tion. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a Senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX 3

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY HON. LESTER L. WOLFF, SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN, ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, AUGUST 4, 1977

Report on 1975–76 Hearings

As you know, Secretary Vance is scheduled to visit the People's Republic of China later this month. The Carter administration has consistently indicated its determination to follow up on the Shanghai Communique of 1972, and to pursue normalization with the People's Republic of China. Secretary Vance's trip can be seen as an effort to reestablish a sense of momentum towards normalization between our two nations.

The timing of this visit is propitious in terms of the work of the Congress, for I am releasing today a study and analysis of the issue of normalization, and the triangular relationship between the People's Republic of China, the United States, and the Soviet Union stemming from a 2-year series of hearings I chaired starting in 1975.

I think this analysis, produced by the Library of Congress, is particularly timely today because by interpreting the views of our nation's foremost Sinologists some of whom, incidentally, now serve the administration-we can help the American people understand some of the complicated issues surrounding normalization, and the foreign policy relationships between our country, the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.

Further, I feel that this analysis should prove useful to experts in and out of the administration who are seeking to find a common ground in defining, redefining and implementing our foreign policy.

Before discussing some personal views and recommendations stemming from the experience of these hearings, and my visit to the People's Republic of China last year, let me briefly outline some of the major themes which developed during the 2-year duration of the hearings. As you will note from the paper you have before you, many have direct impact on issues facing us today.

First, the hearings helped clarify and define for the first time in our foreign policy debate the existence of a triangular interrelationship between the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. While we still have an unfortunate tendency to view our foreign policy relationships in nation to nation, bilateral terms, the witnesses at our hearings helped evidence that we live in an interdependent world. In particular, actions we take on China must also take into account the reaction of the Soviet Union, and vice

versa.

This may seem a truism now, but I can assure you that that principle was not clearly established when our hearings began in 1975, and that the degree of interdependence of our foreign policy is still an area of great analysis and debate today.

Second, the hearings helped analyze and define what we have in common with the People's Republic of China, as well as our points of divergence. Normalization is obviously a complicated foreign policy achievement, and these hearings helped clarify many of the specific issues and difficulties which Secretary Vance may confront this month, and which the Carter administration will certainly confront in the months ahead.

Finally, the hearings helped place the United States-China relationship in a useful framework beyond the immediate triangular relationship, so that we can analyze the effects of our policy on Japan and our Asian neighbors and allies. To expand on some of these issues for a minute, the hearings showed that while it is proper to speak of a triangular relationship, we should realize that the triangle has sides of unequal length. To continue the metaphor, the sides between the United States and Russia, and the United States and China, are longer than the sides between Russia and China.

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Our witnesses provided some of the first in-depth analysis of the Sino-Soviet split, and a consistent theme was that the split stems from deep and genuine ideological and political differences which are not likely to be solved for a long time, if ever. We do not know whether this means that if the United States and the People's Republic of China do not normalize in the near future a counter policy would be for Russia and China to seek rapprochement regardless of their differences. It must be borne in mind that we, too, have deep differences with the People's Republic of China, but that normalization is none the less in progress.

Most witnesses generally agreed that for the purposes of analyzing our normalization posture with the People's Republic of China we should realize that the Sino-Soviet split is a key motivating factor on the part of the Chinese, and that it is not a superficial squabble which will vanish overnight.

One practical application of the use of the triangular relationship in analyzing U.S. policy came to light during the hearings and again recently; that is, the issue of whether or not to sell arms to the People's Republic of China.

The focus of a major hearing in April 1976, just prior to my visit to the People's Republic of China, the issues raised were virtually identical to the debate within the Carter administration which was revealed in the press this June. That is, what would be the effect on détente with the Soviet Union of arms sales to the People's Republic of China?

Most of our witnesses indicated a cautionary approach to this entire issue would be preferable, and the Carter administration has apparently reached roughly the same decision-that arms sales to the People's Republic of China would be too grave a risk for détente at this time. I would say, however, that this does not mean our China policy should be made in Moscow.

Finally, a major theme of the hearings was the issue of how to settle the Taiwan question. Right from the outset in 1975, most of our witnesses stressed the importance of settling this question in the wake of the Shanghai Communique on the one hand, and on the other, the formal diplomatic and defense commitments we have had with Taiwan over the years.

The issue of Taiwan has come to be the single largest question in our pursuit of normalization with the People's Republic of China. These hearings provide an invaluable compendium of the issues involved in abrogating our defense treaty with Taiwan, for example, and what our future relationship with Taiwan can be. Let me begin my personal comments by noting that many of our witnesses indicated that a "Japanese solution" to the Taiwan issue may be possible for the United States, given that we have said in the Shanghai Communique we will move toward removing our formal defense presence from Taiwan.

But we have done this in the context of indicating our strong interest in a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem.

The People's Republic of China, on the other hand, has said it will brook no interference in its policies towards Taiwan, which it regards as a province of China.

But because of the possibility of an attack on Taiwan, no matter how remote for either People's Republic of China policy reasons or practical military realities, I recommend that the U.S. negotiating position on normalization should inIclude the point that if we must abrogate our formal commitment to Taiwan, we should receive in return permission for an informal, de facto arrangement of some sort.

In this way, we may be able to locate. somewhere between our position and that of the People's Republic of China, the gray, bargaining area necessary for successful negotiation. Certainly if we do not make our position clear at the outset, our chances for a solution compatible with our goal of stability in Asia may be severely diminished.

In this regard, however, let me briefly note that since the Shanghai Communique is apparently to be the rock upon which present and future bargaining is to be founded, the issues remaining unresolved from the Communique should be clearly understood by both sides.

The key section of the English-language version of the Communique states, and I quote:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The U.S. Government does not

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challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. (See pg. 52 of the report.)

I make the point today that in that document, we do not say whether we accept or reject claims by either the People's Republic of China or the Nationalist government as to which actually owns Taiwan. We simply say that we take note of the position of the two governments concerned, and that we feel that any settlement of questions in this area must be made by the Chinese themselves.

Each side has said something. All we have done is acknowledge what has been said. But because of the ambiguity of what has been said, Taiwan remains one of the major obstacles to normalization.

I make this point because I am not entirely persuaded that the U.S. position is understood on either side of the Taiwan Strait today.

Further, and this brings me to a major point I wish to make, the Shanghai Communique seems to me to leave out an important part of any future equation containing a solution to the Taiwan problem-the views of the native Taiwanese themselves.

Let me suggest one way for us to find out how the people of Taiwan feel about this: Since both the United States and the People's Republic of China have consistently indicated their support for the principle of self-determination, why not support a plebescite, open to international inspection, so that the native people of Taiwan can indicate their preference on normalization?

Please understand that I am raising the question, not suggesting the answer, when I say that a plebescite on Taiwan could provide a vehicle for a solution to this problem in view of the stated adherence of the United States and the People's Republic of China to the principles of self-determination.

Before opening the floor for questions, let me conclude by wishing Secretary Vance a safe and successful journey, and let me say that we all appreciate the magnitude of the difficulties confronting him in what I think is a common goalnormalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

APPENDIX 4

PRC RESPONSE TO WOLFF PRESS CONFERENCE ENTITLED "HSIN WAN PAO EXAMINES WOLFF PLAN FOR TAIWAN SECURITY" FROM FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE, AUGUST 11, 1977

[Unattributed "New Talk" column from the PRC: "The U.S. Strategy of Slipping Away by Casting Off a Cloak in Handling Chiang" Aug. 8, 1977]

SUMMARY

U.S. Congressman Wolff, who advocated that a plebiscite should be held in Taiwan to determine its future status, has suggested still another strategy which Taiwan's Chiang clique has referred to as the strategy of slipping away by casting off a cloak. What will be cast off is the "coordinated defense treaty" between the United States and the Chiang clique.

China has demanded that the United States sever diplomatic relations with the Chiang clique, abrogate the treaty and withdraw its troops from Taiwan in order to achieve normalization of relations. Washington said the most difficult thing is abrogating the treaty, noting that the United States has never done this before.

However, Wolff has made it very clear: "The treaty will be automatically null and void when there is a normalization of relations." This is commonsense. Nevertheless, there is a small handful of people in the United States who never act according to commonsense.

In fact, Wolff has his own scheme. He wanted to use a congressional resolution "as a substitute for the treaty and a continued guarantee for the security of Taiwan." The resolution may take two forms. First, it may directly express concern regarding the security of Taiwan. Second, it may indirectly express concern for the security of Taiwan by expressing concern for the security of the western Pacific.

Wolff said that he would make the proposal when the Congress resumes next month, after Vance returns from his visit to Peking. Wolff believes that Vance may draw up a relatively more precise timetable for normalization during his visit to Peking. He also believes that normalization is inevitable.

His scheme has four parts: First, a guarantee of security; second, the supply of parts for weapons; third, an economic guarantee; and fourth, negotiations with the Chiang clique. The second part is more or less the so-called Vietnamese formula and the third is more or less the so-called Japanese formula. When the four are put together, it will be a U.S. formula.

Though the word Wolff used is "guarantee," for the Taiwan Chang clique it means escape and abrogation. They believe that the United States wants to abrogate the coordinated defense treaty and slip away from it. It is they who cannot escape the fate of being forsaken by the United States. Thus, they are frightened when they hear the word "guarantee."

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