1 for the breach of contract, and B cannot maintain an action against C for damages. It is not illegal for the surety of a firm about to become insolvent to induce a member of the firm to use its property to discharge the debt upon which the surety is liable, and the other partners cannot maintain an action of conspiracy against their partner and the surety. Although a combination among workmen of a particular trade to prevent other workmen from laboring at a less rate of wages than that prescribed by them is contrary to public policy, and may, if carried into effect by threats or acts of violence, amount to a criminal conspiracy, yet an agreement among workmen that they will not themselves work for less than a stipulated price is not contrary to law.3 A conspiracy to entice a citizen of one state to go into another state, where he may be arrested on civil process, is actionable; or to maliciously prosecute him; or to defame him, and ruin him in his profession; or to defraud a creditor by taking an assignment of a debtor's property and aiding him to leave the state; or to vex or harass a person by having him subjected to an inquisition of lunacy without cause. Where the parties to a judgment that has been paid combine to set it up as unsatisfied, and cause an execution to be levied on land on which the judgment, whilst in force, was a lien, but which the judgment debtor had conveyed to a third person, they are liable to such person's action, though the execution may the plaintiff to leave his business and his home and travel into another state: Cook v. Brown, 125 Mass. 503; 28 Am. Rep. 259. 5 Dreux v. Domec, 18 Cal. 83. Wildee v. McKee, 111 Pa. St. 335; 56 Am. Rep. 271. Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts, 304; 31 Am. Dec. 468. 8 Davenport v. Lynch, 6 Jones, 545. Aliter, where it was not done maliciously and without cause: Hinchman v. Richie, Brightly (Pa.) 143. be void, and the purchaser under it acquire no title to the land.' 1 Swan v. Saddlemire, 8 Wend. 676. In Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U. S. 104, the supreme court of the United States say: "Penrod v. Mitchell, 8 Serg. & R. 522, was an action on the case in the nature of a writ of conspiracy for fraudulently withdrawing the goods of the defendant in an execution from the reach of the plaintiff. It was not questioned that the action would lie. The court held that the measure of damages was the value of the goods thus withdrawn, and not the amount of the judgment on which the execution was issued. In Mott v. Danforth, 6 Watts, 304, it was held that a creditor, without judgment or execution, and even before his debt was due, might sue parties at law who conspire to defeat his right of collection by fraudulently concealing and converting the debtor's goods. See also, to the same effect, Kelsey v. Murphy, 26 Pa. St. 78. And see Meredith v. Benning, 1 Hen. & M. 584. The three cases last cited extend the rule further than the exigency of the present case requires, and further than this court has been disposed to go. These authorities establish the right of a judgment creditor to his action against rescuers of the person or goods of the debtor seized by the sheriff to satisfy the judgment, or against one who prevents the seizure of the debtor's goods on execution; and the principle on which they rest is directly in the face of the contention of the defendants in error, that the plaintiff has no legal interest in the taxes to be collected to pay his judgment, and has sustained no legal damages by the alleged acts of the defendants. We think they support the action in the present case. Of the authorities cited by the counsel for the defendant in error in support of the demurrer, the principal case is Adler . Fenton, 24 How. 407, where it was held that an action would not lie by a creditor whose debt was not yet due, against his debtors and two others for a conspiracy carried into effect to enable the debtors fraudulently to dispose of their property, so as to hinder and defeat the creditor in the collection of his debt. Mr. Justice Campbell, who delivered the opinion, put the decision of the court on the ground that to sustain the action it must be shown not only that there was a conspiracy, but that there were tortious acts in furtherance of it and consequent damage; that Adler and Schiff, the judgment debtors, were the lawful owners of the property, and had the legal right to use and enjoy or sell it at their pleasure, and the plaintiffs, being general creditors, had no interest in or lien upon it. There was, therefore, no wrong of which the plaintiffs could complain. In the other cases cited by the defendants (Lamb v. Stone, 11 Pick. 527; Wellington v. Small, 3 Cush. 146; 50 Am. Dec. 719; Smith v. Blake, 1 Day, 258; Burnet v. Davidson, 10 Ired. 94; Green v. Kimble, 6 Blackf. 552; Austin v. Barrows, 41 Conn. 287; Cowles v. Day, 30 Conn. 410; Moody v. Burton, 27 Me. 427; 46 Am. Dec. 612; and Bradley v. Fuller, 118 Mass. 239), the plaintiff was merely a general creditor, and had no judgment, attachment, or lien, the enforcement of which was obstructed by the defendant, or the cases were otherwise inapplicable to the question in hand. In the present case there was a conspiracy, tortious acts in furtherance of it, and consequent damage to the plaintiff. The property seized by the collector was in the custody of the law. The tax-payers, for whose unpaid taxes it had been seized, had no longer any right to its possession or use, and could not sell or otherwise dispose of it. It was devoted by the law to be sold to raise a fund to pay the plaintiff's judgment. The plaintiff had, therefore, an interest which the law gave him in the property and its sale, and suffered a direct damage from the alleged acts of the defendant, by which a sale was prevented. The plaintiff, according to the averment of his petition, had recovered his judg ment against the county; and he had obtained his mandamus to the county court directing it to levy and cause to be collected a special tax to pay the judgment. The collector of the county, in obedience to the orders of the county court, which were themselves A conspiracy to obtain from a master mechanic money which he is under no legal obligation to pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by deterring others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to do this, so that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under a reasonable apprehension that he cannot carry on his business without yielding to the demand, is an illegal conspiracy; and the money thus obtained may be recovered back from the conspiring parties, who are also liable for all damages to the business of such mechanic occasioned by such illegal acts. in obedience to the mandamus of the circuit court, was proceeding to collect the tax, and had levied on property to that end, and was about to sell it, when the threats and hostile demonstrations of the defendants defeated the sale, and the petition averred the defendants continued to overawe and intimidate the tax-payers of the county, so that they did not pay the tax, and the collector had not been able, by reason thereof, to collect the tax. The plaintiff cannot sue the collector, for he has done his duty, and no suit lies against him. Unless the plaintiff has a cause of action against the defendants, he is without remedy. To hold that the facts of this case do not give a cause of action against them would be to decide that a citizen might be subjected to a willful and malicious injury at the hands of private persons without redress; that an organized band of conspirators could, without subjecting themselves to any liability, fraudulently and maliciously obstruct and defeat the process of the courts issued for the satisfaction of the judgment of a private suitor, and thus render the judgment nugatory and worthless. Such a conclusion would be contrary to the principles of the common law, and of right and justice. It is no answer to the case made by the petition to say, as the defendants by their counsel do, that the judgment of the plaintiff is still in force and bearing interest, and the liability of the county still remains undisturbed. What is a judgment worth that cannot be enforced? The gravamen of the plain A conspiracy to ruin an tiff's complaint is, that the defendants have obstructed, and continue to obstruct, the collection of his judgment, and he avers that he has been damaged thereby to the amount of his judgment and interest; in other words, that by reason of the unlawful and malicious conduct of the defendants, his judgment has been rendered worthless. To reply to this the judgment still remains in force on the records of the court is an inadequate answer to the plaintiff's cause of action." 1 Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, 8 Am. Rep. 287, the court saying: "We have no doubt that a conspiracy against a mechanic, who is under the necessity of employing workmen in order to carry on his business, to obtain a sum of money from which he is under no legal liability to pay, by inducing his workmen to leave him, and by deterring others from entering into his employment, or by threatening to do this, so that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under a reasonable apprehension that he cannot carry on his business without yielding to the illegal demand, is an illegal if not a criminal conspiracy; that the acts done under it are illegal; and that the money thus obtained may be recovered back, and if the parties succeed in injuring his business, they are liable to pay all the damage thus done to him. It is a species of annoyance and extortion which the common law has never tolerated. This principle does not interfere with the freedom of business, but protects it. Every man has a right to determine what branch of actor by hisses, groans, etc., during his performances may be actionable, though the public have a right to manifest disapproval of an actor's performance. The wrong consists in the combination to do it unfairly and of malice.' In Minnesota, a complaint against a judge for maliciously conspiring with others to institute in his court a malicious. prosecution against the plaintiff was held good on demurrer. In an action against A, B, and C for a conspiracy to defraud such merchants and traders as they might be able to impose on by representing A, who was insolvent, as a man of large property, and safely to be trusted, evidence that the defendants made such representations to other persons than the plaintiff, in consequence of which such persons without the request of the defendants recommended A to the plaintiff, whereby the plaintiff was induced to give him credit, is admissible.3 ILLUSTRATIONS.-J., a merchant tailor, was engaged in carrying on a profitable trade in his line of business from New York to New Orleans, the successful prosecution of which depended upon a knowledge of certain things known to so few that his gains were very large. B. conspired with J.'s foreman, in J.'s absence, to obtain the secrets of the business; did obtain them, and was, in consequence, enabled to rival J. in his trade, and J. was otherwise injured. Held, that an action on the case lay against B. and the foreman, at the suit of J., for the conspiracy, and that one of the defendants might be convicted and the business he will pursue, and to make his own contracts with whom he pleases, and on the best terms he can. He may change from one occupation to another, and pursue as many different occupations as he pleases, and competition in business is lawful. He may refuse to deal with any man or class of men; and it is no crime for any number of persons, without an unlawful object in view, to associate themselves together, and agree that they will not work for or deal with certain men or classes of men, or work under a certain price or without certain conditions: Commonwealth Hunt, 4 Met. 111; 38 Am. Dec. 346; Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, V. other acquitted. "The damage is the gist of the action, not the conspiracy": Jones v. Baker, 7 Cow. 446. M. and seventeen others employed by R. as journeymen tailors conspired together to stop work simultaneously and return their work in an unfinished condition. This intention they carried out, and R. was damaged in losing the money which he would have received from the completed garments, as well as by the loss of customers and the injury to the character of his house for punctuality. Held, that the facts constituted a good cause of action against M. and his associates: Mapstrick v. Ramge, 9 Neb. 390; 31 Am. Rep. 415. The plaintiff, being the holder of certain county bonds, obtained a judgment against the county in the United States circuit court. He afterwards obtained a mandamus in the same court requiring the county court to levy a tax to pay the judgment. Certain citizens formed themselves into a tax-payers' association," and succeeded, by threats and hostile demonstrations, in preventing its collection. Held, that they are liable to the plaintiff in damages: Findlay v. McAllister, 113 U. S. 104. At the suit of the owner of a patent for vulcanized rubber, A, a dentist, was enjoined from using the preparation. Believing that A disregarded the injunction, the owner employed B to ascertain. B procured C to apply to A for a set of teeth upon a plate of vulcanized rubber. A made the teeth upon such plate, delivered them to C, and received pay therefor. B and C reported the facts to the owner, and on their affidavits, proceedings for contempt were commenced against A. Held, that B and C were not liable for a conspiracy to induce A to violate the injunction; that the owner of the patent had a right to resort to this method of learning the facts, and that the communications of B and C to the owner of the patent were privileged: Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; 19 Am. Rep. 542. A borrows money of B, and gives him an absolute deed of land as security, on a mutual understanding that it should be reconveyed on payment of the loan. C and D, conspiring against A, applied to him, and proposed to loan him a further sum and pay the debt to B, and hold the said land as security for both sums. They then falsely told B that they had made the proposed advances to A, and B thereupon conveyed said land to them; whereupon they represented to A's creditors that they had fairly purchased the land, and that A was insolvent, and advised them to attach his property, which was done, to A's ruin. Held, that A might recover against C and D: Bulkley v. Storer, 2 Day, 531. One of two partners who were in failing circumstances made a note in the name of the firm to A, for fifteen hundred dollars, on an agreement that the stock of the firm should be attached in a suit on the note, and the proceeds applied ratably to pay said partners' debts and the debts of the |