strating the tendency of the dominant thought of the day to arrogate to itself every sphere of thought and action. As formerly in the case of theology, so now in the case of science, the dominant thought is a veritable Procrustes, lopping and stretching all other forms of thought till they come to the measure of its own understanding. It has been claimed, and no doubt rightly, that the social sciences ought not to stand aloof from biology, but ought to obtain from it any light it is able to give them. But such statements as the following are extremely misleading. We are told that it is time "for the biologist to advance over the frontier and carry the methods of his science boldly into human society, where he has but to deal with the phenomena of life" (Benjamin Kidd, "Social Evolution," page 28). To make thus, as it were, a play upon the word "life" so that the term biology shall connote not merely that life which is wholly controlled by physical law, but also that life which, on a religious hypothesis, transcends it, and on any showing cannot be proved to come wholly within it, is to jeopardise honest inquiry. This analogy of the organism is of course highly useful to those persons who desire, for the purpose of facilitating their extensive and peculiar "reforms," to merge the individual in the whole so that he cannot appeal to his moral Rights as against the decision of the State. All such moral defence would be swept away, seeing that by the analogy he is merely a part of an organism for whose convenience alone he exists, and that his relations with that organism exhaust his significance.1 1 See Appendix A. THE MEANING OF RIGHTS AND THE Seeing then that the Person cannot be merged in the "Whole" or controlled in the alleged interests of its alleged "highest good," it will now be well to examine at greater length that thing in the interests of which he can be controlled. Unless we are to do violence to the sanctity and integrity of Personality, the Person can only be forcibly controlled in the interests of his Freedom, that is to say--in the interests of his natural "Rights." It is this moral or personal “Right” that inspires the State with a moral aim or ideal, and indicates the kind of means to be adopted for the attainment of that aim. Those who hold that the individual's Rights and claims are wholly relative and subordinate to the alleged "good" of the Whole, are compelled also to maintain that the "right" is that which is (ie. appears to be) "useful" for society, and that the justification of any human relation or activity is to be sought in its demonstrable utility to the Whole. Thus we read in the "Fabian Essays "_" The actions and propensities of the individual have always, it appears, been judged by his fellows moral or immoral chiefly according to their supposed effects upon society. The object of every living creature being to do as he pleases, if what he proposes to do incommodes other people, they will take measures to restrain him from doing it. This they strive to do by means of laws and conventional codes of morality . . ." (Mr Sydney Olivier, in "Fabian Essays," p. 110). Again-"We find that in all Societies those actions and habits are approved as moral which tend to preserve the existence of Society and convenience of its members; and that those which are, or seem to be, fraught with contrary tendencies, are considered immoral” (ibid., 107). This is the Socialist view, a view somewhat similar to that entertained by a section of the Roman Catholic Communion. The only alternative standard of right and wrong must be sought in the independent moral nature, i.e. the a priori Rights of the individual. It is evident to all who believe in Personality, that our relation with our Divine environment and consequent relation with our fellow men are not justified, ¿.e. do not become right, because a political majority considers that they have been experimentally proved to be good for society; but, on the contrary, they are good for Society because they are right. So that morality is not the product of Society. Society only provides the occasion of the manifestation of morality, and so becomes a condition of its development. The Person is more than a member of the finite Whole. If he were not so he would be wholly determined by that Whole, in which case he could not be a Person, though he might be a sentient automaton. The Person has correspondences (to which he owes his personality) outside society, outside phenomena, with an Environment which is Divine and Personal, to which he owes his free-will, and to which he is responsible for the use to which he puts that free-will. Such a relation implies self-consciousness, with its corollary of self-development, self-discipline, self-determination, conscience, and free deliberation and decision. Now all this implies an area of independent activity-free from the coercion of our neighbours. But what is this area to be? What are its limits? It is to be replied that there are no limits to this area of personal liberty at all, save only that, in the enjoyment of our freedom, we secure a similar freedom to our neighbour. This area, sacred from the forcible intrusion of our neighbour, is what is ultimately meant by a Person's Rights. Rights owe their existence to the recognition by each individual of his own personality on the one hand, and upon the other to an equal recognition of a similar personality in others. These two attitudes are intimately associated. Thus speaking of "my neighbour and myself," F. D. Maurice says: "Supposing I forget either, I forget the other. I cease to recognise the distinctness or worth of my neighbour if I do not recognise my own; I cease to recognise my own distinctness and worth if I do not recognise his " (" Social Morality,” p. 3). It follows therefore that the preservation of the Rights of the individual is all important to the preservation of that respect by each one for his neighbour which is the basis of all society. No legislation which ignores the rights of the individual as its basis, and attempts instead some "short cut" to the Good of the Whole, can do otherwise than undermine mutual reverence and respect, and so make for the dissolution of Society. It will be seen, therefore, that the type of individualism I have ventured to call Political Personalism is essentially altruistic. The Personalist insisting on his own rights insists equally upon those of his neighbour, the common fact of Personality compelling him; for the Personalist is compelled to seek and to enforce the sanctity and integrity of Personality in general; his own Personality as well as that of others, the Personality of others as well as that of himself. It is extremely common to hear the attitude of the Socialist described and extolled as being necessarily unselfish or altruistic, while that of their opponents is assumed to be essentially the reverse. As already observed, the word individualist has a double significance. It may either denote the person who on principle seeks his own individual advantage, and recommends all others to follow his example; or it may be applied to the individual who seeks to maintain the sanctity and integrity under all circumstances of the individual Person, i.e. of Personality in general. To the first of these persons we have limited the application of the term individualist, introducing the term Personalist to denote the second. That the political theory of the individualist, as above described, would involve not only selfishness, but the exaltation of selfishness to the level of a virtue, may be readily conceded. But it cannot be admitted that the type of individualism here styled Political Personalism can be condemned as selfish, or as in any way involving selfishness. We are selfish if we seek our own interests or political ideals, or the interests or ideals of our class or party without due regard to the Rights of others. But the Socialist, who is so widely regarded as altruistic, for his part does not even allow of the existence of the rights of others; and, unless those others constitute a powerful political party, he is not bound in his search for the Good of the Whole to consider them at all. Indeed, it may be said further, that he is not even bound to search for the Good of the Whole at all |