the United States-Republic of China defense treaty remain the greatest impediment to United States-People's Republic of China normalization.

Finally, it was generally agreed at the hearings that the Taiwan problem-the existence of a government in Taiwan in opposition to the government in Peking-will not be settled quickly, and will probably persist for many years, if not decades. Several spokesmen at the hearings, notably former Senator Hugh Scott, indicated that the United States should use its influence to encourage peace talks between Peking and Taipei, as well as to maintain stability in the Taiwan area and support Taiwan's security vis-a-vis the mainland. However, because of the protracted nature of the Taiwan issue, it was generally agreed that the United States should not wait for a reconciliation between Taipei and Peking before proceeding with United States-People's Republic of China normalization.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

Points of general agreement on the normalization issue which were voiced during the hearings were unable to obscure the continuing strong differences of opinion among those who testified over whether or not U.S. interests would be best served by normalization on People's Republic of China's terms. A review of the various schools of thought voiced in the hearings and elsewhere in the United States on normalization with the People's Republic of China underlines the difficulties faced by U.S. Government leaders as they determine how quickly the United States should try to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China and what steps should be taken. Most notably, the strong arguments made by proponents of United States-People's Republic of China normalization on Peking's terms are countered by the forceful arguments pointing up the major disadvantages of such action. It seems clear from the conflicting testimony at the hearings and other forums that there is still no consensus in the United States on what steps should be taken by the United States to promote the normal ization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

A. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST NORMALIZATION

1. U.S. Interests

Arguments for and against normalization on Peking's terms focus on U.S. strategic, economic, and moral interests. In the strategic area, proponents of such normalization claim that it is likely to strengthen the United States-People's Republic of China understanding-set forth in the Shanghai Communique that the two countries will cooperate together to maintain a stable balance of power in East Asia that will preclude domination of the region by international "hegemony"-a euphemism denoting the Soviet Union. Establishment of United States-People's Republic of China diplomatic relations on terms agreeable to Peking is also said to represent a major diplomatic accomplishment for the current leaders in Peking, which would presumably serve to reinforce their recent policies of cordiality toward the United States and hostility toward the Soviet Union. At the same

6 Testimony of former Senator Hugh Scott, Oct. 13, 1977.

time, the relations are expected to develop to the extent that Peking could become more cooperative in the settlement of such sensitive international problems as the military confrontation in Korea and international arms control.'

Opponents of this point of view are quick to note the uncertainty of these hoped for benefits and the clear disadvantages of complying with Peking's demand that the United States break with Taiwan. The United States would lose official contact with a longstanding ally and would lose access to modern military installations on Taiwan. U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan is also said to be likely to call into questionat least temporarily-U.S. willingness to stand by its defense commitments elsewhere in Asia. The impact reportedly would be particularly severe in Japan, unless the United States took strong measures to support and protect Japanese interests in the region. It is also said to be likely to have an adverse impact on Korea and on the noncommunist states of Southeast Asia.8

The termination of the U.S. security guarantee for Taiwan may also seriously disrupt U.S. economic interests on the island. Thus, for example, if the Chinese communists gain control of Taiwan, they might confiscate foreign investments and curb foreign trade there. Of course, most U.S. observers judge that there is at present little likelihood of the People's Republic of China quickly gaining direct control of Taiwan, even if the United States withdrew from the island. However, although the communists may not immediately assert control over Taiwan, some U.S. observers, notably Marinus van Gessel, believe that the termination of the U.S. security guarantee for Taiwan might severely undermine international business confidence in the island's future prosperity and lead to a substantial setback for U.S. economic interests there. The United States currently has over $3 billion in investments in Taiwan and United States-Taiwan trade each year is several times the annual United States-People's Republic of China trade. In 1976, for instance, United States-Taiwan trade was valued at over $4 billion, while United States-People's Republic of China trade was under $400 million.

The main economic advantage for the United States in normalization on People's Republic of China terms is that formal United StatesPeople's Republic of China diplomatic relations are likely to lead to increased Chinese trade with the United States.

However, other factors-unrelated to United States-People's Republic of China diplomatic relations-are said to continue to put severe limits on Peking's interest in trade with the United States. Thus, for example, the Chinese Communists continue to adhere to policies of economic "self-reliance" which require Chinese officials, wherever possible, to use Chinese-made products and to avoid purchases from abroad. At the same time, the Chinese communist administrationunlike the Nationalist government on Taiwan-does not allow foreigners to invest in its economy.

Regarding U.S. political and ideological concerns over the promotion of international justice and morality, the main advantage of nor

7 See, for example, testimony of A. Doak Barnett and Allen Whiting, Sept. 20, 1977, and testimony of Donald Zagoria. Sept. 28, 1977.

8 See in particular testimony of Nathaniel Thayer and Robert Scalapino, Sept. 20, 1977. • Testimony of Marinus van Gessel, Oct. 11, 1977.

malization centers on the fact that the United States would finally be recognizing the existing government of China. Normalization would thus put an end to what Robert Barnett and many others in the United States have seen as mistaken policy of U.S. refusal to officially recognize a government representing one quarter of the human race.10 At the same time, establishing relations with Peking would fulfill the commitment to normalize Sino-United States relations, made by the United States in the 1972 Shanghai Communique.

However, these benefits must be weighed-at least for the foreseeable future-against the major moral questions that would accompany a U.S. break with Taiwan. Thus, for example, Ray S. Cline and many other American observers feel that the United States cannot in good conscience unilaterally cut ties with a government of 16 million people that has supported the United States for almost 30 years. In particular, ending the U.S. security guarantee for Taiwan runs the risk of subjecting the people there to intimidation and perhaps eventual military attack from the People's Republic of China-events that run diametrically against traditional U.S. support for the principles of self-determination, popular sovereignty, and international freedom from military threat. If Taiwan came under People's Republic of China control, the condition of individual freedom and civil rights on the island would decline-a development contrary to U.S. ideological principles.11

2. Impact of People's Republic of China leadership changes

Major changes in the Chinese leadership over the past two years have exacerbated differences in the United States over the normalization question. Foes and proponents of normalization on Peking's terms disagree strongly over whether the recently fluid political situation in Peking should cause the United States to slow or speed up its efforts to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. In particular the changing leadership situation has prompted strong differences in the assessments of U. S.-China experts concerning the degree of flexibility in Chinese demands for the termination of U.S. involvement in Taiwan.

Since early 1976, Chinese leadership instability has been highlighted by the deaths of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung, the purge and subsequent reinstatement of Chou's protege, Vice Premier Teng Hsiaoping, and the arrest and purge of Teng's chief adversaries-the notorious "gang of four" led by Politburo Members Chang Chun-chiao and Chiang Ching. Some experts question whether the United States can be sure that agreements on normalization reached with the current Chinese leaders will continue to be honored by future leaders in Peking, and they warn that since the United States has little assurance that the present leadership in China will prove to be any more stable than its recent predecessors, the United States should delay normalization until more firmly established Chinese leaders emerge.

Instability in Peking is also said to reduce chances that the Chinese Communists will change policy toward the United States. The current

10 Testimony of Robert Barnett, Sept. 28. 1977.

11 Testimony of Ray S. Cline, Sept. 29, 1977.

12 Compare, for example, the testimony on this issue of A. Doak Barnett and Allen Whiting with that of Ray S. Cline and Harold Hinton.

leaders in Peking are said to be preoccupied with domestic political difficulties stemming from the recent leadership changes and are reportedly unwilling to make any major changes in Chinese foreign policy-such as a shift against the United States-which would seriously complicate Peking's already extensive problems. Some witnesses predicted that Peking will continue cordial relations with the United States, whether or not Washington is active on the normalization question.

Rejecting these arguments, some proponents of normalization on People's Republic of China terms maintain that the fluid leadership situation in China should prompt the United States to increase the pace of normalization efforts. The current pragmatic, moderate leaders in Peking are said to follow policies agreeable to the United States: the Peking leadership has expressed an intention to increase trade and scientific-cultural exchanges with the United States, and it has softened past Chinese media invective against U.S. foreign and domestic policies. These proponents argue that it is in the best interests of the United States to see that these moderate leaders remain in power and are not replaced by a more revolutionary, less accommodating regime. Members of this school of thought maintain that there probably will never be a better time than the present for the United States to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China. And, if Washington delays normalization, it runs the risk of alienating the new Peking leaders and subjecting them to pressure from other Chinese leaders who distrust the United States and favor a more militant People's Republic of China line against both the United States and the Soviet Union. In contrast, by promptly normalizing relations with China, the United States would provide moderate Chinese leaders with a major diplomatic success-something that would support their efforts to consolidate power and offset potential rivals for power in Peking. Allen Whiting and others in this group have gone on to claim that although Peking has been patient over U.S. policy on the Taiwan issue for six years, this patience may soon wear thin. They judge that the current Chinese leaders place top priority on obtaining U.S. acceptance of the three conditions dealing with Taiwan. They note that Peking's current conditions represent a moderation of past People's Republic of China conditions for normalization of relations with the United States and that Peking is justified in feeling that it is now Washington's turn to compromise in order for normalization to proceed. They said that the alternative to U.S. compromise could be a potentially explosive situation developing in a few years, in which Peking would become increasingly inclined to use force to obtain jurisdiction over Taiwan.

This analysis is disputed by other U.S. China xperts such as Robert Scalapino who feel that Peking currently is less concerned with Taiwan than with the question of U.S. policy vis -vis the Soviet Union.13 They judge that Peking will continue a moderate posture on Taiwan so long as the United States assists the People's Republic of China international policies by maintaining a strong strategic presence which serves to offset Soviet influence in Fast Asia and elsewhere. Some of this group claim that Peking compromised its position on Taiwan in

13 Testimony of Robert Scalapino, Sept. D. 1977.

receiving President Nixon and signing the Shanghai Communique prior to a U.S. withdrawal from the island, precisely because the Chinese leaders were more interested in U.S. help against the Soviet Union than in U.S. policy over Taiwan. These spokesmen predict that so long as the United States remains a useful anti-Soviet lever for the People's Republic of China, there is little likelihood of a People's Republic of China initiated flareup over the Taiwan issue.

3. U.S. complications

Some U.S. observers judge that recent U.S. policy decisions have complicated the process of United States-People's Republic of China normalization. Thus, for example, Donald Zagoria claimed during the hearings that the U.S. decision earlier this year to withdraw troops from South Korea over the next five years had served to seriously upset Japan, South Korea, and the non-Communist Southeast Asian states.14 This apparently caused the United States to vascillate on a decision to withdraw from Taiwan for fear of further upsetting these friendly countries. A number of commentators have argued that a U.S. pull back from Taiwan, coming on the heels of the announced withdrawal from Korea, would call into question the future U.S. strategic posture in the region; it might promote seriously destabilizing conditions in East Asia which would adversely affect U.S. interests in the region. Similarly, Congressman Les AuCoin, Robert Barnett, and other spokesmen at the hearings criticized what they saw as a pattern of "indecisiveness" and a lack of coordination in recent U.S. policy on China and Asian affairs generally.15 It was asserted in the hearings that without clearly defined goals and strong strategic capability in East Asia, the United States will have difficulty in acting decisively in moving from Taiwan and in establishing full relations with the People's Republic of China.

Á number of commentators-including Congressman AuCoinhave also noted that the United States has been recently distracted from the normalization question on account of heavy preoccupation. with problems in other parts of the world.16 In particular, it has been claimed that the Carter administration has been unwilling to move forward on the normalization issue for fear of alienating conservative U.S. Senators, whose support the administration is seeking for ratification of the Panama Canal treaties.

A further complication on the American side concerns popular American ignorance of the issues involved in United States-People's Republic of China normalization. A poll conducted by a well-known public opinion surveying organization, suggested that there is a need for greater public awareness of these issues. The poll noted, for instance, that more than half of those surveyed did not know the ROC Government in Taipei was not a communist government. Indeed, almost 20 percent of those surveyed said that the ROC was communist.1 A number of spokesmen at the hearings praised the Asian affairs subcommittee for promoting an exchange of views designed in part to improve public knowledge of the problems in U.S. relations with China.

14 Testimony of Donald Zagoria, Sept. 28, 1977.

15 Testimony of Congressman Les AuCoin, Oct. 11, 1977, and testimony of Robert Barnett, Sept. 28, 1977.

16 Testimony of Congressman Les AuCoin, Oct. 11, 1977.

17 "The United States and China: American Perceptions and Future Alternatives." Potomac Associates, 1977. 41 pp.