Of old sat Freedom on the heights,
The thunders breaking at her feet:
Above her shook the starry lights:
She heard the torrents meet . .

Then stept she down through town and field
To mingle with the human race,

And part by part to men revealed
The fullness of her face.

Her open eyes desire the truth,
The wisdom of a thousand years
Is in them. May perpetual youth
Keep dry their light from tears !—

That her fair form may rise and shine, Make bright our days and light our dreams, Turning to scorn with lips divine

The falsehood of extremes.

PART II

THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL GOVERNMENT ARE MORAL ASSUMPTIONS

Justice

"There is no middle course: two masters cannot be served. must either be enthroned above might, and the moral law take the place of the edicts of selfish passion; or the heart of the people, which alone can sustain the efforts of the people, will languish; their desires will not spread beyond the plough and the loom, the field and the fireside; the sword will appear to them an emblem of no promise; an instrument of no hope; an object of indifference, of disgust or fear. . . . Let the fire, which is never wholly extinguished, break out afresh; let but the human creature be roused; whether he have lain headless and torpid in religious or civil slavery; have languished under a thraldom, domestic or foreign, ... let him rise and act" (Wordsworth, “Essay on the Convention of Cintra," quoted in the " Albion " edition of his poems).

F Government is to be moral, the principles that

assumptions. The Science of Politics like that of Ethics or of Formal logic must be a normative or teaching Science. Its principles cannot be simply due to generalisations of observed facts, as in the physical sciences; they must on the contrary be statements of what ought to be. The State cannot claim as regards its first principles themselves, to base these principles on inductions from observed facts. The facts may corroborate the principles, but that is all. Instance the almost universal laws against murder. The State does not claim to have collected instances of murder, to have

noted that these have been uniformly injurious to Society as a whole, and then to have made a generalisation on the subject and induced a principle of law to the effect that all murders are injurious to Society, and then on the strength of that principle to have legislated against such deeds. History and observation are alike against such a notion. The legislation proceeded, of course, from an a priori conviction that murder was morally wrong; it being an invasion by one citizen of the absolute and a priori Right of another; and this apart altogether from official or other statistics.

To produce another instance of the deductive methods of true politics. The nations of Christendom-as also many other nations-in their upward course have particularly extolled and rejoiced in their national and individual liberty, and individual liberty has been insisted upon with passion and persistence, and sometimes with an almost incredible heroism. If ever

anything in the whole realm of politics has been urged on purely a priori grounds as a moral assumption it is this claim to religious and political liberty. None of the heroes of the cause even affect to have made numerous and accurate experiments as to the " Utility" of liberty to States in general, or to their own respective States in particular, and then to have induced from their observations the principle that successful States have free citizens. The whole history of liberty is that of an incessant application to particular circumstances of an ethical doctrine held independently of expert generalisations from political phenomena.

The First or moral Principles which animate a moral State are not the doubtful result of calculation and experiment, nor can they be regarded as amenable to

modification, excepting in the sense of growth and development. But this must not be confused with the means adopted for the application of these first moral principles; such means being, generally speaking and as far as morals are concerned, capable of being adopted, changed, or deserted at the dictates of expediency, or such estimate of expediency as the State can make.

THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF THE STATE— THEIR ORIGIN IN PERSONALITY

What then are these First Principles, and why are they to be regarded as the basis of all moral politics?

The answer is to be found in the nature of the subject-matter of politics, i.e. Man. As Man is—so must the laws be that govern him. Everything must depend on whether we regard a man as a Person endowed with all the attributes of Personality and with all the a priori "Rights " inherent in that idea, or whether we regard him as a part of an organism with no significance other than is contained in his physical relation thereto.

It is here assumed that Man is a Personal Being, and that while related to a social " organism," his significance is not therein exhausted. It is further assumed that Personality and its essential qualities of self-consciousness, free-will, and conscience are due to a relation which is ultra-social, viz., to his relation to the Supreme and Absolute Person, from whom he obtains his power of self-determination, and to whom he is immediately responsible.

In order to perceive more closely how the fact of Personality with all that flows from it, while it inspires the State with a definite moral ideal, also limits and directs it, it will be necessary to inquire as to what is meant by a Person. The matter is important owing to the necessity (a necessity frequently ignored) of all disputants, before engaging in political discussion, being clear as to the meaning of all the salient terms they employ, especially as to what they respectively mean by a Man, whether he is a Person or not, and if a Person, what is meant by that, and what follows therefrom.

One thing at least is clear, and that is, that no being whose significance is exhausted in his relation to other created beings, animate or inanimate, can be a Person, or be possessed of individuality. No being can be merely a part of the finite Whole and be in any true sense a Person. That is to say, that if the individual were merely a part of a Whole, he would necessarily be determined by that Whole. But we know that he is only Personal in so far as he is determined, not from without, but from within-that is to say, is self-determined.

Personality implies freewill and moral responsibility, both of which imply a certain independence of Society on the part of the individual, and a relation to an ultra-social authority, to whom he is immediately responsible.

Reviewing Kant's position, a learned writer says of him :

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"He pointed out that all persons, in virtue of their inherent freedom, are ends in themselves, and never merely means to other ends. Their power of self-determination, of becoming a law to themselves, is inalienable, irresistibly compelling them to regard