Campbell v. Stillwater, 32 Minn. 308; 50 Am. Rep. 567. A person is by contract entitled to all the articles to be manufactured by a certain company, he furnishing the raw materials. Held, that he cannot maintain an action against a trespasser who stops the machinery of the company, and obstructs it in performing the contract: Dale v. Grant, 34 N. J. L. 142. A directs his agent to erect a building for him on a certain spot. B, by false representations regarding the boundary line, induces the agent in the owner's absence to begin work elsewhere. A has no remedy against B: Silver v. Frazier, 3 Allen, 382; 81 Am. Dec. 662. A bridge having become impassable, one who desired to carry wood across piled it on the levee to await opportunity. A flood carried it off. Suit was brought for the loss, as being occasioned by the non-repair of the bridge. Held, too remote: Dubuque Wood etc. Association v. Dubuque, 30 Iowa, 176. Defendant corporation laid an eight-inch gas main on the bed of a navigable river, instead of under it. A steamboat grounded her bow on a small hidden lump on the river-bed, and was swung round till she stuck fast on the gaspipe. In trying to pull her off by warping, the gas-pipe broke, and the boat was burned, and libelants injured. Held, that the injuries were caused proximately by defendant's wrongful act: Omslaer v. Philadelphia Co., 31 Fed. Rep. 354. Fire was negligently allowed to fall from a locomotive on defendant's elevated railroad upon a horse attached to a wagon in the street below, and upon the hand of the driver. The horse was frightened, and ran away. The driver attempting to drive him against the curbstone to stop him, the wagon passed over the curbstone and injured plaintiff, who was on the sidewalk. Held, that he might recover therefor: Lowery v. R. R. Co., 99 N. Y. 158; 52 Am. Rep. 12. The defendant unlawfully obstructed a street by a train of cars. The plaintiff, desiring to pass, walked around the rear of the train, entered another street, obstructed by ice placed there by the defendant in clearing its track, which was laid also in that street, fell upon the ice, and was injured. There were other available routes to her destination. Held, that the injury was the proximate result of the ice: Railway Co. v. Staley, 41 Ohio St. 118; 52 Am. Rep. 74.

§ 1030. Not Liable for Remote or Unexpected Damage. -If the wrong and the resulting damage are not known. by common experience to be naturally and usually in sequence, and the damage does not, according to the ordinary course of events, follow from the wrong, then the

wrong and the damage are not sufficiently conjoined as cause and effect to support an action.1

ILLUSTRATIONS.-Common carriers undertook to transport goods from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh by canal. While on their way, the goods were destroyed by an extraordinary flood. The goods would not have been at the place of injury but for their having been delayed by the lameness of a horse attached to the boat. Held, that the culpability of the defendants in allowing the boat to be delayed by the lameness of the horse was not the proximate cause of the loss: Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171; 57 Am. Dec. 695. A railroad train running behind time was upset by a gale of wind, and the plaintiff was injured. Had the train been on time the gust would not have reached it. Held, that the injury could not be attributed to the delay as the proximate cause, and the railroad company was not liable: McClary v. R. R. Co., 3 Neb. 44; 19 Am. Rep. 631. A man mounts a pile of flag-stones in a public street to make a speech. A crowd of hearers gather about him, some of whom also get on the stones, and break them. Held, that the speaker was not, as matter of law, liable for the damages; but whether his conduct was the proximate cause of the damage was a question for the jury: Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86; 10 Am. Rep. 664. A water-works company stops up a public foot-way, so that persons having occasion to pass that way trespass upon the land of B, and beat down his herbage. Held, that B has no cause of action against the company: Blagrave v. Water Works Co., 1 Hurl. & N. 369. A person negligently suffers his fence to get out of repair, whereby his neighbor's horse escapes into his close, and is there killed by the accident of a hay-stack falling upon him. Held, that he is liable: Powell v. Salisbury, 2 Younge & J. 391. A goes to the house of B, a neighbor, at nightfall, and quarrels with B on the porch of B's house, using violent, threatening, and abusive language.

1 Addison on Torts, 6; Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Ex. 240; Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. St. 86; 10 Am. Rep. 664; McGrew e. Stone, 53 Pa. St. 436; Scott r. Hunter, 46 Pa. St. 192; 84 Am. Dec. 542; Lake v. Milliken, 62 Me. 240; 16 Am. Rep. 456; Stark v. Lancaster, 57 N. H. 88; Atchison etc. R. R. Co. v. Stanford, 12 Kan. 354; 15 Am. Rep. 362; Marble v. Worcester, 4 Gray, 395; Bennett v. Lockwood, 20 Wend. 223; 32 Am. Dec. 532; Proctor v. Jennings, 6 Nev. 83; 3 Am. Rep. 240; Doggett v. R. R. Co., 78 N. C. 305; State v. R. R. Co., 52

N. H. 528; Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; 28 Am. Rep. 607; Morrison v. Davis, 20 Pa. St. 171; 57 Am. Dec. 695; the court saying: "A blacksmith pricks a horse by careless shoeing. Ordinary foresight might anticipate lameness, and some days or weeks of unfitness for use; but it could not anticipate that by reason of the lameness the horse would be delayed in passing through a forest until a tree fell and killed him or injured his rider; and such injury would be no proper measure of the blacksmith's liability."

In consequence of this, B's wife, abed in the house, becomes so frightened that she gives premature birth to a child. Held, that A is not liable to B for this, as it is not a natural and probable consequence of his violent conduct: Phillips v. Dickerson, 85 Ill. 11; 28 Am. Rep. 607. Plaintiff owned houses which were separated from a river by a street only. Defendant, a railroad company, filled up a part of the river in front of these houses, and occupied the same and a part of the street with tracks and buildings. Plaintiff's houses took fire and were destroyed, because the firemen were unable to reach and procure water from the river by reason of such obstructions caused by defendant. Held, that defendant's acts were not the proximate cause of plaintiff's loss, and that defendant was not liable even though his acts were unlawful: Bosch v. R. R. Co., 44 Iowa, 402; 24 Am. Rep. 754. The defendant was in possession of a partially inclosed piece of public land, on which he was pasturing his cattle. The plaintiff drove his cattle through defendant's inclosure onto the same land for the purpose of pasturage, from which they were driven by defendant. They afterwards roamed on land claimed by one G, who gave notice to plaintiff to come and take them, which he neglected to do, and many of them died from starvation. Held, that the loss of the cattle was not the proximate result of the defendant's trespass: Story v. Robinson, 32 Cal. 205. Defendant sold gunpowder to a boy eight years old, who, in the absence of his parents, took it home, and placed it in a cupboard. Afterwards, with the knowledge and consent of his mother, he fired some of it off; a few days later he did so again, and was injured by the explosion. Held, that the injury was not the proximate result of the sale of the powder: Carter v. Towne, 103 Mass. 507. The defendant's bartender sold liquor to B, and an altercation ensuing, threw a glass at B, which missed him and injured plaintiff. Held, that the injury was not the proximate consequence of the sale of the liquor: Lueken v. People, 3 Ill. App. 27. By the collision of trains in Virginia, a passenger was so injured that he became insane, and eight months after the accident, committed suicide. Held, that his own act was the proximate cause of his death, and that the company was therefore not liable: Scheffer v. R. R. Co., 105 U. S. 249. P. fastened his horse with a stout rope by the side of a public street; a steamwhistle upon the top of U.'s factory, about fifteen rods distant, was blown as a notice to the operatives, producing a sound shrill and calculated to frighten ordinary horses. The horse pulled violently at his rope, which gave way, and he was killed. It was found that if the whistle had not been sounded, the horse would not have pulled; and that if the horse had been free from the habit of pulling, he would not have been killed. Held, that the death

of the horse could not be regarded as caused by the negligence of U., and that he was not liable: Parker v. Woolen Co., 42 Conn. 399. A passenger, on leaving a train at night which had stopped a short distance beyond the station, was misinformed as to its position by the conductor. Instead of going back, he went on, being familiar with the neighborhood, and intending, by crossing a cattle-guard, to come upon a cross-road; but finding that he was beyond the road, turned back to reach it by crossing a similar cattle-guard on that side, into which he fell and was injured. Held, that the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the injury: Lewis v. R. R. Co., 54 Mich. 55; 52 Am. Rep. 790. A train wrongfully obstructed a street crossing; animals were thus prevented from crossing, and while they stood waiting on the other track, another train came along and injured them. Held, the obstruction was not the proximate cause of the injury: Brown v. R. R. Co., 20 Mo. App. 222. A bridge erected over a slough of the Mississippi River, and as a part of the highway from the business part of the city of Dubuque to a levee on that river, became impassable for want of repairs, by reason of which the plaintiff was unable to transport over it a lot of wood which had been collected at the levee, for that purpose, and the same was, while lying there under these circumstances, washed away by a freshet. Held, that the damages were too remote: Dubuque Wood etc. Ass'n v. Dubuque, 30 Iowa, 176. The defendant left a train of cars standing entirely across a highway crossing near its station, and the plaintiff, desiring to reach the station, undertook to drive with a horse and cart at a point where there was no crossing and the track was raised above the ground, and he was thrown off by the jostling of the cart, and injured. Held, that the injury was not the proximate result of the defendant's conduct: Jackson v. R. R. Co., 13 Lea, 491; 49 Am. Rep. 663. A sleigh was overturned by an ash-heap in a highway, and the horses attached ran away, and about five or six miles distant, and a mile from any highway, they were killed by a railroad-locomotive. Held, that the negligence of the township, if any, was not the proximate cause: Township of West Mahanoy v. Watson, 112 Pa. St. 574; 56 Am. Rep. 336. A wellbroken horse, while being carefully driven, suddenly shied at a bird in the bushes, and jumped several feet from the usually traveled portion of a bridge, and broke through a defective part. Held, that the shying was not the proximate cause of the injury, and the town was liable: Aldrich v. Gorham, 77 Me. 287. C. shot and killed a dog on the highway near the house of R., whose wife, unknown to C., was near by, and, being in delicate health, was so frightened that she fell sick. Held, that the act of killing the dog was not the proximate cause of the injury to

the wife of R.: Renner v. Canfield, 36 Minn. 90. Defendant procured from plaintiff a letter introducing D. to plaintiff's agent in Central America, defendant representing that D. was going there on a pleasure trip, when, in fact, D. and the defendant were engaged in an expedition hostile to the government of that country. By reason of D.'s conduct, plaintiff's property in Central America was seized and held for a time by United States vessels. Held, that plaintiff's losses were not the proximate result of defendant's conduct toward plaintiff: Jex v. Strauss, 55 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 52.

§ 1031. In the Case of Fires.-The same principles. apply in the case of a fire spreading; the person or corporation negligently starting it is liable for all the damage it does in its travel provided no unexpected and unusual agency intervenes.1 Where a fire originates in the care