TROVER.-Conversion-Principal and Agent―Liability of Broker.-B. obtained, by means of a fraud, thirteen bales of cotton from plts. He sold them on the 23rd of December 1869, to defts., who were cotton brokers, for cash, payable the same day. Defts. took samples and exhibited them to N. (a spinner of cotton), who examined them in order to judge the quality of the cotton; he also made inquiries as to the quantity and the price, and agreed to take the bales at the price named, with the addition of £1, 4s. 10d. for commission, and 6s. 6d. for porterage. Defts. sent one of their clerks with a cart to the warehouse of B., obtained the bales and forwarded them to N., who paid the price and proceeded to spin the cotton into yarn, as defts. knew that he would do. N. had not instructed defts. to buy the particular cotton for him, but he had informed them that he was coming on the 23rd of December to purchase cotton through them. They had been in the habit of buying cotton for him, and at the time they bought the particular cotton of B. they intended to buy it as brokers, and intended it for N., believing that it was such cotton as he was coming to buy, and that when he arrived he would take it. Plts. having discovered that they had been cheated by B., sued defts. in trover for the bales of cotton. At the trial the jury were asked whether the bales in question were bought by defts, as agents in the course of their business as brokers, and whether they dealt with the goods only as agents to their principals. The verdict was found for defts., but the Court of Queen's Bench made a rule absolute to set that verdict aside, and enter one for plts. :-Held (upon appeal), by Kelly, C.B., Byles, J., and Brett, J., that defts, were not, under the circumstances, guilty of a conversion, in respect of which the action could be maintained; by Martin, B., Channell, B. and Cleasby, B., that plts. were entitled to succeed in the action.-Fowler v. Hollins (Ex. Ch.), 41 L. J., Q. B. 277.

CARRIERS.-Late Delivery of Goods-Non-acceptance of Goods by ConsigneeMeasure of Damages.-A common carrier is liable for the late delivery of goods received by him in the amount of damages which may reasonably be expected to arise out of the breach of an ordinary contract; but he is not liable to an unusual amount of damages, arising out of exceptional circumstances, unless distinct notice is given to the carrier by the consignor before the delivery of the exceptional circumstances touching the delivery of the goods. A consignor, having a contract with his consignees for the delivery to the consignees of the goods by a particular day at an exceptional price, with power in the consignees to reject the goods and rescind the contract if not performed to the day, delivered to a railway company goods within the contract, in time for delivery to the consignees within the time mentioned by the contract, and at the time of delivery the company had notice that the consignor was under a contract to deliver by the time mentioned in the contract, and was liable, in case of late delivery, to have the goods thrown on his hands. The company did not deliver the goods till after the time stipulated in the contract, and the consignees refused to receive them :-Held, that the measure of damages to which the company was liable was the difference between the market price of the goods on the day when they ought to have been delivered, and on the day when they were delivered, and any incidental expenses to which the consignor might have been put in finding a customer and reselling the goods; but that the company, under the notice which they had received, were not liable to repay to the consignor the difference between the exceptional price mentioned in the contract and the price of re-sale.-Horn v. Midland Ry. Co., 41 L. J., C. P. 263.

COMMON CARRIERS.--Live Animals-Vice of Animals-Liability without Negligence. The liability of a railway company as common carriers of live animals as well as of goods is, in the absence of any negligence, subject not only to the exception of the act of God or the Queen's enemies, but to the further exception of any act wholly attributable to the development of a latent inherent vice in the animal itself. A. bullock, one of a number of cattle delivered to a railway company, was properly loaded into a proper truck by the railway company. The truck was properly fastened and secured, but in the course of its

journey, the bullock escaped from the truck and was found lying dead on the railway. There was no negligence on the part of the railway company, and the fact was that the escape of the bullock was wholly attributable to the efforts and exertions of the animal itself-Held, that the company was not liable for the loss of the animal.-G. W. Ry. Co. v. Blower, 41 L. J., C. P. 268.

NEGLIGENCE.-Dwelling-house-Escape of water on upper floor.- Plt. carried on business on the ground floor of a house, the deft.'s offices being on the second floor. One morning plt. found that a quantity of water had oozed through the ceiling and damaged his stock-in-trade. The water had escaped from a water-closet in the deft.'s offices, owing to the valve having got out of order, so that the water flowed into the pan and completely filled it. There was no evidence of negligence on part of defts., nor did it appear that they knew that the valve was out of repair-Held, that they were not liable, as there was no obligation on them under all circumstances and at all hazards to keep the pipes from overflowing and their room water-tight.-Ross v. Fedden, 41 L. J., Q. B. 270.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.-Embezzlement by servant a discharge of surety.— Deft. guaranteed that he would be answerable for any loss not exceeding £50, which plt. might sustain through any breach of duty by S., her servant, in receiving, collecting, and paying over to her moneys due from customers. To an action brought upon such guarantie, deft., in respect of moneys received by S. on account of plt., after the giving by deft. of the guarantie, and before the 12th of Nov. 1869, paid money into Court; and with respect to the residue of plt.'s claim, deft. pleaded, by way of defence upon equitable grounds, that, after the giving of the guarantie of deft., and before 12th Nov. 1869, S. embezzled moneys received by him to the amount of £57, that plt. became aware of this on or about 20th Nov. 1869, and that without informing deft. thereof, she agreed with S. that he should continue in her service, and should pay her £3 a-month in liquidation of the sum of £57; and thereupon S. agreed to continue, and did continue, in the service of plt. until 4th April 1871; that during that time he paid to plt. sums of money amounting to £48; that during such continuance of S. in such service, he collected the moneys for and on behalf of plt. comprised in the residue therein pleaded to; that during the whole of the time S. collected the said sums of money, deft. was ignorant of the embezzlements prior to the said 20th of November 1869; and that deft. was prevented from revoking the guarantee, and compelling S. to pay to him, deft., the moneys he was liable under the guarantie to pay to plt.-Held. by Cockburn, C.J., Lush, J., and Quain, J., that the plea was good, and that in the case of a continuing guarantie for the honesty of a servant, if the master discovers that the servant has been guilty of acts of dishonesty in the course of the service to which the guarantie relates, and if, instead of dismissing the servant, as he may do at once and without notice, he chooses to continue him in his employ without the knowledge and consent of the surety, express or implied, he cannot afterwards have recourse to the surety to make good any loss which may arise from the dishonesty of the servant during the subsequent service-Held, by Blackburn, J. (with some hesitation), and on the grounds expressed by Malins, V.C., in Burgess v. Eve, 41 L. J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 515, that the deft. was entitled to judgment on the demurrer to the plea.-Phillips v. Foxhall, 41 L. J., Q. B. 293.

TRESPASS.-Escape of water accumulating in excavation-Consequential damage. -Plt.'s mine was flooded by water, which had, after an unusual rainfall, accumulated in an excavation made by defts. on their land, and had escaped thence through their mine into plt.'s, which was situated at a lower level- Held, that although defts., in making the excavation, had no intention of collecting water therein, and although they had provided an outlet for such an amount of water as might be looked for in ordinary seasons, the case was still governed by Rylands v. Fletcher (37 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Exch. 171), and defts, were liable for the damage sustained by plt.-Smith v. Fletcher, 41 L. J., Ex. 193.

FOREIGN ENLISTMENT ACT.-Prize-Towage. The employment of a British steam-tug to tow a prize to the captor's waters is a despatching a ship from the United Kingdom for the purpose of being employed in the naval service of a foreign State within the meaning of section 8 of the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870.-Queen v. Elliot-The Gauntlet, 41 L. J., Adm. 65 (in the Privy Council). CONFLICT OF LAWS.-Damage to cargo-German ship and English cargoCharter-party and Bill of Lading-War.-A German ship, while in a German port, was chartered by a charter-party in the English language by English charterers, and the ports of call for orders and of final delivery of cargo were English. On a question of delay in delivery of cargo-Held, that the contract must be governed by English law. The excepted perils mentioned in the charter-party were more numerous than those in the bill of lading-Held, that, under the circumstances, both instruments together contained the contract. The S. R., a German ship, with an English cargo, being in need of repairs, put into V. in the month of August, and then ascertained the existence of the war between France and Germany. The repairs were completed on the 21st of September, but the master, under the advice of his consul, did not set sail till the 23d of December-Held that, under the circumstances, the risk of capture was such that the delay was justifiable. According to both English and German law, an apprehension of capture, founded upon circumstances calculated to affect the mind of a master of ordinary courage, judgment, and experience, would justify delay.-The San Roman, 41 L. J., Adm. 72.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.-Damage to cargo-German ship and contract between Germans.-The master of a German ship, while at Constantinople, by a charterparty, partly in English and partly in German, and entered into with Germans, chartered his ship to take a cargo from Taganrog to England, Havre, or Hamburg-Held, that the contract must be construed according to German law. Detention of the vessel at Gibraltar from the 18th of August 1870 to the 2d of February 1871, during the war between France and Germany-held, under circumstances, to be justifiable. By German law, if a vessel is liable to risk of capture, either party may withdraw from the contract of affreightment, but the master is not obliged to part with the cargo or to tranship it, unless distance freight, as well as other claims of the shipowner and the contributions due from the cargo for general average, etc., have been paid or secured-Held, that a demand upon the master to tranship at his own risk and expense, was not such a compliance with the German law as obliged him to tranship.-The Express, 41 L. J., Adm. 79.

BENEFIT BUILDING SOCIETY.-Winding up-Distinction between investing members and outside creditors.-By one of the rules of a building society, members who held investment shares were entitled, on giving one month's notice, to withdraw their investments, it being provided that, if several members should give notice to withdraw at one time, they should be paid in rotation, according to the priority of notice. Another rule provided for the reference of disputes to arbitration. On the 26th of April the petitioner, a holder of five investment shares, gave notice to withdraw her investment. Sixteen hundred investing members had previously given notice to withdraw investments to the amount of £350,000. On the 28th of May, altered rules were duly certified, and it was thereby provided that dividends should be paid to all the members in part repayment of the principal of their investments, and that any member holding investment shares might give one month's notice of his desire to withdraw, and that at the expiration of such notice he should cease to be a member of the society, but should be entitled to receive the same dividends as continuing members, and to be paid the balance of the principal of his investment shares when the funds of the society would admit of it, in such instalments as the directors might determine. The petitioner, not being paid at the expiration of the month, gave the statutory notice under the 199th section of the Companies' Act 1862, and subsequently filed a petition for winding up the society. It appeared that the society had sufficient assets to meet

all claims, but that these would take a long time to realize, and that it had not money in hand to pay all members who had given notice of withdrawal previously to the petitioner :-Held, that the 199th section did not entitle the petitioner to a winding-up order :-Held, also, that the petitioner, as an investing member, stood on a different footing from outside creditors, and was not entitled ex debito justitie to an order for winding up under the 199th clause of the Companies' Act, and that the Court had a discretion to order or refuse a winding up.-Semble, the rules as altered were not illegal.-Re the Planet Benefit Building and Investment Society, 41 L. J. Ch. 738.

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TRADE MARK.-Arbitrary name given to new article-Injunction. The plaintiff, a woollen manufacturer, introduced into the market cloths of particular textures made by him, under arbitrary names, as Sefton," ," "Turin," etc. The defts, copied the patterns, which were not registered, and sold the cloths under the same names. The defts. also used a ticket in sending their cloth to the wholesale dealers, closely resembling that of the plaintiff; but they explained that they purchased the ticket, which was of a simple description, and did not bear the manufacturer's name, from the stock of a stationer, without any intention to copy the plaintiff's. They claimed to be entitled to describe the cloths by the names given to them by the plaintiff :-Held, that the plaintiff was solely entitled to the names as trade marks; and that the use of the tickets, even if innocent, was unjustifiable.-Hirst v. Denham, 41 L. J. Ch. 752.

CUSTOM OF STOCK EXCHANGE.-Contract-Specific Performance-Infant transferee.-M. sold fifty shares in a company (upon which there remained a liability of £900) through his broker, a member of the Stock Exchange, to N., a stock jobber, also a member. On the settling day N. passed the name of L., which he had received from some other broker to M.'s broker, who prepared a transfer to L., which M. executed. The price was paid, and the transfer handed over in the usual way. The transfer was never registered. Two years later the company, being ordered to be wound up, M.'s name was put upon the list of contributories, and calls upon him were made. He then, for the first time, discovered that L. was an infant: Held, that the jobber had not performed his contract, and that he was bound to indemnify M. against the calls. -Rennie v. Morris, 41 L. J. Ch. 321, overruled.-Merry v. Nickalls, 41 L. J., Ch. 767.

PARTNERSHIP.-Assets, which cannot be sold-Contract not assignable—Mode of Valuation.-A. and B. carried on the business of carrying mails under a contract entered into by the Postmaster-General with B., and not assignable. A. died, B. continued to carry on the business under the contract, and refused to account for the value of the contract to the executors of the deceased partner: -Held, that as the contract was not assignable, and its value could not be ascertained in the usual way by sale, it must be referred to Chambers to ascertain the value, and the surviving partner must pay that amount to the executors of the deceased, with a share of the profits since the death of deceased, a fair sum being allowed to the surviving partner for his services in carrying on the business.-Ambler v. Bolton, 41 L, J., Ch. 783.

MISREPRESENTATION IN LAW.-Mistake-Railway Company-Liability of Directors. The doctrine that a person who by a false representation induces another to do an act which results in a loss, is liable to make good his representation, does not apply where the misrepresentation is one of law only. Where (with the sanction of their Board) three directors of a railway company signed an authority to the company's bankers to honour the company's cheques, and upon the strength of this authority the bank permitted the company to overdraw their account to a very large amount, the directors who signed the authority were held not to be personally liable for the debt, even if the authority could be considered as a misrepresentation (which probably it was not) that the company had power to overdraw their account, which they could not legally do. By an arrangement with the manager of the company's bank, preference shares and debentures of the railway company, on which nothing was paid, were

issued to two of the directors of the company, and transferred to nominees of the bank as security for the above-mentioned advances :-Held, under the circumstances, that the bank knew at the date of the transfer that nothing had been paid on the shares and debentures, and that there was no misrepresentation or fraud in the transaction.-Beattie v. Lord Ebury, 41 L. J. Ch. 804.

LANDS CLAUSES ACT (8 Vict. c. 18, s. 49).—Severance—Precarious Interest.— Plaintiffs, a volunteer corps, obtained leases of different plots of land for the erection of a rifle range of 80 yards. Immediately behind the butts was a land occupied by A, and beyond that some ntarsh land, both of which were required by the rifle corps for the purpose of making provision for the safety of the public during the time the butts were in use. The plts, obtained a lease of the marsh land, but only made a verbal agreement with A for the use of his land during the rifle practice, in consideration of an annual payment of £49. The defts., under their compulsory powers, took a portion of the marsh land occupied by plts. for a use which put a stop to the use of the rifle range. an inquisition under the Lands Clauses Act, ss. 38, 50, the jury assessed the value of the land taken, and damages for the injury to the rifle range:-Held, that there might be an injury from severance within the meaning of the Act, although the land taken was not immediately contiguous to that retained by plts., and that the fact that plts. had precarious occupation of the land of A only affected the quantum of compensation to be awarded to them.-Holt V. Gaslight & Coke Co., 41 L. J., Q. B. 351.

At

MARINE INSURANCE.-Re-assurance subject to conditions of original policy.— A policy of insurance was underwritten by defts. for £1000, which was declared to be a re-assurance, subject to all clauses and conditions of the original policy, on the ship D. at and from any port or ports in any order on the West Coast of Africa to the vessel's port or ports of call and discharge in the United Kingdom, the insurance to commence "from the loading of the goods at as above." By the original policy the insurance was for £1000 upon the cargo of the D. at and from Liverpool to any ports in any order backwards and forwards, and forwards and backwards, on the coast of Africa, and thence back to a port of discharge in the United Kingdom, with leave to increase the valuation of the cargo on the homeward voyage; "outward cargo to be considered homeward interest twenty-four hours after her arrival at her first port of discharge." Goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the vessel, with the same goods on board, departed from a port on the West Coast of Africa, and more than twenty-four after she had arrived at her first port of discharge, the goods were lost by perils insured against in the original policy:-Held, that the words "the insurance to commence from the loading of the goods as above" were qualified by the words in the original policy, by which outward cargo was to be considered homeward "interest twenty-four hours after the vessel's arrival at her first port of discharge, and that the risk had consequently attached, and the underwiters were liable.-Joyce v. Realm Marine Insurance Co., 41 L. J., Q. B. 356.

COVENANT AGAINST TRADE.— - Unreasonableness Costs.-Deft, entered into a covenant that he should not, at any time within two years from quitting Messrs. A. & Son's service, directly or indirectly sell, procure orders for the sale, or recommend, or be in anywise concerned or engaged in the sale or recommendation, either on his own account or for any other person or persons or any company, of any Burton ale, or beer or porter, or of any ale, beer or porter brewed at Burton, or offered for sale as such, other than the ale, or beer or porter brewed by the firm :-Held, that the covenant went beyond anything that could be reasonably required for plts'. protection, and was inoperative independently of any absolute rule requiring a limitation of area. Semble, the want of such limitation would have avoided the covenant. Deft. having broken his express contract, was allowed no costs.-Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, 42. L. J. Ch. 12.

NEGLIGENCE.-Railway company-Agreement by passenger to travel at his own