Mr. Futterman tried to avoid the collision by applying his brakes and driving as far as possible to the right, but was unable to do so, and his car was shoved into the guardrail bordering the right-hand side of the road.

As a result of the accident Mr. Futterman's automobile was damaged beyond economical repair. The Army driver and his passenger were thrown clear of the vehicle and the passenger sustained minor injuries. Neither the Army driver nor any one of the occupants of the civilian automobile appears to have been injured.

Mr. Futterman's Chevrolet sedan, which before the accident was reasonably worth $475, was sold for salvage for $50, and a towing charge of $23 was incurred. It therefore appears that Mr. Futterman sustained a net loss by reason of the damage to his car in the amount of $448. Accordingly, on March 2, 1943, he filed a claim with the War Department for such damage in the amount of $448. He stated in his claim that the damage sustained by him was not covered in whole or in part by insurance.

The claim, however, was disapproved on July 23, 1943, on the ground that the Army driver was operating the vehicle without authority and for a purely personal mission, and, therefore, was not acting within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred, a condition precedent and necessary to bring the claim within any statute or appropriation available to the War Department for administrative settlement.

The evidence of record does not disclose the manner in which the Army driver obtained possession of the reconnaissance car, or whether the unauthorized use of such vehicle was facilitated by negligence on the part of responsible military personnel. The claims officer found that the accident was not due to any fault or negligence on the part of Mr. Futterman but was caused wholly by the negligence of the Army driver. In his report the claims officer stated:

"Pvt. Norman D. Stricklin was wrongfully using the Government vehicle at the time of the accident, and was not using it in line of duty. He was tried and convicted by a special court martial for his unauthorized use of this vehicle.

"The Governmnet driver is responsible for the accident, since he was driving at an excessive rate of speed on an icy road and skidded into the private vehicle which was coming along on the other side of the road.'

It is the view of the War Department that the evidence clearly establishes that this accident was caused solely by reason of the negligence of the Army driver. However, as the Army driver was using the Army vehicle without authority and on a purely personal mission and, therefore, was not acting within the scope of his employment when the collision occurred, the United States is not responsible for the damages sustained by the claimant in this accident. The Department, therefore, is constrained to recommend that the bill be not favorably considered. The fiscal effect of the bill is manifest.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget in a letter to the War Department, dated February 10, 1944, concerning this bill, stated:

"The proposed report, while conceding negligence on the part of Private Stricklin, the driver of the Army reconnaisance car, recommends against enactment of the proposed legislation on the ground that the Army driver was operating the vehicle without authority and on a purely personal mission.

"The fact that the driver of a Government vehicle was proceeding upon an unauthorized mission at the time of an accident for which he was responsible has not, in the past, been considered sufficient reason, standing alone, for a determination that the Government should not grant relief to the victim of the accident. Bills have been enacted by the Congress and approved by the President which provided for relief in cases where the driver of the Government vehicle was proceeding upon an unauthorized mission, but had obtained the vehicle for that purpose through the negligence of those responsible for its use.

"It would appear, therefore, that a denial of relief in these cases should rest upon such evidence as might be produced to show that those responsible for the use of the Government vehicle had not been negligent in the discharge of their responsibility. Accordingly it would seem quite desirable that such affirmative evidence as it may be possible to obtain should be supplied to the Claims Committees of the Congress for the purpose of aiding these committees in their consideration of relief measures of this character.

"Subject to your consideration of what has been said above, there would be no objection by this office to your presentation to the House Committee on Claims of such report as you may deem appropriate with respect to the bill, H. R. 3595."

There is no evidence that the Army vehicle involved in this accident was obtained by Private Stricklin on the day of the accident and driven to Windsor, Conn., as the result of any negligence on the part of any other person. Private Stricklin in a signed statement said:

"I took the jeep without permission and I was court-martialed and convicted for it." The claims officer who investigated this accident found that the collision was not due to any fault or negligence on the part of Mr. Futterman but was due wholly to the negligence of Private Stricklin, who, he stated, "was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time the" accident occurred.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON.
Secretary of War.

I, Robert Futterman, of Springfield, Hampden County, Mass., being duly sworn, on oath depose and say that on January 16, 1943, I was operating my automobile on the main highway called Palisade Avenue in Windsor, Conn., toward Hartford, on my side of the road, when an Army jeep being operated by Pvt. Norman D. Stricklin in the opposite direction going north, came over to my side of the road toward me and pushed me over to the fence on my right.

The impact was so great than my automobile was completely wrecked. Damage was done to the radiator, all fenders, all running boards, all steering parts, doors, wheels and tires. My automobile could no longer be operated and the cost of replacement was greater than the value of the car. It was considered a total loss except for its salvage value.

ROBERT FUTTERMAN.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this second day of March 1943. [SEAL]

My commission expires September 23, 1943.

JOSEPH SWIRSKY,

Notary Public.

To Whom It May Concern:

LOUIS CHEVROLET CO., Thompsonville, Conn., March 2, 1943.

I have examined the 1937 Chevrolet special deluxe four-door sedan, serial No. 2GA10-1336, owned by Robert Futterman, of 290 Oakland Street, Springfield. Mass.

A complete replacement of all damaged parts, several of which would include new frame, radiator, four fenders, two running boards, complete front and knee action parts, steering parts, three body door glass, complete right rear door, two tires and tubes, two wheels and many smaller parts, would involve a bill consider ably in excess of the value of above car prior to being involved in accident.

I have been a Chevrolet dealer since 1921 and feel qualified to pass on value of used automobiles in my line. A fair valuation of this car in January 1943 would be $475. I base this on my knowledge that this was a one-owner car, well taken care of, and equipped with many extras, including seat covers, radio, heater. bumper guards, and other smaller items not usually found on average car. car was so severely damaged it is beyond reasonable repair. Salvage value at present is $50.

The

This information respectfully given and signed under seal of the Louis Chevrolet Corporation. LOUIS B. HALBWACHS, President

[SEAL]

LOUIS T. KLAUDER

MAY 18, 1944.-Committed to the Committee of the Whole House and ordered to be printed

Mr. PITTENGER, from the Committee on Claims, submitted the

following

REPORT

[To accompany H. R. 3644]

The Committee on Claims, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 3644) for the relief of Louis T. Klauder, having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.

The amendment is as follows:

Page 1, line 6, strike out the figures "$3,750" and insert in lieu thereof the figures "$1,904.80".

The purpose of the proposed legislation is to appropriate the sum of $1,904.80 to Louis T. Klauder, of Moorestown, N. J., in full settlement of all claims against the United States as compensation for engineering services rendered in connection with a Rural Electrification Administration project in Franklin County, Mass., known or designated as Massachusetts 3 Franklin.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

It appears that Mr. Louis T. Klauder, an engineer, entered into a contract on October 9, 1936, with the Tri County Electric Co. to furnish engineering services on a Rural Electrification Administration project. This contract was duly signed by Mr. Everett M. Johnson, president of Tri County Electric Co., and approved by the Rural Electrification Administration. This contract was entered into through the requirements of the financing of this project through the Rural Electrification Administration.

Under section 1 of article II, subsection c of the construction loan contract between the United States and the Tri County Electric Co., the requirements were set forth as follows:

submission to the Government of the following: (2) The name of an engineer (who shall be subject to the approval of the Administrator) who it is intended shall supervise the project on behalf of the borrower and execute all certificates

and other instruments pertaining to engineering details required hereunder to be delivered to the Government in connection with the construction of the project.

Mr. Klauder did render services to the Tri-County Electric Co., whose financing depended solely upon the contractual law with the Rural Electrification Administration, valued by him in the amount of $1,904.80. Because of adverse action by the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, the company was forced to abandon the project. Not having received any advances of Federal funds, due to noncompliance with the terms of the loan contract, the company was unable to compensate Mr. Klauder. As set forth above it will be noted that paragraph 10 of the contract for engineering services provides that payment to the engineer be made by the Tri-County Electric Co. from advances under the loan.

In view of the facts and circumstances in this case your committee amends the bill to appropriate the sum of $1,904.80 to Mr. Klauder. The committee recommends favorable consideration to the proposed bill, as amended.

Appended hereto is the report of the Department of Agriculture, together with other pertinent evidence.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
Washington, March 11, 1944.

Hon. DAN R. McGEHEE,

Chairman, Committee on Claims, House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. MCGEHEE: This is in reply to your request of January 13, 1944, for a report on H. R. 3644, a bill for the relief of Louis T. Klauder.

The bill authorizes the payment to Louis T. Klauder, of Moorestown, N. J., of the sum of $3,750 in satisfaction of his claim for compensation for engineering services rendered in connection with a rural electrification project in Franklin County, Mass.

Mr. Klauder's services were furnished to the Tri-County Electric Co. of Greenfield, Mass., a corporation organized under Massachusetts law for the purpose of constructing and operating a rural electric distribution system to be financed by the Rural Electrification Administration pursuant to a loan contract, dated September 29, 1936. Excerpts from this loan contract indicating the Government's relationship to the project engineer and a copy of a contract for engineering services between the Tri-County Electric Co. and Mr. Klauder, dated October 9, 1936, are attached hereto. The latter contract was approved by the Rural Electrification Administration solely for the purposes and in accordance with the terms of the loan contract above referred to. Examination of both these documents discloses that the United States was not a contracting party with Mr. Klauder and that there exists no debtor-creditor relationship between the United States and Mr. Klauder.

The claimant did render services to the Tri-County Electric Co. valued by him at $1,904.89, as appears from engineering statement enclosed with claimant's letter dated August 6, 1937, copies of which are attached hereto. Because of adverse action of the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, the company was forced to abandon the project. The loan was rescinded under Administrative Order No. 143, dated October 5, 1937, copy of which is attached.

Not having received any advances of Federal funds due to noncompliance with the terms of the loan contract, the company was unable to compensate Mr. Klauder. It should be noted that paragraph (10) of the contract for engineering services provides that payment to the engineer be made by the Tri-County Electric Co. from advances under the loan contract. It appears from the foregoing that the claimant contracted with and rendered services to the Tri-County Electric Co. and not to the United States.

It is accurate to state, however, that the services grew out of a project of the Rural Rehabilitation Administration, and it was anticipated by all parties that they would be compensated out of the Government loan, since the electric company had no other sources of financing.

Your attention is invited to this Department's report to the Senate Committee on Claims, dated October 19, 1942, on S. 2211, Seventy-seventh Congress, second session, which is identical with H. R. 3644.

The Bureau of the Budget advises that the enactment of the proposed legisla tion would not be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

CLAUDE R. WICKARD, Secretary.

EXCERPTS FROM CONSTRUCTION LOAN CONTRACT BETWEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND TRI COUNTY ELECTRIC COMPANY

ARTICLE I

Loan, note, and mortgage

SECTION 1. Subject to the terms and conditions herein set forth, the Borrower agrees to borrow and the Government agrees to lend an amount equal to the cost of the electric transmission and distribution lines or system (hereinafter called the Project) more particularly described in section 1 of article III of this agreement, to be constructed and operated by the Borrower, such cost of the Project to be determined as provided in section 5 of article X of this agreement, or the amount of two hundred fifty-five thousand dollars ($255,000), whichever of said amounts shall be the less.

*

ARTICLE II

Duties pertaining to first advance

SECTION 1. The Borrower shall, not later than forty-five (45) days after the execution of this agreement by the Government, do or perform or cause to be done or performed the following acts and things:

(b) registering, when and where required by law, with all Federal, State, county, municipal, or other authorities, and obtaining therefrom all franchieses, authorizations, permits, licenses, certificates of public convenience and necessity, approvals, and orders, required or permitted by law and necessary for the performance of this agreement, and acquiring from whatever source and recording in the appropriate office or offices of record all right-of-way easements, releases, or consents necessary or advisable to be obtained from the lawful construction and operation of that portion of the Project to which the first advance by the Government hereunder is intended to be applied; and delivery to the Government of documents in evidence thereof, staisfactory in form and substance to the Administrator:

(c) submission to the Government of the following:

(2) the name of an engineer (who shall be subject to the approval of the Administrator) who it is intended shall supervise the Project on behalf of the Borrower and execute all certificates and other instruments pertaining to engineering details required hereunder to be delivered to the Government in connection with the construction of the Project;

(2) the plans and specifications for the construction of the Project (hereinafter called the "Plans and Specifications") identified by an executive officer or authorized engineer of the Borrower, which Plans and Specifications shall be subject to the approval of the Administrator;

(5) all contracts entered into by the Borrower for engineering or other services pertaining to the construction of the Project or any portion thereof;