2d Session No. 1508 CONSIDERATION OF S. 919 MAY 23, 1944.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed Mr. SABATH, from the Committee on Rules, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. Res. 565] The Committee on Rules, having had under consideration House Resolution 565, report the same to the House with the recommendation that the resolution do pass. о SAFEGUARDING ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN CASES MAY 24, 1944.-Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed Mr. WEAVER, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the following REPORT [To accompany H. R. 3690] The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the bill (H. R. 3690) to safeguard the admission of evidence in certain cases, having considered the same, report the bill favorably to the House with amendments, with the recommendation that, as amended, the bill do pass. The committee amendments are as follows: Page 1, in line 3, strike out the word "no" and insert "the". The amendments merely cause the provisions of the bill to be stated affirmatively. THE NEED FOR SUCH LEGISLATION The Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in the case of McNabb v. United States (318 U. S. 332), on March 1, 1943. That decision established, without constitutional or legislative authority, a rule of evidence utterly new and variant from the standard set up by the Constitution of the United States in the Bill of Rights. In that part of the Bill of Rights known as the fifth amendment there is the familiar guaranty that no person shall "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Since the Bill of Rights became fully ratified as a part of the Constitution on December 15, 1791, this has been recognized as the supreme law of the land on this subject. Such recognition has been accorded by repeated decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, and prior to the McNabb decision, it had become well settled that the sole test of admissibility of statements made by persons accused of crime H. Repts., 78-2, vol. 3-58 while in custody was whether they were "made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort" (Wilson v. U. S. (1896), 162 U. S. 613, 623; see also Lisenba v. California (1943), 314 U. S. 219, 239). Whether an individual in custody had or had not been arraigned prior to the obtaining of a confession from him, was never before considered a determining factor in considering its admissibility. * * For the first time in legal history, in the McNabb case, the Supreme Court used section 595, title 18, of the United States Code as a factor in determining the admissibility of confessions. This section provides that it shall be the duty of the marshal or other officer who may arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, "to take the defendant before the United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having jurisdiction under existing laws, for a hearing, commitment, or take bail for trial A similar statute is found in 5 United States Code, section 300a; requiring agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to take arrested persons immediately before a committing officer. Thus, the Supreme Court has substituted a rule or law of evidence, written and adopted by a majority of the Court, for and instead of the Constitution. The Constitution says that involuntary confessions must not be admitted as evidence in any criminal case. Therefore, by plain implication and on ample authority, voluntary confessions should be admitted as evidence. Yet, in the McNabb case, the Supreme Court says: Quite apart from the Constitution, therefore, we are constrained to hold that the evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances disclosed here must be excluded. For in their treatment of the petitioners the arresting officers assumed functions which Congress has explicitly denied them. The Supreme Court does not say that the confessions of the McNabbs were involuntary, but "quite apart from the Constitution," and although "Congress has not explicitly forbidden the use of evidence so procured," because the arresting officers failed to comply with the requirement that defendants should be promptly arraingedno matter how voluntary the confessions may have been, no matter that the trial judge, jury, and the Supreme Court of Tennessee had held them to be voluntary, no matter that Congress had not forbidden, and no matter what the Constitution provides-the confessions were inadmissible as evidence. Mr. Justice Rutledge took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Reed dissented, as follows: An I find myself unable to agree with the opinion of the Court in this case. officer of the United States was killed while in the performance of his duties. From the circumstances detailed in the Court's opinion, there was obvious reason to suspect that the petitioners here were implicated in firing the fatal shot from the dark. The arrests follows. As the guilty parties were known only to the McNabbs who took part in the assault at the burying ground, it was natural and proper that the officers would question them as to their actions. The cases just cited show that statements made while under interrogation may be used at a trial if it may fairly be said that the information was given voluntarily. A frank and free confession of crime by the culprit affords testimony of the highest credibility and of a character which may be verified easily. Equally frank responses to officers by innocent people arrested under misapprehension give the best basis for prompt discharge from custody. The realization of the convincing quality of a confession tempts officials to press suspects unduly for |