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DENNIS C. O'CONNELL

MAY 31, 1944.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and ordered to be printed

Mr. RAMEY, from the Committee on Claims, submitted the following

REPORT

(To accompany H. R. 4439]

The Committee on Claims, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 4439) for the relief of Dennis C. O'Connell, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendment is as follows:

At the end of the bill strike out the period and insert the following: : Provided, That no part of the amount appropriated in this Act in excess of 10 per centum thereof shall be paid or delivered to or received by any agent or attorney on account of services rendered in connection with this claim, and the same shall be unlawful, any contract to the contrary notwithstanding. Any person violating the provisions of this Act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not exceeding $1,000.

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to appropriate the sum of $122.73 to Dennis C. O'Connell, of Arlington, Mass. Such sum represents the amount paid by him pursuant to a judgment rendered against him in an action brought by one Andrew W. James to recover damages for personal injuries and property loss resulting from a collision in Boston, Mass., on February 11, 1941, involving the automobile of the said Andrew W. James and a United States mail truck operated by the said Dennis C. O'Connell.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

It appears from the evidence submitted that on February 11, 1941, a United States mail truck driven by Dennis C. O'Connell, which was on official business, was proceeding in a southerly direction. The mail truck made a left turn at an intersection of streets, whereupon the James car, which was east-bound, ran into the right front corner of the truck. Inasmuch as the evidence indicated that responsibility rested with the civilian driver, his claim arising out of the accident

was disallowed by the Post Office Department. Then he brought suit and recovered judgment against the driver of the mail truck. The report from the Postmaster General dated April 17, 1944, states:

"Although the report of the trial indicated that the judge who heard the case was prejudiced against mail-truck drivers generally, and that the judgment rendered was against the evidence, the United States attorney recommended against an appeal whereby the postal employee was required to pay the amount of the judgment. The judgment was for $111 and the costs were added thereto, making the total amount collected from Driver O'Connell, $122.73."

The Post Office Department feels that the pending bill should receive favorable consideration. Your committee concur in the recommendation of the Department.

Therefore, your committee recommend that the pending bill be favorably considered. Appended hereto is the report of the Postmaster General, together with other pertinent evidence.

Hon. DAN R. MCGEHEE,

OFFICE OF THE POSTMASTER GENERAL,
Washington, D. C., April 17, 1944.

Chairman, Committee on Claims,

House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR MR. MCGEHEE: The receipt is acknowledged of your letter of March 22, 1944, requesting a report on H. R. 4439 for the relief of Dennis C. O'Connell of Arlington, Mass., in the amount of $122.73 to reimburse him for a judgment which he was required to pay arising out of an accident involving a United States mail truck and a vehicle belonging to one Andrew W. James.

The investigation of this accident disclosed that the mail truck, south-bound, made a left turn at an intersection of streets, whereupon the James car, which was east-bound, ran into the right front corner of the truck. Inasmuch as the evidence indicated that responsibility rested with James, his claim arising out of the accident was disallowed by the Department. Thereupon he brought suit and recovered jugdment against the operator of the mail truck. Although the report of the trial indicated that the judge who heard the case was prejudiced against mail truck drivers generally, and that the judgment rendered was against the evidence, the United States Attorney recommended against an appeal whereby the postal employee was required to pay the amount of the judgment. The judgment was for $111 and the costs were added thereto, making the total amount collected from Driver O'Connell $122.73.

In the circumstances it is believed that the pending bill should receive favorable consideration.

It has been ascertained from the Bureau of the Budget that this report is in accord with the program of the President.

Very truly yours,

K. R. ALDRICH, Acting Postmaster General.

CLAIM FOR DAMAGES-ACCIDENT, MOTOR TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT,

Mr. ANDREW JAMES, Somerville, Mass.

MOTOR VEHICLE SERVICE,
Boston, Mass., March 4, 1941.

(Care of Anthony W. DiCecca, attorney at law),

SIR: In order that the claim for damages submitted by you may receive prope consideration, you are requested to fill out and return to this office the form on the reverse side of this sheet, duly sworn to before an authorized officer of the law, and attach thereto receipted bills covering expenditures made necessary

because of said damages. All material facts should be stated upon this form, as it will be the basis of further action upon your claim. If additional space is required for a full statement of the facts, blank sheets may be attached.

Very truly yours,

PETER F. LAGUE, Postmaster.

Date of accident: February 11, 1941; hour 7:41 p. m.

Place of accident: Corner Essex Street and Harrison Avenue, Boston. Describe how accident happened: As I was driving down Essex Street in direction of south station, I was struck in the left rear fender and side by a mail truck emerging without stopping from Harrison Avenue.

Names and addresses and extent of injuries: Andrew James, 63 Hurley Street, Cambridge.

If medical aid was rendered, state by whom: Dr. Harold Rudy, 292 Harvard Street, Cambridge.

Name of owner: Andrew James.

Address: 63 Hurley Street, Cambridge.

Kind of property and extent of damage: Auto; $63.65.

Method by which damage is established (if by receipted bills or appraisals indicate at this point and attach to claim); Appraisals.

Where may property be inspected? At home.

Is the damage covered in whole or in part by insurance? No.

Do the attached bills cover any repairs except those made necessary by the accident? Yes.

For personal injury: $150. For property damaged: $63.65.

ANDREW W. JAMES.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 27th day of March 1941, at Somerville. [SEAL]

ANTHONY W. DICECCA,

Notary Public.

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Denis C. O'Connell, driver-mechanic, being duly sworn, makes the following statement:

On February 11, 1941, at about 7:40 p. m., while en route from the Essex Station to the South Postal Annex with mail truck No. 4900, I was involved in an accident at the intersection of Essex Street and Harrison Avenue, Boston, Mass., with an automobile owned by Andrew W. James, Cambridge, Mass.

I proceeded southerly on the right-hand side of Harrison Avenue Extension from the Essex Station, which is about one hundred feet from the intersection of Essex Street. Upon reaching the intersection of Essex Street, I observed no traffic on that street coming from the direction of Washington Street, but when I had practically completed a left turn into Harrison Avenue, the truck traveling at a speed of about 5 miles per hour, the private car turned into the path of the mail truck and the left rear of the car collided with the right front wheel of the mail truck, and I immediately brought the truck to a stop, while the private car

continued into Chauncy Street before it came to a stop. I blame the private operator entirely for the accident.

Mass.

DENIS C. O'CONNELL.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of August 1941, at Boston, C. M. NELSON, Post Office Inspector.

UNITED STATES POST OFFICE

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF MAILS

Did you see the accident?

INQUIRY OF WITNESSES

Yes.

When did it happen? 7:40 p. m. February 11, 1941.

Where did it happen? Harrison Avenue Extension and Essex Street, Boston, Mass.

Locate place, as nearly as possible, with reference to cross streets. At intersection.

Where were you when the accident occurred? Northeast corner of Chauncy Street and Harrison Avenue.

How fast was Government-owned auto moving? About 10 to 15 miles per hour. How fast was other vehicle moving? About 20 to 25 miles per hour.

What was the apparent extent of the injury or damage? Left rear fender of private car. No personal injury noted.

Tell, in your own way, how the accident happened. I saw the private auto going easterly on Essex Street, and as it reached the corner of Harrison Avenue, it passed to the left of another automobile that was turning south on Harrison Avenue. At about the same time the mail truck entered the intersection in a southerly direction and the right front of the mail truck struck the left rear fender of the private car. The car continued to the easterly corner of Harrison Avenue extension, where it stopped at the curb.

In your opinion who was to blame for the accident? I blame the truck driver for accident because the private car had the right of way. Date, July 29, 1941.

WILLIAM J. COUGHLIN, 101 Heath Street, Somerville, Mass.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of July 1941, at Boston, Mass.

C. M. NELSON,
Post Office Inspector.

BOSTON, May 1, 1943.

Re Andrew James v. Dennis O'Connell your file FMS: WSW 145-5-86
The ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Washington, D. C.

SIR: Enclosed herewith please find copies of judge's finding and memorandum of findings of fact and rulings of law.

In reference to the last part of the second paragraph of your letter I wish to state that there was no merit to our defense set forth in the third paragraph of our answer since the accident happened on February 11, 1941, and the plaintiff had 1 year within which to bring his suit under the statute, and suit was commenced according to the date of the writ on January 31, 1942, and the writ was served on February 7, 1942, all within a year, so that this defense of the suit not having been brought within the statutory period could not be sustained. The man who first filed this answer was evidently guided by the fact that although the writ was dated on the 31st day of January and served prior to February 11, still the return date on the writ was not until the 21st day of February. The controlling date, however, is the date when the suit was commenced and when the writ was placed in the hands of a sheriff for service, and not the return date.

The finding in this case is conclusive against the defendant due to the fact that the judge made a definite finding of fact that the defendant was negligent and that the plaintiff was not guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident. May we return the Post Office file and consider this case closed? Respectfully,

Enclosures.

EDMUND J. BRANDON,

United States Attorney.

1942.

CLERK'S OFFICE,

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN MIDDLESEX,
East Cambridge, Mass., April 22, 1943.

No. 737. Andrew James, Plaintiff v. Dennis C. O'Connell, Defendant. In the above-entitled case the court finds for the plaintiff for $111 of which $50 is on the first count and $61 is on the second count of the declaration. (See memo. enclosed).

Judgment will be rendered.

CHARLES T. CAVANAGH, Clerk.

THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF EASTERN MIDDLESEX

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS,

Middlesex, ss.

No. 737 of 1942.

Andrew James v. Dennis C. O'Connell.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND RULINGS OF LAW

This is an action of tort for property damages and personal injuries which the plaintiff sustained as a result of a collision of automobiles which took place at the corner of Essex Street and Harrison Avenue in Boston, at about 7:40 p. m. on February 11, 1941.

The plaintiff was the owner and operator of his automobile, but did not have with him either his license or registration. The defendant was the operator of a United States Railway Mail truck, which was engaged on official business at the time of the accident. Essex Street at the place of the accident is a one-way street, and the plaintiff was proceeding along it in an easterly direction which was proper. There were cars parked on both sides of Essex Street. The plaintiff turned into Essex Street from Washington Street, and proceeded at a rate of speed estimated at 20 miles an hour. There was an automobile in front of him. As the plaintiff approached the corner of Essex Street and Harrison Avenue Extension, which comes in on the left, the automobile in front turned to the right and went southerly on Harrison Avenue. The plaintiff swung slightly to the left and proceeded into the intersection. The post-office truck, operated by the defendant, came out of Harrison Avenue Extension on the left of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was within the intersection, appreciably ahead of the truck. The truck swung left to go along Essex Street in the same direction that the plaintiff was going, and in so doing the front right corner of the truck struck the left rear corner of the plaintiff's automobile. The force of the impact swung the plaintiff's automobile slightly to the right, but the plaintiff stopped the automobile within about 8 feet.

I find that the defendant was negligent in that he did not grant the right-of-way to an automobile coming into an intersection on his right, which entered the intersection before he did.

While the plaintiff did not have either his license or registration with him, which is evidence of negligence, I find that that fact did not in any way contribute to the accident. While the rate of speed of the plaintiff's automobile as it went through the intersection was disputed, and there was a question as to whether it slowed down on approaching the intersection. I am not satisfied by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the speed was improper under the circumstances, or that the failure to slow down in any way contributed to the accident.

The defendant presented four requests for rulings which I deny.

While there was evidence which taken by itself might justify an opposite conclusion I find upon a fair preponderance of all the credible evidence that the defendant was negligent, and I am unable to find by a fair preponderance of all the credible evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of negligence which contributed to the accident.

ARTHUR P. STONE, Justice.

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