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trespasser without having recourse to this last extremity. But making an attack upon a dwelling, especially at night, the law regards as equivalent to an assault on a man's person; for a man's house is his castle; and, therefore, in the eye of the law, it is equivalent to an assault. The right to defend the house extends to all the inmates and includes the right to defend against both real and apparent danger (12).

§ 65. Defense of property. A man is not justified in defending his property to the extent of taking human life unless the defense be in a case of an assault upon him by persons intending to rob him, which, of course, includes also an exposure of his person to danger. But one who has been wrongfully deprived of his property may justify an assault and battery to recover it if the recaption is attempted immediately. One having bought goods, a dispute arose as to the price, and he placed $20.00 and the goods side by side and told the seller to choose, whereon the latter took up the money, and said: "You owe me $1.55". The defendant then demanded his money, threw the seller down, and choked him until he gave up a pocket-book containing the money. On a prosecution for robbery and assault and battery the court held that the defendant was justified in doing as he did if the force he used was not excessive (13).

§ 66. Defense of a friend or stranger. The rule is as old as the common law that the master may defend the servant, the servant the master, the husband the wife,

(12) Pond v. People, 8 Mich. 150.

(13)

Commonwealth v. Donohue, 148 Mass. 529.

the parent the child, the child the parent, and so forth; but the courts have also gone further and held that what a man may do for himself another may do for him, and no more. "The appellants Renzy and Harmon Stanley, seek to excuse the killing of Rufus Ebling upon the ground that it was done by them to save the life of William Stanley, who is the brother of the one, and the uncle of the other. It is a general rule that whatever a person may lawfully do in his own defense, another may do for him.

The innocent cannot This would be para

This other person in such a case steps into the place of the assailed, and there attaches to him, not only the rights, but also the responsibilities of the one whose cause he espouses. Thus, if A unlawfully assaults B endangering the latter's life, C has no right, because he may come upon the scene of conflict at a time when, during its progress, A is in danger, to kill B. This would be murder in C, just as it would in A. Any other rule could not be tolerated. be sacrificed to save the guilty. doxical. A volunteer must not kill in behalf of one in fault. This would be what some writers have termed a negligent killing. He may, however, do so far for one not in fault, if the impending danger thus brought about be either actual or apparent. In other words, as the person not in fault may, if he believed and has reasonable grounds to believe that his life is in immediate danger, defend it to the extent of taking life, so another may act upon the like appearances as to such danger, and defend it for him to the same extent. * It is evident that

it (the instruction to the jury) confined the right of the appellants to act in defense of William Stanley's life to the existence of actual danger to it. It did not allow them to act in good faith upon appearances, however reasonable" (14).

(14) Stanley v. Commonwealth, 86 Ky. 440.

CHAPTER V.

THE PARTIES TO A CRIME.

§ 67. Parties classified. The possible persons participating in a crime are those who do the act themselves; those who give present aid; those who advise, plan, or aid in advance; and those who assist in stifling the prosecution or aid the escape of the criminal. Therefore the parties are: (1) Principals, (a) in the first degree, and (b) in the second degree: (2) Accessories, (a) before the fact, and (b) after the fact.

§ 68. In treason and misdemeanors all are principals. The classification given above applies only to felonies, for in treason any person participating in any way is considered a principal because of the enormity of the offense. On the other hand, in the case of misdemeanors all are considered as principals. One who incites others to commit an assault and battery is a principal and may be prosecuted as such, if the offense be actually committed, although he did not otherwise participate, and was not present at the time. There are a few minor crimes, mostly statutory, in which the offense is so mild that persons merely procuring the commission of it are not punished at all. For example, although the law forbids the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday or a holiday, a person who goes and purchases liquor contrary to law, and thereby induces the saloon keeper to sell it, is not liable to prosecution as an accessory before the fact,

nor as a principal inducing the sale and being present and giving assistance.

§ 69. Principals in the first degree. Ordinarily where there are several persons committing the crime and they are not liable in the same degree, the principal in the first degree is the one who actually does the crime with his own hand. But it is not necessary in order to convict one as principal in the first degree that he shall have committed the act in person, nor even that he was present at the time when it was committed. If one sets a trap, a spring gun, or poison, with design to kill another, and the other is injured thereby, he is a principal in the first degree, and liable to punishment accordingly; for otherwise there would be the anomaly of a crime without a criminal. Likewise, one who prepares and sets poison at the instigation of another is the principal in the first degree; and the other who merely advises is an accessory before the fact. Where the commission of the crime consists of a series of acts and each of the acts is performed by a different person, each is a principal and liable as such, though none were present during the whole transaction. This is illustrated by the case of a gang who made counterfeit money, one preparing the paper, one making the dies, one forging the signatures, and each acting separately. One may also be a principal, though the act is done by another person, provided the person doing the act is innocent. If one gives poison to be taken to another as medicine, and the person delivering it is not aware of its poisonous character, he is, of course, innocent though he gives the poison and death results. The person prescribing the poison is a principal in the

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