steam-whistle on a locomotive is sounded under a bridge while a traveler is passing over it, whereat his horses take fright, run away, and he is injured. The negligence of the servant of the company is the proximate cause of the injury, and the company must pay damages: Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Barnett, 59 Pa. St. 259; 98 Am. Dec. 346. A moored his barges, loaded with coal, in the middle of a stream, making them fast to a bridge below. In this position, if any of them should sink, it would probably work injury to the barges of others. One of them sank, by an accident which did not involve negligence in A, and in sinking lodged against and settled under the barges of B, which, when the water subsided, were thereby injured. A was liable to B: McGrew v. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436. A fire breaks out in the building of A; in order to get water to it, the firemen are obliged to lay their hose across a railway track; a train comes along and cuts the hose in two, although the servants of the railway company in charge of the train have notice that the hose is there, and have time to stop the train until it can be uncoupled and removed from the track; by reason of the hose being thus cut, the building is consumed. If the hose had not been cut, the fire would probably have been extinguished. Held, that the cutting of the hose is a proximate cause of the destruction of A's building, and the railway company must pay damages to A: Metallic Comp. Casting Co. v. R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 277; 12 Am. Rep. 689. B, in the entry to a school-room, seized A by the arm, swung him around, and let him go, thereby throwing him violently against C, who instantly pushed him away and against a hat-hook, which injured him. Held, that A could maintain an action of trespass against B: Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420; 9 Am. Rep. 267. § 1029. Intervening Causes. If the original act was wrongful, and would naturally, according to the ordinary course of events, prove injurious to some other person or persons, and does actually result in injury through the intervention of other causes which are not wrongful, the injury shall be referred to the wrongful cause, passing by those which were innocent.' The wrong-doer is liable for 1 Cooley on Torts, 70; Balt. etc. R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Md. 117; Goshen Tp. Co. v. Sears, 7 Conn. 86; Morse v. Richmond, 41 Vt. 435; 98 Am. Dec. 600; Seigel v. Eisen, 41 Cal. 109; Tucker v. Henniker, 41 N. H. 317; Winship v. Enfield, 42 N. H. 197; Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271; 58 Am. Dec. 699; Macauley v. New York, 67 N. Y. 602; Thomas v. Hook, 4 Phila. 119; Holley v. Winooski Turnpike Co., 1 Aiken, 74; Byrne v. Wilson, 15 I. C. L. R. 332; Hunt v. Pownal, 9 Vt. 411; Powell v. Deveny, 3 Cush. 300; 50 Am. Dec. 738; Joliet v. Verley, 35 Ill. 58; 85 Am. Dec. all the effects of his act,1 unless they are the result of the negligence of the injured person. Thus when one is injured by the negligence of another, the latter is responsible for any aggravation of the hurt caused by the neglect of a physician, provided the plaintiff was not negligent in selecting him.3 Where one is injured by the negligence of another, and the injury renders the system more susceptible to disease, and less able to resist it, and death results from such disease, such death is legally attributable to such negligence. If the origi nal wrong becomes injurious in consequence of the intervention of some distinct wrongful act or omission. by another, the injury shall be imputed to the first wrong as the proximate cause,5 provided, however, that the intervening act was one which the defendant should either have anticipated or have guarded against. If the doing of a particular act is forbidden by law, and an agent for which the defendant is not responsible intervenes, and conforming with the defendant's unlawful act, but without negligence on his part, produces an injury, he (the defendant) will be responsible;' provided, however, that 342; Lacon v. Page, 48 Ill. 499; 1 Thompson on Negligence, 1091. 3 Collins v. Council Bluffs, 32 Iowa, 324; 7 Am. Rep. 200; Rice v. Des Moines, 40 Iowa, 638; Stover v. Bluehill, 51 Me. 439; Eastman v. Sanborn, 3 Allen, 594; 81 Am. Dec. 677; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Bluhm, 109 Ill. 20; 50 Am. Rep. 601; Loeser v. Humphrey, 41 Ohio St. 378; 52 Am. Rep. 86. Terre Haute etc. R. R. Co. v. Buck, 96 Ind. 346; 49 Am. Rep. 168. 5 Thompson on Negligence, 1089. Thompson on Negligence, 1089; Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507; Parker v. Cohoes, 10 Hun, 531; Davidson v. Nichol, 11 Allen, 514. 7 Clark v. Chambers, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 327; Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458; 8 Am. Rep. 354; Dickinson v. Boyle, 17 Pick. 78; 28 Am. Dec. 281; Woodward v. Aborn, 35 Me. 271; 58 Am. Dec. 699. the intervening agency was one the defendant was bound to anticipate.' If the damage has resulted directly from concurrent wrongful acts or neglects of two persons, each of these acts may be counted on as the wrongful cause, and the parties held responsible, either jointly or severally, for the injury. In an action brought to recover damages caused by the falling of lumber, which is alleged to have been carelessly piled by the defendant, if the lumber was thus carelessly piled up, the facts that it remained in that condition a long time before the injury, and that the lumber was caused to fall by the negligence of a stranger, are no defense; for the negligence of the defendant, concurring with the negligence of the stranger, is the direct and proximate cause of the injury. It is not relevant that the plaintiff or defendant were at the time of the injury engaged in violating the law.* Bosworth v. Brand, 1 Dana, 377; Sharp. Powell, L. R. 7 Com. P. 253. 2 Cooley on Torts, 79; Bartlett v. Boston Gas Co., 117 Mass. 533; 19 Am. Rep. 421; Burrows v. Gas Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 57; L. R. 7 Ex. 96; Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; 100 Am. Dec. 199; Philadelphia v. Weller, 4 Brewst. 24; Carpenter v. R. R. Co., 11 Abb. Pr., N. S., 416; Eaton v. R. R. Co., 11 Allen, 500; 87 Am. Dec. 730; Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190; Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B. 29; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Pa. St. 151; McCahill v. Kipp, 2 E. D. Smith, 413; Peck v. Neil, 3 McLean, 26; Smith v. Dobson, 3 Scott N. R. 336; Congreve v. Morgan, 18 N. Y. 84; 72 Am. Dec. 495; Irvin v. Fowler, 5 Robt. 482; Ricker v. Freeman, 50 N. H. 420; 9 Am. Rep. 267; Wheeler v. Worcester, 10 Allen, 591; Chapman v. R. R. Co., 19 N. Y. 341; 75 Am. Dec. 344; Colgrove v. R. R. Co., 20 N. Y. 492; Barrett v. R. R. Co., 45 N. Y. 628; McMahon v. Davidson, 12 Minn. 357. Some exceptions to the general rule are to be found in the books. Thus where dogs of several owners commit a trespass, each owner is not liable for the whole damage, but only for what his own dog did. See Division III., Title Animals, ante. "Another exception,' says Judge Thompson (Thompson on Negligence, 1088), "exists in England and in some American courts, in cases where the relation of the person injured to one of the parties doing the injury is such that they are deemed to be identified, in a juridical sense, with each other; as where the goods of A on board the vessel of B, A's carrier, are lost by reason of a collision between the vessel of B and the vessel of C, the pilots of both vessels being negligent; or where A, a passenger on board B's train of cars, is injured by B's train coming in contact with the train of C., the servants of both companies being negligent. Here A may recover damages of B, but not of C. Nor does this doctrine apply in case of actions for damages, under the statutes of Massachusetts, for injuries sustained by travelers in consequence of negligence of towns in suffering their highways to get out of repair": Shepherd v. Chelsea, 4 Allen, 113. ILLUSTRATIONS. A horse took fright from the carriage striking an obstruction in a way, and became unmanageable, and ran away, injuring the driver. Held, that the obstruction was the proximate cause of the injury: Clark v. Lebanon, 63 Me. 393. A man in a balloon landed in private grounds, attracting thereon a crowd of people, who trampled and destroyed the flowers and plants. Held, that he was liable for the damage: Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 381; 10 Am. Dec. 234. A negligently leaves his horse unhitched in a crowded street. The horse runs away, and, while going violently down the street, people run towards it, endeavoring to stop it. This causes the horse to swerve from the course it is taking, and brings it into contact with the horse and sleigh of B, causing damage to B. Held, A is answerable for the damage which B has thus sustained: Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81; 100 Am. Dec. 199. A, a dealer in lumber, negligently piled some timbers on each other near a passage-way. A wheel of the wagon of B, a customer, casually caught in a timber projecting from the pile, and threw the whole structure down upon C, another customer. The timbers had been thus piled several months before the accident. Held, that the negligence of A was the proximate cause of the injury to C: Pastene v. Adams, 49 Cal. 87. Hoisting-shears were held in position by two guys. A stevedore cast the front guy loose, and did not refasten it. The next day, some boys swung on the rear guy, and caused the shears to fall and break. They would not have fallen but for the swinging of the boys, and the swinging of the boys would not have caused them to fall had the stevedore refastened the front guy. Held, that the stevedore was not liable for the injury to the shears caused by the fall: Tutein v. Hurley, 98 Mass. 211; 93 Am. Dec. 154. A negligently piled boards on the traveled part of a highway. B, driving along, ran over the boards, and the contents of his wagon produced a rattling noise, which frightened C's horse, causing him to jump, and threw C out of his wagon. The horse was a well-broken horse and well driven. In an action by C against A, held, that a nonsuit was improper: Lake ". Milliken, 62 Me. 240; 16 Am. Rep. 456. The defendant put a dangerous spiked hurdle in a private road over which he and others had rights of way. Some person, without the knowledge of the defendant, moved the hurdle a few yards. On a dark night, the plaintiff, who was not a trespasser, without negligence, and thinking to avoid the original position of the hurdle, came into collision with it, and was injured. Held, that the plaintiff could recover from the defendant: Clark v. Chambers, L. B. 3 Q. B. D. 327. A sign, hung over a street in a city, with due care as to its construction and fastenings, but in violation of a city ordinance which subjected its owner to a penalty for placing and keeping it there, was blown down. by the wind in an extraordinary gale, and, in its fall, a bolt which was part of its fastenings struck and broke a window in a neighboring building. Held, that the owner of the sign was liable for the injury to the window: Sailsbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458; 8 Am. Rep. 354. The defendant had, contrary to the provisions of the police act, washed a van in the street, and suffered the water used for the purpose to flow down a gutter towards a sewer at some little distance. The weather being frosty, a grating through which the water flowing down the gutter passed into the sewer had become frozen over, in consequence of which the water sent down by the defendant, instead of passing into the sewer, spread over the street and had been frozen, rendering the street slippery. The plaintiff's horse coming along fell in consequence, and was injured. Held, that, as there was nothing to show that the defendant was aware of the obstruction of the grating, and as the stoppage of the water was not the necessary or probable consequence of the defendant's act, he was not responsible for what had happened: Sharp v. Powell, L. R. 7 Com. P. 253. Through the negligence of a gas company, a leakage of gas occurs in the cellar of A, a consuiner. At the request of A, B, a gas-fitter, sends his servant to examine and repair the leak. Through the negligence of B's servant, the gas which has thus escaped in A's cellar explodes, doing damage to A. The gas company must answer to A for this damage: Burrows v. Gas Co., L. R. 5 Ex. 67; L. P. 7 Ex. 96. A leaves his horse and cart standing in the street, without any person to watch them, and a passer-by strikes the horse, in consequence of which damage ensues. Held, that A is answerable for such damage: Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190. An omnibus overturns, precipitating a passenger into the lock of a canal. A third person, for whose acts the proprietor of the omnibus is not responsible, lets the water into the canal, in consequence of which the passenger is drowned. Held, that the proprietor of the omnibus must pay damages for the death of the passenger: Byrne v. Wilson, 15 I. C. L. R. 332. Two independent contractors were negligent in performing their respective portions of the work, so that an accumulation of water entered the plaintiff's cellar, damaging his goods. It could not be ascertained how much of the water was caused to flow by the negligence of each contractor. One of them was sued. Held, that he was held liable for the whole damage: Slater v. Mersereau, 64 N. Y. 138. A horse is frightened by a moving street-car, and runs away, and the driver is injured by collision with a dangerous obstruction in the street. Held, that the obstruction is the proximate cause: |