existing protection, plus crisis action to improve fallout protection in existing buildings and to construct expedient shelters.

"In fiscal year 1976, we propose to move that work forward by training a group of planners, hired under contracts with the states, to work with additional states and cities in developing allocations of risk area population to host areas, and in the preparation of standby instructions for the public. Concurrently, we will continue our research and development efforts, with emphasis on development of special solutions for densely urbanized areas such as the Northeast. We will also conduct host area surveys in counties near selected high risk areas and the "all-effects" shelter survey in selected areas. The latter identifies the best protection available from fallout in existing structures in all areas of the U.S.. In high risk areas, it also identifies best available protection from the direct effects of nuclear weapons. Should the bulk of the population be relocated from the high risk areas, the direct effects protection facilities would be used by 'key operating personnel", i. e., persons who would commute into cities from nearby host areas to keep the most essential industries and services in operation during the relocation period.

"Developing flexible-response capabilities for use in case of a severe crisis or nuclear attack requires that local jurisdictions throughout the United States be able to conduct emergency operations to support and assist their citizens. This in turn generates, as

a highly desirable bonus, improved readiness to conduct coordinated local operations in peacetime emergencies or disasters. Such peacetime capabilities are accordingly a secondary, but important, objective of the Civil Defense Program.

"The Department of Defense (through the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency) provides to state and local governments shelter surveys which identify inherent protection against fallouts and other weapons effects in existing structures. It provides radiological detection instruments and training on their use under attack conditions and in peacetime emergencies involving radiological hazards, as well as periodic maintenance and calibration for the instruments. It provides the National Warning System, through which attack warning can be disseminated in less than two minutes, from the primary National Warning Center at Cheyenne Mountain to over 1, 200 warning points throughout the United States (this system is also used to disseminate severe-weather warnings, based on imputs from the National Weather Service).

"In addition, the Civil Defense Program provides matching funds to assist state and local governments to weld the elements of emergency readiness into an all-hazard civil preparedness capability to conduct life saving operations during peacetime emergencies or in the event of war. These funds support the construction of Emergency Operating Centers, the procurement of warning sirens, communications equipment and other hardware, and the basic management structure the Civil Defense Directors and their staffs.

"To fulfill these civil defense responsibilities of the Defense Department and to make a modest start on the relocation planning effort, we are requesting a total of $88 million in the FY 1976 Budget and $20 million in the Transition Budget. The $88 million requested for FY 1976 would provide $8 million for the shelter program, $43 million for financial assistance to state and local governments, and $37 million for other programs such as attack warning, emergency operations, research and development and program management. The $20 million requested for the transition period would provide $2 million for shelters, $11 million for financial assistance, and $7 million for the other programs.

"PLANNING FOR THE INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION BASE

"A viable industrial base is a major element of our national strength and deterrent posture, and maintaining the capacity of that industrial base to respond to potential wartime demands continues to be a major consideration in our defense planning. In some specific areas, however, we have experienced a gradual eroision of the defense industrial base. Material scarcities

increases in production lead times, and the cost burden to comply
with safety, health and environmental protection requirements
are symptoms of this erosion. In addition, private industry is

less willing to accept the complexities of doing business with
the Defense Department as the proportion of defense spending in
the economy decreases.

"'The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) has been directed to take a new look at our planning for industrial preparedness. We are seeking to implement further incentives to encourage industry to cooperate with the Industrial Preparedness program under a peacetime environment, as well as under the declaration of a national emergency.

"1. Materials Scarcity and Production Lead Times. The general scarcity of a wide spectrum of materials, particularly in the past year, has seriously affected our procurement of weapons systems and logistics support. For example, the shortage and high cost of petroleum resulted in shortages of industrial chemicals such as ethylene oxide, toluene and benzene. The lack of the se fuel stocks, in turn, caused cutbacks in production of synthetic fibers and textiles and severely restricted the production of plastics such as neoprene and polyvinyl chloride. Moreover, virtually all metals were in short supply, causing a significant escalation of production lead times and other production shortages. As a result, the list of supplies identified as long lead time procurement items has grown rapidly and now includes: forgings, extrusions, electronic subsystems, aircraft wheels and brakes, and many other commodities.

"2. Impact from Application of Environmental and Safety Regulations. Because of recently imposed environmental and health protection requirements, it has been necessary to shut down certain facilities, some of which are essential to DoD's operational needs. Other facilities are in danger of being closed because compliance with the more stringent environmental protection requirements is often not feasible in view of the age and condition of the facilities and the prohibitive cost of rehabilitation.

"For example, the production of a liquid missile fuel known as Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine (UDMH) has come to a halt except for a limited production capability at a recently-established facility at Indian Head Naval Ordnance Station in Maryland.