should be, seeing that it is one of the greatest works on modern politics that has been given to the public. No apology, therefore, is needed for introducing from that noble work a somewhat lengthy quotation, bearing as that quotation does upon the issues under consideration, and setting them forth in a manner patently impossible to the present writer.

"A time, however, came in the progress of human affairs, when men ceased to think it a necessity of nature that their governors should be an independent power, opposed in interest to themselves. It appeared to them much better that the various magistrates of the State should be their tenants or delegates, revocable at their pleasure. In that way alone, it seemed, could they have complete security that the powers of government would never be abused to their disadvantage. By degrees this new demand for elective and temporary rulers became the prominent object of the exertions of the popular party, whenever any such party existed; and superseded, to a considerable extent, the previous efforts to limit the power of rulers. As the struggle proceeded for making the ruling power emanate from the periodical choice of the ruled, some persons began to think that too much importance had been attached to the limitation of the power itself. That (it might seem) was a resource against rulers whose interests were habitually opposed to those of the people. What was now wanted was that the rulers should be identified with the people; that their interest and will should be the interest and will of the nation. The nation did not need to be protected against its own will. There was no fear of it tyrannising over itself. Let the rulers be effectually responsible to it, promptly removable by it, and it could afford to trust them with power of which it could itself dictate the use to be made. Their power was but the nation's own power, concentrated and in a form convenient for exercise.

But in political and philosophical theories, as well as in persons, success discloses faults and infirmities which failure might have concealed from observation. The notion that the people have no

need to limit their power over themselves might seem axiomatic, when popular government was a thing only dreamed about, or read of as having existed at some distant period of the past. Neither was that notion necessarily disturbed by such temporary aberrations as those of the French Revolution, the worst of which were the work of an usurping few; and which, in any case, belonged, not to the permanent working of popular institutions, but to a sudden and convulsive outbreak against monarchical and aristocratic despotism. In time, however, a democratic republic came to occupy a large portion of the earth's surface, and made itself felt as one of the most powerful members of the community of nations; and elective and responsible government became subject to the observations and criticisms which wait upon a great existing fact. It was now perceived that such phrases as 'self-government' and 'the power of the people over themselves,' do not express the true state of the case. The 'people' who exercise the power are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised; and the 'self-government' spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by all the rest. The will of the people, moreover, practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people; the majority, or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority; the people consequently may desire to oppress a part of their number; and precautions are as much needed against this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, therefore, of the power of government over individuals loses none of its importance when the holders of power are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to the strongest party therein " ("On Liberty," page 2).

However cautiously and cunningly we devise a democratic constitution in the interests of liberty, if the Spirit of liberty ceases to inspire and animate the Nation, we shall find that there is nothing more in a democratic form of government to exclude tyranny than there is in any other form. The fact is that "democracy" is not a "utility" over and above any other form of rational government; rather does it

stand for the recognition of a moral Right, one which in former ages had not been seriously claimed, to wit, the Right of a Person to have a voice in the government of the country if he was compelled to contribute to that government. Seeing, then, that democracy, contrary to early speculation and hope, forms no safeguard against tyranny, surely it behoves those who care for the Commonwealth to imbue as far as possible the minds of all-but especially of the young-with the Spirit of liberty. That Spirit established, nothing need give us fear. Exceptional legal measures will not alarm us, they will be but transient expedients-steps up to liberty.

In insisting on the dangers attending democratic government, as we have, it may not be out of place to point out two principal fallacies regarding it which are commonly held. The first is that the popular opinion is reflected by the Government majority.

Now there are two senses in which the word majority" is employed. Sometimes it means the parliamentary majority, and sometimes the majority of opinion among the electorate. Thus in a community consisting of parties A., B., and C., A. may entertain an opinion of which B. does not approve, and B. may have an opinion disliked by A.; C., on the other hand, may be opposed to both opinions. It is clear that among the electorate-were issues judged separately-both A. and B. would be in a minority. But experience shows that A. will dishonestly conspire with B. to produce a fictitious parliamentary majority. Both A. and B. then come forward in their Parliament, and claim that they have a mandate from the people.

Parliamentary majorities have a tendency to be mere

conspiracies. In the early days of party Government, the domestic questions that arose were comparatively few, and the issues on which a party were elected to power were proportionately clear. Moreover, the science and art of parliamentary intrigue and conspiracy were not then in the developed state in which they are now. But while nowadays any parliamentary majority may be the mere outcome of an intrigue between minorities, Radical majorities are, for various reasons, peculiarly liable to this failing. No one, e.g., can pretend that the Radical bourgeoisie are really at one with their communist "allies." It is also impossible to believe in the bona fides of the Irish Home Rule party when it finds itself able to vote unanimously on subjects which do not concern it (as a Home Rule party) and which played no part in its election. It is also absurd to suppose that by some coincidence, the people opposed to the employment of Chinese labour in South Africa, should also, for instance, be opposed to the Education Bill or the use of alcohol, or the establishment of the Church, or vaccination, or the House of Lords.

It was very significant after the last election, that newly elected members should one day claim-on this count or that a mandate from the people, and the next day discuss dubiously on what grounds they had been elected.

The fact is, of course, as we have said, that there are two senses in which the term "majority" is used, viz., firstly, the majority of opinion in the country, and secondly, the majority by way of conspiracy in Parliament, and of this ambiguity politicians are not slow to avail themselves. The danger to liberty arising from

this state of things has long been apparent. All kinds of measures are passed, many of which would certainly have been repudiated by the people, had they had the opportunity of declaring their opinion by way of the referendum. But even if the electoral majority of the moment greets with acclaim certain curtailments of public liberty as favourable to their party interests, and so does not itself at the time consciously suffer from such curtailments, yet that majority-when the party exigencies which created it are overpast, and it has broken up again into its several parts-will have occasion to consider whether their successful Parliamentary conspiracy had not cost more than it was permanently worth. The Radicals-who are largely bourgeoisie-are already considering whether it is worth paying an unlimited price for the Wage Vote; and some of the Wage party are considering the advisability of transferring their allegiance to the Unionists.

The second fallacy is that a minority, if it is "right,” has only to bide its time to become a majority. Even were this historically true, the fact remains that the individuals composing the minority would-in a State not inspired by love of Liberty and Right-suffer wrong. Let us take the case of a minority desiring a certain liberty. The opinion of that minority may be an enduring thing; and as the individuals composing the minority are ever approaching severally the time of death-while they are waiting to get their claim to liberty recognised, the years of their servitude are increasing, and the time in which they may enjoy their liberty is ever diminishing. If we ultimately discover they are and were " right," how shall we justify ourselves